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ABSTRACT 
Ther~ is a need to consider critically the growing popularity of 
projects as vehicles for development in the light of their frequent 
failure to achieve their stated objectives. The central question 
addressed by the study is: can projects funded by external aid donors 
circumvent the economic, social and political problems that hinder 
development within the national political framework of developing 
countries? This involves an enquiry into the relationship between 
bureaucratic authority and traditional society, a relationship which 
is inherent in the project mode of development assistance. The 
particular significance of Fiji as a case study lies in the fact that 
it is a liberal democratic state which has retained a bureaucratic 
civil service and is, therefore, apparently an ideal environment for 
project implementation. 
The thesis examines in depth two aid-funded cattle projects, 
studying the contexts within which they werP. established and their 
progress through the various stages of the project cycle. Both 
projects were established with the explicit aim of expanding the 
participation of indigenous Fijians in the commercial economy. One 
(Uluisaivou) sought to achieve this goal through a communally owned 
ranch; the other (Yalavou) created individually owned farms. 
The comparison of the projects centres on the different ways in 
which project planners (including managers) have sought to control the 
direction of the pro,jects while at the same tine allowing for 'local 
participation', which recent studies have argued is the key to 
successful project outcome. Both projects made serious attempts to 
provide for local participation though the attempts were not match~d 
by performance. At Uluisaivou a clear local majority on the 
corporation board could not overcome the difficulties created by the 
. ' 
fact that whole conception of such a large communally owned enterprise 
run according to modern business principles was foreign to the local 
populace. At Yalavou, by contrast, a preimplementation phase during 
which landowners were able to make the project more fundamentally in 
accord with their wishes removed many, though not all, problems of 
participation, at least in the initial stages of the project. 
Consideration of the problems experienced in both projects 
suggests that the achievement of participation is the main problem 
rather than the solution to other problems. Moreover, the inevitably 
bureaucratic nature of the oversight of projects exercised by aid 
donors means that the most assiduous, on-going attention must be given 
to the various problems of participation; they are not susceptible to 
any single, once-and-for-all solution. Bureaucracies, which are 
attracted to 'final aolutions' (such as replicable models for 
development) are also attracted to neat dichotomies, despite the many 
failures experienced as a result of the inability of dichotomies to 
capture the untidy complications of social reality. The 
communalism/individualism dichotomy, which characterized planning in 
colonial Fiji for so long, illustrates clearly both the fruitlessness 
and the inevitable attractions of dichotomies. In Western societies 
such dichotomies can be broken down through interaction between 
bureaucrats, political leaders and citizenry. In developing societies 
such interaction is not easy to achieve. The important role 
sociologists can play in project work is that of facilitating the 
interactive political process through which the interests of project 
participants can be articulated and incorporated into projects. 
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Buli A Fijian civil servant in charge of a Tikina 
Dalo Tan" 
Galala An independent Fijian farmer, that is one living 
independently of his village. Before 1966 the permission of the Buli 
was required to acquire this status 
Lala The traditional power of Fijian chiefs to levy the produce 
or-labour power of their subjects 
Mataqali A Fijian group (see Chapter Three for an explanation of its functions) 
Ra tu A title used before the na"'t. of Fijian men of rank. 
Roko Tui A Fijian civil servant in charge of a province 
Tabua A polished whales tooth, an item of traditional Fijian ~h presented in affirmation of important social relationship 
Tikina A district. It should be noted that there are 'old' Tikinas 
which were in the 1940s officially amalgamated into 'new' Tikina3 
Tokatoka More accurately i tokatoka. A descent group. 
Turaga Usually translated as 'chief' but more generally applied to 
anyone of rank or importance. A turaga ui ID.Q!JL<ull.j is the head of a 
'!1ataqalj. 
Vakavanua 'The way of the land', i.e. according to custom. 
Yaqona 
is drunk 
ceremony. 
Yavusa 
A plant used to prepare a beverage of the same name, which 
informally on social occasions or as part of an important 
A descent group. 
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Vowel sounds approximate those of Latin or Spanish. The 
orthography of Fijian consonants employs several simple conventions 
that can mislead the foreign speaker. 
b is mb as in timber 
c is th as in then 
d is nd as in handy 
g is ng as in sing 
q is ng as in finger 
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INTRODUCTION 
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~ 
Over the last decade development projects have become 
increasingly ambitious, turning from infrastructural development which 
is capital intensive, to agricultural projects in which there are 
important contributions of labour and capital by small farmers. The 
logical culmination of these developments is the integrated rural 
development project which attempts to coordinate infrastructural, 
-
institutional and social developmett. Innumerable evaluations of such 
pro;ects have been carried out for the limited bureaucratic purposes 
of planners, but there is a need to take a broader view. Projects 
should not be thought of as just another part of development planning. 
In 1967 Albert 0 Hirschman published his celebrated Development 
Projects Observed in which he compared eleven World Bank projects. 
His ~im was to trace different project experiences to what he called, 
, 
'for want of a better term', their 'structural characteristics' 
(Hirschman 1967:4). The emphasis was on technical, economic and 
adminlstrative matters, and social and political matters were touched 
on only peripherally, although they often turned out to-be of critical 
importance. Most of the projects were infrastructural or industrial 
and all but one of the agricultural projects studied were irrigation 
projects, which are capital intensive and more akin to industry than 
to the agriculture of small farmers. The key problem within 
Hirschman's study was 'uncertainty', the inability of planners to knov 
in advance all of the problems that will arise and the solutions that 
will need to be found. At the same time, Hirschman emphasized that it 
is impossible to assume in advance the creative talents which will be 
needed to overcome problems. As a result, Hirschman found, when 
planners systematically underestimated difficulties, they brought into 
Page 2 
play what he called 'the Hiding Hand': 'the difficulties and the 
ensuing search for solutions aet in motion a train of events that not 
only rescued the project but often made it particularly valuable' 
(Hirschman 1967:13). 
In the 1980s development projects are increasingly oriented 
towards agriculture, because it is here that the opportunities for 
providing a wide spread of benefits are usually greatest. The 
uncertainties, however, ar~ also ,greater and social and political 
factors are usually central rather than peripheral. From the outset 
project planners must make judgements of a social and political 
nature. 
The aspect of projects in which I am most interested is the 
r~lationship between bureaucratic authority and village societies. 
Can bureaucrats intervene in traditional societies to produce social 
change which they believe to be desirable? This question takes its 
cue from the fact that public administration in developing countries 
' is seldom bureaucratic (while aid assisted development projects must 
operate within the bureaucratic frameworks of the donor agencies). 
Four cattle projects have been selected as case studies to answer 
these questions. The two more important of these, Yalavou and 
Uluisaivou, are aid assisted and have multi million dollar budgets. 
Verata and Tilivalevu are smaller, Fiji government sponsored projects. 
The Uluisaivou p:1:oject sought to establish a communally owned 
ranch on approximately 41,000 acres in Ra Province (see map J. rage i~). 
It arose out of feasibility studies conducted in 1973 and 1975 by a 
team supplied under New Zealand aid •. Work on the project commenced in 
1975 when the New Zealand government agreed to provide technical 
assistance, together with subsidies for a number of inputs and loan 
funds for most of the others. 
The Yalavou project was designed to establish or rehabilitate 
approximately one hundred individually owned beef farms in the 
extensive grassland area to the east of the Sigatoka river in Nadroga 
and Navosa (see map l page he). The feasibility study for the project 
was funded by the A11stralian government in 197 5-6. It was followed by 
a preimplementation study and the commencement of implementation in 
1977. Australian assistance consisted of grants for most inputs 
requiring foreign exchange, and technical assistance. 
The Verata and Tilivalevu projects were established Jn 1962 and 
1969 respecLively, though reference to them as 'projects' is 
relatively recent. They ~~re, in their time, known as 'sohemes' 
rather than projects. Cattle farmers within the two schemes were 
regarded as different because they were 'groups' rather than 
individuals, with whom the Department of Agriculture normally 
preferred to work. 
The choice of cattle projects as the focus of this study is 
purely for convenience. It allows the comparison of two large aid 
assisted projects, with two smaller local projects serving (in a 
loose sense) as 'control' groups.[l) An interesting feature of the 
cattle projects is the relative unfamiliarity of Fijians with 
livestock management. Fijians are traditionally horticulturalists and( 
fishermen, and 1...,:n pigs have occupied a relatively unimportant place 
compared with many other places in Melanesia. Despite the apparent 
simplicity of the technology, and the intermittent labour demands of 
beef cattle, it is now apparent that profitable cattle breeding in the 
tropics requires a high level of 'management'. That is to say, there 
is little latitude for errors in decisions regarding matters such as 
fence and pasture maintenance, and stock management. The projects 
[l) In fact their status as 'local' must be qualified by recognition 
of the fact that both began in colonial days. 
T 
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soon turned out to be about people rather than cattle. (1) 
The two large projects, Uluisaivou and Yalavou, were said to be, 
respectively, communalist and individualist. I had oziginally thought 
that this would be a fundamental point of comparison but it soon 
became apparent that both 'communalism' and 'individualism' were vague 
terms which broke up under analysis (see chapters two and four). 
Methodologically, this study has been conducted at two levels: 
first, I have sought to understand the views of planners, together 
with the roles they have performed in the projects; secondly, I have 
sought the views of project participants, together with the impact the 
project has had on their lives, and the impact they have had on the 
project and its planners. [~) have tried to 
avoid the populist view that 
Genera~ speaking I 
regards all pla ners as misguided, if not 
malevolent, while regarding 'the people' as endowed with folk wisdom 
that has no need of advice and a natural moral integrity that can only 
suffer through, contact with outside expe~s. With the benefit of 
access to project documentation and the opportunity to interview all 
people involved in project decision-making I have attempted to 
reconstruct the planners' views of their projects, from identification 
through to implementation. The unsympathetic treatment that planners 
often receive from social scientists is perhaps partly due to the 
inaccessibility of their views. Project documentation can give only 
the strict ends/means rationalization of a project; it leaves out the 
~otivcs of the individuals who actually shaped it. It is of course no 
[1] This sentence echoes the title of a recent monograph on cattle 
projects in Papua New Guinea: Cattle Ranches Are About People (Walter 
ed. 1980). This monograph reports the sociological contribution to a 
feasibility study carried out in 1979. Planners in Papua New Guinea 
had learnt some lessons from previous experience of the particular 
d1fficulties associated with cdttle (sec Philipp ct al 1975). 
(&] I use the term 'planner' to refer to all government officials and 
privat~ consultants who have charge of the direction of dcvulopmcnt 
~·4nning. See below (p.47) for an explanation of this usage. 
accident that civil servants views are not easily accessible. 
# 
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it is 
an inevitable result of the confidentiality of the process of policy 
formation. (In the interests of respecting this confidentiality I 
have not sourced statements to government files nor have I identified 
informants who would prefer anonymity.) 
At the participant level I have also been interested in motives. 
Interviews, sometimes with groups, sometimes with individuals, have 
provided the main source of participants' views of their motives and 
of the projects. Sociological surveys commissioned by planners at 
Yalavou and Uluisaivou at various stage in the projects provided 
opportunities to check the consistency of the expression of these 
views. In addition to the expression of views, however, I have sought 
objective socio-economic data, in order that project participants' 
actions and motives might be better understood. A survey was 
therefore carried out in seven villages in the four project areas. 
The questions asked, the data gathered and the reasons for the choice 
, 
of the seven villages are explained in an appendix. The intention 
behind the survey was largely descriptive. I did not hope for data 
that could explain' social change, so much as for data that could 
describe the qpecific, changing socio-economic contexts within which 
. 
project participants have acted. This is a study of the planning of 
social c~ange rather than the 'process' of social change (if indeed it 
is a pr~~~ss). 
The sociological analysis of development projects is still new, 
and the literature reporting and analysing it is undeveloped. 
Moreover, it lacks a solid theoretical foundation, as contributions 
have been made by people from all disciplines of the social sciences, 
und not 8imply 'Sociology'. In project work sociologists are usually 
selected for their concrete knowledge of a particular project area 
rather than the general theoretical equipment of their discipline. As 
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a result, there is a gap between the academic study of social change 
anci the role played by sociologists in project work. One aim of this 
study is to elucidate the nature of this gap, to consider the academic 
literature on social change in Fiji and to relate this to the process 
of change created by the cattle projects. But this is a subsidiary 
aim. The primary target of the study is the relationship between 
'planners' and 'people' in the context of projects that attempt to 
plan ~~cial change. As such the study is primarily political or, if 
aome more specific sub-disciplinary affiliation would be helpful, it 
is within the field of development administration. (It must be added 
by ~ay of qualification, ho~ever, that all development studies are 
unavoidably interdisciplinary.) 
David Goldsworthy has argued that development administration 
'seems ~urrently to occupy a limbo between the rather sterile analyses 
of the "organization model" on the one side and critical analyses of 
the "overdeveloplllent" of the post colonial state on the other' 
(Goldsworthy 1917:29). Goldsworthy is therefore pessimistic about the 
possibility of any 'fresh' contributions in the field. It is my hope, 
however, that this ease study can demonstrate the utility of studies 
in development administration. In particular, I want to suggest the 
present relevance of Weber's distinction between 'bureaucratic 
authority and traditional authority. 
At the root of my interest in this general issue, however, there 
is a particular problem of pressing importance which has long occupied 
my interest, and which has a substantial literature of its own. This 
is the problem of Fijian participation in commerce. For some time, it 
has been apparent that expansion of Fijian participation in commercial 
life, particularly in agriculture, is essential for the continuance of 
harmonious relations between indigenous Fijians, who make up 44 per 
cent of the population, and the Indian 'immigrants' who now outnumber 
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them. This problem vexed colonial officials and now vexes the 
Fijian-led government which has ruled Fiji since 1966. Despite the 
best endeavours of a governmP.nt committe<l to their intere~ts, rural 
Fijians have not experienced the economic development that they 
believe is their right and they of ten express profound dissatisfaction 
with the bureaucratic officials with whom they deal. In this study I 
examine the attempts of two well-intentioned aid donors to succeed 
where the Fiji government has failed. The problems they encounter in 
the favourable, politically stable conditions of Fiji have a great 
deal to say about the limitations of the project as a vehicle for 
development assis~ance. As Robert Nisbet has written: 'It is a truth 
we should never tire of repeating that no genuinely good or seminal 
work in the history of sociology was written or conceived as a means 
of advancing theory grand or small. Each has been written in 
response to a single, compelling intellectual problem provided by the 
immediate intellectual environment (Nisbet 1976:LO). 
, 
CHAPTER ONE 
ENDS AND MEANS 
The Political Context of Development Planning 
'It is a strange feature of the world today that vast 
resources are devoted in every sphere to the problem of how 
to do things, but very little to the problem of what to do. 
The latter is often taken either as being so obvious as not 
to require serious attention or as being outside the proper 
orbit of scientific and rational investigation'. E.K. Fisk 
(1970:57). 
'The trouble about valuing means above ends which, as 
confirmed by Keynes is the attitude of modern ~conomics - is 
that it destroys man's freedom to choose the ends he really 
favours: the development of the means, as it were, dictates 
the choice of ends'. E.F. Schumacher (1973:42). 
the crucial question for democracy is not what to strive 
for, but by what means to strive. And the question of means 
is one of wilat to do now and what to do next - and these are 
basic questions in politics'. Philip Selznick (1949:7). 
Introduction 
There are many political contexts of development planning, 
ranging from the subtle bureaucratic politics of multilateral 
'agt'ncies', to tne particularistic political worlds of 'villages'. 
The intricate relations between the various levels are themselves 
inherently political. Attitudes to the role of political factors are 
accordingly complex. Sometimes 'politics' is used as a pejorative 
term, at other tim.,s 'politics' is held up as the key to all other 
social and economic goods (seek ye first the political kingdom). 
\./ithin international conferences thl~ terms within which political 
matters are concPiVPd are usually global, universal and morally 
oriPnte<l, arriving at conclusions auch as 'the nation state is both 
too large and too small' (Streeten 1980:7). At another level 
entirely, technocratic institutions auch as the World Bank gloss over 
.. 
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politics as just another part of the overall 'social contexts' of 
projects, alongside 'cultural, resource, technological, behavioural 
and other factors' (World Bank 1980:1). 
The many international political influences on development 
planning are largely outside the scope of this thesis. The competing 
philosophies of development and their functions within the various 
international institutions would be an ideal subject for another 
study, but the focus of my thesis is on the impact of externally 
funded projects in the nation state context. The relevance of the 
nation state is often called into question in these days of powerful 
multinational corporations and big budgeted multilateral development 
agencies, but it is still a unit of critical importance. 
Problems arise when philosophies from the 'international 
bureaucracy' reach the nation states within which they must operate. 
One of the problems is the incompatibility of many of the tenets of 
these pt~ilosophies, each of which nevertheless claims universal 
applicability. Redistributionist philosophies from UN agencies arrive 
for incorporation into national policies and practices alongside LMF 
procedures for economic management. 'If a citizen of the Roman Empire 
were to attend a confarence of today's development experts', Sylvia 
lnrupp suggests, 'he could readily grasp much of its subject matter. 
The spread of new en~ineering and military technology, of new 
techniques of rational law, of trade, of formal educiltion and a wider 
moral sens<> of community, all emanating from cities, would be familinr 
to him' (Thrupp 1971:198). 
The matn political context of development plnnning to be examin'!d 
in this thesis is the relationship between bureaucrats and the 
citizens whom they serve. The texture of this relationship, as 
0 
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evidenced by its language, is visibly political. It is 'the language 
of desire and aversion, of preference and choice, of approval and 
disapproval, of .praise and blame, of persuasion, injunction, 
accusation and treat. It is the language in which we make promises, 
ask for support, recommend beliefs and actions, devise and commend 
administrative expedience and organize eliefs and opinions of others/--...._ 
in such a manner that policy may be effectively and economicall{ 
.\ 
executed' {Oakeshott 1962:322-3). Too often, however, planners fail 
to recognize the inherently political nature of their relationship 
with the local level. And even when they do, it is not necessarily 
welcomed, and is perhaps regarded as an undesirable intruaion of the 
sentimental and non-rational into their rational and objective world. 
Thye often prefer to speak of decision-making rather than politics. 
The methodology of this study has been guided by C. Wright Mills' 
concept;on of the 'classic tradition of social science'. 'Classical 
science', he says, 'neither "builds up• from microscopic study nor 
'· 1 deduces down" from conceptual elaborations. Its practitioners try to 
build and deduce at the same time in the same process of study, and to 
do so by means of 0 adequate formulation and reformulation of problems 
and of their adequate solution ... The classic focus in short is on 
substantive problems' (Mills 1959:128). Tite substantive problem 
central ro this study is: can projects funded by external aid donors 
circumvent the economic, social and political problems that hinder 
development within the national political framework cf devol~ping 
countries? In approaching substantive problems the 'classic 
craftsman', Mills says, must be able to move with eaae between 
different levels of generality and to control this process by seeking 
always to ensure that in the final analysis 'the directieyn of 
abstraction is towards social and historical structures. It is on the 
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level of historical reality-which is merely to say that it is in terms 
of specific social and historieal structures that the classic problems 
of social science have been formulated, and in such terms solutions 
offered' (Mills 1959:124). 
The specific historical context of the problem of this study is 
.. 
taken up in the second half of this chapter. Before turning to the 
problem at that level I examine the mo<e general themes which are to 
be woven throughout the a1alysis of projects in Fiji. I commence at 
the highest level of generality with the conception of bureaucracy, 
noting that administration in developing countries very often departs 
from usual bureaucratic practice. This is a problem that has troubled 
Western political scientists who are often torn between feel:i.ngs of 
regret about the apparent inevitability of corruption and the fear 
that their perceptions are ethnocentric. From here I move to a 
slightly lower level of generality to the conception of policy 
implementation, a focus within policy studies which sheds light on 
some of the political and administrative problems of developing 
countries. The emphasis on such policy studies is, David Goldsworthy 
has suggested, all that is left of the general theoretical work of 
political scientists since the modernization/political development 
school petered out in the early 1970s (Goldsworthy 1983:42). In 
undertaking a case study of projects in one country I am obviously not 
attempting to reverse this trend though I do believe there are general 
lessons that can be drawn from the study of projects in Fiji. Two 
which I wish to identify at the outset are: the concept of 
participation and the role of social science in projects. 
Part ici pat ion has been put forward by some writers as the key to 
project success and seems to fill part of the gap left by the 
desertion of the field of development studies (at least in terms of 
. ' . 
• • I 
, I • 
~/ . 
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general theory) by political sciantists who began to have doubts about 
the inevitability or desirability of Western democratic political 
models in developing countries. 
The role of social science is, as I have already said, a 
subsidiary theme in this study. I wish to consider the role that 
social scientist might play in projects and to examine the role they 
lave actually played in the cattle projects in Fiji but I do not have 
any illusions about my ability to bring order to the untidy, divergent 
schools of thought which comprise this field. Apart from cataloguing 
~•ome of the diversity, my main interest i11 the role "! social 
scientists relates to the need for control over projects and the 
danger that, in the absence of a clearly-defined, conventional role 
for sociology, planners will seek from sociologists a degree of 
control over social change which it is neither desirable nor feasible 
for the sociologists to attempt to achieve. In chapter three I 
analyse the so~io-economic circumstances of Fijians living in the 
cattl~ project areas and use this analysis to assess the role of 
sociologists in the direction of the projects but I do not attempt to 
provide a definitive account of social and economic change in rural 
Fiji. 
Bureaucrnci. 
Bureaucracy is an overworked word. In its everday (vulgar) usage 
it connotes slow moving public administration. Social scientists 
prefer to use it with more care and precision. The classical 
conception of bureaucr8cy is usually said to be the ideal type 
con!lt ructed by Max Weber, 111 though theorists of administrative 
behaviour often take Weber to task for what they believe to be the 
!lhortcomings of his model, arguing that as an account of the efficient 
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working cf modern organization it is seminal, but not entirely 
accurate. {l] 
Bernard Schaffer has argued that bureaucracy is one among a 
number of 'styles' of administration. Its main characteristics are 
the well known elements of the Weberian ideal type: it is 1 expert, 
universalistic, professional, computa ti ve, depersonalised, 
disenchanted, routinised 1 • The golden rule of the bureaucrat, 
Schaffer says, is 'like treatment for like cases. It is in the 
interests of the burea~crat to see the issue as something which is 
wholly familiar, cr~pletely precendented and therefore a case 
completely (not merely adequately) covered by an e~isting and 
not-to-be changed rule' (Schaffer 1969:190). 
The behaviour of administrstors in less developed countries is 
frequently non-bureauc~atic. Behind the formal impersonal structures 
there are networks of informal activities so extensive that they often 
subv rt the formal organization entirely. Sometimes the informal 
practices seem venial o~ perhaps even functional, providing much 
needed flexibility to cope with the diverse social orders of less 
developed countries {relaxation of huilding standards in squatter 
settlements, for example). At the other end of the scale there are 
flagrant <tepotism and corruption which are universally deplored. 
Schaffer, employing the perspective of organizational theory, 
recommended the design of administrative structures which contain 
limited elements of the bureaucratic style, though he recognized that 
'one cannot sensibly expect much or suppose that the problems can 
I I} Georgiou ( 1975) summarizes these criticisms. He argues that the 
critics hnve misunderstood the context in •.1hich Weber wrote (viz 
bureaucracy as a type of author\ty). ntis, as l explain below, is the" 
position that l also accept. 
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easily be solved' (Schaffer 1969:211). 
F.W. Riggs, from a more p=litical point of view, has argued that 
the combination of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic e\ements of 
organization in the public administration of less developed countries 
creates self perpetuating structures that are well adapted to the 
social structures within which they arise. They will not simply 
dissolve through organizational design. An important part of the 
problem is the exercise of political power within the bureaucracy. 
Power that should, in principle, be exercised by politicians is in the 
hands of bureaucrats. Such bureaucrats, Riggs says, do not ' 11uJ>-Orp 11 a 
/ 
,,,..: 
political role; it would be more accurate to say that they refuse to 
relinquish it' (Riggs 1964:236), Power as it is actually exercised 
within this type of organization, as distinct from the formal 
allocation of authority, is 'neither centralized nor localized, 
neither concentrated nor dispersed, but highly equivoral' (Riggs 
1964:281). The whole structure is therefore unpredictable and 
non-bureaucratic. The politician, hot~ever, generally finds this to 
his advantage. Once he discovers the possibility of 'interference for 
his own political ends', predictability and strict adhereuc~ to rules 
are less desirable. 
Riggs' hypothesis that there is a consonance between public 
administration, politics and social organization in less developed 
countries is bold and ingenious. The postulation of a 'prismatic 
society 1 , frozen between a 'fused' traditional order and a 
'diffracted' or differentiated modern order seems to capture many of 
the structurally interrelated features of transitional societies. The 
'prismatic society' is, however, a compelling metaphor rather than a 
theory. Riggs' trichotomy ultimately explains no more than the 
tradition/modernity dichotomy that it replaces. 
The conception of bureaucracy that I employ is that of Weber. 
Most of the features of the Weberian type are well known. Its 
essential feature is adherence to formal rationality, · the rational 
adoption of means for ends. The bureaucrat, in principle, does not 
establish goals or priorities but merely analyzes the compatability of 
different goals and identifies the most rational means of attaining 
them. Weber recognized that this 'ideal' was not necessarily adhered 
to in the real world; that the power interests of the bureaucrat 
could not be ignored. The important point was that formal rationality 
w~s the claimed basis for bureaucratic authority. 'The only decisive 
point for us is that in principle a system of rationally debatable 
~reason~ stands behind every act of bureaucratic administration, that 
is either a subsumption under norms or a weighing of ends and means' 
(Weber 1946:220). In Western societies the rational-legal basis of 
bureaucratic authority is generally accorded legitimacy. In the 
tradition-oriented social worlds of developing countries 
rational-legal 'reason' lacks this appeal and hence bureaucratic 
authority seems inevitably to crumble when it no longer has external 
colonial force supporting it. 
PolicY- Implementation 
Concern with policy implementation is a rerent development in 
policy studies. During the 1970s a number of writers argued that the 
implementation process was the missing link in social policy studies 
(Nakamura and Smallwood· 1980:12). Emphasis on implementation was 
regarded as a necessary revision of 'classical' theories of 
bureaucracy, according to which implementation was seen as a 
mechanical, non-political process by which policies created in the 
political arena were carried out. Some analysts were led to regard 
implem~nters as the key actors in the policy process (Nakamura and 
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Smallwood 1980:18). 
lbe interest in implementation arose first in the United States, 
suggesting that the importance of the implementation process is most 
noticeable in the federal presidential context. Developing countries 
present a situation that is in some ways comparable: the informal 
federalism of the broken backed state, or the strong pressures for 
decentralization that have characterized politics in Melanesian 
countries, or the rambling bureaucratic empires of Brazil and 
Argentina. 
Merrilee Grindle argues that in lees developed countries the 
implementation pr0Ce88 is Often I the major arena-1n which individuals 
and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete for 
access to scarce resources. It may even be the principal nexus 
between the government and the citizenry, between public officials and 
their constitutents' (Grindle 1980:19). The causes of the 
politicization of the implementation process identified by Grindle 
resemble many of the characteristics of Riggs' prismatic society. 
'Flexib_ility in policy implementation may even be part of a 
polity-wide accommodatio~ and conflict resolution system used by 
political elites to maintain the often tenuous cohesion of the 
political commmunity itself' (Grindle 1980:18). 1lle general picture 
is typical of prismatic societies: 'The factio1s 1 patron-client 
linkages, ethnic ties, and personal coalitions that are often the 
basis of political activity are well suited toj making individuali~ed 
demands on the bureaucratic apparatus for the allocation of goode and 
se:i:vices' (Grindle 1980:18). As in the prismatic society, the 
political and administrative systems are well adapted to the needs of 
society. 'flle flexibility is seen as 'entirely functional for 
_)\ 
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achieving particularistic and short term goals at the local level 
where specific groups and interests are affected. In fact, from the 
perspective of individual citizens, this may be the most effective and 
:t.;:, 
rational means to acquire wha)I they want from governmant' (Grindle 
1980:18). 
Rather than attempt to create a general theory of the 
implementation process, however, the policy implementation approach as 
presented by Merrilee Grindle attempts to build through case studies a 
set of lower level generalizations capable of assisting planners to 
adapt the contents of their policies to the contexts of implementation 
within which they are required to work. Tiie first stage, for example, 
is to achieve the commitment of the political elite to clearly spelt 
out goals and priorities. Agreement should be sought at all levels of 
the political and administrative hierarchy. Ideological promotion of 
programmes should be avoided at the formulation stage. 'Perhaps the 
most important lesson of these cases is that such problems might be 
anticipated and best managed not during implementation, but at the 
outset of the policy process when goals are initially defined and 
established' (Grindle 1980:22-25). 
Tiie insights of the policy implementation approach cannot 
guarantee that .!!!l. policy will be implemented. Indeed redistributive 
policies, which are favoured by the basic needs philosophy, are rarely 
implemented: 'the capacity of low income groups to acquire benefits 
from their governments may be strictly limited in an environment that 
minimizes the influence of numbers on political decision-making 
through the elimination of open elections and rotation of political 
leadership' (Grindle 1980:30). lbe critical point is that 'political 
realities may dictate that redistributive policies are implemented 
ll 
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effectively only when they do not threaten the interests whose support 
is essential to the regime' (Grindle 1980:32). 
" 
' 
In relation to the centralization/decentralization question, 
there is a clear lesson to be learned from policy implementation case 
studi~s. 'Our studies suggest that political s1stems that do not 
concentrate excessive amounts of power at the center ought not to 
decentralize implementation authority or responsibility if they wish 
to see their objectives attained' (Grindle 1980:14). Without a fund 
of powers at the centre there will be no way of ensuring that powers 
delegated are used to implement policy goals. 
Tile problems identified by the policy implementation approach 
have been conceptualized differently by other writers. Hal Colebatch, 
for example, argues that 'the design of any study of a government 
programme should not presuppose the primacy of the stated purpose, and 
exclude or downgrade to 'obstacles to implementation' factors at 
variance with the model' (Colebatch 1979: 116). In common with the 
policy implementation approach he recognizes that the theoretical 
distinction between policy, which is the province of politicians, and 
administration, which is the province of bureaucrats, does not 
correspond to the division of functions in the real world. Unlike the 
policy implementation approach, however, he attributes this to the 
nature of policy itself. Policy never is, nor should it try to be, a 
neat set of means and ends, set beneath some specific primary goal. 
Policy is really no more than 'commitment'. 'To the extent that the 
course of government action is settled, we may speak of "policy'' 
(Colebatch 1979:14). 
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Colebatch's main objection to the policy implementation approach 
0 
is that it is 'not very illuminating'; it fails to shed light on· the 
more important aspects of the business of government. Governments do 
not pursue 'clear and specific objectives'. Rather, they 'embody a 
range of values that are not necessarily universally acknowledged, of 
' c 
equal weight, or consistent with one another' (Colebatch 1979:115). 
What then is there to choose between the two approaches? Are 
they incompatible or do they involve no more than a difference of 
emphasis? Borrowing a distinction from Colin Leys, Colebatch suggests 
that his approach is an 'observer's model', whereas the policy 
implementation approach is an 'actor's model' (Colebatch 1979:116). 
Such a difference would presumably be one of degree rather than kind. 
Another difference between the two is the emphasis within the policy 
implementation approach on the executive arm of government. The case 
studies seem to be biased towards studies of presidential regimes 
overseeing sprawling bureaucratic empires. Colebatch, on the ocher 
hand, is writing about a small, recently independent state with its 
colonial bureaucracy still largely intact, free from in-built bribery 
and corruption. He therefore emphasizes the need for officials to 
respond flexibly to the needs of of the people they serve; the 
implementationists, on the other hand, have in mind administrations 
that are all too flexible and, at a price, responsive to the needs of 
their clients. 
The real problem is, how can colonial bureaucracies 'loosen up' 
(as citizens will naturally expect them to) without giving way 
altogether. 1be flexible policy-making which Colebatch recommends 
requires a modern political framework in which different interests may 
contend and resolve their differences, the kind of activity which 
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Bernard Crick has suggested is fully deserving of the name politics. 
According to Crick's usage politics is only one of a number of 
solutions to 'the problem of order' which arises 'when differing 
interests in an area grow powerful enough to need to be conciliated' 
(Crick 1964:30). Violence and coercion may be used instead of the 
political means of compromise and persuasion. Crick recognized that 
politics in this sense was rare in the developing world and under 
threat in the Western world where it first arose. 
Post-colonial societies are typically composed of, on the one 
hand, cities where an easily mobilized minority is able to readily 
articulate its political interests, and, on the other hand, rural 
areas, where interests are strongly parochial and not easily 
the articulated for incorporation into the national political arena; 
problem which Michael Lipton encapsulates in the term 'urban bias' 
(Lipton 1977). Or, as Marx observed, the peasants are uot a class. 
In short, there is often a gap between the policy-making process and 
rural populations. One reason for the popularity of projects is the 
promise they hold of, at least temporarily, bridging the policy gap in 
rural areas. 
Projects 
All over the world projects are coming to 
'basic building blocks in the development 
be regarded as the 
process' (Rondinelli 
1976b:573). lbeir fashionableness is spreading beyond the boundaries 
of the multilateral agencies within which they have long been the 
basic frame of reference. In 1971 the Ghanaian Ministry of Econofilic 
Affairs reported that 'the slow progress or even the outright failure 
of Ghana's national development plans has been caused, not so much by 
inherent weaknesses in the formulation of preYious development plans, 
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but rather by the failure of the plans to identify feasible projects 
for development' (quoted in Rondinelli 1976a:315). 
'nle advantage claimed by the project approach is that it can 
bring to bear on a particular problem the most technically efficient 
means available for its solution. Projects are often seen as the most 
suitable vehicle for redistributionist endeavours. Aid donors can 
circumvent the vicious circles of handicap facing the poorest groups 
by careful selection of projects. 
Foremost among the battery of modern technical inputs is modern 
management. Elaborate procedures are employed in all project 
stages: project identification and definition, project fo°?vlation, 
preparation ar.d feasibility analysis, project . t . design,· proJect 
appraisal, project selection, negotiation and approval, project 
activation and organization, project implementation and operation, 
project completion or termination and output diffusion, project 
evaluation and follow-up analyses. 'nle difficulties that these 
procedures have created have been the comment of many evaluation and 
follow-up studies. An exhaustive study of such comment has led Dennis 
Rondinelli to the conclusion that the elaborate procedural 
requirements constitute an 'imperious rationality' that imposes a 
severe burden on the administrative capacity of less developed 
countries. 'Project preparation guidelines', he says, 'are designed 
to ensure that proposals are compatible with lending institution 
policies, procedures and requirements; as such they have become 
ine1truments of contr~l rather than aid' (Rondinelli 197fla:315). 
·~nile each set of requirements prescribed by each of the assistance 
agencies may, from its perspective, seem rational and necessary, the 
collective impact of all the pre~criptions can impose intolerable 
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burdens on the administrative capacity of developing countries' 
(Rondinelli 1976b:593) 
Procedural requirements also distort planning. 1bey lead to 
'window dressing' which sometimes includes use of questionable data, 
if not outright falsification. 1bey necessitate the use of expatriate 
staff, with all the attendant difficulties that can bring. Most 
significantly, they tend 'to skew the selection process toward large 
scale, technically complex, 
detriment of smaller, less 
physical 
capital 
construction proposals to the 
intensive social programs' 
(Rondinelli 1976b:598). In other words the means determines the end. 
Rondinelli mentions, but does not explore in detail, the 
political implications of these problems. Modern management's 
asslli~ption that 'objectives, tasks, activities, and outputs can be 
clearly defined' simply overlooks the realities of politics. Even in 
highly centralized governments there will not be agreement between all 
agencies and departments. Governments can be expected to establish 
projects, and to direct them throughout their lives, to serve a 
'multitude of intertwined political, social, economic, and 
organizational goals' (Rondinelli 1976b:595). 1bis, as Colebatch has 
stressed, is simply the political nature of policy. It is normal. 
Rondinelli argues that 'no amount of •objective analyses• can resolve 
those conflicts. Resolution remains inevitably a political process' 
(Rondinelli 1976b:595). 
However, Rondinelli stops short of an exploration of the way in 
which projects might be politically managed to serve complex national 
needs. He simply urges the exploration of 'the value of more diverse 
procedures sensitively tailored to the needs, constraints, and 
capacities of individual developing nations' (Rondinelli 1976b:599). 
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The political obstacles to be overcome are not explored, although in 
another article Rondinelli explains in greater detail the necessity 
for 'political commitment' (Rondinelli and Ruddle 1978). 
lbe problem is, how can political commitment be achieved? For 
expatriate project planners open analysis of politics is usually 
taboo. It cannot be accomplished without the mention of names: real 
countries, real regimes, leaders and interests. Planners are never 
without political opinions, and it is inevitable that these opinions 
will influence their judgement, but they can rarely be used to justify 
the decisions they influence. Justification must always be in terms 
of 'objectively rational.' criteria. nais, it must be remembered, is 
the nature of bureaucracy's claim for the legitimacy of the control it 
exercises. In place of the candid examination of political problems 
there is often crypto-political analysis carried out with the use of 
euphimisms such as 'participation', 'popular participation' or 'local 
participation'. [l] 
Participation 
Recent studies by aid donor bodies have identified 'local 
participation' as an important variable in determining the outcome of 
development projects. Participation includes both commitment of 
resources by local people and their participation in decision-making 
at all project phases - feasibility, implementation and review. In 
quantitative terms, one study found 'that, when weighed together, 
8mall farmer involvement in project dechon-making and hi8 resource 
[1] Political scienti8t8 also f ~ fficultics in relation to 'real 
names' when particular projects and po1icie8 are in question. nae 
names of public servant8 who deal in 'objectively rational' criteria, 
rather than political commitment, cannot be used freely. Ralph Love' 8 
study of cattle projects in a South Pacific country used fictitous 
names for all key actors. nae country itself was given the name 
'Rabona'. However, the donor country, which had more to be embarassed 
about, was named. (See Love 1979.) 
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commitm~nt to the project accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the 
difference in success scores for the projects' (USAID DA). An 
important factor that was found to influence the level of local 
participation was project size. Projects with budgets in excess of $1 
million had little local participation and poor success records. (An 
interesting observation with which to begin an examination of the 
Uluisaivou and Yalavou projects, which commenced with budgettl h, 
excess of $2m and $7m respectively.) 
Participation is therefore a popnlar word in planning circles, to 
be found on the lips of planners everywhere (including authoritarian 
states). 1be problem is, how can participation be achieved? If 
carefully designed programmes and policies can go wrong, how can a 
nebulous phenomenon such as lo~al participation be controlled? Aft~r 
a lengthy analysis of the concept of political participation Samuel 
Huntington and Joan Nelson concluded: 'It is not 
homogeneous variable. It is 
different forms of action; all 
rather, an umbrella encompassing many 
of these actions nre designed to 
influence government at some le¥el, but they are not all related to 
each other, nor do they vary in the same directions or respond to the 
same pressures' (Huntington and Nelson 1976:159). It is easy enough 
to define political participation as 'activity by private citizens 
designed to influence government decision-making' (Huntington and 
Nelson 1976:4) but this does not make it a homogeneous variable. 
Like political participation, participation in development 
projects is a complex phenomenon. Contribution of 'resources' masks 
the fact that land, labour and capital in traditional societies ar~ 
rarely continuous variables, measurable in terms of a common 
denominator of cash value. Labour, for example, might be provided 
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free for some tasks, while for others it might be impossible to 
obtain. Land is likely to be subject to all sorts of particularistic 
taboos. Participation in decision-making is anoth_er very mixed bag. 
It could, for example, include allowing farmers to make their own 
production decisions, or it could also include placing local 
bureaucrats under the control of local representative bodies. 'frying 
to orchestrate the wide variety of pheno~ena that can be placed under 
the heading of local participatior. is obviously no easy task. 
Allowing farmers to make production decisions might, for example, 
reduce local contributions of labour or capital. Any attempt to 
create representative institutions that will control local bureaucrats 
could have wide political ramifications, so that it becomes difficult 
to distinguish political participation from project participation. 
The popularity of the word participation is perhaps more a 
reflection of ita ideological function than of its explanatory value. 
It is a portmanteau concept, able to sneak politics in unnoticed. 
Political difficulties facing the redistributive orienta~ion of many 
development projects are conveniently concealed from sight. 
Lipservice is paid to vaguely democratic notions without attempting to 
face the serious political obstacles to implementation. 
'lbe Role of Social Science 
With the rise of redistributionist philosophies, social 
scientists have played an increasingly important role in development 
planning. At first, however, economics was the only discipline among 
the social sciences to play a significant role in development 
planning. Glynn Cochrane, an anthropologist who has guided World Bank 
policies on the uses of his discipline, explains the greater influence 
enjoyed by economists in this way: 'Different economists will be 
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able, ind!:!pendently, to arrive at the conclusion tha::. there will be 
roughly similar rates of return on an investment project. But wi 11 
several anthropologists give the same advice, if consulted, about a 
partlcular investment proje~t? I suspect that most potential users of 
anthropology think the answer is "no", intuitively sensing that the 
cherished individualism of the anthropologist is at variance with the 
degree of uniformity of judgement and predictability that characterize 
the objectivity and verifiability of professional statements. 
Anthropology needs to convince potential users of the discipline that 
it can be a profession whose members can be relied on to perform with 
the degree of uniformity and reliability associated with engineers, 
doctors, and lawyers' (Cochrane 1976:4). 
But what precisely does Cochrane mean by 'cherished 
i I'll iv id ua l ism' ? He seems to suggest that it is no more than lack of 
experience in working outside academic circles, and with that, lack of 
experience in working in teams. But is this the only reason that 
planners might not trust anthropologists to 'perform with the degree 
of uniformity and relial .ty associated with engi.ne<~rs, do..:tors and 
lawyer~'? ls it not also partly due to the f~~r that anthropology, 
along with the so"ter social sciences in general, is too imprecise and 
therefore open to manipulation (which might even be political)? 
r:..:onomist9. r. Scadett Epstein says I label .1nthropologiats I as 
'woolly' and stress the nec~o .ity of num(!r ica l predictions. 
Anthropologists tend to 'talk of "their~ people and frequently regard 
thP·n .1s uniqul"' (Epstein 1976: 17). But is the 'softn(•ss' and 
of anthropology purely a question of tl}e \al"k of 
q1rnnti.tative rigour. J.M. Duncan Derrett, from the earth-bound 
1>rnplriciAt orientati1>n of a lawyer, findg th.it <'lnthropologi.sts arl" too 
f.>n<i of 'bold conceptuallz.3tion 1 • 'they .,ill see thl? habits of thl" 
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Mbongo-Mbongo as throwing indispensable light on Life, Death and 
Eternity' (Derrett 1976:45). 
Another aspect of the individualism of the softer social sciences 
is their lack of what T.S. Kuhn has called paradigms, that is accepted 
frames of reference within which researchers can work, solving puzzles 
that elaborate the predictive models inherent in the paradigm (Kuhn 
1970; Giddens 1977:11,12,63). This makes physical scientists and 
economists uncomfortable. An economist, Michael Lipton writes, is 
'often bewildered by the "models' of other disciplines in the social 
sciences: the alleged variables Geem to be names not tangible and 
measurable things; their connections are stated 1s relations of 
direction only; and, where there ~re clear hypotheses, the procedure 
for testing them is not suggested' (Lipton 1968:12). 
The variety of studies of social and economic change in Fiji, for 
example, can be grouped into four types: modernist, traditionalist, 
determinist and populist. The modernists are those who make a sharp 
distinction between traditional and modern society. Social relations 
in the former are seen as 'reciprocal, collective and motivated for 
susbsistence and prestige rewards', whereas in .-he latter they are 
'market oriented, individualistic, and motivated primarily for profit' 
(Lingenfelter 197?:103). Another name for this point of view is 'the 
dual society' model. Writers adopting this model are generally led to 
the conclusion that traditional attitudes, values and institutions 
must be changed before there can be economic progress. 
The traditionalists, by contrast, reject the sharp distinction 
bctwt>en traditional and modern aocities and argue that 'traditional 
institutions are not the primary obstacles to change, but quite to the 
contraryt may even stimulate economic development' {Lingenfelter 
----
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1977:106). Modernists and traditionalists actually have a geat deal 
in common, however, and the better studies have combined elements of 
both points of view, supporting the modern relevance of some aspects 
of tradition while insisting that others must change to allow economic 
progress (for example Spate 1959). Both points of view are 
voluntarist, as distinct from the third category, determinist. 
Voluntarists regard social and economic change as available to be 
chosen by people at the grass-roots level, requiring only 
encouragement by development agencies. Detecminists, on the other 
hand, see the choices available at the periphery as severely 
circumscribed by forces outside their control, the international 
forces of dependency. 
The three models can be seen as forming a natural sequence, each 
step growing out of the inadequacies of its predecessor, though n~t 
necessarily invalidating it. There are, however, departures from the 
sequence. Watters, for example, published hi~ study in 1969, but is 
nevertheless strongly modernist (and therefore pays the price for it 
in criticism by the traditionalists). (1) ln the 1970s the Broo~field 
studies of the eastern islands of Fiji are well informed by thP 
Lnternational perspective, while maintaining an awareness of the 
quP•tion of the role of tradition. 
1ne fourth point of view, populist, might prefer to label itself 
'development from below'. Unlike the determinist and voluntarist 
models, which have been developed from the poi.nt of vi.ew of the 
planner, the development from below school attempts to look upwards 
from the grass-roots level and ascribes to the people at the bottom 
the ability to take irtitiative rather than simply react to initiative 
[l I See the review by Ron Crocombe (l97l). 
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from above. 
The different approaches do not constttute paradigms; they are 
more like ingredients that a researcher might use to produce the 
individualistic fare required of academic work in the 'softer' social 
sciences. 'lhis lack of paradigms means that the planner who invites a 
'sociologist' to participate in a project cannot be sure what he will 
get. He might, for eKample, be afraid that he will get a little more 
populism or traditionalism than the project can use. The advantage 
the planner enjoys when he asks an economist to participate is not 
simply that the economist will predict accurately the economic outcome 
of a project (which is subject to some doubt), but that the economist 
will being a predictable kit of tools of analysis. 'lhis is an 
important part of the predictability that the bureaucrat needs. 
Since the mid 1970s, however, social scientists from other 
disciplines have begun to prepare such kits of tools, and bureaucrats 
have begun to learn to accommodate the skills of 'sociologists'. It 
is now routine to employ 'sociologists' in project work. Major aid 
bodies such as the World Bank and the USAID have recruited fulltime 
sociologists and anthropologists who have been charGed with the 
prepdration of guidelines gcverning the employment of sociologists in 
project& work. (1) A quick glance at these guidelines, or at the 
project work which flows from them, confirms that this is not the type 
of work that appeals to the academic 1 individualist'. Project work is 
oriented towards description and calls for little use of ireagination 
or interest in the theoretical ideas of any of the the disciplines of 
[ 11 A World Bank study in 1980 reported that there were four 
sociologists or anthropologists working fulltime on project work. 'The 
study stated that employment of anthropologists arose from a report by 
Glynn Cochrane which the bank commissioned. Cochrane (1976) explains 
that this study waa entirely on his initiative and, though the Bank 
subth!t{uent ly made an ~ !i!_llt ia payment, was to be undertnken at his 
ex pt• nae • 
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the social sciences. The guidelines are directed mainly towards the 
identification of points in the project cycle where sociological 
analysis is called for; the idea of 'social feasibility' for example. 
Other common headings are: 'behavioural risks', 'target groups', 
'motivation' and, of course, 'participation'. The purpose of this 
literatu~e appears to be that of assisting the other technical 
specialists in project work to appreciate the role to be played by 
sociologists, and conversly, to allow sociologists to see where their 
skills may be used. The skills and methods that sociologists are 
expected to use are very basic ones, such as questionnaire 
construction. 
The term sociologist is used loosely to cover a variety of social 
scientists such as anthropologists, geographers or political 
scientists. The breadth of the social factors with which they deal is 
reflected in the frequent use of hyphenated terms such as 
socio-cultural, socio-political, in addition to the more familiar 
socio-economic. 
The Problem Of Predictability 
The bureaucratic nature of the planner's task means that he is 
continually facing problems of predictability in his environment. The 
use of sociologists in projects can create two problems of 
predictability. First, will sociologists employ 'objectively 
rational 1 methods? This is the problem that Glynn Cochrane identified 
when he said that sociologists need to be able to 'peform with the 
degree of reliability associated with engineets, doctors, and 
lawyers'. The second problem of predictability is: can sociologists 
actually predict behaviour with the required degree of reliability1 
nm two problems are re lated, but not idcnt ical. The first prob Lem 
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requires only that decisions should be made in accordance with rules 
that are objective in the sense of impersonal. 
It might happen that the prediction of behaviour, or at least the 
precise calculation of behavioural risks, is considered to be an 
essential part of an objectively rational sociological contribution to 
project design. But this is not the only objectively rational 
standard available, and it may be the worst. The 1 trouble with modern 
theories of behaviourism', Hannah Arendt writes, 'is not that they are 
wrong but that they could become true, that they actually are the best 
possible conceptualization of certain obvious trends in modern 
society' (Arendt 1959:295). The slogan 'The purpose of the social 
sciences is the prediction and control of human behaviour' was part of 
what C.Wright Mills condemned as 'the bureaucratic ethos' which sought 
to use social science for the promotion of political manipulation 
(Mills 1959). 
In less developed countries manipulation is not the same problem 
that it is in the mass democracies of developed countries. (l] The 
problem is rather that the attempt at manipulation will not work. The 
communities in which projects are being established will not 'behave' 
as expected. This is the 'behavioural risk' that planners speak of. 
And it is an unfortunate fact of life that 'behavioural risks' seem to 
be highest in the poorer communities. 
n1c manipulative intent of project planning is no more than the 
exercise of the specifically bureaucratic form of responsibility. 
Projects must have a specific goal and must state the means by which 
(lJ In the more economically advanced of the less developed countries 
this might not be true, however. Guillermo O'Donnell has argued that 
the 'bureaucratic-authoritarianism' that characterizes B~azil and 
Argentina, while not totalitarian, is more manipulative than earlier 
forms of South American. authoritarianism (O'Donnell 1973). 
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they are to be achieved. For example, the USAID logical framework 
requires that each project design nominate: (i) a specific 'project 
output' (such as an irrigation network); (ii) a 'project purpose' 
(increased crop yield); (iii) a sector or prog~am 'goal' to which 
the project will contribute. In other words, the project 
'hypothesizes the causal (means-end) linkage between inputs, outputs, 
purpose and goal'. All assumptions must be spelt out, progress goals 
nominated and 'targets expressed in terms which are finite and 
verifiable' (Summary Description of the Project Design and Evaluation 
M~thodology 1975). And so it goes on. These are the requirements 
which give rise to the procedures that Rondinelli condemned for the 
unnecessary burden they place on the administrative capacity of 
developing countries, and the distortions they can create in the 
planning process. 
Yet development assistance bodies find it difficult to pursue 
'policies' of the sort that Colebatch proposes. Without being part of 
the internal political process they cannot continually define and 
redefine policy. Tiley must nominate a project that can be justified 
according to objectively rational criteria. In short, the question is 
not: should development assistance agencies become more involved in 
politics, but rather, can they recognize the bureaucratic nature of 
their existing political involvement? 
Fiji as a Case Study 
The important questions in any case study concern the 
relationship between the conclusions about the particular case and the 
wider universe to \<lttich the case might be thought to belong. In 
flhort, the quest ion is, what is the case under study an example of? 
In the present study, for example, the larger contexts within which 
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Fiji might be located could include 'the third world', 'developing 
countries', 'the South Pacific 1 , 1 micro-states', 'plural societies 1 or 
'former British colonies'. 
My approach to this problem is guided by a preference for 
historically specific generalizations, as are recommended, for 
example, by Reinhard Bendix. The universally applicable concepts of 
social science, such as 'division of labour', are, Bendix argues, of 
limited utility. 'It is more illuminating to learn in ~nat ways the 
division of labour in one social structure differs from that in 
another than to reiterate that both structures have a division of 
labour' (Bendix 1969:5). The danger of the ahistorical 'scientific 
spirit' with which Western social scientists have approached the 
non-western world is that it 'tends to conceive of complex societies 
as natural systems with defined limits and invariant laws governing an 
equilibrating process'. The next step in this scientific endeavour is 
to attempt to distinguish dependent and independent variables, for 
'control of critical variables will automatically entail planned 
change in a host of dependent variables'. Proponents of this natural 
science approach admit the shortcomings of their attempts but move 
ahead optimistically hoping that dependent and independent variables 
will emerge in due course. Bendix prefers to decide what has changed 
before attempting to discover causal relations. 'Accordingly, the 
studies assembled in [his] volume stay closer to the historical 
evidence than would be possible on the assumption that societies are 
natural systems' (Bendix 1969:12-13). 
An analysis of the significance of Fiji as a case study must 
commence with the fact that, unlike the majority of states in the 
developing world, Fiji is a liberal democracy. Since the winding down 
' 
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of the colonial administration in 1966, governments have been chosen 
by open elections with high polling turnouts. While it is true that 
one party has held power over all that time, it has always enjoyed the 
support of the majority of electors (see Nation 1982). Just as 
important, however, has been the role of the National Federation Party 
as the 'loyal opposition' in a stable two-party structure. This has 
allowed the adoption of bipartisan approaches to a number of important 
issues. On other issues, guarantees of individual rights contained in 
the constitution, together with the rule of law and the ability of the 
opposition party to question executive activity in the legislature, 
emphasize the fact that Fiji is a genuinely liberal democracy. 
It is a paradox, however, that democratic political stability in 
Fiji has been founded on communal loyalties. Both government and 
opposition parties enjoy support based upon racial or religious 
loyalties. The predictability this gives to political activity has so 
far worked in the interests of stability (see Norton 1977). It is 
difficult to foretell whether this will continue to be true, but that 
io a queRtion beyond the bounds of this thesis. The importance of 
Fiji's liberal democratic system to the case study is that it will be 
seen that it docs not dissolve planning problems. The necessarily 
bureaucratic endeavourg of'project planners, even when unhindered by 
the constraints of a corrupt or authoritarian regime, face serious 
difficulties when attempting to plan social change in rural Fiji, 
particularly in the traditional or village sector of society. 
Political stability in the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by 
substantial economic growth. Between 1968 and 1978 GNP grew (in real· 
terms) by thirty six per cent (Current Economic Statistics 1981). 
Unlike the growth experienced in many less developed countries, growth 
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in Fiji has not been accompanied by extremes of economic inequality. 
The agricultural sector is overwhelmingly characterized by smallholder 
production, the virtual absence of either a plantation sector or a 
landlord class, and significant government participation in marketing 
and other support services for smallholder agriculture. In the 
manufacturing and service sectors there is a high level of foreign 
ownership, although there has also been some local participation in 
growth. The question of local participation in these sectors in 
general, and the tourist industry in particular, is an important one, 
but not subject to major inter-party conflict. 
The Fijian Problem 
Fiji has, nevertheless, a significant redistributional problem. 
For many years, but most particularly in the last two decades, 
indigenous Fijians have had a less than equitable share of the fruits 
of growth compared with other races. This problem has become more 
serious socially and politically as the proportion of the Fijian 
population living in urban aras has increased. The increasingly 
Fijian face of the unskilled urban work force, and their corresponding 
under-representation in higher level jobs, threatens to sharpen 
intercommunal feeling. The table below shows that the area of 
greatest Fijian under-representation is in managerial positions in 
commerce in categories B, C and D. 
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PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY % FIJIAN % INDIAN % OTHER 
A) Professional & Technical 41 44 15 100 
B) Managerial & Administrative 14 49 37 100 
C) Clerical & related 33 52 13 100 
D) Sales workers 20 69 11 100 
Source 1976 Census 
The 'Fijian problem' has long been subject to norms of 
bi-partisanship. Historically it can be traced to the Fijian/settler 
problem which led to the cession of Fiji to Great Britain in 1874. 
Although the deed of cession promised little more than the provision 
of law and crder, the Fijian chi~fs who signed it were said to be 
'relying upon the justice and generosity of Her said Majesty', The 
deed was s4bsequently interpreted by both colonial officials and 
Fijian leaders as an undertaking to safeguard Fijian interests. The 
policies that were e&tablished as a result of this prohibition of 
the sale of Fijian land, restrictions on the use of Fijian labourers 
by planters, use of Indian indentured labourers have not only 
created the social and economic problems that are known collectively 
as the Fijian problem, they have also created political difficulties 
which impede their solution. 
In 1946 there was a debate in the Legislative Council, often 
refe~red to as the 'Deed of Cession debate' 1 which set much of the 
tone for the post-war political activity that shaped development 
planning and constitutional change. A motion was carried recording 
the Council's unanimous opinion that 'the Government and the 
non-Fijian inhabitants of the Colony stand by the terms of the Deed of 
Cession and shall consider that document as a Charter of the Fijian 
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people' (Gillion 1Y77:196). The deed is variously said to have 
promised the paramountcy or primacy of Fijian interests, although 
precisely what these might mean it is difficult to say. Like many 
political concepts they were originally fashioned with deliberate 
.'l ::1 b i g U i t Y I and have endured so well, partly because of their 
a
1
nbig11ity. In the early days of colonial rule paramountcy/primacy 
m1•ant above all a ban on the sale of Fijian land and the 
di~couragement of the use of Fijian labour on plantations. Now, 
h,,.,..,.ver, it seems to mean the opposite of this; the adoption of 
"l'•·cial mt>asures to assist Fijians to move into the modern economy. 
In its simplest terms the Fijian problem might now be seen as a 
n•·t>d for induced (.•conomic change, a fairly straightforward matter of 
economic planning. But this would be too simple, for the technical 
probl£>ms of choosing means to achieve given ends are overlaid by 
politics in which there is considerable argument over proposals as 
Pnds in themselves. 
ln colonial times the primacy of Fijian interests was interpreted 
in negative or protective terms. Fijian land rights and traditional 
political organization were interfered with as little as possible. ln 
simple terms this meant that Fijian land not alienated before cession 
was made inalienable, and a Fijian (originally Native) Affairs 
dPpartment was established, This did not m£>an that outsiders did not 
~a1n access to Fijian land, nor that Fijian traditional leaders did 
not have their powers !lubstantially alter<>d by the imposition of the 
rule of law, but only that there was a number of pieres of legislation 
r1v1ng s·~e protection to Fijian rights in these nr~as. 
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NLTB (the Minister for Fijian Affairs) vowed never to sign another 
lPase approval for an Indian! (Hansard 1973).(1] 
In 1975 a British consultant was commissioned to review NLTB 
'organization and methods of lease administration' (Parliamentary 
Paper 25 of 1977). His brief was purely technical. It did not 
include any 'consideration of, or comment upon, basic principles upon 
which the Native lands Trust Act (and therefore the NLTB) is 
Pstablished' (ParliarnPntary Paper 25 of 1977). The ch~nges that 
rPsulted from his study are explained in chapter two. Their net 
effect was a tightening of the administration of the board's 
activities, removing inefficiency and petty corruption. 
Once bureaucratized, the NLTB can no longer be regarded as an 
in!"t\tution specifically designed to protect Fijian privilege. The 
board's power to declare Fijian reserves remains, but the declaration 
of reserves halted in the 1960s. (The last gazzettals were in 1967.) 
All land outside reserves can be leased on equal terms and conditions 
by all races. The NLTB as landlord on behalf of the owners treats all 
tenants with impersonal equality. Its function i~ as protective of 
the rights of tenants as it is of the lando~~ers' interests. 
The NLTB is not the only protection that tenants have. The 
Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act (ALTA) of 1976 sets minimum 
lensing conditions, in particular the length of the leases. ALTA 
~~Pnded the Agricultural Landlords Tenants Ordinance to provide a set 
period of thirty years for all agricultural leases. It also 
automatically £•xtended all ten year lea11es by twenty years. The 
pa~sing of ALTA pre.wides a good <•xample of intercommunal cooperation. 
11 J The following Wt>ek, when tempers had cooled, the Deputy Prime 
Minister announced that the minister would, of course, continue to 
LJf.n lease approvals. 
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Constitutional entrenchment required the support of opposition members 
,if parliament for a three quarters majority of the House of 
Represenr tives. Some opposition members opposed the bill, because it 
also contained measures for rent reassessment, but wost were happy to 
b'll'l improved security for the Indian tenant farmers who were the 
party's traditional basis of support. 
Land is now often regarded ns 'depoliticized'. In 1979, when an 
ind1•pendent Fijian member of parliament moved a motion asking that the 
NLfB be required to consult landowners on all dealing affecting their 
land, Indian members, in both government and opposition parties, 
01bstai11ed from discussion on what Fijians clearly believed to be an 
intra·community matter. At the end of the debate the mover thanked 
Ind inn ml•mbPrs for their 'golden silence', It should be noted, 
h,iw1•ver, that the idea of the depoliticization of land leaves out of 
Blcount the strong intra-communal feelings among Fijians regarding 
land. 
In colonial days, unused land was continu3lly brought to the 
attention of Fijians, with hints that unless they took ~ction to bring 
l t into production, steps to compel them to do so might be 
1..ontemplated. 1.and rates were one means by which this could be 
brought about, al though it was not until lata in the colonial period, 
when Fij inn leaders were in power, that land ~·ates w.nre introduced. 
(The difficulties that they {aced will be examined in the next 
chapter). With the passing of the colonial rugime this kind of 
prrEJsurc on Fijian landowners hns largely disappeared. Govcrnmc>nt 
nttrmpts to Recure land for the M0nasavu hydro-electric scheme have 
rPl1Pd almost solely ~n persuasion. Sums paid in compensation have 
b»l'l"I above whnt is !HltnE•timt>s referred to as fair market value but the 
I 
-
• 
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government is well aware of the emotional power of land within the 
Fijian community. Any perceived injury by a landowner is one issue 
that is sure to be r.hared by a wide section of the Fijian community. 
(See the Fiji Times of 22 May 1980 for a report of a Ministerial 
titatment explaining the basis of the Monasavu land acquisition.) 
Th_!:__~~ji~~-~~~~~~s~~~tio~ 
Like land legislation, the legislation providing for tP.c Fijian 
Administration is entrenched in the constitution bPcause it was 
rPgarded by Fijians as providing spPcial protPction for their 
intPrests. Since cession, the native Fijian population had been 
trt>ated as separate from other, 'immigrant' peoples in Fiji. The 
institutions established to accomplish this are often described as 
1•xamples of the British policy of indirect rule. Fijians continued to 
live in their villages, subject to the rule of their 'chiefs'. A 
Crent Council of Chiefs was created to advise the Governor on matters 
concerning Fijian interests and to provide a list of candidates from 
which he could select Fijian representatives to the Legislative 
Council. 
The application of the label 'indirect rule' needs, however, to 
be considered carefully. Were 'the chiefs' through whom the indirect 
rule was made truly traditional leaders? The offices which they held 
were civil service posts with prescribed duties and rewards, to which 
thPy Wt>r<.' appointed by the Governor. Were they civil servants, or 
wrre they chiefs? The answer, 
BureaucrGcy in the Weberian usage is 
of course, is that they were both. 
an idt>a l type, more or less 
prc>nent in a i.<idc varif.'ty of organizations. 'Chief', as the Fijian 
(Oncept of 't~!_~J\.~ 1 1 is a concept of great flexibility. Expatriate 
n>lonial bureaucrats, for example, could be referred to as 'turaga', 
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The entire history of the Fijian Administration could be characterized 
generally as one of gradual bureaucratization. In the early days 
colonial officials made many allowances for the cultural 
interpretation Fijian chiefs made of the offices they held. 
Gradually, however, they were obliged to conform to certain 
bureaucratic rules, in particular those providing for strict financial 
accountability (see Macnaught 1982). After its restructuring in the 
1940s, the Fijian Administration became even more bureaucratic. When 
the 'old Tikinas' were amalgamated into 'new Tiki~~· it was no longer 
possible to appoint as Buli (head of Tikina) a man qualified largely 
by traditional criteiia. The nature of this change has never been 
fully invl:stigated, although it seems clear that increased 
bureaucratization was an important part of it. Rusiate Nayacakalou 
has argued that the reorganized administration, although it looked 
like a 'cross' between traditional and non traditional leadership, was 
in fact 'a modern bureaucracy which derive(d) much of its str1•ngth 
from some elements o1 the traditional authority system' (Nayacakalou 
1975:114). He argued further that the bureaucratization of modern 
Fijian leadership under the Fijian Administration had caused a great 
deal of dissatisfaction among Fijians. He proposed that the 
leadership role that Fijian Administration officials found difficult 
to perform be transferred to democratically elected provincial 
councils. In 1966 Dr. Nayacakalou's proposals were accepted by the 
Great Council of Chiefs and the government. The e1fects of these 
changes, and the related question of the future of rural local 
government will be examined in the next chapter. 
The Alliance government has consistently chosen to by-pass the 
Fijian Administration ns a tool to engineer increased Fijian 
participation in commerce. lt has preferred to promote general 
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policies of rural development, which stand to benefit the majority of 
Fijians (who live in the less developed rural areas). The preference 
for such universalism has an obvious political source. It removes a 
great deal of political pressure from the Indian members of the 
Alliance party. In 1971 and 1972 legislation for a Fijian Institute 
to promote Fijian participation in commerce was prepared but withdrawn 
when it was felt that the political cost might be too high. 11le 
withdrawal of this legislation was one of the grievances that provoked 
the rebellion by Sakeasi Butadroka (an Assistant Minister in the 
Alliance government). Butadroka then formed the Fijian Nationalist 
Party. He argued that universalistic rural development policies 
favoured Indians. In 1977 the Alliance government only just managed 
to withstand the electoral effects of the appeal of Butadroka's party. 
It appears that the unity of the Fijian elite (and with that the 
masses) has been able to withstand what would otherwise have been a 
very persuasive ideology (see Nation 1978). 11le universalistic 
flavour of Alliance policies and the bureaucratic nature of their 
implementation have little appeal with the Fijian masses. Were it not 
for the need to appease Indian feeling it is doubtful whether 
development planning would have been as bureaucratic as it has been. 
Nevertheless, rural development probably had substantial appeal among 
better educated Fijians, who could see that it did promise to assist 
Fijian part ic ipat ion in the most promising area, commercial 
agriculture. 
Rural Development 
The policy of rural development recognizes the traditional 
association of Fijians with their land. Land is regarded by Fijians 
as the major asset they possess, its development is seen as the best 
mc>ans of expandinf, their participation in commerce. Large t~qcts of 
I 
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idle Fijian land also caught the eyes of planners. 'I1le primary 
problem was the scale of infrastructure development needed. It could 
not be. undertaken without the help of finance and technical assistance 
from overseas. 
'I1le necessary assistance came from a variety of sources. 'Ille 
Fiji Pine Corporation (FPC) received finance from the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC). 'The Seaqaqa sugar project obtained 
World Bank finance. Cattle projects at Yalavou and Uluisaivou found 
assistance from Australia and New Zealand respectively. In 1981 a 
feasibility study was carried out for another large project in the 
Korotolutolu river basin of Vanua Levu. 
Projects of this sort have obvio~s attractions for the Fiji 
government. They channel resources on a large scale into previously 
neglected, predominantly Fijian areas. Employment opportunities are 
created, communications are improved and other services are therefore 
easier to provide. 
'The large scale of such projects also has 
attractions for overseas assistance agencies. Administrative costs 
per dollar invested are lower. Movement into 'virgin' territory makes 
it easier to establish a sense of control over the project. Many of 
the 'objectively rational' criteria are easy to satisfy. 'Ille numbers 
of beneficiaries are small but, as the inhabitants of disadvantaged 
areas, they are candidates for redistributive consideration. 
It seems ironic that the Fijian Nationalists emerged just as the 
Alliance government was stepping up efforts to &pread development to 
hitherto neglected rural Fijians. 'Ille Nationalists rejected policies 
of rural development, arguing that these would be of more use to 
other, more prosperous races. 'Illey were unimpressed by the promise of 
projects, regardless of their multi- million dollar budgets. lbe 
~--------------------------' 
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Alliance government has made a few concessions to the Fijian 
Nationalist demands for 'special treatment'. For example, it 
establ.ished the Business Opportunity and Management Advisory Service 
(BOMAS) within the Ministry of Fijian Affairs; the role of BOMAS, 
however, is limited to assisting Fijians to negotiate their way 
through bureaucratic channe~s, the FOB, the NLTB, the Lands 
Department, Town and Regional Planning, etc. A special fund was 
created by the FOB for industrial loans to Fijians but, apart from 
this, they receive no special consideration. [l] 
The substantial majority achieved by the Alliance party in the 
second election of 1977 confirmed it in its path, although the size of 
the majority probably owed \lll,ore to the appeal of tradition than to the 
policy of rural development. In 1981 the Alliance faced another 
dissatisfied group, the Western United Front (WUF), wh;.ch claimed that 
Fijians in the western areas of Viti Levu had been neglected by the 
,.diance. The Alliance pointed to the large projects established in 
the area, the pine forests, the Monasavu hydro-electricity project and 
the two cattle projects, but the WUF was unimpressed. The landowners 
at Monasavu W4 re unhappy with the compensation for the land that had 
bee, alienated. And as for the roads, they had been built for the 
trees, not the people, so why should the people be grateful? The Fiji 
Pine Commission had a long series of acrimomous disputes with 
landowners about the terms and conditions for the leasing of their 
land. lt was in the course of these negotiations that the WUF leader, 
Ratu Osea Gavidi, had gained his strong following (see Pacific Island 
Monthly report, March 1981, p.33). 
Ill The most controversial special measure taken by the government was 
the policy of granting equal numbers of scholar~ihips to Fijians and 
non-Fijian applicants from Fiji for places at the University of the 
South Pacific. This had been recommended by a committee of enquiry in 
1969 but did not have any p~actical effect until 1977 when the number 
of Fijians pas~ing the Universit~ Entrance examination ~ose to allow 
them to take up the positions made available by the pol icy. 
__._.. ____________________________ , 
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There can be no doubt that people in the project areas enjoyed 
new infrastructural facilities (the cost of which represented a vastly 
disproportionate share of infrastructural spending in terms of 
population) and wage earning opportunities which rewarded their labour 
far more handsomely than any crops they could grow. Why then should 
the project beneficiaries be dissatisfied? Some planners attribute it 
to ignorance on the part of the people. This has nllowed demagogic 
leaders to create unrealistic expectations. Planners seem, however, 
to have made their own contribution to the problem of expectations. 
By offering as little by way of compensation as they think they can 
get away with, and then being forced to give more, planners have 
~onditioned landowners, who have no idea of any of the ~conomics 
involved, to see the whole exercise in terms of confrontat~on. [l] 
None of the projects that I have studied has had landowner 
problems comparable to t:.ose of Monasavu and the Fiji Pine Commission. 
They do, however, sh~d light on these problems. They illustrate the 
many difficulties that arise in the relationship between planners 
motivated by national goals, and villagers whose horizons are 
extremely parochial. The endeavours of planners to determine the 
interests and wishes of the local people are not always rewarded to 
the extent that planners think fair. They find villagerb are often 
guilty of the cardinal sin, unpredictability. 
The fact that Fiji is a liberal democracy makes a difference. 
The government is often limited in the courses of action open to it. 
There are fears in the civil service that colonial legislation for 
compulsory acquisition of land has been rendered unconstitutional by 
(II This is based upon conversations with a number of FPC officers and 
landowners in the pine growing areas. 
I 
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the independence constitution. 'llle fact that the government relies on 
elections also limits the courses open to it. Planners in Fiji 
complain of 'politics', despite their democratic legitimation. Fiji 
therefore provides an interesting test case for those who advocate 
popular participation as the solution to all planning ills. 
Planners and People 
The juxtaposition of the terms 'planners' and 'oeople' will 
perhaps suggest to some readers that I see the 'planners' as 
narrow-minded bureaucrats who are deaf to the voices of 1 the people', 
the toiling masses whose simple needs and uncomplicated aspirations 
deserve our sympathy and support. However, while the choice of terms 
with such connotations is deliberate, it is not because they convey my 
view. Rather, it is because such populism and a general belief in the 
legitimacy of democratic organizations often underlie the perspectives 
of western observers of developing societies, leading to an 
interweaving of evaluative perspectives with empirical analysis, which 
is yet another part of the general problem which I am addressing; viz 
the problem of the relationship between agencies of modern 
administration and social groups within which traditional organization 
plays an important part. As will be seen in the project case studies 
(especially in the Uluisaivou project) democratic organization, even 
with the best of intentions, is not immediately adaptable to all 
cult~ral contexts. 
t have applied the term planner to the various officials, 
consultants, or professionals-on-contract who have had charge of the 
direction of ~rojects. tbe justification for this labelling is no 
more than their involvement in the decision-making processes of a 
project which, to the extent that it is 'an organized, conscious and 
I 
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continual attempt to select the best available means to achieve 
specific goals', may be said to be planned (Waterston 1965:26). 'Ille 
use of the collective label planner parallels Raymond Apthorpe' s use 
of the term 'planistrator' to cover the full range of officials 
involved in the planning and implementation of development activities. 
He contx·asts planistrators with 'peasants 1 who are the 'receivers' of 
the plarllistration product, just as I contrast planners and people 
(Apthorpe 1976). 
Of course the projects differ in the extent to which they 
approximate the definition of planning, just as the individuals vary 
considerably in the degree to which they interpret their role as that 
of planner in this sense, but all are caught up to some extent in the 
planning enterprise. Projects, by their very nature, are like this. 
Physically, a project area is well defined; temporally, the dates of 
commencement and conclusion are announced in advance. It is true that 
dates are subject to frequent revision, and that project effects can 
seldom be confined to their designated boundaries, but. the fact is 
that projects continually aim to plan in the Waterston sense. 
Similarly, to label planners bureaucrats in the Weberian sense is 
not to suggest that they all conform in all resp~cts and in all that 
they do to the Webet'ian ideal type. It was never the intention of 
Weber's historical mode of analysis that ideal types should be used in 
this way. 'The goal of ideal-typical concept-construction is always 
to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather 
the unique .. individual character of cultural phenomena' (Weber 
19L•9:101). 'Ille present study, in accordance with Weberian 
methodology, is anchored in a particular historical context, focusing 
on the ways in which two projects have attempted to overcome the 
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complex social, economic and political problem of increasing Fijian 
participation in commercial agriculture. In more general terms it is 
a study of the problems of projects as vehicles of development in a 
liberal demo1;racy. 
The most important general concept within this investigation is 
'participation'. As suggested earlier, the popularity of the term is 
derived largely from its ambiguity and its political or ideological 
content, rather than its explanatory utility. In fact it begs the 
question it pretends to andwer. And that question, in its widest 
terms, is concerned with the interaction between traditional or 
peasant societies and government agencies of modernization. The 
passing of modernization theories, with their inbuilt assumptions of 
the inevitability and uni-directionality of social change, has led to 
a neglect of the more fundamental Weberian ideas from which they were 
in part derived. In particular, the problematic role of bureaucracy 
Gs a form of authority deserves further analysis, especially in the 
context of development projects where distinctly modern bureaucratic 
forms of organization are inevitably brought in from outside the 
country. 
In many developing countries the agents of modernization have 
been transformed by, the people they hoped to modernize, leading to a 
now familiar pattern of bribery and corruption in administration. In 
Fiji, ho~ever, the civil service is still distinctly bureaucratic and 
governed by the rule of law. It is beyond the scope bf this study to 
explain why Fiji has retained (and in fact strengthened) the 
bureaucracy inherited from colonial days, although it will be apparent 
from the case studies that there are pressures within rural Fijian 
society which work against the bureaucratic style of administration. 
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The policy implementation approach is one response to the problem 
of th~ dysfunctionality of bureaucratic organization in many social 
contexts within the developing world. The criticisms of the 
implementation approach suggested by Colebatch make clear, however, 
that no amount of implementation can make policies work if they are 
not the flexible, responsive practices that he argues are fully 
deserving of the name policy. But how, by what political processes, 
are such policies to be created? 'nlis is the problem that plagues 
politicians and administrators in developing countries, a problem 
which projects at~empt to circumvent. 
In chapter two there is an examination of the changing 
relationship between rural Fijians and the various government 
authorities with which they have had dealings in both colonial and 
post-independence times. This historical perspective is essential for 
an understanding of the present day perceptions of governmental 
authority by rural Fijians and the attitudes of officials to the 
people whom they serve. With regard to the latter, the long-running 
debate about the relative merits of communalism and individualism as 
policies is of particular importance. 'nle expatriate proponent1 of 
individualism, whether colonial officials or post-independence 
'advisers', have frequently failed to realize how old the idea of 
individualism is as a solution to 'the Fijian problem'. In chapter 
four the relationship between rural Fijians and Lhe officials who 
serve them is taken further with an examination of two cattle projects 
which are in a sense forerunners of the two large aid-funded projects. 
Both were based upon the individualist dogma of the colonial 
agriculture department. The limited success they enjoyed offered an 
equivocal answer to the question of suitability of individualism 
(whatevec it might mean) as a policy for the promotion of Fijian 
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participation in commercial agriculture. 
Both of the aid projects hoped to be able to overcome the 
problems experienced in the past in the relationship between Fiji 
government officials and Fijian villagers. With the depth of 
resources of capital and expertise available to them the aid donors 
hoped to create models that might be replicated elsewhere in Fiji: 
one sought a communal model, the other favoured individualism. 'lbe 
differing strategies are analysed in chapters five and six and then 
compared in chapter seven. When beginning this study I had envisaged 
that I would be able to reach some sort of judgement about the 
relative merits of communalism and individualismi however, I found 
that the concepts were vague and of themselves unhelpful.[l) I came 
rather to the conclusion that the search for models was not only 
unlikely to succeed in its aim, but was itself symptomatic of a deeper 
problem. 'Ibis problem, simply, is that which I have termed the policy 
gap; the failure of political processes to incorporate the interests 
and wishes of peasant or tribal societies in policy-making and 
implementation. 
At the highest level of generality, there are two major questions 
which I address: first, can projects 'solve', 'overcome' or 
'circumvent' the policy gap that so often divides planners and rural 
populations in developing countries; secondly, what part can 
sociological analysis play in helping to achieve this objective? (2) 
The starting point for this study is the widespread phenomenon of 
project failure. 'lbere is room for debate about the most appropriate 
criteria for a~sessing project success/failure, but the fact that very 
[ 1) On the other hand it is important to recognize the role they play 
aa planning philosophies - as explained in chapter two. 
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many projects are simply disappoint in~ no elaborate 
substantiation. 'Disappointing and inadl:'.quate development project 
performance is', Frank Wilson observes, 'a fact of life' (Wilson 
1979:203) Wilson argues that there is no single problem that can be 
identified as ·~major limitio.g factor' (Wilson 1979: 207). I ugue 
in this thesis, however, that there is one fundam~ntal limiting 
factor, and it is the same limiting factor that circumscribes 
development outside the framework of aid-assisted projects. 'lllis 
'factor' is the gap between the worlds of planners and villagers. 
'Ille planners' world is necessarily bureaucratic, or at least 
there are pressures to make it so. It is true that planners' actions 
often depart from bureaucratic norms but the pressure to conform 
remains. Officials of donor countries must be seen to be operating in 
accordance with impersonal rules (whatever the political or personal 
motives that might lie behind any particular decision). I do not 
argue that this can ever be otherwise. 'llle burden of my argument is 
simply that this must be tecognized. 'Ille proposal of nostrums such as 
participation reflects the difficulties that are created by 
bureaucratic planning of projects in traditional societies, but. 
(2] The second question is in many respects subsidiary to the first. 
Sociologists are planners along with agricultural scientists, 
eng~neers and economist§, However, in projects with ambitious social 
goals, such as Uluisaivou and Yalavou, the sociologist's role is 
ostensibly of special importan~~. though there are problems associated 
with fulfilling thi~ role. Most notably there is the problem of 
divergence which characterizes the work of social scientists. 'lllere 
is a danger that unless sociologists can of fer to be able to predict 
(and thereby control) the behaviour of project participants, their 
contribution will be ignored. 
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'participation' cannot solve the problem. In effect, the employment 
of a term like participation tends to assume that traditional cultural 
organization will naturally be replaced by modern western forms of 
organization, and thereby harks back to the modernization approach of 
the 1960s. 
The gap between planners and people is not unbridgeable but it 
.J 
can only be overcome if. its existence is first recognized. The 
modernization theorists perceived the gap but erred in believing it 
would close· naturally and inevitab,ly as development took its course 
(just as 'progress' in its time had taken its course in Europe). I 
take the view that the question of Whether the gap will close or not 
matters less than the need to come to terms with the problems that 
arise in the interaction between bureaucratic authority and 
traditional organization. 
The particular interest of Fiji as a case study for this argument 
lies in the fact that it is a developing country without great social 
or economic inequality which has enjoyed fifteen years of stable, 
liberal democratic government by a party committed to the interests of 
the village or traditional segment of society. If ever there was an 
environment in which projects should work, it is Fiji. Project 
planners have enjoyed the full sympathy of political leaders, an 
administrative environment free from corruption and a populace 
enjoying all the civil liberties necessary for political expression 
and participation. The problems that surface in projects established 
under these conditions shed light on problems inherent in the whole 
conception of projects as vehicles for planned development. 
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CHAPTER 'NO 
BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY 
Tne Administrative Context of Development Planning in Fiji 
'Bureaucracy inevitably ac.comp&nies modern mass democracy in 
contrast to the democratic self-govPrnment of SM.~11 
homogPneous units. This results from the characteri.~tic 
principle of bureaucracy: the abstract regularity of the 
execution of authority, which ls a result of the demand for 
"equtility before the lEl._&' in the personal and functional 
s,>nse - hence, the horror of "privilPge", and the principled 
reject:ion of d"ing business "from case to case•.' r-:ax Wrber 
( 1 94 6: 221~) • 
'As rights are universalized and govern~~ntal activities 
proliferate, it is less problematic t~at the uneducated 
citizen is barred from public emplo}ment bec;:iuse he c1nnot 
qualify, than that he ,ay not possess lhe aptitudes reeded 
to obtain reasoned consideration of his case by the public. 
authorities.' Reinhard Bendix (1969:157). 
In the 1960s tile remaining elements of ~.n<l irec t rule wen> removed 
and rural Fijians acquired full equality before the law, together with 
the right to vote. By the 1970e muny were wondering what b~nefits 
these rights had brought. The acquisition of formal rights did not 
automaticalJy confer the ability to exer~ise those right~. The 
relationship with the state could not simply be rewritten by 
legislativ~ change. Democracy, together with the expanding economy, 
raised Fijian expectations more easily than it prov).dad the means for 
fulfilling them. Elsewhere in Melanesia there has heem a general 
dPGir<> lo close the gap between parochi&l a"pirations and government 
by devolving powers, so as to 1estore the non-bureaucratic 'democratic 
Gelf-government' of which Weber speaks. In !iji, paradoxically, such 
local 11elf-governm<!nt was lost just as national eelf-g,,vernment was 
:ichieved. Thi~ loss now appears to have been ine~itable and 
1rrPvPrsiblc within the multi-racial social ~ontext. Bureaur.r:acy' s 
1 nhPrE•nt adherence to impersonal, unive.rrial ~9tic rules now has a 
·~· 
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political imperative as strong as that of the separatism of indirect 
rule in colonial times. Nevertheless, the communalist tradition of 
ninety. years of indirect rule is still a significant force in Fiji. 
It is important to understand the nature of this tradition, and in 
particular to distinguish its political and economic aspects. 
The Tradition of Communalism 
The debate about the relative merits of 
communal ism and 
individualism as policies for Fijian development has a longer history 
in Fiji than most expatriate policy-makers would imagine. They use 
the terms confidently, and assume that their meanings are obvious, 
whereas the terms have never been clearly defined and their usage in 
Fiji has been subject to change over time. 
The system of native administration esta.blished by Sir Arthur 
Gordon and Sir John Thurston was deliberately communal in the sense 
that it attempted to preserve a way of life t~at was thought to be 
communal. The aim was, in Gordon's words, 'to seize, if possible, the 
spirit in which native institutions have been framed' (quoted in Roth 
1951:2). The leadership of traditional chiofs was to be retained, 
though their povers would be defined by law to ensure that they 
fulfilled their roles as guardians of the communal interest. Fijian 
land waa made inalienable in fee simple and its ownership registered 
according to 'mataqali whose boundaries were clearly defined and 
recognized by all, under a system of immemorial origin' (France 
1969:163). 
European planters wtio were deprived of access to Fijian land and 
labour by the communal system soon took up the cause of individualism. 
Following the death of Thurston ·in 1897 they were more sympathetically 
rPceived by the government, although Fijian attachment to existing 
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institutions made it difficult to adopt wholesale changes. 
' There a ft er ' , T. J . Macnaught says, 'it was standard rhetoric for 
British governors, as it had always been for planters, to decry the 
communal system's paralysing influence on individual effort and 
ambition', while at the same time they hesitated to let 'each man 
··.go his own way before he has learnt to stand alone' (Macnaught 
1974:8). 
The strongest push for re forms came under the governorship of Sir 
Everard im Thurn (1904-11) who believe~ that communalism served only 
the interests of chiefs (Hacnaught 1982: 28). For a brief period he 
elevated individualism almost to the status of an ideology. One of 
the first targets for reform was lala, the power of chiefs to levy the 
produce and labour power of their subjects, which had been preserved 
for chiefs filling the colonial positions of Roko Tui (head of a 
province) and Buli (head of a smaller district). The goal of his 
policies was clear: ' ••• the gradual change which I desire to effect 
in the native policy will, I hope, eventually improve the chances of 
obtaining Fijian labour' (Chappelle 1978:62). 
The other communal burden from which im Thurn desired to relieve 
Fijians was the inalienability of their land. The Native Lands 
Ordinance of 1905 gave Fiji~ns the right to sell their land (subject 
to the approval of the Governor in Council). Three years later, 
following pressure by Sir \rthur Gordon (who had been elevated to the 
House of Lords as Lord Stanmore) this was reversed and Fijian land 
again became alienable only through leasing. In the meantime, 
how(•ver, 104, 143 acres had passed out of Fijian ownership (Macnaught 
1976: 52). Of all of the cc~'•munal pol iciee adopted by the Lolonial 
government, that providing for the communal ownership of land has had 
i 
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the most far reaching effects. 
Restrictions on Fijian labour were not abolished as im Thurn had 
hoped, but they were gradually relaxed. Lala was restricted in 1912 
by the introduction of a distinction betwen 'personal lala' and 
'communal lala'. The former was described by 'Thomson as 'payment of 
rent in the form of tribute or service by the tenants settled upon 
their land'. 1he Native Regulations of 1912 specified the chiefs to 
whom personal lala was due and imposed a maximum annual levy. 
Communal lala was the chiefs' authority to make levies on behalf of 
the commune. 'This included not only public works such as bridges and 
ro~ds but also the houses and gardens of individuals (Thomson 1~68). 
Individuals \o'ho did not wish to participate in communal 
housebuilding and garden preparation could apply for exemption. If 
they were deemed capable of supporting themselves they were granted 
galala (independent) status upon payment of a fee ...ttich would meet 
their obligation to their community. In 1928 this fee was reduced 
from 10s to J. 1 and then in 1932 it was further reduced to !Os 
(Macnaught 1974:15). 
The policy of encouraging galalaism during the 1920s and 1930s is 
sometimes regarded as the policy of individualism. G.K. Roth (a 
for r Secretary of Fj ian Affairs) states, for example, that 'the 
pri11 ie of individualism introduced by im 1hurn was ••• given a trial 
but it failed'. 'The granting of galala status, Roth argued, had been 
made inappropriately according to the criterion of of 'the economic 
concept of man rather than ...tlether (an individual) was fitted in all 
respects for the life of a peasant farmer'. In 1944, undar Governor 
Sir Philip Mitchell, 'thP. principle' was finally abandoned and a new 
order under the direction of Ratu Sukuna was established (Roth 
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1951:5-6). 
Under Sukuna, Fijians were again appointed to positions of 
authority and galala status was made more difficult to obtain. Each 
province was headed by a Fijian Roko Tui. Districts (known as 
Tikinas) were amalgamated in effort to reduce parochialism and the 
salaries of the Bulis i.mo administered them were increased 
accordingly. Attempts were made to put communal labour to work in 
agricultural development projects but these failed, leaving both thu 
Fijian Administration and the term communalism with bad reputations in 
economic matters. [l] 
In the 1960s the debate between communalism and individualism 
reached a peak, with social scientists (Spate, Belshaw and 
Nayacakalou) throwing substantial weight behind individualism. A 
report by Dr. Rusiate Nayacakalou, a Fijian anthropologist, finally 
persuad~d the Council of Chiefs to approve the abolition of the 
position of Buli and the Programme of Works under i.mich compulsory 
commur.al labour was organized. Tiie Roko Tuis were retained but almost 
all of their old powers were gone. 
The ambiguity of the term communalism i.men it is applied to 
Fijian society can now be seen. In the beginning it was applied to 
the preservation of the communal aspect of Fijian society; a vague 
g 011 l . Since then, it has been identified with some of the means 
adopted to achieve that goal: use of men of traditional rank to add 
legitimacy to administration; compulsory communal labour; communal 
land ownership. Individualism as a policy meant little more than the 
proposed abolition of these specific measures. Tiie identification of 
p,~laism as the policy of individualism is misleading. Galala never 
( l J Spate (1959: 78-83) examines a number of such failures and the 
official reaction to th1im. 
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were the independent farmers they were thought to be. AB Henry Rutz 
has pointed out: 
'galala not only generally seek out wider 
interpersonal and intergroup relations but they also seem to gain 
direct economic benefits in the form of labor services, a pool of 
savings, some resources, and a degree of economic security against 
natural calamities and social mishaps' {Rutz 1973:302). Rutz was also 
surprised to find that some of the men whom he had previously thought 
to be staunch villagers had in their younger days been £!!.lala. {See 
also Belshaw 1964:84.) 
When the terms communalism and individualism are applied to 
Fijian society in general, rather than to colonial institutions and 
policies, their dichotomized relationship with one another creates 
problems. 'Dichotomous contrasts', Reinhard Bendix explains, 'abound 
only in normative contexts; they are rarely if ever found in social 
action. 1lle reason for this is that all rule making must distinguish 
between conformity and deviance and classify actions accordingly. 
However, the ease of formulating norms of right and wrong stands in 
sharp contrast to the difficulty of fitting any particular action into 
this preconceived schem~. For empirically, social actions show 
continuous gradations ~n~ human relationships are marked by much 
ambiguify and ambivalence' {Bendix 1970:123-4). Land rights, for 
example, have always been held simultaneously by both individuals and 
groups. {See chapter three.) Academic observers were inclined to 
break up the dichotomy by dismisetng communalism as too va~~~ ~Belshaw 
1964:125) while individualism was accepted as if it were entirely 
Unamb 'g s O H K Spate, for example, concludt!d his influential 1. uou • • • • 
study by saying 'that the natural growth is towarde individualism'.[l] 
A number of other writers have quoted this statment, but none has 
further explicated the concept, which must be considered at least as 
(I) SPP OVPr pagP 
' 
"!.· 
() 
I' 
\ 
Page 60 
vague as communalism. Often it seems that individualism is rc::garded 
as synonomous with modernity ( a term that has troubles of its own -
see B~ndix 1970:250-314). At other times, Fijian communalism is 
contrasted with Indian individualism (and success) in commerce. 
It is significant that Fijians themselves speak more of tradition 
and traditional organization than of communalism. [2] A number of 
critics of communalism have argued that the colonial authorities 
created an artificial traditional order. (3] Rusiate Nayacakalou, 
writing with the additional insight of an insider, took tradition more 
seriously. Traditional authority, he recognized, even in 'its modern 
form, emerges as a tightly organized authoritarian system which makes 
for great efficiency in certain contexts' (Nayacakalou 1975: 115). The 
main problem faced by the personnel of the Fijian Administration was 
that they were expected to function as 'leaders' in the traditional 
sense, whereas they were equipped only to be administrators. 
Nayacakalou looked to urban areas for the development of new forms of 
leadership. 
Ill He qualified this, however, by saying that 'one cannot be sure of 
success with a policy of individualism; but I am as nearly certain as 
one can be in human affairs that one can be sure of failure of the 
opposite policy of communalism' (Spate 1959:96). In policy contexts 
it seems, even for the most careful annlyst, dichotomy is 
irresistable. 
(2) There is no Fijian word for communalism, though the general idea 
pervades the Fijian language, as for example in Fijian pronouns 
(Nation 1978:xix). 
(1) Notable within this literature are Peter France's 'demythologizing 
liibours' on the developmt•nt of the system of land tenure, which is 
1'xamined in the next chapter. R.F. Watters has traced the 
development of 1o'hat he calls traditionalism, as distinct from 
tradition. He speaks of the 'so-C'alled "communal system"' and 
suggests that the 'the most fundamental reason for aut ... oritarianism in 
Fijian society springs not so much from the surviving strength of 
chieftanship as from the condit~on of that society after a century of 
culture contact' (Watters 1969: 221). 
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The power of tradition in rural areas in the 1980s should be 
traced to colonial neglect as much as to colonial institution 
building. Before the reorganization of the Fijian Administration in 
the 1940s Fijians lived in 'close-knit ~ikina .•. engrossed in their own 
ceremonial and po1itical affairs' (M ht 1974 20) acnaug : . HeadPd by 
Bulis who were then clearly traditional chiefs rather than petty 
bureaucrats, life went on almost as it always had. If the Buli could 
keep the peace and ensure the village was neat on inspection day, 
there was litle interference from the outside. w~th an annual salary 
of ! 6 to f..12 he obviously had to find ways 0f creating his own 
rewards from the position. Provided he did not gt: i:.oo far, the ~, 
like his more purely traditional predecessors, could benefit 
materially from the labour power under his command. 
De~yite the insulation of Tikina life, some external forces were 
able to filter through and bring social change. The church 
established a place for itself as an institution, education expanded 
and participation in the cash economy increased. These changes came 
gradually, however, and were accommodated by the traditional 
structure. The agents of change, the missionaries, teachers and 
government officials, worked through the chiefs. They found it to 
their advantage to seek chiefly blessing and in return added their 
recognition to chiefly status. The colonial government intervened to 
the extent that it held the power to appoint ~s- but the general 
practice was to appoint men who were acceptable to the power brokers 
within the Tikin...!!. (sec Macnaught 1982). 
Since the 1930s there have been many changes, the most notable of 
which are abolition of the position of Buli, increased outflow of 
po~ulation to urban areas, and increased production of cash crops. 
Q 
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Neverthless, to live in a Fijian ~illage means the acceptance of a 
certain amount of communal activity, as for example i.n the 
fund-raising for churches, schools, village improvements or just for 
purely traditional gatherings. 'This is true not only of areas that 
are isolated from the cash economy but also of areas that are well 
within its orbit, such as those surrounding Suva. 'The traditional 
order is fundamentally a political structure, which has changed to the 
extent that it has retained its political functions by yielding to 
newer social and economic forces. Put simply, this means that chiefs 
withdraw from economic functions; they no longer organize labour or 
redistribute wealth. New men of econJmic power, successful farmers or 
salaried professionals, tend to be accepted in leadership roles 
provided ~hey do not challenge chiefly status. There is a process of 
accommodation similar to that by which church officials were given a 
place within the traditional order. Economic cooperation and 
reciprocity largely vanish from the economic sphere wl'lile the communal 
traditional order remains important in political life. 
The confusion and controversy surrounding 
communalism/individualism is both terminological and conceptual. 'The 
terminology 1 propose is as follows. 'The terms communalism and 
individualism will be applied mainly to the policies and institutions 
that arc said to be communalist or individualist. In other words the 
reference is to the nature of the justification of policy. 
Communal ism as a political phenomenon is another matter. ln ta 1 king 
nbout politics among Fijians it is impossible to avoid the word 
communal. The activities of groups within the Fijian community and 
the behaviour of Fijians as a group in their relations with other 
races are distinctly communal. It is necessary to make clear whether 
one is talking about this political communalism or communalist 
I 
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policies.(!] 
Reorganization of the Bureacracl in the 1960s 
The decade of development opened in Fiji with the presentation in 
February 1960 of the report of the commission of enquiry into natural 
resources and population trends. Headed by Sir Alan Burns, it had 
been appointed to 'recommend how the development of the colony and its 
resources should proceed' (Burns 1960:4). TI1e report was strongly 
critical of the Fijian Administration and the institutions and 
policies governing land tenure. It recommended the abolition of the 
administration, the introduction of a minimum tenure of sixty years 
for agricultural leases, the overseeing of NLTB activities by the 
legislature, compulsory leasing of land by Fijians outside reserve 
areas and a tax on underutilised Fijian land. The report was also 
critical of the reserves policy but drew back from recommending its 
abolition unless 'Fijian public opinion' favoured it. Fijian leaders 
found the tone of the Burns report objectionable and strongly opposr:d 
its main recommendations. As a consequence it failed to fulfil its 
intended role as a guide to developmm1:: policy. It was politically 
unrealistic, even within the colonial framework. 
(l] ln the context of economic activity l avoid the term communal, 
distinguishing instead, collect iv t! and ind iv id ua 1 ownership in 
narrowly legal terms. If l refer to such projects as communal the 
reference is solely to the implicit policy justification. TI1e 
question of the validity of the justification is one that has to be 
answered. The term traditional I apply only to what Fijians 
themselves call traditional (vakavanua), avoiding altogether the urge 
to designate certain practi~-;;-;s g~nuinely traditional while others 
arc supposed to be spurious. If there is ambiguity or change in the 
use of the term vakavanua, this is to be identified and explained. 
'The' tr ad it ional mode Of-product ion, system of land tenure or 
political organization is to be avoided. Rather, I would distinguish 
the use of monev from reciprocity in economic relationships, 
1>xplaining the dif fer<>nccs this makes in the way people condu1:t their 
Pconom ic l i fc. 
'-
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A year earlier, in 1959, Professor O.H.K. Spate had presented a 
report on the economic problems and prospects of the Fijian people. 
More sympathetic in tone, it was more warmly received, although a 
number of its main recommendations were similar to those of the Burns 
report and were therefore similarly ignored. However, the rentral 
arguments marshalled by Spate to support his recommendations have been 
very influential, even up to the present day. The re form of the 
Fijian Administration and the introduction of taxes on Fijian land in 
the 1960s can be traced to his report via the influence of his 
assistant, the late Dr. Rusiate Nayacakalou. Perhaps the most 
influential part of the Spate report is the goal declared at the 
beginning: 'It is my firm conviction that for the Fijian country-side 
the objective should be a community of independent farmers, living or 
working on holdings heritable, and alienable at least between Fiji3ns, 
but retaining in each village or old Tikina area a common centre 
church, school, guesthouse, parish hall, chiefly residence- where the 
old dignity which the koro is rapidly losing might be recaptured' 
(Spate 1959: 9). 
Within various reports dealing with Yalavou this passage is 
quoted in no fewer than four pl&ces. Its influence appears to arise 
out of the implicit distinction between, on the one hand, social and 
political comrnunalism, and on the other, economic individualism. nte 
former, Spate argued, does not have to be sacrificed in order to 
achieve the lntter. 
Tile Fijian Administration 
ln 1967 the Fijiar. Adminstration was drastically changed when the 
position of 6uli was abolished. Th<? Bu li' s function had been the 
foundation of communalism as a policy. Together with the Tik~na 
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Council the .!!:!.!..!. would establish a Programme of Works with which the 
surplus labour of the Tikina would be put to work on tasks for the 
benefit of the Tikina. This would range from the construction and 
.tz repair of the houses of individuals through to the construction and 
() 
maintenance of village drains, schools and other obviously public 
facilities. The whole operation was generally carried out, as 
Nayacakalou has put it, within a 'customary idiom' (Nayacakalou 
1975:86). The~ "'as often, though in the 1950s and 1960s not 
always, a man of trad.itional rank who frequently operated with the 
traditional autocratic style. Participation in communal labour was 
compulsory fo ~ all men of working age who had not been granted gal ala 
status. 
Complementing the abolition of the position of !!!.!.!:, was a change 
in the role of the Provincial Council. Democratic elections were 
introduced and councils were empowered to make by-laws governing 
village health standards, thereby taking over one of the functions of 
the Buli. In four provinces the powe·r to levy land rates was 
introduced as a first step towards making provincial councils into 
local government bodies. 
'nle practical effect of the 1967 reforms was the abolition of tho 
Fijian Administration aa it had been known to generations of Fijians 
since cession in 1874. With the removal of the old bonds of 
?aternalism Fijians faced a bewildering array of government officials, 
public servants they were told, whose services they were freo to 
enlist for their own development. 'n\ey were in legal terms 
individuals. The Roko Tui remained as a line of communication open to 
--
all Fijians in their dealings with the government but his powers were 
gone, his funds for travel limited, and he was increasingly by-passed 
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by other civil servants in their dealings with Fijian villagers. In 
the 1960s and 1970s government attempts to bring development to rural 
Fijians were channelled through expanding civil set"Vice ministries, 
most not~bly the Department of Agriculture. [l] Infrastru~ture 
development priorities nimained firmly in the hands of the central 
government. 
.'.!!!! ~ Development Authority 
Despite its enduring general influence, the Spate report did not 
shape development planning in the 1960s. 1be institutions of the 
' Fijian Admidistration that Space proposed to amend were. simply 
by-passed. lfhe main vehicle for development in the early 1960s was 
the Land Development Authority, which was created as a pale imitation 
of the Malayan land development organization. Chaired by a 
Development C~mmissioner, the autho~ity was initially composed mainly 
of senior civil servants. Its role wao two-fold: ( i) the opening up 
of land not at present settled or leased; (ii) the promotion of 
increased production and, where possible, new·crops on land at present 
held by existing small-holders (Counr.il Paper 30 1963:1). 
Two areas were proposed for the first role; bananas were to be 
grown at Lomaivuna and beef ranching was to be established at Ra. 'nle 
Fiji Development Company (a subsidiary of the British 
government-sponsored Commonwealth Development Corporation) was engaged 
as the LDA's 'managing agents' ta undertake the planning and 
implementation of both projects. rne second, more diffuse task was to 
be the responsibility of six Land Dev~topment Officers seconded to the 
t.DA from the civil service. tbey would identify problems associated 
..,ith markets, land tenure, capital availability, technical advice or 
[ l J the Agriculture Department is now part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and 1isheriea (MA.F). 
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motivation, and devise plans f.or schemes to be approved by Local 
Development Boards (made up of civil servants from appropriate 
departments at the local level). 'lbe local boards and the LDOs worked 
in the belief that an I• • intimate knowledge of each area is essential 
bef)re sound plans can be made' (Council Paper 30 1963:3). Funds were 
made available for small loans to purchase equipment and materials 
needed for improved methods of production. 
In 1963 the I.DA was reorganised so that it would work together 
more with the existing agents of development. District Officers 
replaced Land Development Officers; Divisional Commissioners were 
made ex-officio chairmen of the local development boards and the AILB 
(Agricultural and Industrial L~ans Board) took over the administration 
of loans made by the LOA. 'lbe l~A 'remained responsible for planning, 
implementation and finance of large scale development schemes and for 
examining development plans presented to it by Local Development 
Boards' (Council Paper 13 1968:4). In Suva the Authority itself, now 
under the chairmanship of Ratu Mara (the Ministerial Member for 
Natural Resources), would have the power of veto. 
'lbe cattle ranch in Ra, as will be explained later, was not 
established but the Lomaivuna banana scheme commenced operations in 
1963. 'lbe first one hundred settlers moved in between October 1963 
and March 1964. 'lbe second hundred settled the following year. By 
1967, however, it was apparent that the Lomaivuna scheme, as a banana 
project, had failed. Disease and marketing problems prevented 
earnings from reaching levels sufficient to service debts and leave an 
income for necessities. In !967 farmers' remaining debts, apart from 
those for their houses, had to be written off. 
I. 215,225. Council Paper 31 1968:3) 
(They totalled 
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.!!!.!, Change ~ Extension 
The Lomai vuna 'failure' provided lessons that reshaped 
development planning in the second half of the 1960s. Having seen the 
CDC fail, the Agriculture Department felt that it could do better 
through normal extension work. In 1967 a change was made 'away from 
banana monoculture to a basis of mixed crops' (Council Paper 31 
1969: 1). At the end of the year the Fiji Development Corporation 
withdrew from management, although some of its staff remained as 
employees of the Agriculture Department. As government officials, 
however, their role had chenged to that of extension. The close 
supervision forwerly exercised ceased. As a. result : 'An outstanding 
feature of the yeer vas ~the difference in the performance of 
individual growers f~llowing the reduction in the level of day to day 
supervision which the new proposals entailed' (Council Paper 31 
1969:2). Soce growers produced 250 cases of bananas, others as few as 
45 ca~es. It was estimated that about twenty of the two hundred 
settlers 'would gradually be replaced'. 
'llt~ Fiji Development Bank (FDB) in ics annual report for 1968/69, 
described the changes as a 'discontinuation of the p~evious g~oup 
approach towards management of sche~es and imple~entation of new 
development projects, for which farmers will be se!ected on the basis 
of individual mcri:,,,', As a result t the repor•. go11a on to say, the 
FOB 'will be associated with the farmers as i.D.dividua.l.s rather than as 
a group 1 and this should OV'!rcomP. some of the disadvantages of the 
J earlier systiam' (Council Paper 4 1970:2). The only problem with the 
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new system, the bank noted, was a decline in the loan repayment! that 
occur~ed when the LDA no longer mark~ted produce and m4de deductions 
for lo~n repaytnents. 
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Henry Rutz provides an interesting diagnosis of the problems 
faced by the LOA at Lomaivuna: 
'The LOA espoused the official 
ideology of "individualism" but asserted the primacy of a centrally 
managed organization that could take adv9.ntage of maximum efficiency 
in production' (Rutz 1973:54). The Agriculture Department, cnrough a 
return to advisory extension work, attempted to resolve this conflict. 
It also attempted to allow farmers a greater voice in their collective 
affairs. In his first meeting with settlers at Lomaivuna, the Senior 
Agricultural Officer who assumed direction of the scheme promised that 
the Committee of Sector Chairmen created by the LOA would h~nceforth 
be used as a two-way channel of coam.unication, rather than as an 
instrument of daiwnward communication. 
From 1969 till 1972 the LOA was in abeyance. It was revived to 
allow the creation of the Ika Corporation and, later, the Uluisaivou 
Corporation and the Yalavou Rural Developmant Board. The many other 
smaller schemes started by the LDA wer~, in 1968, already under the 
control of District Officers working with the assistance of 
Agriculture DE' ,·.irtment extension staff. From 1968 they remained under 
the general direction of the Agriculture Department. Responsibility 
for marketing produce, which had been an important feature of the LDA, 
was gr~dually dropped, although Agriculture Department officers 
continued to offer as~istance wher~ possible. In a number of LOA 
created schemes the Co-operatives Department stepped in to establish 
marketing co-operatives. [ l l 
Throughout the 1960s there was a steady expansion of the 
development bureaucracy. Agriculture bec&ltle the larg~st department 
and had the most extensive contact with people but Co-operativea and 
(1) For beef, howev9r, the Agricultui~ De~artment ~ade an exception to 
its gena~al rule (see below p.14~). 
o, 
::he Fiji Development Bank also expanded :iignificantly. When created 
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as the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board in 1952 the FDB had a 
p , staff of four• By 1967, following its takeover of LDA loans, it had 
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expanded to thirty-three, with branches at Sigatoka, &a and Nausori • 
.:!'!!.!. Hunter Report 
The proliferation of development agents, predictably, created 
problems of coordination. In 1969 Guy Hunter, a social scientist with 
experience of development in India, South East Asie and Africa, was 
invited to look at Fiji's development bureaucracy and to make 
recommendations about the coo~dination of its proliferating branches. 
He was also asked 'to consider especially how all section~ of the 
population could be brought to partidpate more fully, at all levels, 
in rural development'. Hunter's report, although much shorter and 
more superficial than the Spate and Burns reports, fundamentally 
shaped the structure of the development bureaucracy of independent 
Fiji, reflecting the fact that it had tecome easier to make 
politically acceptable proposals once politics had come out into the 
open. 'llle difficultie8 of the 'transition from a communal to a more 
individualistic society' were noted by Hunter but he avoided raising 
questions about the Fijian institutions of land tenure or local 
government. 'nle Ministry of Fijian Affairs had been considering ways 
in which Fijian Provi~cial Councils might expand to include other 
races (Davies 1971: 254) but Hunter's report avoids this questio\l on 
the grounds that it 'would be better considered when the shape of 
things to come i8 a l~~tle clearer' (Hunter 1969:9). 
lhe two main recommendations made by Hunter ~ere for (a) 
administrative coordination under the District Administration; and 
(b} a 1ystem of informal consultation to fill the local goverrililent 
o" 
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vacuum. The District A.dmiuistration coMisted of the Diviiti.onal 
Commissioners, heading the four major administrative units, and th~ 
District Officers stationed in the eighteen districts. After the 
bureaucratic expansion of the 1960s the role of the Divisional 
Commissioners and District Officers bad ~hanged significantly. Before 
that their role as agents of the government had been wide-ranging, 
giviug them direct authority over many to act for many government 
departments. By 1969, when they were operating alongside the 
fieldstaff of mruiy of the departments they had formerly represented, 
their powers had shrunk considerably. Administration of the minor LOA 
schemes, ~hich passed to the Agriculture Department in 1968, was the 
last of the District Officers' substantive powers to go. 
nte new coordinating role that Hunter envisaged for the District 
Administration was that of serving as a 'mail exchange' rather than 
the exP.rcise of direction. n1e departments to be coordinated would 
inform the Divisional Commissioner of their activities, so that he 
could in turn give &n overall picture of the development activities of 
his division to the Chief Minister's office and to other relevant 
departments. Hunter believed that it Wds unnecessary for Divisional 
Commissioners to exercise powers of direction over the field staff of 
other departments, preferring that they remain ent~rely responsible 
for their 
\ 
ac tiv it ie11 to their own departmental hierarchies. 
Divisional Commissioners would, howaver, exercise a minor leadership 
role by chairing meetings of the divisional heads of deparment~. At 
District level the District officer would lead a District r lVelapment 
o Team. 
0 
oo 
')' 
I 
r 
I 
,,~ 
,,, 0 ,, 
0 "?t 
J'c 
0 
0 
Q 
c 
,,::'._\ 
,:) () ... 
JO 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 
Q ' 
The 'post office' role recommended by Hunter grew partly out of 
hia belief that 'when political leadership takes over control, the 
rolt= of the Civi:I. Service as a .whole, and especially of the DivisionaJ. 
and District Administration, clearly changes. 'nley supply the data 
and execute rather than form policy. Experience shows that the load 
upon them increases, often steeply •.•• 
'nle civil servmit in the 
period of strain, will have to adjust to a new style of leadership and 
to decisions taken naturally and rightly on political rather than 
bureaucratic Leasoning' (Hunter 1969:9). Hunter himself, however, 
sceered well clear of politics, including the difficult question of 
relationship between local and central government. Instead he spoke 
of the need for 'consultation 1 , to be accomplished by regular meetings 
of the Di:ttrict and Divisiondl teams with popular representatives, so 
as to allow a two-way flow of information. Fijian representatives 
coulj be selected by provincial councils while representatives of 
other races could be elect~d by whatever procedures the Divisional 
Commisaioner~ or Dist~ict Officers thought appropriate for their 
particular areas. 
Hunte~ specifically rejected proposals that had been made within 
the ministry of social services for the creation of a department of 
commun\ty development (Davies 1971:264; Hunter 1969:7,8,10). He 
argued that, while 'community development is vitally necessary in 
itself', coordinated attention to the problem by existing d~partments 
would more efficiently &erve the purpose. 'Ille 'most vital form of 
community development', he argued, 'is e~onomic dev~lopment' (Hunter 
1969:8). He therefore looked to the efforts of th6 Divisional 
Commissioners in coordinating other agencies. To auist the 
commissioners, however, he suggested the creation of 'a amall fudd to 
be used Wholly at the commissioner's discretion', a suggestion which 
._•r-----------------------------------• 
, 
' ~ 
0 
0 
0 
wa& also taken up by the government. 
'Die 'self-help' fund 
subsequently grew to have an important part in the government's rural 
development policy, if only because it allowed bureaucrats and popular 
representatives to have something to talk about when they met. 
TI\e government extended Hunter's proposals by using the 
divisional and district development committees to achieve popular 
participation in drawing up Development Plan Six. In 1970 a problems 
census was conducted in which the development committees suggested 
projects and classified them according to whether they could be 
?rovided Ca) entirely by self-help, (b) by self- help with government 
assistance, or (c) only with full gQvernment funding. The problems 
that were compiled during that exercise led planners to the conclusion 
that it w~s 'unlikely that people at grass roots level cl~sely 
o analysed the socio-economic context of their needs and aspirations and 
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the choices they themselves must mak~ regarding 8pecific expressed 
needs' (Review of DP6:44). Indeed many of the problems compiled by 
one provincial council read like a Programme of Works drawn up by the 
Buli under the Sukuna ad1rinistration ~stablishing villagP. 
plantatione, village house building with comm•mal labour, communal 
cutting of grass and clearing of drains. 
Tile self-help scheme, which commenced in 1970 with the small 
pump-priming fund suggested by Hunter, was more successful. Through 
it, parochially-minded vi!Jagers were motivated to make some plans and 
to mobilize funds so as to be able to compete with their neighbours 
for a share of the subsidies available. As a result, 8ea walls, creek 
cr~ssings and community hMlls began to SFring up. Planners were 
plea4ed wi-h the responsg, although ~~ey ~oped that there would be 
progress from the cor.centration on 'community and soc:i.al service 
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facilities and assets' towards 'projects dealing specifically with 
economic development' (Review of DP6:45). 
'lbe Reorganization of the NLTB 
- ---
The reorganization of the NLTB, which commenced in 1977 
1 
capped 
of£ the work of steady bureaucratization that had been underway since 
the 1960s, when the colonial government initia.ted policies to ;>repare 
the economic basis for independence. In 1977 the consultant dppointed 
by the board (see above) reported that there was a number of 
". deficiencies in the bureaucratic structure of the NLTB. i:le found that 
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it lticked 'entirely the professionally <1ualified staff component 
nece~1sary for tJound management' • There was no 'known and proclaimed 
es tab tishment 1 1 and no 'known and adhered to qualifications within the 
establiahmetut'. 
'Formal work generation and control systems' were 
needed to replace the existing 'amorphoua masses of generic classes of 
work', the responsibility for which was often confused. The filing 
system was found to be 'in a deplorable state' and needed 'a complete 
overhaul' (Parliamentary Paper 25 '977:1). 
On the other hand, the NLTB organization was highly bureaucratic 
in that it employed extreme centralization to impose order on its 
dealings. Branch officers were no more than 'inspectors and 
letterboxes'. 'lbe General Manag·:r 1 'knowing the limit at ions of his 
Br~nch staff, ha(d) every recolllJllendation therefrom inspected and 
ecrutinised down to the minutest detail by a small te3m of competent 
senior technical officers whom ha (could) trust to weed out and 
prev~nt the worst legal catastrophes. 'lllis they (did), successfully, 
on the whole, but at a tremendous cost in time and af ficiency' 
\Parliamentary Paper 25 1977:3). 'llle reliance on centralization to 
achieva bureaucratic control reflGcted the fact that the WuTB had 
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retained the essentially colonial character of its genesis in the 
1940s. It had grown without developing. 
The consultant argued that the NLTB was hampered by the lack of a 
precise definition of its role. The act creating the board gave it 
the role of 'the control of all land' adding that 'all such land shall 
be admiuistered by the Board for the benefit of the Fijian owners'. 
But this broad definition is supplemented by five specific powers: 
(i) the power to grant leases; (ii) responsibility for the approval 
of all 'dealings' in Fijian land; (iii) the power to collect and 
distribuute rent money; (iv) Che power to reserve and dereserve 
land; (v) the power to grant leases over reserve land. The 
consultant argued that the responsibility for 'administ~ation' should 
be interpreted as confined to the five specific powers. The 
consultant found, however, that board staff often saw their role in 
much wider terms. 'For examph, it was suggested that the NLTB had 
some duty to improve the farming standards of those producing 
traditional basic foods' (Parliamentary Paper 25 1977: 5). In 
practice, staff had been involved in a variety of wider functions. 
Some, for example, had become deeply involved in the day-to-day 
management of development projects (e.g. the Fiji Pine Commission Lind 
the Seaqaqa Sugar Project). The NLTB had created the Native Lands 
Development Corporation (NLDC) as a company actively to develop Fijian 
land for the benefit of its owners. Some people felt that by offering 
employment to Fijians only the NLTB was helping to bring Fijians 'into 
the mainstream of the commercial life of the nation' (Parliamentary 
Paper 25 1977:6). 
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maximum efficiency. 'nlis would serve both the interests of landowners 
and the national interest. He estimated that there were probably some 
15,000 leases that were overdue for rent reassessment in the 
agricultural sector alone. Failure to meet this responsibility cost 
landowners money that could never be recovered (Parliamentary Paper 25 
1977:16). 
Even if rent collection and reassessment could be improved 
dramatically, the consultant doubted that the board could ever pay its 
way if it relied upon its collection of a twenty-five per cent share 
of lease revenue. He argued that the government should share the cost 
of financing the NLTB, as it 'is fulfilling, or should be, an 
essential role in the economic development of Fiji as a whole' 
(Parliamentary Paper 25 1977:20). 
lmplement~tion of the consultant's proposals was commenced in 
1978. Professional staff were ·recruited overseas and placed in senior 
positions within the new decentralized structure. Regional offic~s 
were closed until filing was reorganized and new procedur.·es 
established. In a remarkably short space of time the NLTB seems to 
have been transformed into an institution that is functioning 
efficiently a.nd con!orming much more closely to the bureaucratic ideal 
of impersonal efficiency. nte influx of expatriate staff has been 
accepted by local NLTB officers with little apparent dissatisfaction. 
Expatriate officers have been pleasantly surprised by this and 
attribute it, at least partly, to the demoralization that had caken 
place when local staff had been forced to opQrate with smaller numbers 
and outmoded and inefficient methods. Professionalization and 
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bureaucratization, even if accompanied by an expatriate takeover, have 
provided a welcome relief. 
Local Government 
At present rural local government is confined to provincial 
councils which, as heirs to the Fijian Administration, serve only 
Fijians. [l] They have the power to levy rates and to pass by-laws 
governing such matters as village health regulations and the funding 
of education. Since their boundaries arise out of traditional 
political considerations, provinces vary considerably in population 
and area. 'nle councils also vary in the types of activites they 
undertake. Many have in recent years undertaken corporate economic 
activity in an attempt to provide alternative sources of finance to 
provincial rates which have sene~ally been poorly paid and often 
resented. 'nle funding of such corporate busineu has been 
accomplished by 'traditional' fund-raising. [ 2] Tht! results of such 
group-based fund-raising have been surp·risingly good, in contrast to 
the reluctance to pay relatively small head taxes. Land rates were 
introduced in some provinces in 1967. ntey quickly proved to be even 
less acceptable than the head tax. Members of mata~alis with valuable 
land four.J that they owed large sum• of money. Payments virtually 
stopped. In 1980, having organized a series of traditional 
fund-raising activities over ten years, the Tailevu Provincial Council 
gained approval from the Ministry of Fijian Affairs t:o • :ite off 
o. $252,l-09 in unpaid land rates and $20, 795 in unpaid head taxetf. ,._, 
-~· 
Spokimen for other provinces, when told of this, indicated that they ~ 
too would like to vrite off their debts Cl!,!li Tukuni 11 June 1980, 
(l] Advisory r.ouncils are elect.ed by non-Fijians but, as their name 
implies, thoy have only advisory power. 
(2] The paramount chief of the province allocates a sum to be 
collected by each district. ~e head of the district allocates 
amounts to each of the villages in his district, and so on down the 
line. 
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'llle other side of council finances, spending, has encountered 
obvious difficulties. 'llle lack of regular and predictable funds makes 
it difficult to consider long term programmes of any sort. Added to 
this are the ent~enched parochial sentiments which militate against 
any spending that might favour one part of of the province (see Nation 
1978: 72-103). 
'nle most popular form of spending has been investment 
in the hope of establishing regular and predictable sources of funds. 
Investments have included property development, musical cassette 
production and a dairy farm which will be examined in chapter seven. 
On the whole, provincial councils are extremely conservative 
bodies. 
'llley are an effective form of upward coimnunication for a 
limited range issues but they are reluctant to take positive action 
for development, even within the restricted powers available to them. 
Their normal mode of communication is the airing of ~o~plaints.[l] 
They rarely propose development priorities within the boundaries of 
the province (see Nation 1978:67-103), As a result, there has bean 
pressure to disperse funds for infrasructural development rather than 
concentrating spending in areas where the economic return will be 
highest. 'llle construction of roads in northern Vanua Levu, for 
example, is being undertaked to equalize road access betw~en the 
northern and southern parts of the island rather than to mQet any 
specific development need. 
[ l J Complaints 
expenditure in 
particularistic. 
concern such 
districts and 
matters as 
provinces. 
shares of development 
'llley tend to be extrGmely 
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Development Plan Eight makes a mention of a number of proposed 
lines of action to regionalize planning so that dispersion of 
development, a more generalized objective of the seventh development 
plan, can be given more substance, One proposed avenue is the 
creation of rural growth centres where improved facilites of various 
kinds will be provided. Another, related, approach to regionalization 
will be a study 'to review the structure and effectiveness of the 
Pxisting Divisional administrative machinPry for regional development 
implemt•ntation' (Developrn1~nt Plan Eight 1980:32). Consideration w~ll 
be given to increasing the powers of divisional commissioners, perhaps 
allowir;g them some role in supervision and discipline. More 
inportantly, the question of regional budgeting will be raised. The 
proposed study 'will make recommendations on the extent to which and 
how Commissioners (initially) and elected Provincial bodies 
(eventually) can be given control over regional budgets' (Development 
Plan Eight 1980: 32). 1brec specific steps towards budgetary 
decentralization arc foreshadowed. First, ministries will be asked to 
identify 'budget activities which could, in whole or in part, be 
administered at the divisional level or below'. Secondly, there will 
be a progressiv~ increase in the level of the Small Projects ~"und (the 
<lirect descccndant of the 'small pump-priming fund' recommended by the 
Hunter report), Thirdly, 'Regional Development Grants vill be 
al located to Divisional Development Com.-nittees for Apen.H1'\g in 
accordance wit~ both regional and national objectives' (Development 
Plan Eight 1980:32). Divisional Development Committees arc planned to 
have respons~bility for establiPhing priorities but the size of the 
~rants will be determined by objective ~riteria such as 'population, 
Ptonornic potential and the degree of 'backwardness' of the region' 
(OevelopmPnt Plan Eight 1980:33), It ia believed that there is little 
i 
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scope for increasing decentralization through greater autonomy of 
revt.>nue raising. 
The complementary local government aspt-c ts of the 
decentralization proposnls are not cl · d b D 1 t Pl P - ie y eve opmen an 
Eight. It is merely mentioned that 'a special committee' will 
'examine whether or not l'Xisting relationships bPtween the Provinces, 
District organizations advisory councils, rural local authorities and 
municipalities should be altered and make recommendntions for the 
future structure of local government and how this should be 0rganizPd 
and co-ordinated' (Development Plan Eight 1980:32). No mention is 
made of the political and constitutional obstacles in the way of any 
alteration to existing provincial councils. Any amendment to the 
Fijian Affnirs legislation INhich nrovides for provincial councils 
would require a three quarters majority of both houses of parliament 
and the concurrence of the Great Council ot Chiefs. 
Participation in ~ning 
In formal 1 institutional terms, nature of popular 
participation in planning changed dramatically during the 1960s. 
Before 1966 colonial officials controlled both the executive and 
legislative arms of government. ln 1963 popular representation in the 
Leg isl at ive Council was increased (although there was st i 11 an 
'official majority') and 1 for the first time, Fijians e>lccted 
Leg i a l at iv e Council me>mbcrs. [ l J In 1966, cabinet government was 
introduced 1 fol lowed four years later by indQpen<lencc. 
The com~enceme>nt of self govern~ent in 1966 did not lead to a 
nudden change of.direction in devdopmPnt policy. The Allian-::e party 
took over from the colonial regime a steady incrementali&t approach to 
(I) Before 1963 Fijian representatives on the Legislative Council were 
no;ninated by the Great Council of Chie>h. 
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government. Development Plan Six, which the Alliance used as the 
basis of its 'Peace, Progress ancl Prosperity' general elector al 
campaign in 1972, was a conservative product of the conventional 
~conornic planning of the time. It aimed to maximize economic planning 
in aggregate terms and paid little attention to the Fijian share of 
the benefits of growth. The problem with this type of planning was, 
as E.K. Fisk observed in 1970, that concentration of growth in sectors 
. 
of the economy where Fijians were under-represented would accentuate 
the economic imbalance between the two major races (Fisk. 1970:49-56). 
Fijian leaders could see the problems but. moved cautiously to change 
the emphasis of development strategy. [l] Development Plan Seven, 
which began in 1976, described the sixth plan as a 'transitional 
plan', the first of 'the post-colonial era'.· It was seen as 
'providing for a continuation of the established pattern of 
development while a view was taken by ~he newly independent people of 
Fiji as to the kind of society and approach to development they wanted 
to evolve' (Davelopment Plan Seven 1975:5). 
nae emphasis of the seventh plan was on regional development, the 
spread of benefits in a geographical sense, which also promoted a more 
equ1~able distr,bution racially. It ~as noted that, up to 1976, 'very 
1 it t 1 e t.ad been done in the inland r.reas of Viti Levu, the bulk 
of Bua atd Macuata and Cakaudrove and the outer islands'(Development 
Plan Seve11 1975:)2). Mention was made of the need to ~ecentralize 
'controls a1 d decision making' but no concrete steps were proposed for 
the implem~ntation of such a goal. Development Plan Eight carries 
these plans further by making a commitment to bring an element of 
regionalism into the development planning process. However, the 
Ill See hanaard 7 December 1970, page 53. 
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,·r,•bl,·;ns mt•ntionPd above (p.77) in relation to existing institutions 
lucal government mean that this will be a slow process. The 
j .. 1rt1cipation problem, in its widest sense,·can be expected to persist 
Conclusion 
-------
Tt1e democratization of government led to increased popular 
,"rt icip.ition 1n government in national or aggregate terms, but 
;·.rt 1, i pat ion at the local level is quite another problem. Despite 
;,,. i·res.•nce of a government totally sympathetic to their interests, 
i-!J 1 .• :1'. have faced many ot>stac)es in their attempt to participate '!lore 
illy in the commercial eco:wmy. The two major cattle projects were 
;, rt:iken in the hope that aid donors might have the ability to 
. "'' • 11t rate resources on two of the underdeveloped Fijian areas. The 
; ·"blt·m ls, however, do the projects prov5de the means of solving this 
;·r ,•bl .·m in other areas? 
Ttll' problem that the projects are attempting to solve, the 
I'' -it°' 1 em of Fijian par tic ipat ion in economir. growth, mus1-. be set within 
t'1t ~'intext of the relationship between rural Fijians an~1 the state 
" p :- a t us wi t h in wh i ch they ope r a t e • This relationship changed 
:r ,.,at1cally in 1967 when the position of Buli was abolished. The 
··1·1, l,lence of this changP. with the attainment of self-government (and 
.. .r turned out to be Fijian- led) confused many Fijians who could not, 
r n i ,;ht, become new citizens, aware of their democratic rights and 
11;ip1·d to deal with technocratic civil servants. Unlike many other 
· •' l iptng countries, Fiji, i>ince independence, has experienced a 
tr. :.,.ttHning of the bureaucratic struc.ure of its civil service (most 
•t i~ily ir. the reorganiz.ation of the NLTB) • 
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Tne abolition of the Buli system ended the policy of communalism, 
such as it was in the 1960s. In its place there was, by default more 
than anything else, a policy of individualism. In practical terms, if 
the policy of individualism meant anything at all, it mPant that 
d~vt>lupmt>nt bureaucrats did not want tp deal with groups, only with 
i n d i v i d ua 1 s • 
In chapter ·four the practical efft>cts of this pol icy are 
•X~1ined in relation to the Verata and Tilivalevu cattle projects. 
\.,':iat the planners of these projects overlooked was that the abolition 
of coin:~unalist institutions did not remove all 'com:nunalism', in the 
.:L1st gt>neral sense, from Fijian society, as will be apparent in the 
:i.·x t dH1pt er. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE ARE ONE * 
The Socio-economic Context of the Cattle Projects 
'Tne old economic order asked: How can I give, on thio 
piece of land, work and sustenance to the greatest possible 
number of men? Capitalism asks: From this given piece of 
land how can I produce as many crops as possible for the 
market with as few men as possible'. Max Weber (1946:367) 
1
MPn c~ased to see the agrarian problem as a question of 
supporting people on the land and began to perceive it as 
the best way of investing capital 1n the land. They began 
to treat land more and more as something that could be 
bought and sold, used and abused, in a word like modern 
private property'. Barrington Moore, Jr 0967:8) 
'For Fijians the problem is not whether the land tenure 
system and pattern provide areas for future occupation, but 
wt1ether or not the distribution of land between ownership 
groups coincides sufficiently well with that of population 
and wnether the community can modify its cultural and social 
organization to make full use of the available land'. R.G. 
~ard (1965:139) 
Explaining Social and E~onomic Change 
In addition to the many shared characteristics of Fijian 
villages, each of the areas in which the four cattle projects have 
hPen established has a distinrtive social and economic setting. Some 
,1f tne distinctive features are long standing, being the result of 
daptat1on to differences of soil, climate and topography. Other 
l1fferences are the result of social and economic changes arising out 
i! contact with the outside world. The purpose of this chapter is to 
: .. ,,~ribe these differences in order to elucidate the motives of 
; •rt1cipants in cattle development projects. 
TI1e question of motivation is often not addressed explicitly in 
t'.,1· .c,,icial scien:es (with the exception of psychology). Explanations 
» "'c1al and economic change frequently l'rnploy implicit assumptions 
• ~ F111an proverb 
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about motivation that are not .igorously scrutinized. Neo-classical 
economists have perhaps the clearest model of motivation but it is 
rather specialized and, some would say, too narrow to be applied to 
all societies. Proponents of 'peasant studies', for example, question 
the applicability of nee-classical assumptions to peasant society, 
which they identify as a type with its own distinct characteristics 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1969:63). 
relations, fatalism, etc. 
Risk aversion, distrust in personal 
are identified as a set of interrelated 
<;ubcul tural el em en ts that not only impede economic development but 
also make untenable the assumptions made by nee-classical economists 
(Rogers 1969:115). The peasant sub-culture theory, if it were 
universally valid, would be of immense importance in the planning of 
development projects. Unfortunately the theory is far from proven. 
One critic has suggested that the whole approach is more a reflection 
of poor communication between rural populations and planners than ri:-,e 
existence of a common peasant subculture (Castillo 1969). The 
valuable service rendered by the subculture of peasantry approach, 
according to Castillo, is the importance it places upon 'knowing one's 
audience in designing programs of directed ~ocial change' (Castillo 
1969:136). 
The problem with Castillo's simple prescription, 1 knowing one' s 
audience', is that of choosing an appropriate level of generality. In 
F1j:i, for exaIJlj:Jle, should planners attempt to understand 'the 
pc>a:ant', 'the Pacific Islander', 'the Fijian villager' or what? Moi>t 
acar.emic observers of Fijian social and economic change appear to 
SPttle for 'the Fijian' or 'the Fijian villager', an afpropriate level 
for policy relevance, but occasionally move to higher and lower levels 
of generality. It is notable that a racial level of generality is 
11ften chosen in Fiji. Accordingly Fijian copra producers in Lau are 
I 
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grouped with Fijian sugar farmeu in Ra while wealthy Indian sugar 
farmers are grouped with the p00rest Indian dry rice farmers. [l] The 
descriptive orientation ciOught in this chapter is at a lower level of 
generality, highlighting the parti~ular values, attitudes and 
motivations of the people living in areas where cattle projerts have 
been established. Nevertheless, description and an emphasis on the 
distinctiveness of each area require some general points of reference. 
Earlier I identified four types of approach to social and 
t'Clllh>mic change: modernist, traditionalist, determinist and populist. 
[ach of these approaches makes different assumptions about both the 
range of choices open to individuals within Fijian society and the way 
in ~nic.h they actually tend to choose. 
R.F. Watters' attitude to questions of choice was fundamentally 
shaped by his voluntaristic, modernist framework. While not wanting 
to deny Fijians the right to choose their own goals he argued that 
they had to come to terms with the reality of a dissonance between 
their goals and the steps required to achieve them. 'The Western-type 
goal of material enrichment is usually paramount, but traditional 
goals may at times compete with this end, or (the Fijian's) efforts 
may be frustrated by his desire to gratify his immediate impulses, by 
deference to ascriptive leadership, or his preference for the 
collective interest of his kinfolk ano:l village rather than his own 
self-interest' (Watters 1969:223). 
[lj The difficulties of generalizing about Fijian social and 
life will be examined in this chapter. A.G. Anderson has 
many differences of economic activity among rural Indians 
(Ancif·rson 1974: 137-184). 
economic 
shown the 
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1.P. Bayliss-Smith has defended the choices made by Nacamaki 
villagers (~nom Watters had included in h1's t d ) S I'. y • He characterized 
the modernist arguments of Watters as 
'the view from the centre', 
contrasting it with the villagers' view from 'the periphery'. At the 
centre, he said, there is 'a concern for promoting 
''economic 
Jevelopment" in the sense of greater participation by rural areas in 
the market economy'. At the local level, however, 
'such development 
u;ay do little to enhance welfare ill the absence of effective control 
by government of the terms of trade' (Bayliss-Smith 1977: 70). There 
is a conflict of interest between centre and periphery. The pattern 
of production in villages seems to national planners to be inefficient 
because it fails to meet national goals. In places such as Koro, 
wriere there is little or no land shortage, productivity 1s not 
u.;efully measured by yield per unit area. Instead the village 
producer is more concerned with the productivity of his labour. It is 
this orientation, together with the combined effects of uncertain 
prices and the need to have a m1n1mum cash income to meet social 
obligations, that explains the pattern of village economic activity. 
'Judged by its own standards', Bayliss-Smith said, 'the economy of 
~acamak1 seems to function with considerable efficiency. Manpower and 
land are allocated in different ways as demands and prices have 
.hanged, and the impression is one of a flexible economic response in 
relation to culturally constrained goals' (Bayliss-Smith 1977:71). 
foe pattern which was characterized by Bayliss-Smith as 'prosperity 
• through diversity' is one which Karo islanders would be unwise to 
.1b11ndon. 
C.S. Belshaw's analysis of choice was influenced by his 
P"rteption of stresses within Fijian society in Lhe late 1950s. With 
·x~1sure to modern society many aspirations had been engendered but 
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not fu 1 f i 11 ed . 
'It is my judgement as an outsider that they (Fijians) 
are intensively interested in acting to improve education, medical 
o.;ecurity, and communications, and that they are interested in a modest 
improvement in their general level of living (including in that 
lnrnsing, material possessions, and ceremonial). It seems clear from 
ir .. my of the examples of enterprise on previous pages that many are 
1•repared to act, but that the terms of action are exeedingly onerous 
in tnat they imply forms of behavior, insecurities, and supporting 
institutions which are outside the habitual frames of reference of the 
Fijians' (Belshaw 1964:274). The principal obstacles impeding the 
.J •. 11dopment of Fijian talents were the colonial institutions of 
i0Vernment, partly through omissions (such as lack of adequate r~ral 
crrdit and agricultural extension) and partly through the perpetuation 
ut the Fijian Administration which regulated Fijian contact with the 
,,utside. The answer to Fijian problems was therefore relatively 
simple: an infusion of people with appropriate skills and an adequate 
system of local government to set goals for technical advisors. 
Belshaw urged the creation of 'organs of local government which can 
fenuinely reflect the goals and aspirations of the constituents. This 
requirement is based on the premise that only the rural peo~le 
themselves can state and interpret their wants, can estimate the 
~ignificance of the relevant costs of action, and can thus determine 
priorities' (Belshaw 1964:287). Belshaw expressed considerable faith 
in Fijian adaptability. He did not regard custom as imposing an 
<>hstacle to economic development, and rejected familiar arguments that 
rijians were conservative or hampered by a preference for leisure. 
In short, Belshaw was convinced that Fijians knew what they 
"·HltPd and had the cultural prerequisites and wherewithal to achieve 
it. All that they needed was freedom from government interference and 
0 
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the provision of basic government services such as rural local 
government, agricultural extension and credit and finance facilities. 
Henry Rutz has also defended Fijian economic activity against the 
Lharge of being insufficiently motivated by rational self-interest. 
In the Waidina banana scheme, which he studied, Fijian village growers 
failed to produc~ bananas in the desired a~ounts and then sold much of 
their production to the local market through Chinese and lndian 
mijdlPmen rather than to the New Zealand export market through their 
producers' co-operative. The middlemen paid lower prices but, since 
thP co-operative provided the point at which loan repayments were 
collected (and which was perhaps the only point at which they were 
collectable) the producers' behaviour is not surprising. From the 
very beginning the co-operative had a huge debt burden that producers 
despaired of ever repaying. It quickly became unpopular. Continued 
~ales through the co-operative required a faith in the eventual 
profitability of the venture which most producers did not have. As a 
result an estimated two thirds of production was diverted to the local 
market. 
Planners explained the lower than expected production as 
resulting from the technical shortcomings of the producers, a charge 
that the producers disputed. Rutz defended the villagers in a number 
of ways. He noted for example that, when growers move•I \ . L, .n r 
cultivation areas from the hillsides to the alluvial flats, the 
[J,.partment of Agriculture refused to approve the change (on the 
;'.rounds tnat it would be an uneconomic 11se of the better quality land) 
but later acknowledged that the hill sites, which had been selected 
w1tnout an adc>quate knowledge of hill soils, were a mistake. The 
plannPrs simply had not examined the full circumstances of the banana 
."ilii': I ..,. 
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browers. 
'The objective and contribution of developers to the project 
did not require them to look at plant<Jtion bananas in the context of 
recurrent root crop cultivation and altt:.nat . ..;e uses of land, nor to 
allocation of labour and · · d" · its r r10 lCity as an important 
factor determining economic behaviour in ·h~ local context' (Rutz 
197 3: 98) . In fact, as Dav1d ~ .. ·;1;i.; .ias shown, the assessment of 
!actors influencing the productio& u~~1sions of farmers combining cash 
cropping and susbsistence activity is no ~asy matter (see Evans 1980). 
Rutz does, however, join the Fijians' critics ln questioning the 
wi~do~ of the strong Fijian preference for investment of savings from 
t•.1nana sales ln housing. 
'The savings in labour-time gained by using 
tin instead of thatch was at least partially offset by an increase in 
tne rate of replacement of houses. "Fijian" houses came to be 
regarded as temporary dwellings, and the quality of workmanship and 
pffort deteriorated'. Rutz calculated the cost of various styles of 
hL>using and came to the conclusion tlldt 'villagers have not 
substituted cash for labor, but rather they have increased labor 
investment in housing as they have increased the amount of cash 
investment' (Rutz 1973:237). 
The Spate report's attitude to the question of choice was not 
-.urprisingly ·onditioned by its status as a report commissioned to 
hive direct ad1ice on government policy. It was required to ma~e 
~pecific recom~endations as well as a general interpretation of social 
( trnnge. It is perhaps for this reason that the Spate report stands 
:ipart from other studies in its lack of both determinism and naive 
V•>luntarism. The report's approach to the question of choice is also 
'ond it ioned by the fact that its author spoke at fi rat hand to a wide 
vJriety of Fijians (at meetings attended by one thousand four hundred 
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and fifteen men, or three per cent of the adult male population) 
(Spate 1959: 103). lhere is consequently an awareness of complexity 
and the difficulties of generalizing even within what is a relatively 
s~all society. Spate found that Fijian attitudes to many questions 
w~re ~haracterized by ambivalence: 
'the Fijian in the more developed 
<1rt>a& has no longer the will to work 10 his old system, and has not 
yet the will to work effectively in the new ways' (Spate 1959:8). lhe 
~ajor finding of the report was that the institutions established by 
Ratu Sukuna would l"iave to be abolished. 'The "communal system" must 
go, not forthwith but in due course:but the objective should be 
accepted now' (Spate 1959:101). The future belonged to individualism 
because of the irreversible trend towards gro~ing involvement with the 
modern world. In effect Spate was saying that it seemed likely that 
the majority of the Fijians would sooner or later choose to abandon 
the enforced communalism of the Fijian Administration. Accordingly 
leaders and administrators should be preparing themselves for the 
policy changes that this would require. 
Of all the analysts of Fijian society Rusiate Nayacakalou was the 
most aware of the importance of the problem of choice. He based his 
analysis of social change upon an examination of the scope for choice 
within the traditional socio-economic framework, and emphasized the 
comfortable flexibility it afforded individuals so long as they 
remained within certain well defined limits (Nayacakalou 1978:134). 
A~ modern economic activity impinged on villagers' lives their scope 
for choice was enlarged. Many of the choices available were 
pt>rmissible within the traditional framework but some were not. In 
the relatively monetized economy of Draubuta village in the 1950s 
yardrn produce was frequently bought and sold for money, and garden 
l:1bour was sometimes performed for wages, but housebuilding, unless 
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done for Indians, was never done for payment in cash (Nayacakalou 
1978:137). Ultimately there are fundamental differences between 
traditional FiJ"ian economic organ;zat;on and the d 
.. .. mo ern economy. The 
former is based on strong personal relations, with social obligation 
as the main motivating force, the latter, impersonal with individual 
self interest as the main motivation. This gradual 
''~epersonalization• of economic relations is tantamount to a shift in 
viewpoint from one of communalism to one of individualism' 
(Nayacakalou 1978:131). This transition depends, however, upon the 
choices of individuals who seek to find =ompromise between the 
alternative economic principles of tradition and modernity. In the 
differing circumstances of the three villages that Nayacakalou studied 
compromises were struck in different ways. 'This relationship between 
individual choice and compromise shows us why we cannot decide for 
people where they are to strike a compromise, for compromise depends 
upon choices, not choices upon compromise' (Nayacakalou 1978: 139). 
The problem that social change creates for policy makers is that, 
while it might be true that there is only one direction in which it 
can ultimately go, at least within a capitalist system, there are many 
paths it can take and the rate of progress depends upon individual 
choice. 
Nayacakalou's recognition of the importance of the problem of 
lhoice gives a subtlety to his strict modernist approach which other 
modernists lack. Watters for example overlooks the many constraints 
that circumsc:ribe the economic chokes t)f Fijian villagers. Some of 
these constraints are physical factors such as tiarket linkages which 
•1eterm in is ts, Baylis a-Smith for example, cite in criticism of 
voluntarists. Other constraints arise out of Fijian culture. 
Detcrminists also tend to overlook cultural constraints, or at least 
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to minimize their sign1'f1'cance, as f l 
or examp e when Bayliss-Smith 
speaks of 'culturally-constrained goals' without further investigatint 
the nature and force of the constraints and their effects on 
prod uc tiv ity. 
Belshaw is the populist ~ excellence, paying little heed to the 
problems faced by planners. Difficulties of local government (which 
were examined in chapter two) are glossed over quickly, as are 
institutio'nal problems associated with land tenure. Belshaw also 
fails to consider the differences in social and economic life that 
might be expected outside the area he studied. Nadroga/Navosa, as 
shown belo~, is a distinctive area. 
The constraints on Fijian economic choices are many and varied. 
Often they are overshadowed by political considerationq and the 
involvement of cultural values makes it difficult to discuss them in a 
value-free manner. The position I adopt combines elements of all four 
of the perspectives that I distinguished: modernist, traditionalist, 
determinist, populist. The emphasis on identifying opportunities for 
choice owes much to the voluntarist position but the many constraints 
on choice are also recognized. Some of these constraints are cultural 
but in accordance with traditionalist strictures, I attempt to 
identify the elements of adaptability within traditional culture. 
With the populists I acknowledge the ability of people at the local 
level to assess their own interests and to articulate them for 
themselves, while recognizing that planners, who often doubt the 
""isdom of village opinion, have a point of ··:cw which grows out of 
their experience and deserves closer study. 1be key to this analysis 
of the social context of project planning is the identification of 
constraints on Fijian economic decisions and the policy implications 
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of these constraints. 
~~Economy and Subsistence 
One pseudo constraint, which should be disposed of at the outset, 
is the suggestion that there is a bounded 'subsistence sector', or a 
Jersistent 'subsiPtence mentality' among Fijians. 
Fijian villages 
1ary in their degree of integration into the cash economy but the 
links between villages and markets are complex and the dichotomous 
dist5nction which is often made between subsistence and cash 
product~on is misleading. Integration into the cash economy is a 
matter of de~ree, both for individuals and villages. Economists speak 
uf cash and subsistenL~ ~c~t~rs in Fiji, and the Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics separates cash and subsist~~cP. producers in its income and 
t>xpenditure survey, but the dividing point is arbitrary and should not 
be imposed without an explanation of the reasons for its selection. 
[l] Some crops have only limited potential for home consumption but 
most of the popular Fijian crops (coconuts, tubers, leafy vegetables, 
ya~) can be consumed at home or taken to market according to 
convenience. Even sugar farmers, who are as cash oriented as any in 
Fiji, engage in significant subsistence cultivation. 
l~ is no accident, however, that the subsistence element of 
Fijian agriculture has tended to be regarded as an identifiable and 
hounded unit. Before the reform of Fijian Affairs in 1966 the system 
compulsory communal labour often had the appearance of a 
~ubsistence 'system'. Each able bodied man was obliged to grow 
.ubsistencc crops and provide his labour to a pool used for the 
'uilding and maintenance of houses and other village facilities. The 
, I I The Bureau of Statistics, after assigning values to subsistence 
production, classified households as either 'subsistence' or 'cash', 
""Pending upon which of the two types of production constituted the 
~reatcr part of the total value. 
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time available for labour Jn cash crops was limited. There a 
considerable difference·. however, between this system of communal 
labour and the present day poverty of certain households where male 
labour for cash-earning opportunities is limited, whether by migration 
to towns, unavailability of land or disinclination to work. In both 
cases households might see little cash but in the former system of 
communal labour the physical standard of living was g,enerally higher 
and inequality was less pronounced. lbere is a qualitative difference 
between the Buli ~ystem in which there is reciprocity of labour 
services, requiring little use of cash, and the cash orientation of 
most present day Fijian villages, within which there are individuals 
who earn little cash and barely subsist. In the former context, but 
not in the latter, the term subsistence sector is warranted, although 
it must be remembered that an important part of the system was the 
Pmployment of surplus labour in projects of value to the community, 
the construction of schools and health posts for example. Communal 
facilities such as these now absorb much of the money earned through 
greater participation in cash cropping. Data from the survey of the 
cattle project areas show that the 'subsistence' pattern of the Buli 
system has in fact survived ·the abolition of the position of Buli in 
an area isolated from markets.for cash products. In the absence of 
opportunities to earn cash, reciprocity of labour services was 
maintained without; compulsion. 
For a number of reasons I prefer the term 'reciprocity of labour' 
to 'subsistence' to describe this social and economic organization. 
The economists' problem of why individuals choose, to varying degrees, 
to devote their labour to production of agricultural goods for sale or 
for home consumption sometimes brings in the term subsistence but this 
problem is not directly relevant to my analysis. The term subsistence 
~--..,_ 
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should be used with care because it can lead to the confusion of the 
economists' problem with a number of related social and political 
problems. I have already encapsulated these into wbat has been called 
'the FiJ. ian problem' •. th b · · f · · · e com 1nat1on o FiJian land ownership with 
strong Indian economic competition and, more recently, Fijian 
political predominance. The use of the term subsistence, with its 
connotatio.ts of underutilization of land and economic backwardness, 
can be misleading unless its meaning is carefully defined. One 
superficial observer of references to 'subsistence' in the literature 
on Fiji has been led to the absurd comment that 'Fijians own most of 
the land and contribute almost nothing to the national income' 
(Clammer 1976:366). 
The Family~ Labour Organization 
Family organization has received little attention in the 
literature on Fijian social and economic change. Kinship, including 
an apparently inevitable discussion of ceremonial obligations, is 
given good coverage, but the traditional 'household' (vuvale) is 
largely overlooked. Its obvious importance in modern Fijian life is 
perhaps interpreted ae a recent innovation. High expenditure of 
1abour and cash resources on housing \s occasionally noted but has 
gPnerally attracted negative evaluative comment rather than 
"xplanatory analysis. One important exception is R.R. Nayacakalou 
~10 sees the household and the institution of the house upon which it 
111 based in these terms: ' To each person, a house is a physical 
••rnbod imcnt of his idealisation of his own place within the general 
framework of village life. It is the "face of his house" which he 
rt>mPmberi> lo/hen he feels homesick; it is the one physical object to 
~11ch he can feel he belongs; it is the last gift of society to him 
hy which it recognises his individuality as a responsible member of 
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the village, and by which the head of his former household grants to 
him his liberty from subservience to another household' (Nayacakalou 
1978:2). 
Households are the basic unit of identity. Larger social units, 
i tokatoka, mataqali, yavusa, are composed of housP.holds, rather than 
individuals. In addition to its role as a source of identity, the 
household has an economic function, both as a unit for consumption and 
for labour organization. Levies of labour for communal work are made 
on households, which was a natural arrangement in a situation where 
houses were built and maintained by communal labour. Within the 
household, labour is organized under the direction of the household 
head. Division of labour is along lines of sex and age, requiring 
therefore a balance of males/females and old/young in order to 
function properly. Adoption, both temporary and permanent, has 
frequently been used to achieve balance in composition. 
It is important to note that all members of the household are 
regarded as dependants of the household head. Nayacakalou uses the 
term 'subservience' to describe this state of dependence. 1lle F:jian 
term is vakararavi, the meaning of which is best approximated by the 
English word 'dependence'. Asesela Ravuvu explains that the 'conc~pt 
of dependence is a key factor in the use ~f k~aship terms and the 
changes that occur in them' in his own village (Nakorosule) (Ravuvu 
1971:484). For example, an aged man who has become dependent upon his 
son would no longer address his son by his name, or as na luvequ (my 
child), but by the term Tamairau, 'our father'. By extension of this, 
he begins to address his grandchildren as taciqu (my younger brother) 
or rataciqu (my younger sister). 
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Membership of a household the~~tore involves much more than 
common residence. As Naya~akalou points out, members of a 'family or 
a household co-operate together in the food quest, pursuing a common 
budget and sharing common meals. For this reason we can regard the 
household as the smallest unit of economic organization' (Nayacakalou 
1978:3). Unfortunately Nayacakalou gives little further clarification 
of the internal functioning of the household in economic matters. Do 
sons have their own gardens in addition to working in the gardens of 
their fathers? There appears to be a difficult question of how far 
the ideal operation based on dependence and obligation is actually 
carried out. ~ 1hlins states that 'In theory, the head of a large 
extended family should do little more than supervise the division of 
labour, drink kava, and sleep. In fact, he will often work in the 
gardens, since knowledge of family resources is required of him in 
order to co-ordinate the men's work properly and effectively' (Sahlins 
1962:122). 
In former times the bonds of dependence appear to have been 
strong. Quain, (writing in 1935) reported that the building of a new 
house required the approval of the 'council ~f elders'. 'Adding a new 
house to the village is a rare event and worthy of a serious 
discussion' (Quain 1948:85). Loyal service within the household of 
one's father (real or classifactory) would probably be required before 
an individual could expect his own house. In the nineteenth century, 
bachelors and some young married men slept in 'club houses' or 'youth 
hostels' (~ ni ~) while awaiting their chance to become heads of 
their own houses (Tippet 1968: 168). The decline of these 
institutions, apparently under the influence of missionary pressure, 
is lamented by some observers as a loss of control over the young men 
(Thomson 1968: 176.1. Hen left the 'club house' when married and 
-- ··~ 
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:irovided with their own house, returning only when their wives were 
iuckling children (and hence sexual union was tabu). 'The higher 
.:hiefs, having several wives, provided a separate house for 
confinement, and never saw the mbure 
-
ni sa again after their 
• I marriage • Thomson adds: 
'Men of the lowest rauk had generally no 
wives at all', and therefore never left the mbure ni .!!.• remaining 
'yollllg men' for the rest of their lives. One possible reason for the 
decline of the~..!!!,.!!, was the inability of elders to make young 
men wait for their permission before marriage, and, concomitant with 
this, to marry a partner of their choosing. The decline of arranged 
marriages is another aspect of changes in family life that has not 
been explained. 
Under the ~ system it was the unofficial role of young men 
(cauravou) to '..lildertake the physically demanding work irl the village. 
Officially, the Fijian Affairs regulations did not distinguish between 
young men and married men. All were able-bodied men required to do 
communal work and also to plant their own individual gardens as 
allocated to them by the village council. The failure to recognize 
distinctions of household membership or marital status represented a 
paradoxical adherence to a form of individualism that appears to be 
without foundation in tradition, either precession or postcession. In 
practice the turnout for communal labour appears to have varied in 
accordance with traditional values. In particular, reciprocity was 
maintained; any individual who did not turn up to build the houses of 
others found that no-one would turn up to build his house. Young men 
iid the heavy work while their elders tended to adopt more supervisory 
roles. One serious problem the Buli system encountered, which was a 
major factor behind its eventual abolition, was the shortage of young 
~en to do the young men's work. Draubuta in the 1950s showed the 
u 
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future for many villages in the 1960s when Nayacakalou reported: 'The 
,• lders are there to lead; but there are hardly any young men for them 
to lead' (Nayacakalou 197B:l29). With easy access to the Suva/Nausori 
area the youn~ men of Draubuta found wage employment attractive 
because it offered independence. 'lbeir parents did not oppose this 
although it appears to have significan,ly altered family life, most 
notably by reducing traditional control over the young men, which was 
felt to be a loss. 
R.F. Watters has attempted to put the changes occasfioned by 
wage earning opportunities into a w;der context: 
'Wage-earning 
implies some changes in the division of labour and, as Sorolevu 
exemplifies, men with a regular income have less need for reciprocal 
labour. As the household has declined as a labour pool and the 
principle of wage contract has superseded that of reciprocity, so ea~h 
working membe'!:' has tended to become an independent unit of production' 
(Watters 1969:184). 
The effects of Watters' uni-directional, monistic orientation in 
which changes of various kinds ar~ subsumed under the heading of 
individualism, are visible in this passage. As a result, a number of 
important features of family life are obscured. First, the continued 
importance of the household is overlooked. 'Visit a koro (Fijian 
village)', Rev. Paula Niukula wrote in 1977, 'and you will see Fijians 
living vakavuvale (in family households)' (Niukula 1977: 1). 'lbe 
composition of this household is much the same as it has always been: 
'The married couple, their own cbildren with, say, another child of a 
relative, and any senior parent li'1ing with them usually constitute a 
family household' Niukula 1977: 17). Relationships within the 
~ousehold have changed slightly but maintain the basic principles. 
-/) 
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, he household is a bounded unit undet· the leadership of a head. •The 
1ervices of the members of the household are under the direction of 
~ts head, who integrates their activities and may issue directions for 
,'ach of them, in order to keep the household functioning' (Nayacakalou 
l978: 25-26). Sons with wage employment may not be as dependent as 
their counterparts in former times but. the ideology of their 
obligation to, and respect for, their father as household head is 
strong. 'llle reduced dependence of young men now manifests itself in a 
bringing forward of the time when they are able to marry and establish 
a house of their own buL it does not substantially alter the nature of 
the household as a social unit. 'llle household remains the basic unit 
of family life, the basis of both production and consumption. It also 
remains the basis for cooperation in wider groups such as a mataqali 
or a village or even a district. Any call upon the labour of the 
individual should receive the permission of the head of the household 
to which he belongs (Nayacakalou 1978: 25-26). In the past 
households have owed more obligations. to outside groups than they do 
at present, but it remains the pr~rog~tive of the head to decide how, 
with the labour resources of his household, obligations should be met. 
Nevertheless the household often appears to be a relatively weak unit. 
Individuals may come and go with relative freeaom. When colonial rule 
was established, freedom of movement became easier and, with declining 
population, it became easier for disgruntled dependants to find 'new 
situations'. 
Status as a dependant (tiko vakararavi) is a long-standing, well 
understood concept and it seems clear that the well known Fijian 
?reference for expenditure on housing results from the material 
1dvantages of maintaining dependants whose labour power can be drawn 
1pon as much as considerations of status. Conversly, desire for 
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:1ousing is a desire to avoid dependence, which, despite the 
0nnotations of a two-way relationship, is generally negatively 
•valuated. (People are reluctant to admit that their children are 
iiving as dependants in another household.) The preference for housing 
1s therefore more rational than it might seem to the development 
writers who recommended that resources be directed to 'productive' 
Lnvestment, ploughs, superphosphate etc. 'nle desire for housing is in 
fact a desire for independence, a sign of the individualism sought by 
the same development writers. 
An important part of changing family life that has not been 
adequately studied is the relationship between fathers and sons, 
particularly in the area of inheritance. Apart from land, which will 
be discussed separately, the main heritable items in former times were 
houses and the sites (yavu) upon which they stand. Succession was 
generally from older to younger brother, passing to the eldest son of 
the oldest brother only when all his uncles were deceased (Thomson 
1968 358). 'nlis is no more than the general principle of 
seniority. In practice the wishes of the individuals and their 
personal efforts and abilities, together with the question of whether 
a lineage was expanding or contracting, would also come into play. It 
was also possible to establish new yavu but this was generally a 
political decision that would involve the mataqali or the village as 
much as or more than father and son. 
Since the weakening of the bonds of dependence the old principles 
'.10 longer ·.1ork. Sons tend to succeed fathers directly but th~y also 
tend to branch out earlier to establish their own households. 'llle son 
.mo stays within his father's house, thereby enhancing his position as 
· · h b Fam1'ly 11'fe is often in a state of •elr, m1g t ea younger son. 
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»nfusion. Sons and fathers frequently fa1'l to cooperate. Sons 
~ncinue to feel obliged to help their fathers, especially if they are 
;till dependants, but disputes over who does what, or who receives 
•!lat share of proceeds from sales of produce, are common. [l] In the 
,,1st the young men of the household have fulfilled the role of 
:upplying that household's contribution to the more arduous village or 
Jescent group activities. ~ top of al~ of these problems is the 
:ndividual's dependence on groups wider than the family for his land. 
:;·athers play some part in determining what land their sons can use but 
tt is a rol~ they share with many others. If land rights are 
restricted solely to the amount of land a man actually uses, then it 
would not generally be easy for a man to provide for his sons the land 
they need. 
Ceremonial Exchange 
Labour reciprocity should not be confused with other forms of 
reciprocity which have not declined and in some cases appear to have 
increased under the impact of greater contact with the cash economy. 
Ceremonial activity connected with births, deaths and marriages still 
tnvolves exchanges and reciprocity of various kinds. Items of 
long-standing traditional wealth such as tabua, mats, and yaqona are 
still in use, although they are now joined by newer traditional items 
~uch as mosquito ne~s, rolls of cloth, and kerosene. All of these can 
~e bought for cash though the norm is still to collect them from 
relatives 'lo'ho will st.are in the distribution of any goods presented in 
'xchange and who, through reciprocity, might make similar calls for 
l l Michael Walter provides an illustrat.ion of the form this problem 
·akes in the coconut areas. 'In some cases older men with resident 
·1arried sons endeavour to avoid the split of the family and its 
Jconut lands, but the quarrelling sons and their p:es~ure on their 
ather to divide the land are very great. Even if it has not been 
arried out, it is anticipated by the sons who further coerce the old 
·m by setting up Hparate households' (Walter 1978a:l04). 
\ 
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:lsistance. 
Cer~monial expenditure has long occupied the attention of western 
1serveC'S. It has generally been regarded as wasteful of time and 
>sources and in.hibitory of individual initiative thk'ough the ability 
f the relatives to request (kerekere) wealth at any time (Spate, 
atters, 'lbomson). Belshaw, however, rejected claims that ceremonial 
·xpenditure was wasteful, arguing that the goods involved are durable 
·onsumer goods that do not increase consumption at the expense of 
_apital. Data available to Belshaw suggested that the contributions 
required of itidividuals were not onerous and were usually capable of 
~eing delayed if necessary. One of the funerals that Belshaw 
described and used to illustrate his point was organized by a 
landowning unit in the Bemana area (Noga - see below). A.' a small 
land-rich group with both Indians and Fijians beholden to it for land, 
Noga could expect greater than average generosity from its 'friends'. 
Complications such as this make generalization difficult. 
Henry Rutz takes up the question in greater detail, employing 
data from an area subject to intensive development activity in the 
middle to late 1960s. Contrary to Belshaw, Rutz asserts that the 
principal participants in a major ceremonial event often shoulder 
large, inconvenient financial burdens. He is careful to distinguish, 
1owever, between the role of ceremonial expenditure in isolated 
'stationary' communities and its role in areas with growing links to 
~he external world. ll\e complaints which Spate, one of the critics of 
·xpenditure on ceremony, collected were undoubtedly genuine but 
·robably representative of areas where contact with the outside world 
tfered opportunities for alternative uses for the resources consumed 
1 ceremony. Rutz continues by asking why, if in areas of expanding 
-----------------
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vnomic opportunities expenditure on ceremony does have 'negative 
1fects', do people continue to adhere to customs which they often say 
•1ey would prefer to do without? 'If producers in the Waidina valley 
"e rational men, and they seek more cash income, and they seek to 
1crease cash income through increased agricultural and commercial 
,· tivities, and ceremonial activities compete for the same scarce 
•sources, then why is ceremonial exchange so resilient, and what 
rends can be expected in the future if conditions continue as they 
re today?' (Rutz 1978a:799-800). Rutz provides two answers to this 
iuestion. First, he believes that as production expands, expenditure 
1n ceremonial decreases as a proportion of total expenditure. 
Secondly, in 'a peasant economy where credit and loan markets are weak 
and incipient', ceremonial exchange cements relationships and thereby 
provides access to means of obtaining labour, land or assistance in 
emergencies, and care and support during old age. Informants are 
explicit about the security obtained through kinship bonds. 'So 
lmportant is the welfare function of ceremonial that those producers 
who have left the villag~ in order to become independent farmers 
(galala) for the expre&s purpose of increasing cash income tend to 
lnvolve themselves in ceremonial to a greater extent than those who 
remain in the village' (Rutz 1978a:801-802). Rutz expected that as 
lncomes rose and social services expanded, expenditure on ceremonial 
ictivity would continue to shrink as a proportion of total 
·x pend i ture. 
A study of sixty-fo·1r Fijian cane growers by Aporosa Rakoto 
rovides support for Rutz's arguments. Rakoto found that 'the moot 
iccessful growers were staunch supporters of traditional ceremonies, 
Hie many unsuccesful ones blamed the latter for their poor 
rformances' (Rakoto 1973:32). 'nle difference between the two groups 
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·uld be found in 'use of time and resources'. 'nle successful growers 
ed their resources carefully, stating openly when they could not 
ntribute. 
Fijian customs of kinship and ceremonial obligation create a 
1mber of problems for government policy. In matters of welfare there 
i the question of ~ether Fijians are disqualified from receiving 
!Stitute allowances on the grounds that kinship ties mean that no one 
10uld ever be destitute. Fijians have often complained that they are 
.nfairly treated by comparison with other races. Welfare officers now 
:1sit Fijian villages and approve Fijians as destitute but attitudes 
to destitution allowances appear to vary. Some people simply do not 
~now that they can claim them, while for others, who would not 
1ualify, the whole notion is un-Fijian (Nation 1978: 119-120). It 
appears likely that the expansion of the receipt of destitute 
allowances in villages will, as Rutz anticipated, substantially alter 
Fijian attitudes to kinship ties and ceremonial obligations. 
Attitudes to personal security and welfare are also being altered by 
1ncreased government ability to provide disaster relief. Fijians, 
·~ven in the most isolated locations• no longer need to rely solely on 
~ommunal effort in times of hurricane or flood. 
Another problem which kinship customs and obligations Ct'eate for 
~overnment policy is in development finance. Kinship obligations 
•ften seem to threaten the security of loans because they represent 
">tential claims on assets offered as security. 'nlis is a particular 
roblem in the case of cattle, which are much in demand at weddings 
Lid funerals. 'nle FOB tells farmers that they do not have full 
-mership of cattle that are security for a loan but recognizes that 
is not able to prevent all illegal transfers. 'nle bank's main 
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.~1wer to this problem is careful selectiveness in the granting of 
1ns. From the bank's point of view this is a workable solution but 
? question is, to what extent is Fijian participation in development 
astrained by this selectiveness? 
~Tenure 
In formal legal terms the institutions of Fijian land tenure are 
,11 defined and predictable. One of the communal policies of the 
1rly colonial government was the creation of institutions for the 
·.roership of land by groups with membership requirements that are 
learly spelt out and which are subject to registration. Boundaries 
1ave been surveyed and recorded. Occasionally boundaries are disputed 
•ut recourse to Native Lands Commission (NLC) records normally allows 
swift resolution of such disputes. Sometimes people continue to 
~elieve that the law is in error but there is no doubt that it is the 
:aw. 
Historical research by Peter France has shown that the neat, 
iniform system of communal ownership was based on an 
Jversimplification of customary practises. It overlooked important 
;tghts of other groups, both larger and smaller than the mataqali, not 
t0 mention the many complex rights of individuals. Variations in 
,irac tice between areas were also largely swept aside as all were 
·••quired to accomodate themselves to the prescribed framework within 
.:nch land was owned by mataqalis. One serious problem that this 
r0cedure encountered was that the mataqali was not the universa~ly 
'cognis'!ld category that the NLC presumed it to be. According to 
•uan practice, which was taken as the model to be followed, mataqalis 
re subdlvisions of yavusas and were themselves composed of several 
~ok.atok.as. The NLC recognised that there was a variety of names for 
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. tokatoka but assumed that the · Y were essentially the one type of 
. c ial group. Peter France points, however, to evidence that in some 
:aces a mataqali was a subdivision of a yavusa, while in other areas 
e yavusa was a subdivision of a mataqali. 
It has been argued by Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna (whose extensive 
:-iowledge of traditional land tenure practices was gained during NLC 
~arings) that the i tokatoka was a more important group in land 
wership than the mata9ali, for the i tokatoka was a unit that 
ictually worked the soil (Derrick 1950:8). It is also widely accepted 
• y Fijians that chiefs formerly exercised unchallengable power over 
Land. [l] People look back to the time of the rule of chiefs as a 
time lotlen power resided in individuals who could make decisions for 
the benefit of all, by contrast with the present situation in which 
selfish rivalry goes unchecked. It is the law itself, which specifies 
rights and obligations without reference to particularistic 
1dentities 1 that \q the alien introduction, regardless of the actual 
:ontent of particular laws. Codification and custom are incompatible. 
Anyone attempting to counter the critics of the mata9ali system 
~ight be tempted to speculate about whether, in the circumstances, the 
:ritics themselves could have created institutions that could 
~ncompass all of the particularistic rights of tradition. But this 
•ould be pointless. 'nle important questions relating to the origins 
t the system of land tenure are those concerning its implications for 
•l Ratu William toganivalu puts it this way: .. 'We all know th~t prior 
l the Deed of Cession in 1874 1 all FiJ ian lands were virtually 
>ntrolled by the chiefs ••• In 1880, at the Great Counc~l of Chiefs 
011ich was held at Bualevu in Lau, it was again the colonial government 
·111t introduced the Ordinance that enabled Fijian commoners to have 
· ·ee ownership of their land. that was the first time that land was 
'" ided into the proprietor unit which pertains today' (Hansard p.1050 
September 1979). 
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~ present lives of Fijian landowners. Peter France concludes 
. 1at the Fijian land tenure system, for which the law provides, sits 
~asily upon Fijians is apparent: inequalities of land distribution 
· i.ch result from the system of land registration are evaded by 
,formal arrangements; the classification of the Fijian population 
ito social units impinges so lightly on their lives that, at the 1956 
·nsus, only sixty-six per cent of Fijians were able to state the 
.1taqali and yavuaa to which they belonged' (France 1969: 174). · 
The claim that Fijians know and care little about the system of 
.iataqali registration, if it was ever true, is clearly untrue today. 
~he failure of thirty-four per cent of Fijians to state their mataqali 
Jnd yavusa in the 1956 census is more attributable to the ambiguity of 
the term mataqali. In ordinary language it means 'type' or 'group' s9 
that to ask a Fijian to state his mataqali without reference to a 
particular context is sure to be confusing. As Michael Walter points 
Jut: 'It is as though an Englishman were stopped in the street and 
Jsked for the name of his "group'', and having made various essays with 
the names of his family, his firm, his cricket team, his club, his 
political party, etc. is interupted with :'~es, but which is the 
~roup to which you belong?'' (Walter 1978b:365). '!be mataqalis as 
recorded by the NLC are only one type of mataqali of significance to 
Fijians. '!be primary usage of the term, Nayacakalou found, is in 
·elation to 'a local division of a village'. Whenever a villLge is 
alled upon to act corporately, as for example in ceremonial 
1~ lat ionships with the outside, tasks are divided up according to such 
.ataqalis. These are composed of i tokatokas which clearly are 
.••scent groups, and which might be grouped together on the basis of 
immon descent, but it is also possible that they are grouped together 
·r political reasons or for convenience. It is possible, though on 
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whole unlikely, that in any given village such functional 
aqalis will coincide exactly with the mataqalis as recorded by the 
It is therefore easy for a census respondent to be confused by 
h a question. 
The inequalit'ies of land dis~ribution, which France says are 
..... 
1ded by informal arrangements, point to :.i complex and important 
.Jblem which will be examined later. France uses this point to 
~gest that at the local level 'the system is ignored or evaded 
•rever possible'. It is only at 'the national level' in the context 
inter-racial politics where it is 'laudP.d as being the very 
•undation of Fijian social order' (Ftance 1969:174). France provides 
> evidence for this assertion, merely m~ntioning it as the reason why 
1e system, which he shows so convincingly is based on myth, has not 
een changed. Contrary to this, it has been one of the surprises of 
~v fieldwork investigation to discover that, despite the problems that 
· ~1e mataqali system creates for Fijians (inequality of distribution 
i-:1ng just one of them) the system itself is accorded unquestioned 
.Pg1timacy. This is perhaps partly a result of the system's existence 
·ver several generations; it has acquired the appearance of the 
1,t1quity that is its supposed basis of legitimacy. It is also partly 
• result of the exalted (almost deified) position now occupied by the 
1te ~ Sir Lala Sukuna, who carried out many of the reg(stration 
"·lr 1ngs. More importantly, however, credit should be given to the 
ire and the thoroughness with which Ratu Sukuna and his predecessors 
I their jobs. It is, as Macnaught points out, absurd to suppose 
.it the NLC under his leadership 'was not aware of the arbitrary 
·mt>nts it imposed' (Macnaught 1974:7). Ratu Sukuna' s 
-
predecessor, 
<well, had already established that the NLC's goal should be 'to 
~ such 4 settlement as may be found to be at once reasonable in 
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.elf and acceptable to the native occupiers' (quoted in Macnau6ht 
'b: 67). 
'The ability shown by Fijian villagers to assess and articulate 
~ir own interests and then to accommodate them to the mataqali 
~tem also sh~~ld not be underestimated. ~ayacakalou provides an 
•teresting example from his own village. 'On ceremonial occasions, 
•asts, and all other occasions when the village co-operates as a 
.ole, there are now only three major divisions, known as mataq~li' 
~ayacakalou 1975:28). During the NLC hearings (in about 1915) thAse 
!Lviaions were presented as three yavusas with eighteen constituent 
nataqalis that could be further divided into thirty-one i tokatokas . 
• n this way the people were able to apportion the land according to 
what they considered to be legitimate while still fitting within the 
framework required by the NLC. 
'The point which the critics of mataqali ownership fail to 
comprehend is that, while the system is not 'genuinely' or 'purely' 
traditional, neither is it entirely alien or arbitrary. It has 
·~x tended and refined traditional mores. To put this in the language 
Jf modern development planning, the codification of Fijian land tenure 
1as succeeded because it was based on genuine particip&tion by 
Fljians. If there are to be any alteratioas to the system, they too 
~111 succeed only if they are based on such participation, rathe~ than 
~construction along lines found by historical research to be 
•nuinely traditional. (1) 
. Chappelle (1978) makes one such attempt at reconstruction, which 
interesting historically but only tangentially relevant to the 
>blems presently facing Fijians. 
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The critics of the mataqali' syst h f 
_ em ave o ten contrasted the 
. Kibility of the traditional system with the rigidity of mataqali 
istration. An important element in that flexibility was, however, 
ability of groups to go to war when they needed more land. 'lhis 
·e of flexibility largely vanished with the establishment of 
.onial government. 
'nle critics of the mataqali system place 
iortance on continuing informal arrangements as illustrating the 
·luring importance of flexible, genuinely traditional values 
:erning land tenure. Individuals who need to borrow land may make a 
· ~uest and a small presentation of yaqona in order to receive 
'"nnission to use land which is not their own. Sometimes such a 
···quest will be made to the head of the mataqali, at other times it 
•all be made to an individual matl,lqali member who has been recognized 
lnformally as the particular owner of the piece of land. 'lhe 
proponents of 'flexible, genuine tradition' are forced to admit, 
nowever, that any opposition from a mataqali member who wants the 
plece of land is bound to succeed (Rutz 1978b:31). [l] 
Inequality in the distribution of mataqali ownership is now 
causing serious inequality in access to land (Walter 1978a:l06; 
3rookfield 1979). Population growth is one factor causing mataqali 
:nt>mbers to refuse access by relatives to their land. Increasing 
.:wolvement in the market economy is also important. Land takes on a 
"w, wholly untraditional value when it can be used to produce for the 
irket. In these circumstances the traditional values described by 
-~ critics of the mataqali system actually impede the creation of 
tormal redistributive arrangements. Owners are reluctant to allow 
use their land for fear that they would not promptly quit 
At Naqalimare (Nadroga) l enountered a land dispute involving 
Belshaw's middlemen. 'lhe middleman had taken his case to 
reme Court to press home a claim which wa~ obviously valid in 
felt by the community to be wrong according to custom. 
one 
the 
law 
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·· . land if the owner wished to resume it. Indian tenants, without 
, 0rmal rights, are often preferred to fellow Fijians. 
There may come a time when, with the growth of significant 
.1dlessness among Fijians, opposition to the matagali system will 
1.se, This seems to be some time off, however; there are simply too 
;.ay people with concrete stakes in the system who wish to preserve 
•at they have, regardless of inequalities. This includes people with 
~all holdings as well as the minority with large holdings. 
The distribution of land within matagalis is still subject to 
~nformal arrangements and the law makes no provision for division 
~'etween the owners. The Agricultural Landlords and Tenants ordinance 
provides for the automatic granting of a lease to all Fijians who 
·~njoy a customary right to land, although it is difficult to say how a 
~ourt might interpret this provision. One value which appears to 
influence the distribution of land within a matagali is past use of 
land. In the Waidina valley Rutz found informal rights to land, such 
as they were, were based solely on past cultivation. Land to which an 
individual laid claim, but which he was not actually cultivating, was 
termed fallow (veimada). The longer the time since it was cultivated, 
the more tenuous the veimada claim (Rutz 1978b:27). However, if 
hsputes arise between individuals, there are 
raditional procedures for settling them. 
no longer any 
In some mataqalis, informal agreements are made to divide land 
•tween constituent i tokatokas. Nayacakalou found this to be 
·nerally true of mataqalis in Lomawai village (Nadroga) • He 
'tributed this arrangement to the extensive holdings belonging to 
:h mataqali, although he noted that in Oraubuta village one mataqali 
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th a considerably smaller holding had also divided its land between 
tokatokas (Nayacakalou 1978: 19, 110). As with veimada, there is no 
•Y of legally enforcing rights created by informal distribution 
·tween i tokatokas. 
A third principle is the allocation of land by the mataqali head 
'_uraga ni mataqali) · It appears that traditionally the turaga ni 
.>taqali' s main powers lay in the allocation of unused land (Chappelle 
l 7 8: 82) • Rights to cultivated or fallow land belonged to the 
1dividuals who had used it, although without courts of law a powerful 
11raga ni mataqali could probably overide individual rights. The 
.>usition of turaga ni mataqali is now recognised officially, and 
~ndividuals are appointed by the Native Lands Commission, but the role 
ts limited to that of distributing rent money. There is no 
recognition of powers to distribute or redistribute land. Individuals 
~ay exercise whatever influence and leadership they can, but they have 
~o authority under law. 
The power and status of informal procedures varies from place to 
place throughout the country. In areas where land is moat valuable, 
irable land close to urban markets, the stakes are high; commercial 
~arming is the aim and reciprocity of labour services has ceased. 
'utz was able to observe such a transformation in values following the 
pening of a road in the 1960s. If individuals within a mataqali 
mnot agree about rights to the ·.·.:;e of land 'there is no real 
;fective means for resolving disputes' (Rutz 1978b:30). Traditional 
1lues are seldom strong enough to override determined individual 
·if-interest. 'nle practice of veimada is no more than the 
,:ognition of the rights of an individual to the fruits of labour; a 
iversal principle of labour ?riented societies, accepted by all 
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,:ause it is in the interests of all (Georgescu-Roegen 1969: 73-78). 
, nship can create strong bonds between individuals, based again on 
.ual self interest, but they are not sacred, and, as will be 
.. parent in the examination of land tenure in each of the four areas, 
1ship also involves jealousy. 
If there is a traditional value that remains important it is the 
neral sentimeut that each individual should have available to him 
:fficient land to support himself and his family by his own labour. 
1.ke the labour theory of value, this is a familiar value in peasant 
,Jcieties (Georgescu-Roegen 1969:73-78). As will be shown later, 
· nere are many individuals with more land than they need for 
;ubsistence. A common justification for the reservation of land in 
tnis way is the need to provide for children and grandchildren, but it 
is obvious that inequalities in land holding are parallelled by 
inequalities in income. 'lllere has been strong social pressure for the 
nmers of 'surplus' land to make available to needy neighbours such 
Land as they need to support themselves, though this has by no means 
.paranteed each man a piece of land and there is a growing number of 
?eople with aspirations beyond bare subaistence. Nevertheless, the 
'Jasic-right-to-subsistence value has meant that reJ.atively few Fijians 
ire landless labourers. It is part of the identity of modern-day 
: i J ians that they, as a group, should have the land needed to support 
. •emselves. Traditionally there have been landless people but the 
· nn for this status (kai .!!_) is pejorative and is now rarely used 
xcept as a term of abuse). 
1be difference between the traditional attitude and that of 
lern capitalism is quite clear in principle· Max Weber, with 
tmany in mind, explains the difference in this way. 'The old 
~~--------------...-...-
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~conomic order asked - How can I give, on th1's pi'ece f o land, work and 
sustenance to the greatest possible number of men? Capitalism asks: 
Fl·om this given piece of land how can I produce as many crops as 
possible for the market with as few men as possible?' (Weber 
1946:367). 
Among Fijians pressurP.d towards both capitalism and the 'old 
economic order' are in evidence. It is interesting that in the Fijian 
language two different forms of the possessive are applied to land. 
One type (the 1,.!!£.1 form) is often referred to as alienable possession 
in that it is applied to forms of property that can be alienated. 'Ille 
other type of possessive (the 1 ke 1 form) is usually associated with 
food but only food that is destined for consumption by the individual 
to whom the possessive applies. 'llie ke form is also used for income. 
It ia possible that in the past, when land was even more closely 
associated with subsistence livelihood, the ke form was the usual form 
of possessive used in relation to land. 'Ille direction of change is 
clear, but the rate of change is not, and the frustrations already 
experienced by planners attempting to promote capitalist development 
show that the event~al inevitability of capitalism (if it is 
inevitable) counts for less than the achievement of progress towards 
it in accordance with plans. 
From the point of view of planners one of the major problems 
created by the Fijian institutions of land tenure, both formal and 
informal, is that of unused land. So far there are very few Fijians 
entirely without access to land, but the distribution of land is far 
from equitable. In this connection Brookfield makes a number of 
uaeful observations. 'People with rights to land will sustain these 
rights by at least token occupation, and the smaller the land 
~~~-------------------
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available to a particular group the greater is the determination to 
sustain these rights. 'lbe rigidities of the Fiji land tenure system 
thus act as a brake on migration, while commercialization is a 
contrary force' (Brookfield 1978:233), 
1 ~ of the consequences of this situation is a distribution of 
holdings '"*1ich seems to planners to be uneconomic. 'If there 
were anything resembling a free market in land in Fiji it is not 
likely that land-holding groups would so value their tiny, remote 
estat~q as to sustain production on them rather than investing their 
etforts more rewardingly elsewhere. While population is thus retained 
,m such unproductive pieces of land as Kabara • Qelelevu, Yanuca or 
even Batiki, the same rigidities prevent the closer occupation of 
naturalLy rich islands such as Kor~. Gau, Lakeba and especially 
Taveuni'. (Brookfield 1978:234). 
Uluisaivou 
The Uluisaivou area can be divided into three socio-economic 
zones ranke,i in terms of accessibility. 'lbree villages were therefore 
included in the socio-economic survey: Nailuva • Nahalabala, 
Navuni ,.,unu. Nail uva is located in the most remote area of 
Uluisa: .011. Until the road reached there in 1979 as a result of the 
llluisaivou project• it was also the most isolated• requiring a round 
trip of no less than three days to take produce to market. As a 
result, cash crop production was limited almost entirely to dalo and 
y~qona which have high value to .reight ratios. In 1980, at the time 
l) f the SU\\"Vey t yaqona and dalo were also being consumed in large 
1!1rnnt it ies in the village. The people themselves were proud of their 
!Hgh routine consumption of these products which are regarded as 
".'<p<>nsive in the cash market. 'lbere was also a consciousness of the 
-~~~---------------....... -.... 
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preservation of traditional ways in social and economic organization. 
In marked contrast to all other villages surveyed, garden preparation 
1ind house-building were routinely accomplished with the employment of 
communal labour. A visiting relative from an area where labour 
reciprocity has disappeared proudly explained that 'here, some work, 
others just eat' (eso cakacaka ~ kana £!!.)· This was the traditional 
wdy. There are no thoughts of land shortage; people freely cultivate 
land outs:de their mataqali boundaries. They describe this as 'kana 
---
~~icurumaki', a term which is difficult to translate but can perhaps 
be approximated by 'eating through sharing'. Houses, even in recent 
years, have been built on what people describe as traditional lines, 
though the technology of housebuilding is new. Most recently-built 
houses have pitched iron roofs and woven bamboo walls. The timber is 
obtained free from the forests but pitsawn by a local man for a fee. 
Labour during building is provided vakavanua, with the house owner 
providing a number of tabua, together with a feast that normally 
consiste of at least one head of cattle and large quantities of yaqona 
(say 30 pounds) and dalo (say 100 corms). The size of the 
presentation depends on the capacity of the owner to pay and his 
desire for prestige. The norm seems to be, the bigger the house the 
bigger the payment but there are no strict rules. Some individuals 
appear to have had their houses built on a welfare basis - that is no 
feast was provided, although workers arc provided with meals (saukana) 
as they would be if working on an individual's garden plot. As with 
welfare housing anywhece, however, the standard is naturally below the 
norm. By contrast, the provider of the large m~giti can not only 
build a large house (30ft x 20ft or more), he can aho enjoy 
··onsiderable prestige. One man in Nail uva provided 2 cattle, 7 pigs 
and 18 tabua. Another provided $400 as a 'gift' (iloloma) to the 
~~----------------..... ~ 
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workers, in addition to his magiti. It is significant that he 
describes this payment as a gift rather than the payment. It woulu be 
11 n infringement of the propriety of reciprocity to describe it as 
payment Ci,~). 
An important part of the system of labour reciprocity, which was 
in evidence at Nailuva, is the production of food. He who feeds his 
vorkers well receives the most support. It is, as R.R. Nayacakalou 
pointed out in the 1950s, 'a culturally accepted ideal that a man 
should have large gardens and be rich in food (vutunikakana)' 
(Nayacakalou 1978:119). Quain in the 1930s reported that the vigorous 
and consciencious gardeners attracted the strongest support and were 
therefore able to feed their workers better (Quain 1948:127- 131). 
In Nailuva, however, the days of labour reciprocity are numbered. 
The recent 'gift' of $400 shows that already cash is becoming 
imrortant as an incentive. In 1980 the high prices being received for 
yaqona and dalo, combined with the lowering of transport costs, meant 
that Nailuva villagers were experiencing an abundance of money and 
enjoying the greater access this allowed to store bought goods. 'Ille 
yaqona they were aelling (and drinking in great quantities) had, 
however, been planted three or more years earlier. 'Ille Assistant 
Ranch Manager, an experienced Agriculture Department extension worker, 
believed that they were not replanting fast enough to replac~ the 
crops being harvested. 'lllis, he had observed elsewhere, was the 
pattern when a new road was established. Planting along traditional 
lines, which involves expenditure of food on workers, declines until 
Pach individual decides for himself that he must plant with only his 
rwn labour. It is tempting to to interpret this change as part of an 
irresistible trend towards individualism, but ia the absence of 
~~~---------------..-
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evidence that other aspects of social. economic and political life are 
correspondingly individualized• this characterization cannot be 
justified. Ratu Sukuna. the architect of post war communal labour. 
r·~i.:ognil:.ed that in Lau. 'whenever copra commands a bl · • reasona e price 
there were 'thriving and happy communities that are economically 
individualistic but at the same time preserve the village 
uL"ganization' (quoted in Scarr 1980: 140). 'llie demise of labour 
reciprocity does not end all communalism. One way to characterize the 
change is as a change in currency. although as Nayacakalou points out. 
the basis of motivation under the traditional regime is quite 
different to motivation for cash production. 
Nabalabala village is situated at the opposite end of the project 
area from Nail uva. It has had road access for fifteen years. as a 
result of "*1\ch those people with suitable land have been able to grow 
sugar cane. Labour reciprocity has disappeared entirely. 'llie income 
available from sugar allows a standard of living distinctly higher 
than in other areas of Uluisaivou (and higher than in any of the other 
six village~ surveyed). 'llie highest income earned in 1979 was $15.000 
($12,000 from cane. $3.000 from cane carting). 'llie ability to earn 
nuch an income can be traced to the possession of a lease over thirty 
acres of cane land. although to this has been added sound farming 
practices and money management. 'llie farmer's brother. with similar 
land available. has earned good incomes from cane but lost a lot a 
money through the purchase of a truck which. through poor maintenance. 
was off the roads for long periods and was eventually repossessed. 
Nabalabala also offers the opportunity for wage labour. One man 
tn the village is a permanent Public Works Department employee and 
~everal others have worked for the Uluisaivou corporation. the 
~~~-----------------~ 
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headquarters of "*iich are within easy walking distance of the village. 
of all the villages in the Uluisaivou area, Nabalabale has benefited 
most from the corn.oration, through th f 1 b e ease o wage a our 
opportunities and the hiring of corporation plant and equipment. 
The third village surveyed in the Uluisaivou area is Raviravi 
which is located between Nabalabala and Nailuva. Villages in this 
arl'a enjoyed road access before the project commenced but the middle 
p1>rtion of the road (after passing Nabalabala) was too steep for buses 
:ind frequently impassable even to four weel drive vehicles (N.Z. 
Foreign Affairs 1976 : 13). With the establishment of the project a 
new road was built to by-pass the steep section, as a result of wich 
cane production could be extended to the middle area of Uluisaivou. 
Before the new road was built people in this area were able to grow a 
variety of cash crops, but the uncertain links with markets appears to 
have inhibited the development of cash cropping. Prior to the general 
decline of the banana industry, bananas were a significant cash crop 
in the area, although the main banana growing area in Ra was cast of 
Uluisaivou. 
R.H. Frazer found in 1960 that this middle area of Uluisaivou was 
characterized by a great variety of crops together with the lavishing 
of great care on gardens. Frazer could find no apparent reason for 
the intensiveness of effort. 'Land is not short so there is no need 
to obtain the maximum yield. If the reason is related to a physical 
!actor it may be a desire to get the maximum return for the effort of 
clearing and digging a plot, but if anything, this effort is less than 
that in most other areas in Ra were such intensive use is not so 
rioticeable, though in truth the soils arc seldl)tll of such apparent 
fPrtility'(Frazer 1961:178). In 1960 the area was still characterized 
.&J 
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by a variety of crops, sixteen in all in the survey, with most farmers 
6 elling at least three or four crops. The reason for the intensive 
agriculture appears to be related to a perceived shortage of good 
I nod. In view of the relationship between continued use of land and 
intra mataqali land rights there is incentive to intercrop so as to 
ro3intain cropping of some sort on the highly prized alluvial terraces. 
Raviravi and nearby villages have long been a source of workers for 
V11tukoula, apparently as a result of what is perceived to be a 
qhortage of land. 
Yalavou 
There are no villages within the Yalavou are·~. Most of the 
vlllages in which the Yalavou landowners reside are situated in the 
Sigatoka valley. The remainder are in the narrow valleys of the Sovi 
nver and the Nasikawa creek. 
The Sigatoka valley can be divided into two major sub-areas: (a) 
the sugar growing area on the lower east bank; (b) the mixed cropping 
area on the west bank and upper east bank. The Bemana area on the 
upper cast bank was· the only village containing Yalavou landowners 
included in the survey. Bemana has given a greater proportion of its 
land to the project than any other district (30 per cent of the 
project area) and its land is in fact in the centre of the project. 
lta economic activity is fairly typical of most of the mixed cropping 
~;q~ntoka valley villages participating in Yalavou. Nakalavo village, 
•m the lower west bank of the valley, was also included in the survey 
t1Pcause it contains one of the two landowning mataqalis of the 
lilivalevu beef project, although this mataqali owns no land on the 
valley floor. 
~~--------------...... -~ 
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The pattern of agriculture at Bemana is atypical of most Fijian 
villages. Mixed cash cropping has long been the main form of farming. 
There is still significant cultivation of produce for home 
consumption, but expenditure on store bought food is generally higher 
than in all but one of the other villages surveyed; 65% of households 
spent more than $20 a month on food. Only Nabalabala, the sugar 
growing village in Ra, had a higher figure than this ( 73%). 
C.S. Belshaw centred his studies of Fijian social and economic 
change in the late 1950s on the Bemana area. At that time a road had 
just been established and Fijian producers were responding ·to new 
opportunities for cash cropping. As noted earlier, Belshaw's 
investigations led him to believe that Fijians could respond to these 
challenges, provided only that they received improved agricultural 
t•xtension and credit, and freedom from the restrictions of the Fijian 
AJministration. . Ten years after Belshaw' s stud:., E. K. Fisk and D. 
Honeybone visited the area and followed up the case studies of Fijian 
Potrepeneurs that Belshaw had used to substantiate his arguments. Of 
the eleven cases of individual commercial farmers used as examples by 
Bt•lshaw, four were judged by Fisk and Honeybone to be 'moderately 
successful'~ five were thought t'o be 'going well' and two were rated 
'outstandingly successful! (Fisk and Honeybone 1971). 
Twenty years after Belshaw's study, the two Bemana farmers he 
included still appeared to be prosperous. The rest of the people, 
h<iwever 1 have not necessarily followed their lead. It is true that 
r0ciprocity of labour has disappeared. Most houses in the area have 
now been individually built. Most farmers now own their own bullocks 
.10d ploughs, and are experienced in the growing of a variety of cash 
<rops. n1e majotity, however, still practices the low input, low 
~~-------------------~ 
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out put agriculture typical of peasantries all over the world. nu:· 
cash incomes produced by such farming are not high; they are lower 
than those of most Indian neighbours, and below the aspirations of the 
farmers themselves (although they are generally higher than all other 
v il lug. s in the survey, with the exception of sugar producing 
Nab11L1bals). A significant proportion of the higher income is spent 
on reremonial activities associated with weddings and funerals. Most 
households reported spending in excess of $50 in the previous year and 
many (40%) spent over $100. With the exception of Nakalsvo, in all of 
the 11ther villages surveyed most people spent less than $50. The 
high .. r ceremonial expenditure at Bemana appears to confirm Rutz' s 
hypllthesis that ceremonial expenditure rises as more cash becomes 
available. Investment in housing has also risen. Investment in 
productive assets, such as fertilizer has not risen significantly. 
One notable feature of Bcmana's relatively greater integration 
1nt1) the cas~ economy is the apparent growth of inequality. There is 
a ~~rPater spread of cash incomes than in any other village surveyed. 
ln Nabalabala the incomes are almost all higher than in Bemann• in 
Nalluva and Navunimono they are generally lower. In Navuniyaumunu, 
the Uluisaivou area "'1here there miY.ed cropping, the spread of 
> n, mnes approaches that of Bemana, but there is no ·household reporting 
an income of $1600. The r~ven Bemana households (35% of the total) 
..,1th incomes in excess of $1600 arc interesting because they have 
nct11«•ved this position through differential access to land. Three of 
thrqp households belong to Tokatoka Noga "'1b:1. ..... owns a high proportion 
of the arable land around the village. Another three households hav..? 
llr<l'ns to Noga land. The seventh household has good access to the 
l ari' of another landowning unit. Each of the seven households is able 
t 0 119e at least nine acres of land. 
.. 
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Like Fijians elsewhere, the people of Bemana tend to explain 
differences in agricultural production and income by reference to 
diff~rences in access to land or differences in the fertility of land. 
The Noga farmer who was identified by Belshaw as an enterprising • 
individual is regarded by his neighbours as successful purely because 
he has access to good arable land. Since the 1950s he has gathered 
around him his sons and nephews in a settlement that resembles a new 
village. Within his compound he has constructed a bi to, a square 
thatched house where the men of the tokatoka (which is known in 
Nadroga as a bito) are able to retreat. 'Ille enterprising farmer of 
the 1950s is now a staunch conservative. 'Ille Noga land is not used 
intl•nsively and most of the Noga farmers have incomes that are lower 
than the farmers from other landowning groups who use small portions 
of their land, but who have less land to cultivate. Some of the Noga 
farmers use their land for share-cropping with lndidn neighbours. 
This practice is illegal and disapproved of by village opinion but 
do~s not appear to attract strenous criticism, probably as a result of 
fears that the small plots of land that are presently used by non-Noga 
members might be put in jeopardy. 
In addition to their existing tract of arable land the Noga group 
aloo owns a swampy area "1hich if drained could add substantially to 
thP arable land available to the village. It was proposed in 1980 
that this land be leased by the NLDC to be drained and developed but 
the proposal lapsed, apparently through reluctance of the non-Noga 
members of the village to sec land pass out of village hands. Noga 
DPmbers, in the presence of other members of the village, seemed 
lukPwarm in putting forward the reply they had given to the NLDC. 
Tlu•y stood to do very well out of the proposed developoment. 'Illeir 
failure to take advantage of the opportunity shows the force of 
> 
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traditional values as a constraint on self-interest. 
Before the Yalavou project was established, the other landowning 
groupa in Bemana had all experienced shortages of land. Members of 
three groups began the move to Yalavou as a direct consequence of this 
shortage. All of these have no arable land in the area surrounding 
Bemuna village. Two other groups which have land near the village no 
longer have enough to provide land for all of their members. They 
have become increasingly reliant on Noga for land. One man with only 
two acres has had to turn to wage labour on an Indian farm for a 
significant part of his livelihood (3-4 days a week at $2 a day). One 
of these groups, Tokatoka Uru 1 is the largest group at Bemana in terms 
of numbers and has always been to the fore in village affairs, 
although it is not the traditionally pre-eminent group in the village. 
[l) Distribution of land within the group is a hi~hly sensitive 
matter. In the time of the Buli system (before 1948) land was divided 
up between families and has been passed down patrilineally. Like all 
of the groups at Yalavou 1 however, Uru has a large tract of land at 
Yalavou. nie problem of the distribution of land between Uru members 
took on a new complexion with the plans to develop Yalavou. 
Ver at a 
The survey in the Verata area was conducted in Navunimono 
village, one of seven villages that have given land to the beef 
proji>r t. Two features of social and economic life in Navunimono that 
distrn;;uish it from the other villages in the survey are: (i) its 
proxtmity to Suva; and (ii) a shortage of good arable land. Despite 
thP higher incomes reported in Nabalabal~ and Bemana, the Vcrata area, 
I l I The originally preeminent group is 
estal>l \shed good standing with the 
d ioturbances of 1876. This allowed 
rec,>gnit ion as the leading family. 
Naduguivalu but a Noga leader 
colonial government during the 
his group to gain colonial 
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as a result to its proximity to Suva, has a longer and in certain 
re a pee ts more thorough-going enmeshment in the modern world. 
Reciprocity of labour seems to have disappeared entirely; no 
respondent reported the provision of a feast for the construction of 
his house. Expenditure on ceremonial affairs was considerably lower 
than in other villages, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of 
income. Forty five per cent of households reported no expenditure on 
weddings or funerals for the previous twelve months. (Correspondingly 
one individual reported the receipt of a destitute allowance.) Another 
measure of the exposure to the cash economy might be the decline in 
the sharing of land among mataqalis. At Navunimono only fifteen per 
cent of respondents reported use of land belonging to a ~ataqali other 
than their own. It appears that land is regarded in a different light 
at Navunimono, though it is difficult to compare complex attitudes 
between different village contexts. 1bere is little leasing of land 
outside the beef farms. 'lllis could be the result of the shortage of 
land ~1ich people report, though unlike the shortages at Bemana and 
Raviravi, the shortage at Verata appears to be an absolute shortage 
rather than just competition for the more fertile areas. 1bis 
absolute shortage is reflected for example in the number of cattle 
owne~ by people in the village. Most people (65%) have no cattle at 
all, in marked contrast to all other villages in the survey. 
The range of ct·ops grown at Navunimono is small i many farmers 
grow only tavioka. Reported cash incomes are distinctly lower than in 
the other villages, as is expenditure on store bought food. However, 
the general level of welfare as reflected in housing is not lower than 
in qt her villages, and the village as a whole is neat and well kept· 
Toilet facilities are clean and modern (many flush pour types), and 
the use of locks on doors was notable, although it is difficult to 
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determine its significance. Together with the absence of labour 
recl'procity, the diminished sharing of la d b n etween mataqali, low 
expenditure on ceremonial events and the relatively long exposure to 
the cash economy, the use of locks on toilet doors could be subsumed 
under the general heading of indivl1ualism or westernization. Against 
this, however, must be counted the relatively weak links with the cash 
economy and the higher level of subsistence production implied by the 
lower level of expenditure on store bought food. lbe neatness of the 
village also suggests the use of communal labour, although the 
J traditional system of reciprocity is no longer in operation. 
!j 
·~ Tilivalevu 
Fi 
> 
The Til ivalevu lands are owned by two mataqalis from two 
different villages. One of the villages, Til1valevu, is located in 
the c;entre of the project area; the other, Nakalavo, is in the 
Sigatoka Both were included in the survey, although, 
Tilivalevu village now has only two households residing in it. Before 
the project began there were thirteen households. Other members of 
the mataqali lived as guests in the coastal village of Togovere. In 
the 1930s all members of the mataqali had resided at Togovere but were 
compelled by a resolution of the Provincial Council to move to their 
own lands, which had poor access (no roads and no navigable river) and 
steep slopes that made agriculture difficult. 
In a sense Tilivalevu no longer exists; almost all of the 
~a_qali I 9 land has been given to the project. lbe smal 1 area around 
the village is used by one houoehold. lbe head of the other 
hOU!l!!hOld 1 the chief of the village, has virtually retired. In 
another sense, Tilivalevu has been transformed rather than ceased to 
exist. It is still the focal point of the farmers who form 'a 
> 
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community of independent farmers' as foretold by Spate. 1he chief t a 
strongly traditional mant lives in a large Fijian-style house that 
embodies the very best of traditional craftsmanship. 1his aspect of 
Til iv11levu apparently escaped the attention of the planners of 
Yalavou · 
The other Tilivalevu project village is stiil occup~ed. Although 
the village is situated in the Sigatoka valley the mataqali owns no 
land in the valley. Several households have accesst through kinship 
ties, to good arable land near Naduri but the amounts of land are 
small and are not leased. Several members of the village work as 
labourers at the nearby Nacocolevu research station. 1he standard of 
housing at Nakalavo is generally poor. Cash incomes seem to be 
reasonably high because of the availability of wage labour but there 
is little indication of prosperity as a result of the receipt of this 
cash. 'Ihe subsistence base which could lift the level of welfare is 
apparently lacking. 1he proportion of households spending more than 
$60 a month on store bought food (40%) was the highest of any village 
surveyed. 
1he Project ~ Compared 
The general framework within which the comparison of the six 
villages has been developed has emphasized the constraints that 
circumscribe the economic choices of Fijians. Some of the more 
important social constraints were identified and their policy 
impl1cations identified. Oth~rt physical constraints have not been 
emphasizedt although the general description of the four project areas 
has indicated a number of these. In the lower Uluisaivou area. for 
exmJplc, the ability to grow sugar, which is the result of a road link 
to the Penang mill together with the presence of suitable soils and 
> 
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climate, has made possible a prosperity unmatched by any of the other 
villages. The fertile soils of the Sigatoka valley and its proximity 
to the tourist industry allow mixed cropping of a distinctive type. 
Navunimono' s proximity to Suva allows access to the high prices of the 
Suva market but the relatively infertile soils limit the range of 
crops that can be grown. Access to development officials is good at 
Navunimono, fair in the Sigatoka valley and lower Uluisaivou and poor 
in inner Uluisaivou. 
Such physical factors are important in explaining the nature and 
extent of development in the four project areas but they do not 
explain it all. 'llle socially determined constraints outlined above 
patterns of land tenure, ceremonial expenditure and labour 
organization - must be taken into account. The problem is to 
disentangle the various social and physical factors so as to account 
for the distinctiveness of each area. 
Nabalabala is clearly the most prosperous village and therefore, 
some might conclude, the most advanced. The source of Nabalabala's 
prosperity can be found in the absence of many of the constraints 
surrounding land tenure in other areas. Although there is no actual 
land shortage, mr.taqali members have clarified whatever rights they 
ponness and settled them with leases. If there had been more or less 
preoaure on the land this might not have been possible. If there had 
been leas pressure there might have been no incentive to take out 
lcaqes at all. If there had been more pressure, agreement on shares 
would have been harder to arrive at. As it is, non-mataqali members' 
lenacr claims on the land have been recognized while still allowing 
rnPJ:Jbers leaseholds as large as thirty acres on arable land. 
rage 1.H 
The contrasting attitude to land in Bemana is clearly a result of 
land ohortage. Members of the numerically small but land-abundant 
Noga group are able to agree among themselves to lease the plots they 
claim lolhile allowing informal access to relatives on other small 
plots. 'The more numerous members of the land-short Uru group, while 
having clearly defined individual pieces of arable land, retreat from 
the finality of leases· This problem will be discussed further in the 
a contPXt of the Yalavou project. 
> 
Of all the social constraints outlined, land tenure seems to be 
the most fundamental. As the passages from Weber and Moore which head 
this chapter point out, land tenure changes are the key change in the 
capitalist transformation of agriculture. Land ceases to be regarded 
as the source of livelihood and is instead treated as a commodity. 
However, the simple dichotomy implied by this is not easy to detect in 
the messy complications of empirical reality in Fiji. Nevertheless 
there can be no doubt that land is the factor of production which 
looms largest in the minds of Fijians. 'There is evidence, for 
example, that the rise in ceremonial expenditure is linked to land 
tenure problems. The high level of expenditure at Bemana can be 
linked to the enforced reliance of many individuals o~ access to land 
through increasingly strained .kinship connections. An alternative 
hypothesis, that ceremonial expenditure arises out of a desire for 
status, should be discounted in the case of Bemana. (1) One survey 
reopondent at Bemana admitted spending more than $100 on ceremonial 
evPnts over the previous twelve months but described the events as 
'nt11pid gatherings' (soqo ulukau). ln his opinion they were the 
Ill Niukula (1977:3) reports a wedding that involved eleven cattle and 
onP hundred drums of kerosene. Extremes such as this almost certainly 
represent a desire for status, but these are exceptional and not 
universally regarded as proper for people who are not of high rank. 
Niukula reproaches the wedding as not reflecting the 'simple ways of 
the ancestors' • 
--o-· ·-• 
1 great problem for the Fijians' (..!!.!, leqa ~ ni Kai Viti) • 
---
This is 
clearly not the statement of a man looking for status. By contrast, 
at Navunimono, where reliance on access to land of h ot er !!ataqaliB. was 
lowest, expenditure on ceremony was also the lowest of the seven 
villages. On the other hand, in areas where access to the cash 
economy is new, where labour reciprocity survives (Nailuva for 
example) ceremony should probably be linked to the desire to maintain 
status (which is the basis of labour mobilization) rather than 
insecurity regarding land tenure. At Nailuva there was no evidence of 
insecurity in relation to land. Rights of informal access to the land 
of relatives were routine and unquestioned. Ceremonial expenditure 
can, therefore 1 be linked to a number of different causes. It should 
not be regarded as a single 'factor' and it is, as will be seen later, 
overrated as an obs tac le to Fijian economic progress. Likewise, the 
tentative generalizations above nothwithstanding, land tenure should 
not be regarded as a single factor, an independent variable 
functionally related to other dependent variables such as ceremonial 
expenditure. 1~ is true that secure, transferable tenure is an 
essential ingredient of successful smallholder development but the 
obstacles to the creation of such land tenure are many and varied.[l] 
Cultural Constraints 
Many aspects of Fijian culture have given way, with apparent 
in(lvitability, to the intrusion of the cash economy. Labour 
reciprocity is perhaps the most striking example. At the same time 
othrr aspects of culture have maintained themselves tenaciously. In 
fact, ceremonial expenditure often seems to increase as contact with 
Ill Rosemary Barnard reports that the large scale leasing of lan~ ~t 
De11ba 'brought about a dramatic improvement in the response factor in 
tcrcrn of commitment to commercial agriculture but she docs not explain 
how the dee hion to lease' apparently a collective one' was made 
(Baurnrd 1974:7). 
I 
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the cash economy increases. It is as important d · · to ist1nguish 
elements of continuity among the cha11ges a · t · d , s l is to escribe and 
explain the changes themselves. 
In the 1950s Nayacakalou was able to draw a sharp distinction 
betwePn 'the Fijian economy' and 'a capitalistic industrial economy' 
(Nayacakalou 1978: 120). In the Fijian economy, he argued, 
'compensations are governed largely by other factors than precise 
exchanges of equal value; they tend to be directed more by the 
concept of social obligation, and therefore to have final sanction in 
a syst~m of reciprocities which permeate the whole group within which 
social relations are effective. 'Ihis means the incentives to work are 
based more on social than on economic considerations' (Nayacakalou 
1978:121). 
In the years since Nayacakalou wrote this, labour reciprocity has 
disappeared from most parts of Viti Levu but social obligation remains 
an important paJt of economic incentive. 'Ihe desire to produce 
individually, free from the constraints of the communal labour 
restrictions of the,Buli system, could be interpreted as a desire to 
meet social obligations more efficiently. In the thriving banana 
based economy of Waimaro iu the 1960s Rutz found social. obligation 
very much in evidence. 'Host men seek the esteem of other men, and in 
Waimnro this status is less individual than it is group centered'· 
Each individual seeks to demonstrate his ability to 'use personal 
inc..ige to benefit his minimal patrilincage and for the collective 
adva.1cement of the village' (Rutz 1973: 304) · 
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Considered in its broadest terms, and t · 1 no simp y as specific 
ceremonial obligations or contributions to communal labour, social 
obligation is a deeply-embedded, enduring element of Fijian culture. 
The FiJ' ian word which best def1' nes th· · is notion of obligation is 
veiqa;avi (service). It is used in many contexts where the English 
'work' would be used. It occurs again and again in obituaries, which 
are un important part of Fijian language newspapers. There are, in 
addition, many other words and expressions which convey this essential 
idea: yaga ki ~ vanua (useful to the land) or dau vakaitavitaki 
(regularly participating), two examples among many others. 
Ceremonial expenditure can be linked, as Rutz suggests, to the 
insecurities that exist in the absence of government welfare, but 
service to the community embraces far more than expenditure on 
weddings and funerals. As social and economt~ change take place, new 
outlets for communal service appear and are taken up. School 
construction and improvement are obvious examples but the range of 
conununal efforts is large and growing larger. Provincial Councils 
have made a variety of attempts to enter business. One such attempt, 
the purchase of a dairy farm, will be examined later as an example of 
development from below that began despite opposition f\om planners. 
I 
Diatricts and villRges are also involved in a wide variety\of communal 
vent1Jres. Two villages from Tailevu province, for example, have 
I recently organized village housing projects. One is based upon the 
t ~ establishment of two farms, one at the Seaqaqa sugar project, the I other on their ovn land. The revenue generated by sugar and cocoa 
' j pr,>•iuction is used to provide the basis of repayment, with the 
un,•xpircd portion of the leases acting as loan security. The other 
hr, 11 riing project attempts to combine the underemployed labour of the 
v1\lage with the hardwood timber resources surrounding the villate to 
> 
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Produce wooden framed houses with timber floors. B h · ot projects have 
been created by educated 'expatriate' village members with the 
requiaite organizational skillsj one is a land valuer, the other a 
senior official of the Co-operatives department. 
The impulse to create such projects represents au extens~on of 
cultural sentiments regarding social obligation. The prediction of 
the future shape of such cultural norms is a hazardous business which 
prornises to be no more rewarding. than planners' attempts to changP. 
• values by preaching. Such exhortations appear to regard culture as a 
I ij 
I 
i 
! 
I 
I 
i 
•• 
garment that individuals can put on and take off according to their 
own convenience. For example, Michael Ward, a former Government 
Statistician in Fiji, has deplored the 'need felt to impress by 
conspicuous expenditure, the extravagent generosity and the tendency 
of many Fijians to throw away future gain for iimnediatc 
gratification' . Such tend enc ics arc 'well known' , Ward says. He 
directs the blame for such attitudes at conservative Fijian leaders 
who oeek to prmrnrve the traditional order which stifles ambition for 
ind i.v idual advancement. Ward also crit iciaes christ ian churches, in a 
slightly contradictory wG.y, for tending to 1 promulgate and emphasize 
the non-materialistic approach to life. Persuaded by Christian 
tearhin~ not to indulge too much in the worldly pursuits of life or in 
tt1<> acquisition or display of material wealth, many Fijians probably 
subrnnsciously and automatically rejected all profitable endeavours 
towards economic developmen~ and the attainment of a higher personal 
standard of living' (Ward 1971:30-42). 
This protestant-ethic-thesis in reverse is a remarkable 
hyw>thesis that is typical of the sweeping auumptions about 
mot i·.ration often e:i ;loyed by planners. Untested (and untestable) 
> 
Page 136 
assumptions such as these often play an important part in the planning 
proceos, as will be seen in succeeding chapters. 
, 
> 
CHAPTER FOUR 
VF:RATA AND TILIV.\LEVU 
The Prototypes for InJividualism 
•·;.i1e 1•xempt0d men nll farm areris he longing to the mataqa l i, 
Tfwy .1rL' charged no rent, but if the m:itaqali require,--for 
in.;t.1nct', a cow for a feast or some money for expenses in 
1· 1nn1•ction with a wedding, they will cnll on the formers for 
Ji,•[?, Such demands by the m<:.!:_a~:_li are not excessive. The 
c>ft-.tllt•gt>d habit of Fijians of "sponglng1' on their 
rd,1tives ,1nd bleeding white anyone with possessions above 
th<' average is certainly not evident in Deuba.' W.R. Ge<ldes 
( ~ 4 11 ) : 6 2 ) • 
ThL' \'t,r.1t.1 and Tilivalevu projects are now regarded as prototypes 
,ir ;ii lnt s for the Yalavou project, al though each arose out of 
11,1rt[,·11!1r circumstances, which in each case included a small hut 
.;i.::11' l ·,111t 1•lt>nwnt of local intitiative. Neither project w.1s the 
r .. ·;:lt of ,1 \frtl thought-out plan and Tiliv:ilevu w;is actually forced 
u11)n !ts planrwr-.. In view of this lnck of premeditritr>d dPsign, the 
vilLlty rif ttw individualist tng which has been attached to the 
;irJj<'•'.l'l <>hould be questioned. Neither project was designed as a 
"l'ldl'! t 1> be P:a11 ln ted, though they do provide lessons for the planning 
\lthou~;h c;1ttle are a European lntroduc11d species in Fiji, beef 
h.1·• ; 1n;~ h••••n ,rn importnnt, if irregular, part of the diet of many 
'.'!j!.1a;, •!sped.illy in the are<tr. that now h<tve cattle> projPcts. In 
;97; .1~1ut 20 per cent of the cnttlr population of Fiji were village 
:.1ttlt> 11<;t>d for draft or me,1t (AD.\B 1976 Ann5:J). Individuals who 
h1·:•• ~1 1 " b l .·ind the land to graze them on, flnd them monpy to uy c.1 t t e, 
1 1nl'f11l frrm >f savinga, allowing conversion to cash by sale or 
'Hilt.1hl" currPucy w1.th which to meet many ceremonial obligations. 
·; 11d1 { 1ttlc> •lrt• clearly regarded as a form of delayed consumption 
b 
Page 138 
ritlt••r than a productive investment. 
\ll•ll'Hl•rn of labour to breeding of cattle has not generally been 
: 1 :·1 »f thi .. p;1tt ern, though there have been l'"'.eptional individuals 
•. , ': 1v<' pursued conimcrrlal bet•' raising or dairying. In Tailevu in 
:~ 1 ,, :<J~•ls, for example, provincial council records show that lo.1 ns 
143 were given to 'ML'lcki of 3urerua' who had thirty dairy 
1" "' ln 1930. The acting Secretary for Native Affairs approved of 
loan and Heleki whom he described ,ns• 'a d 1 " goo examp e to the 
11:lv··' (Provincial Council Records). This was the heydey of the 
.1 1 1~ 1 p1licy, when Europ~ans dominated the higher levels of the 
• ::.1:1 \,hlnistratlon. 
'J,-;;1lt«' the relatively long exposure to catLle and the commercial 
'<"i'i of at least a few Fijians, cattle have always seemed to be an 
•• 
1r 1 1isl:-ig point of take-off for fledgling r'ljian commercial formers • 
. 1:• .. r«; [.J11ntlfies one of the mHJor problems whnn he says that owners 
'd1:ry her<l at Lutu reg.irdcd their c.ittle 'as walking larders, to 
1
•• "-l l l"d when i1 m<1git:..!_ ls needed for some lac .. 1 ceremony' (Watters 
.h·1:J>). \n additional problem was created by a general ignorance of 
"•· ,;,,,·k m.1nanement among Fijians (even among those who own c.1tLle 
.>1«.,.,·1) hy compariso·1 with their familiarity with horticulture.[l] 
~ .. <'f ,·.1ttl(l were also accordod a low priority ln P,\lnt>ral 
' ···l lfl'.l••nt p•>licy tx•cauirn thure Wl•rc no prospects for export, while 
· r• 1 i l ... 1 f quff lciency had lottf~ bt>c>n achlevl!d from d<ti ry cull 
1 ' t '.", ·'itPd working bullocks 1 cattle p,rai lnfl under palm trrcs nnd 11 
. I , ... ir l wlio cLtlmt>d to know nomt>thinp, about 
··x.1r.tp c, ont> man 
· ~ •· ;t wk, ar; ,1 former C!mployee of the: !l;iyly ranch in R•I 1 explained to 
''1it irw of thl' lessons he leiHnc>d was to rantrate all r.lttle (~Ille 
" · >, "'l.1h•q .1nd females alike. This show11 that he io clc>nrly a'Wir'C 
.... fr•••pwnt .-r1tlclgm of Fijian stock owners (that tlwy r.111 to 
1.'r11 .. n.ilc> calvca) but obviously tp,nor.int of evt>n the mont basic 
•, 
1 ~ ~r llvflqtock mnna3eml'nt. 
b 
Page 139 
s:r.al l conu:icrcial ranching sector. By tl1e 1960s, however, local 
production .1ppeared likely to fall hf!hind demand. 1n 1964 the 
Commissioner Central warned the Development Commissioner that he 
I l Will h 1 bcllt.'Vt.'J t wre 8 Ort Y De a crisis in the cattle industry and 
bct«ir<' thL• t>nd of the YL'ar we will be in the silly position of 
In thL• 196\)s wlH'n colonL1l pollcy was for tlw first time oriented 
dL>.1:-ly tow1:-ds thl' g1>al of building Lhe economlc basis of an 
i:id1•;w:hJ,•nt n.Hion, Lt '"1:\S possible to stnrt giving serious attention 
t.1 Fi jl,rn p.1rtidp.1tlon Ln c.1ttle projl'L'ts. llllme<liately the question 
>f '<1m:1ti:1.dicim versus individualism arosl'. The Department nf 
\.~rlcultllre lndividu::il ownership while the Fijian 
.\,binisLr it ion f.lvo11red eollc>ctlvely owned farms. In the Sllkun1 YL'ars 
:rnmb••r <lf such projects had been started under Fijian Affairs 
,!(rt>.:tl·in, .111 of which ·were regardt•<l by the Agriculture Department in 
the :'HJ.)q .is failures. Proposals for collc>ctive schemes continued to 
ht• plll forward by Fijian Affairs when the first individualist project 
(VPrata) w1c; being planned. Agriculture attempted to discourage them. 
·~e ~hief Veterinary Officer, for example, replied to a request from 
~hi' Ol<>trict Officer Suva on beh.1lf of one group by saying 'as is well 
i<·10·,>:1, th l ·; d1'p;1 rtment does not look wl th favour on any r,roup or 
•>-•>pt>r.1tive llve'1tock farming Vl>nture, preferring in every case to 
;,,,, indivl<lu~ll m••n on individual 11'.t<ies', Agrl,~ulture was not ln a 
;i·J•;iti•>n to veto coopnratlV(l gch(lm1•s, and tlwir propon(lnts could !ll'<'k 
>~fi,·L1l eiwour.ig<>nwnt from ttw more sympattwtlc officers of tho 
F~ !hn Adrilnl•>tratlon, hut ,\gric'ulture did have a n<>ar monopoly of 
llv"'ltll•'k PXpt•rt i•H•. f}.!1.K.'lpate gumH up thC' difficult relationships 
i,,_,t,_., . .,n [J( ll:tn Affair<> and Agrlcultur€' in this way: 'OnP side ''knew 
b 
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tll ,_, Fi_ji::ins1', the other side knew farmt'ng·, b t th h u oug there may have 
been for~al espousals the marriage was unconsumated and therefore 
unfruitful' (Sp.ite 1959:40). 
A report prepared hy Dr. David Lornle, the senior agricultural 
,1 f(il.'<'r sup.:-rvising Verata in 1969, states that the 'scheme' arose in 
1%2 out of .1ttempts to assist 'a fow Fijian small holders who showed 
some intl'rt>st in cattle farming'. These farmers, six in all, were 
:\l1tt'd b0..:.H1SL! they 'had tdken th~ rathPr unusual step for Fijians at 
th.it tl!:ie by individually detctching tht~msclves from the community in 
.ia 1tt<'~1pt to farm for self profit', 
:,.;!t!1 Lnrnic•' s .1ssistance 1wgotLltions were commencl'd to nbt.1in 
thirty year leases and loan 
fin1·h·e (with tlw least>hold as st.?curity) from the AILB (Agricultural 
.rnJ Industridl Loans Bo.'.lrd, the forerunner of the Fiji Development 
R11k), ~egotldtions for leases 'did not prove to be an easy task'. 
nher memburs of Lhe landowning ~t:._d_'l.'.~!J. did not mind the use of 
twenty to thirty acres but asking for leases over 150 200 acres 
another very different matter'. After six months of 
:1•'1~·1tLHing, consPnt was obtained to the leasing of 2000 acres, 
'in some ca seq' , it had been necessary to offer 
'p1rti.-tp.1ti<rn in the 11 schPml'•' to other membors of the ~t:_n_qa_l_~ in 
rirdPr to obt.1 l n consent. Altogether thore were twelve farms of 
1pprrixlmately t~O acres, six for the> 'already motivated' ond six for 
'•;•·l1•ctP<l Individuals from the landowning units'• 
Conditions for entry to the scheme were deliberately 'exactlnR' • 
F.1r,;11>rG Wl're required to h.we ustabllshed their own housing and 
,,,.~,;i~tPnC'" gardenq bl'fore they could be entrusted with loan funds. 
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The intention was that 'the less enthusiasti~ people would be sorted 
,mt from what had now become a popular concept•, Lornie's report 
refers to drop-outs but there is evidence of only one. 
\'l•r:it:i w.1s the pi lot scheme for al 1 Fijian sm.illholder cattle 
r'.xpcrience there suggested to the Agriculture Department 
~.•1 ,it Ft.'1ians could be 'trusted'.with cattle. \ltl l bl 
_, 1 1oug 1 pro ems were 
L'Xi''·riL'th:l•d in adapting farmers to 'a steady working rhythm' as they 
_:,intinu<'<l to adhere to their 'soci;i.l obligations', they perservered 
.1.hl, .1bove all, did not liquidate their stock for ceremonial purposes. 
7tw s.1t isf 1ction of the Agriculture Department with Vera ta was 
r<'flL•L'tt>d in the exp.rnsion of Fijian beef smallholding. By 1967, 
SL'vcnty f.1rms had been established and a further one hundred and three 
,.,,.r,• plan1wtl and about to come into operation. 
l11 c.irh:ludiru~ his 1969 report David Lornie summed up the policy 
if th1• .\>~riculture Department in this way 'Prior to these 
,J,.vc•lop:wnts attl•mpts h,1ve been made by the nepartment to develop 
'):'.l:iunal r;Jnching by Fijians- all of which have been uneuccessful. 
~or thP prPsent therefore, emphasis is being given to developing a 
'.l·l'>Y of small "yoeman" type farr. ·~rs fully able to manage their own 
1'f1lrs'. ~e w.is quick to qualify this, how~ver, by saying that, up 
t•) tiwn, the field staff had tended actu11lly to manage the farms 
cit!wr than to Pducat<' tlw farmers. But this, he said, 'was to some 
"<t•:nt lnPvitahln in a pilot scheme of this kind'• 
Th" turthPr expannlon of beef smallholders to,>k place through 
l'X ten•1 ion <l id 1 th r tl\an 'scl1l1.mes'. work with in iv un s ra e 
~ornl~'s report reflects 3 wariness of dealing with groups rather than 
ln<li vidu.1 ls, ln characterizing the different levels of achievement 
•1 b ( d b ti rate c>f repaying loans) he 
• 
1own y thP f.1 rmers measure y 1c 
> 
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states that 'generally speaking the original 'motivated farmers' were 
more satisfactory than the others which had heen included in the 
Sl' }H':Ill' I • The word scheme is regularly placed between inverted commas 
i:1 his report. At Lhe time, the term had lost its appeal as a result 
0 f Jifflculties experienced in LOA 'schemes'. Verata was formally put 
thr1ugh the LOA approval procedures but was administered entirely by 
~orm.il Agric:ul tu re Department extension workers. 
Thf' Orig_i_n_~ El the l!_-!:_!_~<!_levu Project 
------
llse of tlw Tilivalevu area for beef cattle was first proposed by 
Lhe people of nearby Nakabuta village, who had a severe shortage of 
l~nd. A delegation from Nakabuta approached the Livestock Officer, 
::_~t-~<t,i_l_i_ owning the Tilivalevu land, npproving their use or the land. 
Aft,•r ,m inspC'ctlon of thP area hnd been made, however, the owners of 
Tiliv.1levu themselves npproached Jonasa, s.iying that they now wished 
l·1 <lc>velop the land. 
Tlw Tll ivalevu people's original plan was for a communal venture 
but this was quickly disposed of by the Agriculture Department. In 
Lin, the whole proposal, even in its individualized form, was opposed 
by •wnh1 offlcL1ls within both the Agriculture Department and the 
.\I'.!3. ThP manager of the AILB argued that 'it would be unrealistic to 
• ,,,ect p<'rSl'Vl'ranci> and sustainl~d interest from farmers who were to 
r''''••ivP no monPt,1 ry rnward for their efforts during the first four 
Y'"I ry'. 
Pow .. rful ~mpport for the proposal c.ime from a number of young 
l)r.11 offlcc>rq (one> of whom was later to be> Permanl'nt Secr1•tary of 
\grt.:11lt11rc) .ind the prer.ence of newly elected political leadl'rs 
di r•·n l ng d v l1 sc> rv n n tr. • Wlth some reluctance the Chief Veterinary 
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Jfficer persuaded the AILB to support the scheme. The proposal as it 
was 3 c.t11ally considered by the South West Viti Levu Local Development 
3,1.ird admitted that the 'would be grazlers are an unknown quantity but 
~election would be facilitated by demanding an initial establishment 
;'eric><l which should show the 111kewarm and the lazy in order that they 
::iiy be n•placed before there is any financinl commitment'. As at 
\'erJL<l, thc> farmers Wl're required to bull.cl their own houses and have 
suh,lste1l<'l' food crops plant~d before they could receive loan funds. 
Tlw houses that were accot·dingly built, and tlH• crops that were 
,Jl,0 u" •J for the subsequPnt erection of fences. The Chief Veterinary 
1:.:"lcer, who h.1d originally opposed the scheme (and w1s generally 
ip'.',;,•,I to c1im1.1unal ventures) admitted that the value of coliective 
:1 1>1111r ln certain of thP heavier tasks was a valu;1ble lesson lParne<l 
.~ ;'illvalevu. On the gt'neral question of commun.1llsm he obsl!rved 
t!1.1l Fiji.ins are 'communally mindl!d people but they are individual 
~ .-:1 11u;:1 to f<>e! that people should be paid according to the work they 
b 
J1
1 (pPrs comm). In accordance with this principle he revived one 
'il1\~ln~ culll'ctlve venture by proposing what he called a 'comp<lllY 
for each hour's wcrk particip1~ts received a one shilling 
<:'rt•d!t. When cash proceeds became available (after loan r1>payment) 
,ht>y W•>11l<l be split up .1ccording to credits. The idea was Wt!ll 
r" .. ·!·1pd .1n<l workl•d 8,1 tlqfactorily until 1969 wht'n the loan w.1s fully 
r",H!:l and th<:! land subdivided into two family groupq.[lJ 
i~I :{11tz (l971:3l1'+) reports this particular 'scheml.!' and dl'scribes the 
c•n;nny (k_:l_l~·~n_i) as the local t'qulvnlent of the t_~k:1to_k_a. or cxttrndc>d 
f.1tily. 
b 
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Problems at Verata 
---
In 1973, when ~L\F was considering a cattle project in Ra, the 
:~,, 0 ,,r,1l feeling rt'garding the Vt>rata Project was, ~ 11 the words of the 
offlC't'r in charge of livestock policy, that 1t 'was o.K., except that 
l. t 11l•eJ"J considerdbl" wet-nursing'. I 1980 ~1\ 1 ~ ~ n r  F ivestock officers 
~JntlnueJ to complain about the attention they needed to give Verata 
by cnmpa ri son with other Fljian b0ef farmers. The 
intcnslve~ess of the extl'nsion input is a point of some importance. 
:~~ Y<llavou design assumes that the extension input at Veratn has not 
.iJ,,111:1tdy fulfilled its functhrn; indeed it goes further and 
i~t"·.i,1ts Lo c1n1plc a dev,rec of compulsion to extPnslon (ADAB 1976 
·, 1'12: 2 l) • 
Tlll' l'XtPnslon rcL1tionship ls radically different from the 
rt>latlon<Jhlp of the old Fl 1inn 
.\':::1l-itr.1tlrrn, tht«iu~~h which gL'ncraturns of Fijians had dealt with 
'L\F -;taff Jealing wlth Verat•t in 1980 
1:~d;ted of (i) ;1 Loc.11Lty Livl'<Jtock Officer and a Field Assistant, 
·i1» wl·re b.1s1'd n<'ar the farml•rs; (Li) an Agricul tur..11 Officer baned 
~ 1 ~ 111• nir il t owrrn h l p '> f Ko rovou; (iii) thP ntvisional Veterinary 
and (iv) a temporary Peace Corp 
,, .i ::wP, Tlw [.o,·.tlily Llvc!;tock Oft'iccr w.1s n y1HJOft Fijian dlplomate 
r , i • h I' r I j { <:o 11 Pg<' <l f .\g rt c u l tu r 1.1 • II i s F l u 1 d Ari q l s t ant ha <l no 
t ,r·n.il 1P,rl1· 1iltur.d training. Th(' Agricultural Officer ln Korovou w.1s 
:·i !Lin ;~radu.itf' In Agricultural SciC!nCC' 1 n•qponsibl<.' for .111 
.1,;ri1·uJtur.il t'Xt<'n!llon ( livegtock .md crops) in tht• nortla•rn p.Ht of 
~ti l••vn Provlnct•. Ttw DVO was a younq F.np,lish vetcrlnarlnn worklnr, on 
intr1n, only rP('l'ntly arrlv<•d in Fiji and without previous tropical 
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but one of a succession of expatriate veterinarians to 
h.ive ovl'rsight of Verata. Beginning with the DVO who founded Verata, 
sudi cxp.1triate officers, despite their senior status and widespread 
r•'~pnnsi~llities, tended to be closely involved with the project. 
T'ils ls perhaps due partly to Verata' s pioneer status and partly to 
its 11c.1tion close to the DVO' s office in Nausori. Tilivalevu, 
lo~dted at a much greater di.stance from its DVO's office, hns never 
11.d m1ch high level involvement; the Fijian Locnllty Livestock 
1ft[cl'r in Slgatok.1 and, in the early days, n Field Assistant living 
.1~ '.'ilivall1 Vu have had charge of most major decisions. 
~ht• D\'.)' s view of the prtlblt•ms .1t Veratn in 1980 was that the low 
:,·vel •)f min.1gemt•11t exercised by farmers was leading to poor calving 
.11d LHv w0if~ht g.lin!l, which led in t\Jrn to pl)or returns. Such 
rt•qulrcd ,-.1rl'ful .1nd routlne nttention to pasture 
.: 111,;··~1t·nt, f,•nc l ng .md stock control. '!any of the farmers al lowed 
w, 1 .._1 J~; to spr~ad or ft1lled to r~pair fences whon needed and so allowed 
t'.H·lr st·>ck to graze• and breed as and when they wanted. As n result, 
<"'.llvlnr; r.1ttis fell and nnimnls did not attain pE>ak condition for 
·~1ri<r>t whr>n requin•d. At the root of these problems was a failure to 
1i1°• tl::iP wln••ly .rnd in ;1.1rtlc11lnr a failure to adhere to ro\Jtlnc.>. 
'.\ 11.H 1nq nl•t>de<l to overcome tlwsc problc:11s, the OVr) beli<>ved, was 
.,itiv.1tlon t0 .1 tlow the formt>r!l to rcaliZl! th<> bcnl•flts they could 
1 .. rlv•• tron .1•1lwrL•nC<' to the n•quired work routlne. The L0callty 
·.1-.,.'lt l•k Of firer cmpharil?.e<l th<> poor 1J<1e of money hy f.1rmers. 
1:.r ... 1d of wiinP, tlwlr cattl<' n•turn11 to purchase form inputs 'luch as 
'"'"'·lir ld1•, c;pr.1ys or fcnc<>s and p•rnts, farmers tend to spend their 
., nH·y .ind th<>n w<tl t for MAF staff to arrange for the ovPr<luc inputs to 
lw .J .. llvcrt><l with payments out of loan funds. 
> 
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·\n examination of ~!AF files rev 0 ,"ls th t h ~u a t e heavy extension 
input h.1s itself not been re 0 ular but h n rat er a series of spaced 
c.1c1p.1 tgns ;1hout thrL•e yea rs apn rl • Each campaign has commenced when 
it ,,m0 to the DVO' s at tL'nt Lon that farmers hnd st ipped back. When 
till' tll'L'J ior revitalization had been noted, a fresh lnput of capital 
The FOB has therefore played a critical role in the 
,!,•VL'l<ipm"nt of Verat.1. MAF offic<>rs make recommendations for loans, 
••'1Lh tlll' FDB norm.ally follows with thc> understanding that ~L\F 
~ffl,~rs wlll bc> able to ensure that farmers maintain their farms and 
.!> n11t viol.He the conditions of t!wir loans by selling ci1ttle without 
"11:.;i!l)~ 1,1.111 J,,,iuctions. This Litter nspect ls facllitated hy the 
'""r1t!.rn of .1 ~!AF c.1ttle m:1rkt>ting branch known as 'CommL'rclal 
1!"r in.~<' t ran~1port ;rnd agistmt>nt to see that cattlc> nre sold in urban 
Tlw FDi3 is not hound to ncct'pt tho recommendations of ~L\F 
lft lcl'rs .rnd for this re.1son m.dnt.iins its own field workers, most of 
~.1>~ are Jiplomatos of tho Flji School of Agriculturo with MAF 
•'"<r·•rlt'nCl'• A mo'lt important part of their function is to cnimre that 
f lr1t•rq d·l n0l ,ll low tht• value of the assets to slip down to a level 
w'i .. re the debt e.innot be recovt'r"~• This 11ener.1lly means enuuring 
t:i 1t far::wrri d•> not l lquld.itt· tlH'ir stock without going •.hrou~h 
;.•,11rmers l1.1ve on occasions sold stock 
;1plv.H"1y but ii•rn.dly rrnly ln sm.111 numbl'rs. Wh<'n the FOil h.rn learned 
if ·••1ch t r:rnq.H'. t ion•; 1 t h•rn r•I tlrnr .rnked farmers to p.1y th<' FOB the 
Enr.urlng the 
'i•"'11rlty <Jf llve?r.tock lonn11 ls nnt particularly clifflcu~t and no for 
• 1 ' 1 ff <)t1ly on" of tl1c ori 0 in.·il V••rat.1 
.. , •Mn 11.1-. had to bt' wr t tPn o • " ., ~ 
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rcplJcment judged by the FOB to be capable of carrying on the farm. 
S11d1 tr.rnsf"rs are not e.Jsy to make, and are made only as a last 
r,,s.irt. Tht' Jifficu: ties in trdnsfers arise out of the nature of land 
~,,:rnt'c. :\l t\Hrngh Ver.:11.:a graz l ng land is not in pt j ian reserve, the 
;:-,Jr\ is reluctant to attempt to transfer land to people who are not 
··w1h,•rs of t lw owning ~· ~ t a cp_l):_ , or at least relatPd to till' lnndowners 
.in.I th<'rt•fure ,1hle to use it with their approval. The reasons for 
~his .1rc s i l~ r 1 e .ind are based on normal banking pri'1clples rather than 
,"J l [ti's. It is unlikely that anyor.e would be wllling Lu t.1ke over a 
lc.1w on .my othL'r ter:ns. If landr,t,.·ners do not readily coml' forward 
1.·ltt1 .1 v,>lunteer to t.Jkt• over :he lease the FOB somctiml's advertizes 
:·1r t;1;1licrnts hut this is ffi<)rL• in the nnture of an encourage>ml:'nt to 
: i.i! 1.>:1c•rs to find <1 repl.1cement farmer, thnn .i :rnrious at tempt :.o 
.·.~~.r1•t •>11t~;[,h•rs. In order to avoid the risk of a lessee faclnR 
llt' l;.~hhours lt is preferable to have the 11pprov.1l of 
In al 1 transf1~r 1>f lL•ases the concurrence of the ~!.TB 
'J11;t. 'w 1Jbt.lirwd. ~LTH offlcl.1la .1re reluctant to commit tht>rn<>•1 lves 
H ~' tht' crltPrla used in dt•clding whether to grant approval, merely 
rt>t.•rlnr, t•> their c.;tatutory <lllty to protPct the interests of native 
''""'crs. In vtt>w of FDB practiCl'S, however, lt is unlikt>ly that the 
';',-·\ w11Jld Pver need to n•fune transfer!>. In the one case of a 
f ' 1 i n lt ," ml•tnbc>r t)f the> ' r 1 ·l" . •' r of i ... 1 ·; ,. at V c> r .it a , t rll' new <> !HH' e s c " · 
.. :1:.,;; ri_~tyt~l_i_, nor a rc>l.ltlVt>, but ii m.m of chiefly rank at Vt>rata 
W'i'l '.•>olr on tlw f;1 rm in •>rdl•r to kc>ep it for the future llS c> of the 
'J i! '.11~ E!·~t l~'l 1_1_ 1_. Thi• le!lSl'C' [!l also an abs11 ntee, which 3q .1 ru 1 t> the 
F :ir; ,}()P ~) Tl<> t prl•fr•r, but he ls accc>ptable bccmHH' hl' 
[[;I by 
'J, ·1:1\t[r>n, .1 farm m.rnagc>r ('Jaboro PriAon 1''•1rm). 
> 
.l As mentioned earlier, the FOB does not automatical.ly approve all 
10,10 .1;iplic,1t inns supported hy the DVOs. Although the risk is 
rel.1tlvl•lv low, so long as the value of the stock exceeds the value of 
t:w ,!,•bt, there is a relllrtanc<' to continue to lend to fnrmers at a 
.• ,10 .. , •.• ,,·l1rn.1l 1·ate of interest (!11.) if tl1Ay do t b 
_ . . ~ no appear to e 
rd·1''"!1ting a portion of their profits. In many cases strong 
;·l·pr1• ;,•;1t.1t ions h.1ve been ncedNl from the DVO to gain approval, even 
cir ,;,):J•' of the bl't t<'r formers. It is interesting to note that the 
'1r:il'rs' ,1dvoc.lle, the DVO, has alw.1ys bl•cn an expatriate whereas th<' 
,,ftj;,•r.; wlth whom he deals at the FOB are local and Fijian-speaking • 
. 1~f!.- .. r•; r··~.ir,I tht> DVJs .1s qoft and e.1sily taken in by farmers 
,. :."1 ;"; .ind plt.>a~i. In one of the 'triennial' ~!,\F :-ampaigns tlil' OV'J 
~,,, ~ 1t .1 .;t 1t,'rll'nt of objectives from e.ich farmer in which he declared 
1;·; ~i.·lit>f in the norms that his l'Xtension tutors had been encouraging 
·111 t•> .dnpt over the ye.1rq. One typical avowal contai~t>d the 
'To teach and establish sons with the mnnn~ement of 
t•> iillnw his wifl• 'a !l.1y in the running of the f.Jrm'; to 
.,..,. t:11~ 'tlw f.1r.a is always fu\ly stocker:!'. A wide variety of l!'1l'f11l 
1·1•;t>ts was nll'ntloned .1'i the motivating goal ln farmers 
.iv .. ;: pt•r:a.1~wnt stockyard!!, treatPd pine fencing, 1>ducation of •H>n!l 
,) •:11t Uwy wlll b1• ahlt' to help on the farm. When, thrt'e yc.1rs 
''" ·, in t.1r11 inprovem<>nt. In raoot caeeo, however, the FUR has 
•~r. 1r; in ttwir rPnt or loan repay;nents. 
> 
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D"terloration in farms is obvio sl i ~ u. Y not n the longer term 
lnt"rl•sts <)f the b.-nk, especially when the difficulties involved in 
tr.in«fer of lt>ases ,1re considered. In 1980 the FOB and ~L\F were 
~ir1."isl1l)"\ f.1r:ncrs to give consldcrcition to the question of succession. 
rwolv••"'h'lll of sons in farm husiness has long hecn 11 probl 0m. Fathers 
h.1 v1.• .if ten complclint'd of lack of help from their sons, especLllly when 
pr1.•ss1.•d by •'X tl'tu-1 lon workerR to reduce Wl!ed growth nncl rep,1 l r fences, 
In f,i-·t sirns often work on lhl'lr fathers' farms wltho11t rayment. Sons 
. np'..d.wd that father•; do not shart• the rl'Cl'lpts from cattle s.ile 8 , 
It s1.•1":1s n•) .h'<' ldent that the.' farmi>r who h•lB bt>en most succcrnsf 11 1 in 
'11·1.11~i.1g hls fin.1nc1•q, consistPntly relnVt!Sting hls profits .rnd 
:.1:1·:. '.1bllt1r .rn hls farm, ap.1rt from his Jwn, has always bt't'n on a 
'.·r.1 . .1 :'ll' L1.11ily that owns thl' lan<l. lie ls a Police Const.ihle and han 
:tw 'succcsqor' problom is part of the largt•r probll•m of 
11H1;.·h<1ld ,,r,~.rni:rntion outlined ln the previous chaptor. F.1thcru 
lieliPVl' that their sons owe them ,1 duty of labour but the old bond of 
11<1 th••n W'>rkln11 with hlm 1q .1 pnrtn(lr, ls forolgn. \.lh(lll prcssi>d by 
'1.\r' ltficl.1lc; f.irmt•rs t(lnd to ho evariivo or untruthful. 
r1-;1;(.•tJ hy no<ldlng in tlw dircctlon of hU1 two <1ons and naylnp, 'that 
ent L rt• l y 
\notht•r while regpondlnp, to th(I ~rnrv(ly 
f.1r-i h11t thlrl t11nw.J out to bP untrm" 
> 
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so far only one Verata funner has ncquiesced to ~IAF/FDB pi"essure 
to m .• 1'Kl' his son a joint lessee ind borr Tl "'· · ' ower. le r•asult.~ proved 
Jis.istr•>us. F.1t 1wr and son argued, the son sold hl h s s are of the 
,·.ittl1• .ind useJ the proceeds to buy an airline ticket to c d nnn a. A 
Q .,. .... 1r !1t1•r lw rt•turnl'd .tpp.irently with little to show for his trip. 
> 
:-:1e f.1tlwr then dlvld1•<l the farm into two supnrate leases. tn order 
t,1 ~1.1l<.1• hims,•lt independent, the son set about building his own house, 
r.1tlwr th.111 using his funds to buy stock for his farm. 
The ~I ln is try of Youth .rnd Sport Hees 
Tht> FDB SN'S 
1h.,:i:11~t> f.1tlwrs and rC>BpondB by prl'S!luring tht>m to grant their s0n11 
.,. ·~ ''; .1•1 c'1- l•"i'H'1"l ;1ni. co-borrowt•rs .ind to shart> the rect•lpts of 
·1'.tl·· 'i.!ll''I with tlwm. Women's .1ffairs cxp1•rts see women d,•nlod n 
;·:· >hl»'l<i p11t t•H~<>tlwr .rn<l st>en as part of the r:iore general probl1!m of 
':it> il1pt.1tl1Jll of tlw tr.uJltlonal Pljian hous(lhold to ch1'.111t>d social 
:.iv••r.n.·nt d1•p1rtm11nt. Up to now only rc.•linious Or/\•llli.l!ations, with 
' "H) i r w I.ii• r hart1•r, haVl' given .1ny thou;~ht to the problem; moi:H 
'1•1t1hlv It t h(l c.1tho l ic Tutu informal t ra l ning institute which h.19 
HU'" ; ,, •; for hurl b.1 nJ r; .ind Wl Vl'!l 1Hl g1•1w ra 1 hOU!H•ho ld managcmt•nt 
. r·i.··>Jh•• f'l 
.1 l l977) • 
·11\ by thC' rwo to arr.rnn1• hc.ug lnp, loilll!l for the• hl't tcr 
i.1r;,r 1 , ,\t pri><wnt i>nly thrf'e farmi•rr; h.1vc 'improved housing'. Host 
if ''"' f.1r~f•rq now havn trN1t<>d pine fences, W!'ed sprayc; • and 
> 
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ste,1Jy income if pas tu res are properly maintained. Many have high 
debts but wl th proper rn,rnagernent over the next few years this can be 
redu:eJ • T~~ houses are intended to be the incentive to do this, to 
r,,Ju;e tlwlr Jl•bt so as to qualify for the loan. ~lost of them pool 
~twlr L1hnur for several weeks at a time throughout the ye:ir to clear 
1w1v ~L·rub r0-growth, which is heavy work, leaving the lighter work 
;,1\'11 1·; f,•nc1' rL'p.1iring, and we1~d spraying for indivi.dunl effort. The 
~ruup 1.rirks tor two d:1ys nn ench farm, at thf' rate of two farms a 
f1rnwrs who c,1nnot turn up send <l••rn1tles; thnt ls their son~. 
:i)"l" '.°1r1.•rs also usP wage labour for pasture maintenance. Wt ti. a 
••1~" I 1biur r.ltP of $2.)0 a day (plus provision of lunch) this is 
,•'rt1l:1ly prnflt.1blL'· ~oney m,magement is the kl'Y to being <1ble to do 
'!.\:~· s 1ww lnlt•rest in housing marks an important change in 
Pr1•vlously the Fijian preference for investing av:iilable 
fwhl 1; tn h1ius1"~ w:1c; to be disc.H1r<1gt•d. In the 1980s, however, the 
.~ >VL'r:i.~··nt i•; <rnxious to provide for rural Fijians the assistance with 
•:1•1•;1 i.; that h.1s bet•n ,1vailable to other, more urbanizP.d races. 
::1r::i1·r•; with 1<'1~1Phold l.rnd to offer as security provide the easiest 
This pol icy change is evidence of 
;1.i:!'.[c.tl !nflut>nct• on the p<>licy process but it is important to note 
•'1.1t ~h" p<lli,·y lG ~ltLll strictly bureaucratic, bt1Se<l on impt>rsanal, 
ih;. ·•t·:" cri't>rl<l (th.tt is, it •lpplil'S to all races). The DVO who 
w1; 11i;11r"nlly unnw.ire of thn p<rnt policlt>s in relation to Fijian 
i:1,! 1g, q,1w hlti rolP ;1 promoter of housing as part of hls gcner<1l 
r I I l i th t rnfln.ctn v~llrn prevalent 
'·" ,p; .1 'c>Ve opmt>nt agent, a v cw a ,- ,, 0 " "" 
t1r>r1,t dt•vplopmt•nt administrators in the 1980s, as well as the 
hfh1•nc•p of r'ijian political fo,1ders. 
,. 
) 
! 
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The Extens_io~ Relationsh!_p_ at Tili~alevu 
ExLenslon work at Tilivalevu has generally followed a similar 
, 1•t•·rn to that at Verata, with the exc•'ptlon th t Till 1 I 
- ~ a va evu 1as 
,, •. 1.i! ly '.-een under the control of a Fijian Locality Livestock Officer 
, ilht•r th,111 ,rn exp,1triatc veterinarian. The LI.Os at Sigatoka have all 
'. il1w.I tllei r grounding in livestock extension at Verata before moving 
• i ~il!valevu. The F'DB has its own office at Signtoka which performs 
.1 sl:nil.1r function to the Nausori office, although there have been no 
, .. ,,,,1tri1tc• OV·1s to make pleas on behalf 0f farmers. The problems at 
~.l!v.1l,•v:i have been much the sai .. '- as at Verata: poor management 
hy failure to apply funds from cattle sales to form 
• .,1r l\'" .1<•nts, an<l to •1pply labour to p.1sture and fenc.e mainte1rn1h~e • 
. ,., ,'llllild b(' qualifieci, however, by saying that there h,rn been a 
, l·'.•' ·if t.1r;nL1 r pcrform.,nces, just as there has been at Verata. A few 
,,.,. d·llll' i.·,•ll, moat hnve held their own and a few ll<lve dropped 011t • 
. • j r :lt:orp1>L1t ion of sons into the farm work is also a problem at 
·:t!v.1lc•\"11, :tlthough two older formers, following FOB presaure, 
·r.1:1·;f .. rreJ their lenses to their sons. 
ln 1 'JI).) all Tll ivalc>vu farms had reasonable road access but for 
. 1·1v '"•ars most of them did not, !load access was promised whe:1 the 
;1r ii<'ct :"<Jr,,i.1Pnced in 1967 but ten years later only five farml'rs had 
Most of the farmers had to drag their fence posts and 
"rP 1n with tlwlr bullocka. Access to cxtenalon advlce w."\s not <>nAy 
11,: ''Ht l<> often suffered injury whcrn being driven to the roadside 
,d "P po Int for market. log• The perslsten<">J of the farmers in ~pite 
it tlwql' Jlfficultles indicates a level of conm1ltintmt to the projc>ct 
I rw•i f.1r:iwrs droppl1d out• ()nc • on a Crown land block. wns r~~~gc11d 
11 : 1 ;1.rn I roa outs ldc th(> arra. The other block was val"ant in • 
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which .:.s significantly h ig her than l1ad b een anticipated by the 
In 1930 arrangements had been made with the FOB to provide a 
hJusl:lg lo.rn for the construction of a cement block house for 
:'illv.il<vu's i:iost successful farmer. The upturn in his income as a 
rt:>sult of improvL•menls made since 1977 had already been noted by his 
; 1 ,•i;~hbe)urs .md it was hoped that his new house would be a more 
t.in1:ibll' s lgn of .;uccess which would further encourage the other 
fherc ..irL' many diffL•rent critt>ria by which the success or failure 
,1f U11• \'••r•1ta and Tll ivalevu farmers might be evaluated. From tlw 
µ1l:1t uf v!Pw of ~LW the projects h.we 0njoyed li1nited succL•ss, 
\lm·i•lt 111 f.1r:uers have persevered, disproving the earlier fonrs of 
'L\F ·1ffl<'t>rs that Fijians moving from villages, without the benefit of 
t•ll' ln<liv!d<J.tlizing g.!_l_ala exp1.•rlenc(! 1 would fail as cattle farmPrs • 
.. w ?'.Jti h.1s not fo 1 t its loan funds in the farms to be in serious 
i•·0r.1rly .md h.rn regularly advanced further funds on 1:he advice of 
't\r'; <lo it too, n•g.irds the farrnt> .1s reasonably succ<•ssful. The 
far·wrs rl' ~.1rcl tlwmsi•lves as qucct>ssful. With the combined effects of 
['.1 .. l.iti<>n and fin.tncP at .i.J. tlwy havt> accum11lat1.1d substantial assets 
h Uw form ,,f cattlt> and fon<'t•ri, and to a 1 es<i1.1r ext1.1nt, lmprov<>d 
;n ·,t '• r.,. ·nw bi' t t ,, r r ,1 rm"r 9 3 n• prod uc 1 ng r.11 bs tan t ia l <'·l sh l ncom,•ri 
11•1 evPn ttw lerrn nucce!l'1 ful f.it"1nt>r!l arE> l>nJoying incom<>s 1:hut compare 
i.1V·n1r.1hlv with ttw .wt>ragt> in nearhy villar,e!l (Fwe the tables in the 
> 
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When the time came to establish large cattle projects, the Verata 
and Til ivalevu projects provided evidence that could be used by the 
proponents of both communalism and individualism. They were not 
fail11rt>s but then the>y were not outstanding successes. Aid donors 
n.it 11 r.1lly felt that lhey could do better on the basis of their 
tt'>.:hnic,11 expertise but the sociological lessons of the projects, 
which h;1ve bel'n touched on briefly in t~is ch~ptn•r r l 1 
• " ~ , we e a so 
Jvailablt• to be ex,1mined. 
\ full analysis of the lessons to be learned from Vernta and 
".'lliv.1lL'Vt1 should await an examination of the larger, more ambitious 
It should be askL'd now, however, 
\ht'thl'r thP ch,1racterization of Verata and Tillvalevu as individualist 
i·; [:1 f.1ct J11!ltifiui. The DV•1 who founded Verata SN'ms to h,1vi> 
r.·r, 1rde,\ tlw VeratH far:nt•rs as distinct from existing smallholders ln 
th.it th1• V1•rat.1 farmers were a group, including non-.!i.a_!._al~ who h,1<l to 
be r,lVl'n ,1!;sL;tance in order to obtain p<'rmmission for the granting of 
:e.hes to their E1..'!.l:"_l_:'!_ relatives. \fas not Verata therefore a 'group' 
~Lht>:l<' of the type that had become unpopular in the days of the LOA 
(sl'C' .ibove p.6'3). [l) Tillvalevu, similarly, involved the development 
·if thL' lands of two ~ta£!_l_ groups. !)id it Pver really have 
'individuals'? EvPn th!.' non-group farmC'rs, those who secure a lease 
t ) t 111' i r l:rnd thl'n approach !·L\F and the FDB, are not the 
lndiviJ11,1li<Hs thry arc supposed to re. All retain contacts with 
?,Mups of v.1ryinr, kinds (family groups, l:indowninp, groups, rl.'1ddcntlal 
:~r<Htp'; etc.). It is the nature of their cont.11".t with groups that 
·"'"
1! •1 to be ex lo red. To repeat a point that has already bel.'n made 
[l I It i!l interesting to nota that one of the communal cattl<' projects 
r" jPnt>d hy a DVr> in the early 1960s turned up again as an in<lividual 
f.H11, wlth thl' l<.>adf'r holding a lease in his own name and functioning, 
~G tar aq is known, l.'ntirely as an in~ivtJual. 
---. 
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(.1DLl W ill he made again): social action is rarely portrayed 
aJequately l.Jy dichotomies. As for the lesson that good farmers need 
aot ~e held back by group obligations, the quotation from Geddes which 
he.his this chapter shows that the lesson is hardly new. Perhaps the 
real meaning of individualism is the natural bureaucratic preference 
~ 0 r dealing with individuals. ln practice this means that they prefer 
t<) c1,•al with an individual who h;1s been able to obtain a lease over a 
The lease is is a prerequisite for FOB 
fia,1nce, whic.h is in turn a prL•requisite for many farm improvements. 
ln otlwr W'1rds, wirhout a lease the scope for extension work is often 
b 
b 
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CHAPfER FIVE 
WELFARE OR CATTLE? 
The Dilemma nf Communalism at Uluisaivou 
'The mnre complicated and specialized mndern culture 
becomes, the mnre its external supporting apparatus demands 
rne personally derached and strictly "objective" ex_.e..ert, in 
lieu of the master nf older social structures, wh~ wiSmoved 
by personal sympathy and favnur, by grace and gratitude'. 
Max Weber (1946:216) 
I th • • f l l II II • d • 
.. e prov1s1on o oca say in ecentral1zed programs 
Jppears tn result in considerably mnre social prnjects than 
ecnnom1c ones. This consequently reflects the implied 
b~liet that socially nriented projects indicate cnmmunity 
c<'hesi •• 1 and more importantly, a rational belief on the part 
nt the rural penple that such projects are the best mears of 
long run imprnvement of their economic situation'. ·~qbal 
Snbhan (197b:57) 
'Tne traditional system may perhaps be fairly described as 
"c,1-0pt>rat ive" in terms of welfare, but not in terms of 
t>cnnnmic activity. This may seem a nice distinctinn, but if 
it is intended tn build economic development on traditional 
'i;1ses, such psychological distinctions take on great 
i;npnrtJnce in this case negative'. O.H.K. Spate 
( l 'J)':I: 77) 
Lnng before the Uluisaivou project was mooted the people of Ra 
nad w,rnted to start a communally owned cattle ranch. They had before 
r:1"::i the t!xamples of the C.S.R.-owned Yaqara ranch and the J.P Bayly 
rJrh:h which had served the nearby Tova cannery. Many people in the 
Jr1•a n.id worked for these ranches. In 1956 the Ra ~rovincial Council 
p.1:;~··d a mntion to seek to borrow J.. 20,000 for a 'Ra Cattle Scheme' 
tJ , • • • lack of ready finance'. ut thts was turnud down owing again to a 
I. D.<,. 's annual · 32 1957) In the 1960s, when reports, Council Paper · 
tntJ tunding climate had improved, the question of cattlP 
raiq1•<l again and the LOA (or more precisely The Fiji Development 
b 
Page 157 
Corporarion, its managing agent) was cornmissi'oned to· investigate. 
The suitability of the area for cartle was noted, although it was 
.::onsidcred that it 'would be out of the quest ion to have a large c.::1 e 
ranch of say 40,000-50,000 acres' (Eaton n.d.:l). Such a ranch would 
necessitate moving many Fijian villages and abandoning good arable 
land. From the very beginning of the investigation individual 
nwnership was nominated as 'the most viable scheme' (Eaton n.d. :2). 
The feasibility study argued that 'co-operative or m~~~~~~ cattle 
should be discouraged as there had been many recent raising schemes' 
~xamples of rapid stock run-downs following weddings and/or funerals. 
l'tie LOA also laid down strict rules fnr the selection of scheme 
part ic i p.int s. As 'a matter nf principle' it insisted that it must 
'ret.iin n•sp••nsi.btlity for the selection of settlers and must· have the 
;i.•wl.!r to discharge sett le rs who were unwilling or unable to develop 
tnPir blncks in accordance with the plans drawn up by the Authority 
fnr this scheme'. A 'points system' for assessment of blockholders 
was devir.ed. Points would be awarded for a wide variety of objective 
criteria such as age and occupational background, and scores on 
tiut>jecl ive items such as 'General Suitability' and 'Character 
Despite the elaborate scoring system, the LOA was well 
aw.ul' ot landowner tee lings and accepted without reservation the 
'principle that all other things being equal members nf the units 
Bh•'til<l have first choice of all blocks in the scheme'· 
!_~~ George Cakobau of the Fijian Affairs department and ~Ir 
~h3rles Eatnn of the LOA toured the villages seeking approval for the 
project. Methods of selection were exploined and vil1agers were 
I\ 
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assured 'that this project will not affect the land which you have 
been using t:o plant your :-nr,rket produce'. Three nther strict 
C•'nditinns were also laid down during these talks: (i) there would be 
nn cnmpensat ion for crops (ii) ~t_aq<0:_~ members wnul.d not 
nect's:rnrily be given blocks on their nwn .!!!E.!"~~i- land; (iii) 
land1wners evicted from blocks wnuld not necessarily be replaced by 
landnwners. 
During the first round of consultations with landowners it seemed 
t:iat approval wnuld be obtained. During a second round, however, 45 
per -:ent of landowning units refused consent. The reasons for this 
rt.'fuqal were believed to be (i) there was no guarantee that owners 
tnt»rested wnuld be given blocks; (ii) there was a number of groups 
r:1.lt wa111ed their own co-nperat ive schemes, e.g. the Ra Development 
1..11i:;;1.iny; (iii) resurves were required for subsistence agriculture 
'Ji1Jl'r the shifting pattern of cultivation. 
The Ra Development Cnmpany was the creation of a ynung man from 
:iirenitu village who had just graduated (B.A.) from a university in 
:ww li•aland and then gone to Lincoln's 111n in London to study law. Ile 
,,~,~·ised the LOA plan nn the grounds that it would separate the owners 
tr 1'::i their land. 'The Fijians', he said, 'were originally a people of 
'> 1lll&t.rnce, but through the decades, imperceptibly, their very 
'>1'1.,t.rnc1! natt been pecked away so that today without their lands, they 
r1 Ll h · I h patchwork of consents nbtained: 11e >A was un appy w1 t 1 t e 
can only go forward if a large unbroken area is made 
ln 1963 it reported that 
a•111lable with adequate acceas to water'· 
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there were only 19 viabie blocks sr,dttered over 220 square miles and 
Sharl. ng few common boundaries. There lo/er d e reporte to be 'six village 
mataqali 
------
cattle schemes' that did not b want a sorption. From here 
the whole matter languished. Ratu Mara, when he became Ministerial 
Member for Natural Resources, enquired as to the fate of the project 
and was informed that it hao been abandoned because of lack of 
cnnsen t t'd lands . In the 1970s the cattle propoeal re-emerged as the 
~luisaivnu prnjl?ct. 
ln the 1970s, when the question of a cattle project again arose, 
ir w.1s within a substantially altered economic and political Cl"nt,'!xt. 
L•>.:al produ..:ti.nn nf beef had not kept pace with demand and the 
inti.!. a.it i.c>n,ll µrice of beef was high. An Australian firm that heard 
,,: nw l'lui.tiai•'<iu land wrote to the NLTB, expressing interest 111 
fovd.1pin1~ tht~ land, although the idea of leasing land to outsiders 
"'as unre,11 ist ic, even nn a profit-sharing basis. Tim General Manager 
,,f the NLTB said in reply: 'Our main objective in the development of 
F1J1an land is to unsure positive and meaningful participation by the 
lrn.l•1wnt1 rs 1n the project'. At about the same time the public 
~·~rv.ints in the area were making a concerted effort to bring 
1ev••lopment to what had hitherto been a backwater, despite its 
i•'C it inn on the 1 main' is t and of ~·ij i. The people in the area had for 
J lon~ ti![)e accu!H?d the government of neglect· 
H . ~·f';{'lentat ivea of the major government departments in the province 
(Ra) tnrm(lcl 3 committee known Ml ISDlT - the lnnl•r Saivou Development 
With their guidance a body known as UL.UDA (the 
b 
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Uluisaivnu Development Association) was created wi.'th ti · · · le in1t1al task 
~f marketing agricultural produce. A feas 1' bi' 1 't 
,. l y study was prepared 
tC1 df:'mnnstrate the viability of cattle as a major economic activity 
that c0tild be undertaken by ULUDA tn utilize the extensive tracts nf 
11nused land in the area. 
Atrer considering the ISDIT study, the Agriculture Department 
,Jecidl!d that the project was ton large for Fiji. to handle alone. A 
furrtwr public meeting was held at which it was decided that: (a) 
'tht• r1•nple wnuld gn into the development nf the area nn their own and 
a,,r in assoc iat inn with pr iv ate enterpr isc'; ( b) 'Government would be 
J'1Ked tn assist in setting up 11 cnrpnratinn of S<lme kind and that N.Z. 
JiJ ..:nuld be S<'ught both fnr a fensibility study and for aid at a 
~·r,,m the very beginning it was to be a collectively owned 
RJtu Epeli Kanaimawi, who had been involved fir$t as 
Principal Agricultural Otf icer Western and later as the Director ot 
Ar;rt.:ulture, bel ievod t'hat the 1 communal' apprnw:h deserved a trial. 
·~~ ~t the lessons of tho difficulties experienced in the LDA days, he 
bcl11•ved
1 
had been tho inadvisability nf disturbing village social 
Hructure tnn abruptly. The security offered by tho village lifestyle 
hll•'uid be seen as baae upon which to build rather than an nhstacle to 
ti<> ~r11ken dnwn. Ri.r.iing local officers auch as ].a_t:._~ Epeli were now in 
a pnsitinn tn queatinn tho departmental nrthndnxy of individualism. 
r.nll••ctive nwnership was also in the accord with the wishes nf the 
P•"'Pl", at least in the negative s<>nae that they were clearly 
rnw1ll1n,~ to conaent their land to anything 11lsc. Criticisms thn t 
b 
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were subsequently made, alleging that the people were misled during 
the consenting process, will be examined later. 
in mid 1973 a request went to the New Zealand government for 
re..:hnical assistance with the Uluisaivou proposal. Four specialists 
were snugl\t :( i) a business or management expert to look into the most 
Jppr.,priate business organization to carry nut the project (bearing in 
:unJ the relt'vance of Maori Affairs activities); (ii) an economist 
t.1r ft'asi.blity analysis; (iii) an expert in beef production; (iv) an 
~ngineeri.n~ expert. 
ln September 1973 a team of four arrived in Fiji with a brief to 
ex.1:uLne 'the technical and economic feasibility of can le ranching on 
~·':.it· l U 7, UUO acres ' . They were also to recommend the 'most 
nrganizational and management framework for the 
j,•vdopmt>nt project, bearing in mind the training needs of local 
and to 'draw up the financial implications of the proposal 
.inJ dt•ntify P•'ssiblc sources of finance' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 
l ':1; .>: 1 ) . 
Cnlike the terms nf reference for Yalavou, those at Uluisaivnu 
m.de no ment inn of social considerations. New Zealand aid 
aJ~rnlstratnrs now realize that this was a serious nmmissinn that can 
attributed to inexperience during the early days nf their 
•lf>v••lopmt>nt asaistancc programme. 
b 
Page 162 
ln November 1973 a feasibility report was submitted fnr 
.:onsiderat ion by the twn governments. From here, however, the pace 
slackt>nt>d cnnsiderably, apparently as a result of of uncertainty in 
~l'W ,:t.'aland. Cabinet in Fiji considered the feasibility proposal in 
•t;ir.:11 197-f while officals in Ra continued to seek landow11 er consent to 
rhe prnj.:ct in its undefined state. The Assistant Roko reported that 
inti.>rt•st in the prnject was waning and that there was an urgent need 
r., J,, snmdhing. New Zealand foreign affairs were well aware of the 
?•'lltl.:,11 impnrtance of the project tn Fiji but there were apparently 
tl!.:hn1.:Jl dt't.1ils tn be irnned nut. Questions were asked in New 
.'.t>JLind abnut the suitability of the soils and t·hc results of 
:.•rtlliler trials. Two members nf the feasiblity team had to be sent 
~.1:K r,, revise their data before a final decision could be made . 
... 
ln lYlb a memorandum of understanding was signed covering 
c•'•'P••r.ition ttrnt had already commenced in 1975.(1) The delays in 
t1nalil1ng the project and in particular the difficulty of negotiating 
tn a hypothetical vein with village agriculturalists were clearly 
1ll11Hrated at Uluisaivou. As Bob HcKil lop has pointed out in 
relati(1n to cattle projects in Ptipua New Guinea, :-he concept of J 
fe.i~1bility etudy is not easily graaped. 'To the villagers, if the 
~nvPrnnent has aent somenne to investigate the project it must have 
.i1•1•n 1l reariy dee idcd that they wanted the project to go ahead' 
··: Ktllnp 19/'J:)). At Yalavou tjreat painn were takt•n to avoid raieing 
••xp .. ,tat1nno. Mnre will be said later c<'ncerning this fundamcmtal 
H;wn of relations between planners and people. 
l 11 foe board had been created' ita members elected and appoint'ed' and 
tnc (,••rwral M.1nager had already arrived. 
\ 
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!~ ~~i_~ivou Corporation 
-------
The basic cnnception nf the Uluisaivou corpnration was that of a 
largl' enterprise employing modern management but owned entirely by the 
lJnJ•wners. Shares would be al lncated to landowners nn the basis nf 
me uaimproved value nf the t'rnd they contributed. This.would 
.;.,nst ttute all of the equity capital within the corporatinn; the 
renatnlnti funds needed for developmen1' would be provided by loans 
tak"n •'ll the security value of the leasehold. 
fhe feasibility study recognized that the people of Uluisaivou 
ri.1d tn the past 'refus ?d to lease thl•ir land to outsiders even on a 
pr•'tlt sharin~i basis'. The prrblem was to reconcile their desirn for 
·~·'ntr,,l nf their land' with their inexperience and lack ot the skills 
re4uir"J to cnntrol 'an extensive, snphisticated and extremely cnstly 
(N. Z. Foreign Affairs 1975:35). The qolutinn to this 
pr.,b lua was tn have the controlling shares of the owners within a 
8.,ard nf ManaKement balanced by controlling shares held by nominees of 
Jµpr<'priate Fiji government departments and a0encies. The Department 
"f r'l J tan Affairs, the FOB, the Lands Department and the NLTB would 
ti.WP ·'nn nnminei> each and MAF wnuld have two. Once the nwners were 
'sutti..·il•ntly trainl'd to a9sume full control' the governml'.'nt nomineC!s 
'''uld b" 1•itht•r withdrawn or chnsl'n from among the landowners· 
r1.•tw11t>n ttw intitial foaaibility atudy in 1973 and the fnrmntion 
rif ttw .:nrpnrat ion in 1976 there was a significant change of principle 
H rn,~urJa ~nntrnl of the corporation. In 1975, who'\ thP tirst 
fnJqlhllity study was updated, the General Manager's reepnn8iblity fnr 
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'•pp•1 1'nting staff for each activity' had b h 
u een c anged to that of 
'agsisting' the Board in staff appointments. Th 
e Board's membership 
was alsn changed tn give clear control to the landowners. Government 
:1 0 ,~,, 1 ne,•s filled the role of advisors rather tl1an t 11 con ro er~ nnd two 
"t thl!m were people trom the prov1'nce rather th d an epartmental 
lne increased emphasis on local control arose, at least partly, 
,,ut »f a report prl'pared by Howard Gill of Lincoln College. He had 
'lt)l!rl :;il•'Wll a copy of the feasibility study by the team leader and 
tnvitt1 d int<'rm•tlly to make ..:omments. The Gill report described the 
?rnpn•eJ »rgnnization for the corp<'ration as designed to achieve two 
'rne first of these is the profitable exploitation of the 
'UH! second is the technical, 
~·'.:;..il and p•'litical development of the people' (Gill n.d.:5). In 
fln riw ~l•~Cc'nd 11bj1.1 ctive is only implicit within the feasibility 
qt uJ y. lt ia mentioned only incidentally as the means to achieve the 
ftrqt nbjl1.:tive, rather than as a distinct goal in itself. 
'·dl rejr\arded the social goal as 'problematic'. He emphasized 
t:1.1t ttHJ int rnduc t ion of the project into the area would change the 
'''.: t.ll and (lConomic lives of the people but that it could not be 
•l~ply .11Jsu.nt>d that 'the nat•1re and direction of the inevitable change 
----- ~.- ... --- - - --
w1il tlP n••et••;sirily in the •., 1 tertrnts of the people of the area' (Gill 
n.•I.: JI. l.Lk••wLrrn, it could not bo assumed 'that such change could be 
"contr••llct!" t>ittH•r by the people thl•mrrnlves or by an outaido agency'· 
;rw l<H•e:•'B that Gill enviaaged that the project could bring inclwied: 
through wages and increased ca ah cropping 
>> 
> 
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oppnrtun1t 1es ; 'change~ in the nature nf the 
area ... the adnptinn nf 
specialised jnbs and specialised cropping'; a 'formal managerial and 
superv isnr Y 
relar inns. 
pattern' that 
contrasted with traditional authority 
ln general he saw it as 'likely tn introduce a western 
type nt "rndi"idualism" intn a tra<litinnal cnllective based sncial and 
pnliti.ciil order'. 
n1c Gi.11. report challenged the fundamental rat innale upon which 
r11 c C•"rP•'rat inn was to be based but its main ef fee r appears tn have 
been tn help New Zealand nfficials tn see the desirability nf a 
landnwnt>r majority nn the Uluisaivou bnard. Gill stressed that the 
land•'\,rners musr be al l<'lwed to make the majnr dee is inns which would 
attect the lncal sncial and pnlitical order. He urged that a clear 
Jistinctinn be drawn between the 'the authority of the knowledge of 
th,~ 11 xccutive which is placed at the service nf the board, and the 
a.1r 1°,rity nf µnlitical cnntrol which shnuld be vested solely in the 
~·"JrJ' (Gill n.d.:6). To illustrare this pnint Gill used the example 
nf a Htuati.•'n in which 'the bnard may decide on a form of work 
•'r,;rn1zat inn which fits cultural patterns yet contradicts the econnmic 
and rntin1rnl dispositinns of the executive' (Gill n.d.:7). 
G1ll also speculated abnut the pnlitical processes the bnard 
"'·
1ulJ use, l!mphasizing that planners should 'not be prejuduiced by a 
:>cl1 .. t in ttw :rnpremacy of a western democratic system. The local 
~,, · t b f <l t whatever form of control they wish' (Gill r"'PP'ri11s e rPetoaop 
n. l.: 7). 
• 
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In the light of subsequent problems experienced at Uluisaivou 
Gl.lt's words appear almost propheti'c 1th 
, a ough the distinction he 
makes between technical authority and poli'ti'cal · authority is easier to 
:nJ~e in principle than in practice and, as wil 1 be seen, local control 
J,,es not sotve all social problems. 
Despite the increased power of the landowners wi~hin the 
LMP•'rat ion, the ful 1 import of Gil 1 1 s recommend at ions and the 
Jeparture they represent from the original feasibility study do not 
Jppear to have been recognized by the New Zealand aid planners. 
r/1rhin the updatt1d feasibility study the corporation remained 
to the goal of independent viability as a business 
·'rganization. The salaries of expatriate staff were tn be paid b1 tho, 
·"'" Zealand gnvernrnont but t·he corporation wnutd be required tn pay 
rht~ Fiji equivalent of their salaries. Imported cattle wnuld likewise 
t>e pai<l f•'r at local prices. In order to be profitable under thlrne 
·nndirions, careful management would need to be adhered to strictly at 
alt times. Even then, thl' size of the debt needed to start the 
pr·'Jl!Ct is such that, despite concessional rates of intl:'!rest, the 
·.:\ 11le prnject could easily fail unless there was some degree of 
,:1bsidy from thl' outside. lf there were to be subsidy, however, what 
wnuld h:1ppen to the not ion of independence? An appendix to the 
t<>aqibliity study explained that when the Maori Affairs Board o'fera 
tir .. ince to develop land it 'suspends the rights of the ownrrs nnd 
•'n!1>rs <tll righta of ownership on tho Board' (N.Z. Fore igr. Affairs 
117):97). Only wht>n the debt attached to the lnnd has bcl'.1 lowered l8 
l' returned to its ,,wncrs. The appendix recommended the setting up of 
0 1·t · · · F' · · b t •gnored 1°t"' relev"nce in the 0
".I !!tl nrgan1zatlnn lO ljl U ~ 0 u 
b 
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tiLuisaivou case to the recommend at ions made in t'he report about the 
P~w~•rs to be ex ere ised by the landownE.•rs on th .. ~ e corporation board. 
The Uluisaivou Management Structure 
------ ------
fhe Uluisaivou Corporation Board held its inaugural meeting 10 
July 1975, a full year before the memorandum of understanding 
g1werning the provision nf New Zealand assistance was signed. The 
FtJi government was determined to push ahead with the project. Civil 
scrv.rnts involved in negnt iat ing with the people of Uluisaivou had 
rep11rted increasing complaints about delay. From the Uluisaivou point 
.1t view the cattle ranch was an issue that wen.t back to the 1950s. 
In January 1975, before the New Zealand government had made any 
l»nsi 01n regarding thl' foasibility study carried out in November 1973, 
rne FtJi ~nvernm(.lnt began to prepare the way for implementation. Of 
r:1e 117 ~atnq_a_1:2:_s_ in the area, 63 had signt~d lease consent forms 
c.~vt>rin;~ a total of 20,017 acres. Consideration was given to the 
creation under the nld LDA legislation ,,f a b"<lY along the lines nf a 
~..l"ri lncorpnratinn but adapted to the Fijian system nf landownership. 
A b11ard cnmpriaing Rix elected representativea and five nr six civil 
servant q was propnaed. lt was cnv isagcd that deeds of trust 
r••pr•"l·!Ot tog the formal ownerahip of the corporat inn would be made nut 
1n the names nf the tura~l!!. ni m_~':!!.,tl£~1J.~ (m_<;1_t_a_q_a)_~ heads), thereby 
nb•J iat tn 1~ th(.l need for continual updating of a ~ata~lJ. membership 
re~ rnt rieo. Th<> valm~ of each share would eventually be ba.rnd on the 
!ll.Tk val uat inn of eacl, .!!~t_a_q,~~·-~ land i before this could bo 
l d l the acreaae o: a.·cri::iplished the> share certificate wou d recor nn Y o 
land cnntributed. In April 1975 these proposals were approved and the 
b 
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orJer establishing the Uluisaivou Corporation was made, 
The sector representatives (~~_) had already been elected with 
apparent ease in November 1974. In all but nne nf the three sectors 
rhe candidates were elected unopposed. In the remaining sector the 
successfu~ candidate received twenty nut twenty three ~~.'l~~ votes 
in a rhree-cornered contest. In June 1975 the sector representatives 
.;iet with officials and agreed to consider the proposed constitution as 
S•'•'ll as it had been translated into Fijian. At the insistence of the 
Secretary for Agriculture steps were taken ensure that there was a 
de.1r lncal majority on the board, rather than the balance of 
"thcials and ~ataq_a_!_~ representatives envisaged by the feasibility 
st1iJy. Tne nu:nber of sector representat i.ves was increased from seven 
r" eight; the nnmtnees nf the NLTB and ~'ijian Affair11 were prominent 
wn trnm R.i prnvince living in Suva rather than employees nf either 
With this point clearly established at the outset, civil 
~ervants on the Uluisaivnu board have always adopted the position of 
a.lvisnrs, leaving the dee is inns to the local members. In this respect 
taere ts a ci.ear contrast with the Yalavou board. The fir st 
~l1nsaivnu General Manager, despite great influence with the board 
11o~1L~h will be discussed later) adhered closely to the prio.ci.ple of 
l·.'J. u15 major dee is ions to the local members. 
ftw Nt?W lea 1 and government, aware of the need to act promptly 1 
JLqp1tche<l twn nf the feasibility team members to provide an update of 
':w nrig:inal foasibilty study. After snme manipulation of key 
~ ~ - found that the proJ'••ct 'could show a "r"•1uctton variables it was ~ 
prnf1t nne year earlier than in t1.e original feasibility study' (N.Z. 
b 
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fareign Affairs 1975:iv). One nf the team members described this 
revision as necessarily a 'put-up J'ob', · th · e project was obviously a 
'goer' but , in the early days of New Zealand's ai'd · programme internal 
ratt:!S nf return of 10 per cent were being snught. 
At its first meeting, in June 1975, the Uluisaivou board began by 
Jeleb<1t ing ro its acting General Manager (a MAF officer) rhe power to 
;ipp•'int •'mµloyees. The New Zealand General Manager and Ranch Manager 
JiJ not arrive until January 1976 and the memorandum nf understanding 
was not si5ned until June 1976. In the meantime the General Manager 
haJ tn use his personal funds to open the corporation's bank account 
in Suv :J. 
The corpnration's chairman was t-lr Charles Walker, a former 
Permanent Secretary for Agriculture, who was appointed by the Land 
uevel11pment Authority. The LOA arrived at its choice of Mr Walker 
atter his name was chosen from a short list submitted to an informal 
~nmmittee ot chiefs from Uluisaivou, an interesting and instructive 
J 0!parturn fr nm democratic proceedings, which was completely accept ab le 
r,, the µenple of Uluisaivou. 
Tne memorandum of understanding governing the roles of the Fiji 
an'i New Zealand governments expressed a general aim of providing 'b1,th 
ecnn 1'mic and social benefits to the people of the Saivou area of the 
Ra Prnv ince' . These benefits would take the form nf increased 
<11)flcultural productivity, so as to provide a higher standard of 
l lv mg, and 'employment so as to stem the drift to towns .. '. It WJS 
~nvisaged that the corporation would undertake beef ranching, cash 
crnpping and fnre~try development. Cash crnpping was to embrace 
b 
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several activities: the encouragement of lnrRl growers to expand 
'their cash cropping of traditional crops and to . . 
experiment with other 
crops' ; 'the establishment of contract cropping services for local 
S I • grnwer , an increase in 'the scale of operations 1 in the area. In 
aJJit i11n t,..,, and quite separate from I his, the cnrpnrar inn would 
1rself cultivate cash crops 'that IH'e complementary to those grown by 
tne local croppers fnr the local market 1 • As envisaged in the 
t,•asibility study this would be 'an integral part of the beef ranching 
s~neme, providing cash returns rn the Corporation in the early years 
llf the Project 1 • The third element of the project, forestry, would 
re~l1ire invei.t igat inn of the scope for both exploit at inn nf indigenous 
f >rests and the establishment of exnt ic forests. 1nis would not be an 
1ntegral rirt of the prnject and wc1uld be carried nut by the 
~"rP•'rJti.,,n on advice from the Fiji Fnrestry Department and 'from such 
fllr~stry staff as the Gnvernment of New Zealand may in its discretion 
;irnvide if s11 requested by the Gnvernml•nt of Fiji'. 
Tne twn key expatriate staff members were a General Manager and a 
:\:inch ~IJnager. Lor.al staff included MAF personnel on secondment and 
1
l 11.:al locals' i.e. people from the Uluisaivnu area. The main MAF 
0 ecnnJee w.1s an experienced livesrnck nfficer whn held the position nf 
.\qsigtant RJnch Manager. He was from the province of Ra, though nnt 
trn'll thp Uluisaivnu area. No counterpart fnr the General Manager was 
1?~'iatPd Jlthnugh the memorandum of understanding mentioned this as 1 
; 1·1qp i·1n tor which MAF ahnuld pr wide a replacement with a view to 
"V'nt l l l' · Tut's later became a point of cnntentinn when • ua nca u.,at1nn. 
it wag proposed by the review team, in accordance with the feasiblity 
0 t d · · d th t the pnsit inn nf General , u Y but l'ar lier than antic 1pate , a 
b 
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~tanager would be phased out, Other MAF officers at various times 
acted both as normal extension officers within the project area and as 
members of the ranch staff. Uluisaivou people have beP.n employed as 
:•.ockmen, drivers, workshop mechanics and office staff. In 1980 there 
were 16 such permanent employees. In add it ion, casual employment has 
bt•en provided for fencing, sugar cropping and pine planting. Day• to 
Jay direction of all ranch staff has been the responsibility of the 
i\.in.:h ~l • .magt>r but the creation an<l filling of positions and the 
setting nf terms and conditions nf employment have been under tne 
Uluisaivou Difficulties 
--------- ------
fnc many part-ies involved in the Uluisaivou project can readily 
1.;r<'e ttwt it has bN•n beset with problems but they find it hJrder to 
J,~ree abnut ~he relative significance of the various problems. These 
:lltforenccs of npinion wi.11 be examined later in the context of the 
lnnb Jnd difficult evaluation nf the project which took place between 
This sect ion mnre l y catalogues the problems and 
s:.i~.;ests some ol the links between them. 
One nf the first problems to become apparent was that land was 
to be given to the project l:lS readily as had !>een 
a~H ic ipat ed. rne General Manager reported in September 1977 that land 
J??rnvJl had bPen slow; little more than had been consented in 1974 
:><:iirl.! the project got under way. By the end of 1977 there were only 
... J'Ji) 
.Jc res more than there had been in 1974 • It had been found that 
l
o th d bl' h d pockets of arable lanJ that had • e rna s were csta LS e 
?rC?vinusly bee.\ unused by m'!ta~l-~ members were settled. Squatters 
-
) 
I 
--------
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began to appear nn Crown Land which it had b1~en hoped wnuld provide 
snme Cl f the better, arable land needed to provide balance in the 
project's lands. Squatters and new sett" le rs from the owning 
~3~3-~s_, by rnnving selectively tn the pnckets of arable land creared 
frai;mt>ntat inn in the 11rnds given to the ranch. As a consequence, 
fen~ing cnsts were higher than previously planned and the ranch tended 
rn have P'nrer quality land. The ranch, as a rule, was given the hill 
r,1ps while the flats were retained by the ~aqal_~f!., for their own use. 
Given rt1e extensive fallowing system of Fiji£m agriculture, most of 
rne fl.it land is nnt presently cultivated but it does have occupiers 
wtl•' fnrsee a nee<l to use it in the near future, either fnr fallowing 
requirements or tn provide land for their sonR. 
ltle Assistant Ranch Manager who has had responsibility ff'lr land 
~·'ils••nti.ng said in 1Y8U that there was nn more land left, whether of 
P·'·'rt•r nr better quality. By then about 42,000 acre~ had been made 
av.ulable. The increase in consented land from the 24,000 acres in 
l'J77 ts cnmposed almost entirely nf Crown Land, most of which was 
tnnu,;t1t by the Ranch Manager to be unsuitable for grazing. Only 9068 
acres nf the 42,000 acres had been fonced and it was estimated that 
'nly 350 acres nf the remaining land would be suitable for grazing. 
The ~asibility study had estimated that 31,000 ncres would be used 
t"r grazing. 
The R•~C•'nd majnr prnblem at Ului:rnivnu, which is related in snm: 
w.1ys tn the land shortage, is cattle performance. Calving rates have 
bepn substantially below expectationa. The revised feasibility study 
rdied nn a calving rate of 70% to year 8 and 75% thereafter, which 
b 
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was regarded as reasonably caut inus. The calving rate actually 
achieved has averaged 50%. 
~any factnrs appear tn be respnnsible for ~h 
' e poor calving. 
Amnng ttwm are inherent low fcrtil ity rn cattle with bns indicus 
------
blnnJ; .Jdaptarinn problems fnr some cattle transferred from New 
:ealand; inadequate nutrition for calves and lactating females nn the 
~en~rJlly rnugn country avai~able tn the ranch. There is general 
Ji;reement among New Zealand and MAF livestock experts that t·he 
1nf.?rriti1·y problem is greater than previously thought but there is no 
cnneensus as to the measures to be adopted to de&l with the problem. 
Cattle marketing has proved to be a greater problem than 
pr.:?vinusly anticipated. There is a limited demand for locally 
prnJuce,! hi..; tier quality beef. Fiji wtiolesalers tend to meet the 
t.,urist industry's demand for high quality beef by importing from New 
ZealanJ. ln supplying the local market wholesalers have paid little 
attention to quality, preferring to sell all meat as cheaply as 
possible. There is no real system of carcase grading. Old working 
bullncks and dairy culls receive a price per kiln little less than 
n1at paid for prime steers. The govern1ne';lt is aware of this problem, 
which afti.!cts all its smallholder beef oxtensinn clients, and is 
t.iking 11tepu to introduce government controlled killing and grading 
taci.lities. 
The feasibility study envisaged that cash cropping would provide 
an elemPnt of balance in the total ranch operation by giving early 
caah flow, Cocoa, ~ll~• maize, sorghum, peanuts, chillies and yams 
were to be planted. In the case of each crop, however, difficult"ieB 
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inten•ened and prevented any significant return. Cncna and 
were planted but fa i 1 ed through pnnr husbandry. Maize and snrghum 
W"re al Sn planted on a trial bas1' s but th · ld · ¥ e y1e s were indifferent and 
bi1th cropu were abandoned when sugar growing was ccimmencea (as they 
Jrt! regarded as a disease threat to sugar), Peanuts, chillies, yams 
:ind E._q_'2_t~~ were abandoned on the grounds that they would compete with 
10c,1l prnJu,·e. Di sappointme11ts in these crnps have, however, been 
,1dsd by the unanticipnt-ed pos!iibil ity of growing sugar cane. At" the 
ru~e (If preparing the foasibi..lity study the FSC had advised that iL 
would nnt be able tn grant a quota for the growing of sugar. ln 1977 
1t reversed this ad~ice and granted the corporation a quota Lo supply 
.:.ine frnm 200 acres. The small amount of consented land suited tn 
~Jnl! gr111.ing w.1 s supplemented by land con:1t.in t ed for a three year term, 
.1 t t er whi..:h it would revert to its own~rs fenced and ready tnr 
rn-.:ultiva:·tnn. In 1980 68 acres were planted on consented land and 
! 7 ;ic res •'ll short term lease laud. It was estimated that land 
•
1vailable nn short term iense would be sufficient to keep production 
at the level of 2500 tonnes per annum for a further five years. Sugar 
1s theref.-1re not a part: of long term corporation plans. 
The f»Miibitity ::itudy placed no reliurice on timber for the 
cnrpnratinn'R projected financial p~sltlon, mentioning it only aa a 
por1<Jible !ield to be explo1·ed. In the fitst five years nf operation 
tt1e corpnrltion li.nited its role in forestry to the creation of small 
pine plantatinn!l. The Genernl Manager, after -:onsulting the Fiji 
Forestry Departr.rnnt, formed the opinion that indigen,,us timber stan<ls 
were more limited than the data available to the feasibility team had 
indicated. He favoured v illnge exploit at ton of the limited resour 1:es 
~· 
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ratner than full scale commercial logging. 
In addition t-o the problems mentir•ncd above, Uluisaivou has had 
irs :;hare nf the delays and mishaps that 11ormally accompany large 
projects involving co0peration outJidc routine patterns. Supply of 
cattle from New Zealand was poorly coordinated with pasture 
availablity ·1t Uluisaivou. Inputs requiring funds from New Zealand 
were in some cases delayed through the need to have approval given in 
~ellington. Quarantine regulations upset plans that had been made to 
impMt cattle from Australia. 'L'l1esc difficulties, when combined with 
tne more fundamental difficulties outli.rnd above, produced a very 
c•'nfused picture with conflicting claims a11d counterclaims as to the 
S•'urc1~ of problems. The process of project evaluation which began in 
1':171) and continurld through to the end of 1981 was made more difficult 
by this confusion. 
The Evaluation Exercise at Uluisaivou 
-- --·---- __.._._._.4 ... ______ _ 
In October 1978 the evaluation exercise began with the arrival of 
a three man team from New Zealand. The team included a Lands and 
S1rvey Departm~nt offical, as leader, a Foreign Affairs 'Planning and 
Evaluation' officer, and a retired Maori Incorporations administrator. 
A f"'JO:th member, a Fi 11an sociologist from the Inst itutc of Pacific 
St11dic>~ at the Univen,ity of the South Pacific, joined the team in 
fqi. Th" New Zealand Ministries of A;Jriculture and Fisheries and 
::i..,ri Atfairs, which riad supplied the key members of the original 
f"'·Hibility study, did not ptn·ticipate in the review; apparently the 
~apartment of Forc~gn Affairs believed that this would be too much 
l , h · h · k Two years Later 1 when l~e t ~ dcpart~ents reviewing t cir nwn wor • 
hr 
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the review and evaluation exercise had become bogged down, MAF were 
again invited to participate. 
Snnn after the a<rival of the team it became apparent that the 
General Manager and the review team had substantially different views 
ot the fundamental objectives of the project and the corporation. The 
review team continued to adhere to the goals declared in the 
feJsibility study, seeking only to explore new ways of reaching those 
5oals in the light of changing circumstances. The General Manager, on 
the other hand, had come to believe that the objective of establishing 
a .:nmmercially oriented corporation in the social, economic and 
cultural env irnnment of Uluisaivou was fundamentally mistaken. He saw 
the proj~ct as better suited to contributing 'to a Fijian style of 
~nmmerce ~1ere money like roading merely facilitates tho exchange of 
5Mds and services between people rather than becoming an end in 
itself' (Stone 1979: 2). This grew out of his belief that 'the 
flJ ian ... is much more concerned with people than with things. He 
i:::;neJiatt•ly senses tension, aoi.-row, joy, arrogance as part of his 
pt>rsonal communication system. This characteristic gives integrity 
prccPdence over technology' (Stone 1979: 2). Mr Stone did not see the 
arrival of 'development' in the Uluisaivou area as an unmixed 
blesqing.'~ssentially then the development must proceed with a fine 
balance between the needs of the development and the needs of the 
penpui' (Stone 1978). 
. t' Mr Stone justified this reorlontatinn of tho projoc s gnalB on 
ti1e grnunds that it was al lowing the people of tho area 'to assu:ne a 
deci.sinn-making rnle' so as tn 'allow the possibility of 
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C ~mm~rcial ism distinctly FiJ' ian rather ti •. ~ lan to observe the rules nf 
Eurnpt'3'1 commercialization' (Stone 1978). He looked back to the 
rejection of earlier project proposals at Uluisaivou as justification 
f"r tnis belief. Difficulties that he encountered in land 
negMitatinn tended to confirm this opinion. 1 Rhod Galbraith (the Ranch 
~\Jn,1 1~er) and l soon became aw« re that the people wer" not prepared to 
.;11nsent .ill their land; that we had to earn their i:onfidence; that 
we naJ to make the corporation theirs'. From this sprang a sense of 
'Jlle:nma': which should come firnt, 'cattle development' or 'people 
Jevelnpment '? ln the first years of the project a decision nn this 
~Jtter was to some extent pre-empted by New Zealand nfficials. Cattle 
1evel0pm~nt had to come first because the contracts to supply cattle 
n.li ht!en let. PaAtures had to be developed to cater for them. This 
WJS re 1;retable the \;trneral Manager thought. 'Decisions made in Now 
:~aland arP resented by management and the Board. Decisions made in 
~•"w l<>alanJ place tht' beneficiary of aid in the role nf suppliant and 
wdl eventually rebound' (Stone 1979:4). 
Through his energy and indept'indence of thought, however, 'people 
n•'L'<l!l 1 werf> not ignored. Tho resources of the corporation were 
l . i 'bl ' 1 d' 'lf "bus bre"ks down, app l•': wherever poG1H e to poop e nee s . " "' 
the owners will call for a tractor and a tow to town. If a village 
rua1> nut of water we'll be asked to truck in supplies' (Peat 1978:11). 
knn!lnR iron
1 
cattle or anything else that tho corporation had in 
nt 1'1..k were su,>plied 1 often with an element of credit• At t imcs, in 
ca"~n nf n~ed, corporation equipment was put to uso without charge, as 
for ClHlmple i.n the uGc of a bulldozer to level a school playground or 
tilfl use of a corpnrat ion truck to transport a crop of melons to market 
b 
b 
Page 178 
befMe they became overipe. 
When the review r·eam arrived in Fiji they had to cont-end not 
simply with proposals for entry into social welfare fields but the 
!J.:t tlrnt the first- moves had al ready been made, In t-he 1 ight of t-he 
fLnJn.:ial difficulties facing the corporation they saw this as a 
S<'rl''us problem. The review t-eam's report failed, however, to face 
tne sit1iat ino creat-ed by the fact that welfare involvement had already 
tlt!t~un. The main body nf the report contains a recommendation that-: 
'Jespite thu t~xpectat inn of some of the people on the role the 
~·'rp•'rati.•'n was to play in the social welfare field, such social work 
snnuld, unless separately funded from other sources, be limited to a 
c•'-·•rJ inat ing role carr h1d out primarily upon request from groups or 
rhis is oupp!.emented by a further recnmmendation that 
'nw C•,rpnration board ohould carefully consider what they could do in 
r111' social field together with an estimate of cost, so that 
~1nst·ieratinn could be given to special funding' (N.Z. Foreign 
Attn rs 1978:9). Neither of these recommendations is further 
Jiq~ussed in the main body of the report and both are referred to 
J'>p••n.!ix C, which deals with administrative considerations, rather 
t;1Jn .1pp1•ndix. D prepared by the Fijian sncinlngist. The 1nain body of 
~'11' rt.>pnrt contains little reference to the latter appendix, merely 
I<> lar intj that 'aa a whole the Mias ion ia not competent to judge these 
l.itt •• r (i,n, social) aspects and the fact that we unanimously agree on 
all •lf the rt>..:ommendat ions doea not mean that ev<>ry member subscribes 
t,, ''t 11>\tl'c>S with all of the material presented in this or any other 
·1 Pl''ndi.x' (N.Z. r'oreign Affairs 1978:7). As a result there is an 
hiatus between the socinlogical content and the 
br 
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technical content in the report. 
·'n technical matters the report ~nncl d h v ~ u es tat, although the 
indicJtinns are 'that there will be a reduced area nf land available 
tor Jevelnpment, that cattle and cropping results have not reached the 
l~vt?ls expected, and that t-here is nni- n1e previously reported 
inJi~t?nnus timber resource to exploit, the Mission is nonetheless 
,,,nfiJt?nt ,.,f the ultimate success of the project' (N.Z. Foreign 
AttJirs 197d:5). The report continues, however, by suggesi-ing a 
'pJuqe 1n t-he rate of development' so that 'future planning on both 
p.isturt? develnpment :ind cattle performance is soundly based' (N.Z. 
The review argues that more research is 
nt?eJt?J intn cattle fertility problems in Fiji but that- any research 
J~ne at Uluisaivnu should be separately funded so as to preserve the 
1nJq1endt?nt t1nancial status of the corporation. Further increase in 
r:1" number nf breeJa was not favoured; the cost of managing the four 
?re11ent in Inti was regarded aa already excessive. It was concluded 
tn,it, at 1 he very least, a calving rate of 55% would be possible, 
fne development pause would also contribute to a strengthening of 
toe .;nrpnrar-i.nn's financial poaition. If no further cai-i-le were 
lr-lp•1 rted, fonds :llready approved by New Zealand to pay for cpttle 
p1r·ha9es (~NZ 64 .SOO) could be uAod to reduce the balance of the 
..:•'rt>••ration'r; intl'rt"t bearing loan from the FOB. If to this could be 
all·~<J tlie (lli.minatio\ nf the corporation's obligation to pay the FOB 
tt\r> local 1>quivalent co. r nf the salaries of the General M11na~er nnd 
the> R.1nch Mana;; er an11 the local equivalent 'cnst ·or imported cattle' 
,• 
• 
.... 
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the fl·nancial position of the corporati'o ld b n wou e substantially 
impr"ved. It was estimated that this would reduce the corporation 1 s 
debt by $192, 682. Together, these measures would allow a 10 year 
amnrtization of the remaining debt as previously envisaged, despite 
the reduced cash flow resulting from the reduction in the size of the 
ranch and the lower than anticipated cattle performance. These debt 
relief measures would also reduce the debt below the value of assets 
nwoed by the corporation. It would mean, however, that the 
cnrporation had received at no cost 1,359 imported cattle and the 
services of the Ranch Manager and the General Manager; in other words 
the corporation •:ould have paid only for the cost of physical 
deve l npmen t . As a kind of quid ~ ~ and also as a minor means of 
serving the same end, the report urged the corporation board to look 
at ways of reducing expenditure. The proposed expenditure of $55,000 
for a Ranch Manager's hnuse was identified as an example of capital 
expenditure which, if delayed, could lower the corporation's debt and 
thereby the interest paid in the critical years. ln the area of 
nperating expenditure motor vehicle expenses were cited as an area 
where reasonable savings could be achieved. lransporting workers to 
and from their workplaces was apparently costing the corporation a 
great deal, as did transport used for 'the social and public relations 
1spects of the Corporation's operations' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 
l97tl:Appll,8). Attention to problems such as these would, according to 
the report, 'be an act of good faith that would not go unnoticed, and 
enhance the Corporation's case for the continuation of financial aid 
frnm both gnvernments' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:AppB,7). It was 
regarded as important that cost cutting be undertaken both 'to stem 
• 
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the rapid loss of liquidity and possible business prestige'. The 
review team recognized that it 'could be accused of d · a opting too 
mercenary a view of the project and neglecting the social facet, but 
in defence of the consolidation approach the Mission considers that 
benevnlent governments would be more amenable to pumping future aid 
into a stable organization than one proceeding on a course to 
financial instability' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs l978:AppB, 7). 
Tl1e arguments in favour of minimizing 1 social 1 expenditure bore 
no discernable relationship to the analysis made by the Fijian 
socinln6 ist in appendix D. Unlike the rest of the report the 
sociological analysis did not proceed from the basis that the general 
goal of a financially viable corporation was or ought to be the goal 
,,f rhe project. tnstead it attacked the corporation as an alien 
institution which could not be grafted onto the existing social and 
economic framework. 
The sociological appendix commenced with a preamble that leaves 
no doubt about the ·Jveral l perspective of its author. The general 
goal nf the Fiji government 'to narrow the economic gap between rural 
and urban people and to slow down the migration of the people from 
villages inrn the towns' is acknowledged and implicitly accepted (N.Z. 
Fnre ign Affairs 1978:AppD,2) • However the general strategy of 
achieving this through increasing wage employment opportunities in 
rural areas is subjected to detailed criticism. First, it is argued 
that 'there is little correlati'ln between increased wage employment 
and improved lifestyle' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,3). The 
rapid increase in money is oft.en frittered away on unnecessary 
, ' 
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imported commodities. Second, movement to town is caused by social as 
.. •ell as economic factors and will not b l 
w e s owed down simply by 
Offe ring wage employment in villages. I f · f n act, l the wage earning 
opportunities that are established in rural l areas are on y very 
limited in number, and this is all that can be reasonably expected, it 
is likely that those who miss out on the few jobs available will move 
to town so as not be disadvantaged by comparison with their fellow 
villagers who have obtained jobs. Third, wage employment fails to 
fnster self- reliance; 'when one is dependent entirely on what wages 
can provide, self sufficiency or self reliance becomes unrealistic or 
meaningl:ss' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,5). Finally, the 
introduction nf a commercialized market economy into a 'rural 
sncially-based' economy (based on reciprocity) 'creates a social 
disturbance that needs to be handled with understanding and 
sensitivity' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,6). All of tl1ese 
arguments strike at the whole conception of the corporation, although 
there is no attempt in this section of the report to relate the 
general themes to the particular facts of Uluisaivou. 
The first attack on Uluisaivou cames with an outline of the way 
which tne corporation was established. It is argued that 
landowners were pressured to accept a project designed more to serve 
the national interest by increasing beef production than to improve 
their standard of living. The writer directly acknowledges that all 
the people whom he interviewed, bnth individually and in groups• 
'fi'rnily · · 1·s establ1" .. ·h~d for their benefit' bel1eve that the corporation 
(N.Z. 78 A D 8) But this belief, the writer Foreign Affairs 19 : PP • • 
t · ' role. The continues, is based upon overselling ~f the ~orpora ion 8 
~---------------------· 
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people were told: 'All you have to do is get your money bags ready'. 
In view <'f 'the confidence and respect (with an element of awe) that 
the rural people attach to high officials of 'the Government ... 
people with little sophisticated knowledge of the outside world 
believe almost everything they say' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App 
D, 9). The application of such indirect and subtle pressure is 
'contrary to the philosophy of involving the rural people in 
ident i fyir.g and making decisions on whatever projects are to be 
undertaken for their betterment' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,9). 
Having joined the corporation in this manner many people are 
beginning to feel 'that the corporation does not really belong to 
them' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs l978:App D,9). The idea of being paid as 
wage labourers on their own ranch seems strange and contrary to the 
Fijian concept of ownership. More particularly there is a feeling of 
dissatisfaction among those who have missed out on wage employment. 
There is also a feeling of remoteness from the deciision-making 
processes of the board. People complained that board members do not 
communicate with them. The writer goes on to say, although it is not 
attributed to any informant, that it is unwise to take land upon which 
people are living and then to put cattle on the land, spending 
substantial sums of money per head on cattle rather than people, in 
the name of helping the people. The suggestion that there will be 
dividends from the project for the landowners is 'remote and distant 
to the people who have been constantly reminded that their standard of 
living is not comparable to those of their ~ontemporaries in other 
advantageous situations 1 (N .z. Foreign Affairs l978:App D, 10). 
Despite this, the writer argues that the people still have very strong 
~-------------------1111 
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'expectations . In 1978, after three years of the · • corporat1nn s 
Ope rat ion, they believe that the government h owes t em something; 'the 
irnly tangible and most satisfying outcome of the existence of the 
Uluisaivou Corp0ration, so far as the people of Uluisaivou are 
concerned, is the establishment of access roads amongst themselves' 
(N. z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,10). The establishment of the 
corporation had, they believe, hastened this long sought objective. 
The writer questions the relevance of the Maori Incorporation 
model. The physical, social and economic conditions of the people of 
Uluisaivou are greatly different to those of the Maori owners. 'The 
Uluisaivou people are still wholly a part of the physical areas in 
which the Corpnration cattle scheme is now established' (N.Z. Foreign 
Affairs 1978:App D, 11). As a result, villagers who once used land 
belonging to others in the village, because their own lands were too 
far away, are now often denied access. 'The once very generous and 
flexible attitude of allowing others to use the land for their own 
benefit is quickly being reversed. This, in turn, creates unhappy 
relationships, ill feeling and widens the gap between "land-rich" and 
"land-poor" people in the community' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App 
D,ll). As a parting blow in the section on Maori Incorporations the 
writer pnints out that many Maori Incorporations are inactive and 
poorly maintained. 
On the question of technology the sociological report argues that 
the technology of cattle farming at Uluisaivou is 'so sophisticated 
th f h l'~cal soc i' al and economic at one doubts the capability o t e '~ 
infrastructure to maintain it when New Zealand aid comes to an end and 
~~------------------11111 
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the experts return' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,13), The writer 
notes that, at the t1"me of the rev1"ew th l · f . , e se ect1on o local 
counterparts had not been finally settled. 
The land consenting process is subject to serious criticism. The 
reasons for consenting which the landowners gave to the sociologist 
are an odd selection, mostly non-economic in nature and quite unlike 
tl1e simple exercise in rational, collective self-interest envisaged by 
the project planners. 'Not to participate is a reflection of one's 
weakness in relation to the value of being a willing supporter for the 
llbligation of the land' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,15). 
Respect for chiefs through whom consent was sought also played a part. 
The owners of the central part of the ranch, from which the name 
Uluisaivou derives, presented a feast to reciprocate the generosity of 
fellow participants in a scheme that bears their name. Some 
informants also expected direct personal benefits from the corporation 
- roads or assistance with marketing their crops for example - but the 
central corporation objective of making a profit to be distributed as 
dividends was not an important reason for joining the project (N.Z. 
Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,16-18). Consent forms for leasing were 
signed without the rent rate being indicated on the 
thought the period was 30 years , some said 40 years; 
forms. 'Some 
others did not 
know at all. A good number said that their land would be returned to 
them as soon as the corporation had paid its debts' (N.Z. Foreign 
Affairs 1978:App D,19). 
.~~-----------------.. 
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Rent payment procedures were also heavily criticized. The 
criteria for assessing rent were at first not made clear and then 
later changed. No rent was paid on land considered by corporation 
management to be ungrazeable. One mataqali complained that they had 
received rent for only 67 acres of a block of 1210 acres. The 
~~'.1_q_a_0:_ claimed that they should be paid rent on the entire acreage 
as the block was only fenced on three sides. Although hilly and 
precipitous, and classed as ungrazeable, there is nothing, apart from 
the difficulty of terrain, to stop the cattle from using the back of 
tl1e block. The reasons for the changes in rent formulae (and delays 
ln payment) were not adequately communicated to owners. The 
sociologist concludes, rather forcefully, that the handling of leasing 
and rent payment by both the corporation and the NLTB 'showed a degree 
nf inefficiency on the part of their personnel I (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 
1978:App D,21). 
Of the many criticisms made by the sociologist, those concerning 
nrganizational structure have the most serious implications. He 
argued that, contrary to the original intention, the owners of the 
corporation are not in practice involved in its running. Sector 
representatives seldom communicate with their constituents and even if 
they do, 'information is often distorted and misconstrued' (N.Z. 
Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,21). Fijians from Ra Province, but not 
from the Uluisaivou area, who are involved in management are seen as 
nutsiders. Together with other government officials on the board they 
regarded as 'there to represent the interests of their 
instituti•ms, and they can sway the voting to their benefit if l11ey 
want to'. Tile sociologist urged that all board members apart from the 
~-------------------· .. 
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sector representatives should have 
'their role re-oriented to an 
advisory one' (N. Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,22). More 
importantly, however, the corporation if it is to fully involve the 
land owners, must organize itself differently, so that it deals 
directly with the interests of the owning ~t-~q_alis. This would 
require a change from 'the present structure ~hat the mataqali 
the land to which it belongs is considered al a subdivision of 
and 
the 
incnrporation unit under the present Uluisaivou Corporation. The 
various ~~ce.!,~ members and their land should be looked upon as 
seperate economic units under one large incorporation which supervizes 
their activities' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,23). This would 
have several advantages. Development costs would be lowered. Self 
reliance would be encouraged. lnter-mataqa_li rivalry would contribute 
to the project rather than hinder it through jealousy about who was 
receiving the benefits of wage labour employment. Lease money could 
be re-invested rather than distributed to .!!!!.~~q_ali members. The 
sociologist con~ludes the section covering corporation organization by 
declaring that 'the development of the people must take precedence 
nver all other economic factors. The happiness and life of the people 
must not be s.ucrificed for sheer economic interests' (N .Z. Foreign 
Affairs l978:App D,24). 
·n,e sociologist did not draw back from re:_:, .... ,• ing people's 
react it)ns to New Zealand management personnel· Soth the Generai 
M ll received by the local anager and the Ranch Manager were very we 
people. Their professional abilities and dedication to the people of 
Uluisaivou noted. To complete the picture. howevcr 1 their were 
perceived faults were also mentioned: in the one case 1 
a good 
~---------------------
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naturedness that might be s;-;;en in certain contexts as weakness; i.n 
rhe nther 1 a sometimes ~; ~ 0 1-. Ling manner that employees found 
u11 famil iar. Both, however, are 'congr t 1 d f a u ate or bringing the 
pr 0ject so far while ail the t 1me maintaining good relatinns' (N.Z. 
foreign Affairs 197o:Anp D,27). 
Although no quantitative data is used the sociologist records his 
impression that the patterns of consumption are changing under the 
impact of wage employment. Households with members in full time work 
eat mnre processed foods such as flour, rice, tinned biscuits and 
fish. 'On pay days, some of the young men get into the land rover of 
the workers and go to an off-licence liquor shop for a drinking spree. 
This is a regular event when people receive their wages' (N.Z. 
Foreign Affairs 1978:App D,30). 
As in other areas of Fiji, housing is accorded a high priority in 
people's aspirations. The sociologist recommended a scheme to assist 
individuals in the purchase of housebuilding materials such as roofing 
iron, timber and nails 'on terms'. As cattle grazing is extended 
infnrmants believed that it will be increasingly difficult to find 
oaterials for the construction of thatched houses. 
The sociological report concludes with a brief section on the 
r 11 le of women in the corporation, which is negligible. He urges the 
n!ed to make women aware of the changes in their traditional role when 
tney come into contact with regular wage labour• They have a 
· · · • ' h lth 11'v1'ng conditions and contlnulng role to play i.n tn~ ea • 
education of the people of Uluisaivou' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978:App 
D,34). 
~---------------------
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React ion to the Rev\iew 
-~ ----
Management at Uluisaivou responded rather sharply to the review 
team's report. The board disputed many of the allegations made by the 
socinlogist and argued that these charges were made by people outside 
the project. Some of the comments were said to be 1 insulting' to the 
culture of the Saivou people. The general response of the board to 
the report was recorded in these terms: 
'The possible impact of the corporation on the people was seen 
differently by almost everyone. Some saw the corporation going from 
dnor to door helping individuals; others saw a new organization 
taking Mer al 1 the land' . 
The uifferences referred to here are those between the technical 
report, which recommended restricting corporation involvement in 
welfare, and the sociological report, which argued that the 
corpnrat inn had an undesirable social impact. The board's response to 
both of these was to argue for self-determination. 
'Everyone knew thHt the Corporation objective was to develop the 
Saivou and Nai lawa land. Everyone knew the corporation was made up of 
landowning mataq~li only. Everyone knew the local people controlled 
the board' (Minutes 27 October 1979). 
Further criticism, this time in public, was made by a research 
fellow from the University of the South Pacific in 1979. Newspaper 
· · · 'l to tl1ose made by his reports of Ins criticism, which were s1m1 ar · 
colleague who prepared the sociological review, attracted a strong 
rebuttal by the Minister for Fijian Affairs, urging academics not to 
b 
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meddle in affairs that do not concern them (personal communication 
from the sociologist). 
The following year, in May 1980, the South Pacific Islands 
BJs incss News published an article repeating the critic isms that had 
bet.!n made by the university research fellow. In addition, however, 
this article, which is anonymous, suggested that the Uluisai.vou 
planners were making 'a reappraisal of its objectives and tne means of 
attaining them'. The artic lt! further suggested that 'there are signs 
nf a rnnflict of views between those who regard the project as a 
purely commercial enterprise designed to lift national beef output 
significantly and those who in~1ist that the welfare of Fijians who 
have surrendered full control of their land for it must not be 
sacrificed f<}r sheer economic interest' (South Pacific 
Business NL!ws, May 1980). 
Islands 
At first glance this difference of opinion resembles the contrast 
between the former General Manager's philosophy ('people's needs' to 
take preference over 'development needs') and the review report's 
retention of the goal of financial independence by the corporation• 
On clnser inspection this resemblance disappears. The Business News 
article i.s clearly based Lipon the review report's sociological 
append ix. Tne wnrds quoted are actually taken from the rnport • The 
impnrtant difference between the positi"n of the General Manager and 
the snciological review concerns the question of popular control. The 
General Manager believe~ that the principle of local control had been 
prnperly adhered to all times. Apart from this, and a number of other 
unrelated allegations (such as pay day drinking sprees in corporation 
.~-------------------·-
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v<!hicles), the General Manager could agree with many of the major 
arguments put forward by the sociologist. However, the ~trongly 
critical tone of the snciologists' s report, together with the charge 
of ,,verriding local interests and aspirations, made it difficult for 
rne General Manager to support any part of the the sociologist's 
report. 
The division of opinion was therefore not neatly two-fold as the 
Business News article had alleged. The need to reconsider goals arose 
nut nf the impending expiry of the memorandum of understanding 
governing the project. With the exposure of the project to adverse 
publicity, rhe process of negotiation seemed to stall. Having created 
a largely autonomous, locally controlled body, the Fiji government had 
little choice other than to base its position in n~gotiatinns nn the 
view of the corporation board, which did not find the public criticism 
helpful. New Zealand, for its part, took the position that it would 
await requests from Fiji Any reasonable request would, apparently, 
be favourably considered, without reference to the proposals of their 
0 wn review mission. New Zealand officials seemed anxious to take 
refuge in the concept of local participation, local both in the sense 
0 f the Fiji government and the corporation board. 'Increasing local 
participation is now the aim', one External Affairs official explained 
(pers comm J. Larkingdale). New Zealand's input would be kept as 
'technical and advisory'. One of the functions of such popular 
expressi.ons as 'local participation', 'technical', 'advisory' is 
rev,.,1\e<l in this context. I · ld ff'c1'als from the really They s 11a o l 
:liffi.cult questions. New Zealand aid officials were unwilling to 
consider the need to reassess the aiins of the project• as well 38 the 
~~-------------------
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means to attain them. The problem is: what does 'local 
participation' really mean ? 
Loca~ Participation 
ThP. strongly negative tone of the report by the review 
sncirilogist was based to a large extent on the expression of 
crimplaints from people of ULusaivou. There can be no doubt that all 
nf the comµlaints catalogued were actually given to the sociologist. 
~\any 1•erc repeated to me during fieldwork and most informants admitted 
in general terms that all of the problems were real. Most infnrmants 
bd ieved, however, that the report had failed to emphasize the 
benefi.ts brought by the project. Foremost among these were the roads. 
All inform.'.mts were convinced that without the project, and to them 
n1is meant the corporation, there would have been no new roads. 
Communication between the villages within the area, and between the 
area and the outside generally, had improved enormously. Corpnration 
vehicles, and facilities such as the two-way radios, facilitated a 
wide-range of social functions, while providing a sense of security in 
times of emergency. Cattle, which are regularly needed for weddings 
and funerals, are now available locally for a known fair price. The 
0 pp0 rtunities for work in the area are generally regarded as a 
benefit, despite complaints about favouritism in appointments. Most 
people said that rhey would prefec to have employment available, 
WhiHever their feelings about the way in which appointments had 
actually been made. 
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It is not ab le that board members also d · a m1tted many of the 
ne.,ative points made by the s"ci0logist. Th t f · o e no e o outrage in the 
b"ard' s <'ffic ial response bears the penmanship of the General Manager 
.., 11 ,~, 11 0 d0ubt <'Ut of the po 1 iteness of the local board members, would 
have been spared any unpleasantness in discussions about the review. 
He, himself, was closely identified in their minds with the whole 
pr"ject and W.'.ls regarded as one of the great assets of the project. 
Alth0Ltgh the sociologist mentioned that both New Zealand staff members \ .. 
nad been well received he failed to capture fully the impressi"n made 
by the General Manager. His tireless energy, decisivenesa and 
genernsity- made an enormous impact. One infnrmant was adamant that 
witnnut ~lr Stone there W"U Ld have been no roads. He was known widely 
as Ratu Vatu (Vatu meaning stnne or r0ck) although to the board he was 
Ta Qase, 'Our Elder 1 • His ways, in fnrmants assured me, were the ways 
0f a chief. In particular they .:ippreciat~d his decisiveness which 
cnntraste<l sharply with their experience of bureaucrats (as well as 
;:ontrast ing with the strict def int ion of his role). Added to this was 
his 'c0ncern fnr the people'; the 'people's needs' approach mentioned 
abnve, which f"und expression in countless acts of generosity, both 
persnnal and "fficial. For example, he arranged for a New Zealand 
Rntary club to supply roofing iron and.a film projector for village 
However, the attribution of the favoured aspects of the 
· l' · f th General Manager created prnJect to the personal qua it1es " e 
problems, as will be seen. 
One of the se r i0us allegations made ;,y the 
review 
more 
snc in log ist that the consent to Lease land had been 
obtained 
was 
thrnugh the of false promises and the exercise 
of unfair 
use 
~------------------... ~ 
Page 194 
traditional pressure. This was one h ~ c arge t:aat board members 
specifically rejected. All that had been promised was tha1~ the 
project would help to improve living standards and this had already 
started to happen. People had been told: 'some of you' will be able 
to have cars and trucks and in 1980 there were eight new vehicles in 
the area. Many people were building new houses (though most were 
not). Those who construe the 'promises' made during land consenting 
to mean 'all will follow' (all will have trucks, new houses etc.) are 
not speaking in good faith. Mort>over, as one. board member point~d 
out, there is a by-law in ttoe corporation constitution that allows 
!._a!_~q_a 1 is ti) withdraw land if they need it! because of popu lat :on 
growth 
Nevertheless, the complaints made about the consenting process 
are real and believed by many people, the ruore so now that the project 
has encoun~ered financial problems. All Fijian members of the board, 
together with the Fijian Assistant Ranch Manager, fegard the quest ion 
of seeking further bnd, which was needed in 1980 and 1981, as a 
closed question. They did not want to discuss it further with the 
owners of the apparently Hle tracts of land on their margins· lt is 
0 bvinusly a sensitive issue. 
Attitudes towards the project, which were the main interest of 
the review s(Jci,,logist, tell only part of the sto~y. It is apparent 
that his informants in~erpreted hiA review role as that of collecting 
complaints which (as kud rukud ru) 
---------
are a time-honored right of the 
Fijian common man (Nation 1978:63; Spate: 19~9: 36). By contrast, 
<lurt'ng seemed to be a concious desire to e1nphasize my fieldwork, there 
.~-------------............ 
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the! benefits of the project, so as to to off t h b se t e ad publicity the 
project had aLracted. On balance, the feelings of the people of 
Uluisaivou for their project are characterized by 
Fijian attitude of ambivJlence (see for example Spate 
the well known 
1959:8). 
The ambivalence springs not simply from Fijian culture, but / horn 
the fact that the corporation has had, in objective tf'rms, little 
impact on people's lives. No-one has given land that they would 
0the rw i. se use . Wage earning opportunities, which the people, unlike 
the sociologist, do not evaluate in pur~lt negative terms, have been 
limited a!ld, more importantly, only taken on by those who war.t them. 
In 1980 ttiere were si.i<tel!n employees in an area with a total 
P()Flllat ion of over two thousand. Management preferred contract 
labnur, which spread the benefits of employment further, and was also 
m0re efficient for many tasks (General Manager's Report 1978). The 
major impact of the project has come from the roads, which despite the 
connect ion in many people's minds, are separate from the corporation. 
They were built by the government of Fiji with Fiji funds. The only 
part that the corporation played in their construction was in the 
provision of the economic justification within the system of 
centralized budgeting in Fiji. 
The review sociologist provided no evidence tor the deleterious 
effects that he attributed to wage employment. More importantly, 
having rccorrled in great detail the negative attitudes regarding the 
corporation, he fails to note that the deleterious effects such as 
1ependencc on store-bought goods are welcomed by villagers. This is 
one nf the m~in reasons that they wonted road access. Moreover, the 
~------------.......... 
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lower parts of the project area were alraady strongly linked to the 
cash economy through sugar production. Nabalabala village, as shown 
in chapter three, is one of the most prosperous in. Fij L It : s true 
t!1at many of t:he '\Yftlued traditional features of the More remote areas, 
such as Nailuva, will disappear (labour reciprocity for example) but 
~his is a result of the road, not the corporation, with which the 
people of that area have had little cortact. Likewise with the 
'generous flexible attitude to land'. It is th~ growth of cash 
cropping that wil 1 end it rather than the activities of the 
cnL~oration. In the the lower and middle parts of the project atea it 
has probably been many years since there has been a generous and 
flexible attiude to land. Less productive land is fa\rly freely 
available but rights to better quality land are jealously guarded. 
Certainly the corporation has recieved none except on short term lease 
for cane. 
An important question to ask is: why, if the corporation has had 
little impact, negative or otherwise, has there been so much grumbling 
about it? It is here that the fu:,damental truth of much of the review 
sociologist's criticisms must be admitted. The corporation concept is 
alien.[lj The modern business aspects are not understood while the 
c"mmunal ownership aspect is also unfamiliar. Traditionally, 
c"operation in economic matters seldom involved more than a single 
village or two at most. One board member described the corporation as 
'too wide' (rui rab.'.lilevu). People cannot see the 'value' (Ell!!) to 
-- _-----.._ ---
their own groups, that is their mataq~ or villages. As the 
[lj lt <lnes 
percept ions 
H<'cinlngist 
not necessarily follow, 
of the project have 
alleges. 
however, that the local people's 
been so totally negative as the 
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corporation ran into financial difficulties the possible use of the 
C ~rporation became even less clear. An i'mpo t t f ,. • r an part o the feelings 
essociated with these doubts wAs the fear of hurt pride. Those who 
contributed land were receivin~ taunts fr~m the non-contributors. The 
corporation, the latter said, was a foolish idea, a foreign body that 
;.iould not be of a'ny use to anyone. It is this attitude which can best 
explain decisions by local board member.a to spend money generously. 
Wages, ~or exa~ple, have been influenced more by government unskilled 
rates than by what the corporation can afford to pay, or what it needs 
to pay to attract labour. For rural workers able to continue to 
reside in their own villages the wage levels are higher than they need 
tn be to attract workers. In 1980 the corporation paid a minimum rate 
nf $7 per day, c0mpared with about $3 a day for rural casual labour. 
In 1980 only one local board member accepted the acting General 
Manager's recommendation of a two per cent rise; the others insisted 
upon five per cent. One possible interpretation of their action might 
be self-interest. Some members of the board had sons working for the 
corporation. However, the sole member opposing the higher rise was 
nne nf the members with a son employed by the board while most of the 
members approving the rise did not have sons working for the 
corporation. The reason they gave for supporting the rise was simply 
that it was right or just (~~~),a reason that contains a strong 
hint nf tr ad it ional pride. The man opposing the rise gave as his 
reason the need to reduce the corporation's debt burden but he is 
· · wi'thout any real concern for traditi.,nal s1·meth1ng of an individuallst 
pride. [l) The other board members are staunch traditionalists for 
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whom the reasons of 'd~dom~', which means treati' ng 
corporation workers 
on a par with government workers, outweigh all economic 
considerations. 
Such board members are aware of 'the debt' (na ~~) but they 
lack an understanding of its role. 1'h h d ey see t e ebt as a rep~oach to 
the corporat in11, a sign of weakness on its part. There have been 
suggestions that there should be a traditional fund-raising to reduce 
tl1e debt, though the risk that support for the corporation might be 
embarrassingly low is one that most board members would probably 
prefer to avoid, at least until the corporation shows more signs nf 
popularity. 
Needless to say, traditional fund raising, with all of the 
·omplications it poses for the recording of equity in the corporatinn, 
would not be favoured by expatriate management staff, In 1980 no 
progress had been made towards the goal of recording equity according 
ro tl1e unimproved value of land contributed. Paragraph eight of the 
corporation con st itut ion, in accordance with the recommend at ion of the 
feasibility study, provides that initially shareholdings would be held 
according to the number of acres con\ributed; 'after the expiration of 
a pe~iod of time to be fixed by the board', shareholding should be 
changed to the basis of unimproved capital value. This concept of 
ownership means little to most board members and nothing to the mass 
of contributing landowners. Most of them do not have any sense of 
0 1lnersliip of the corporation. Striking evidence of this was provided 
[ 11 He is the younger 
most of the project area 
affairs. His ambit i"n 
land l')utside the village. 
brother of the head of tht !,!1.!!.~ which. c~vers 
but has little interest in traditional 
is to build a new house on a leased piece of 
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by the interupt ion of a board meeting in 1980 by a group of landowners 
protesting at their failure to receive most of the rent owing to them 
at ar. NLTB pay~..out. The head of the group owning the land upon which 
the main mustering yards had been built demanded that all cattle leave 
his property until the rent was received. No attempt was made by the 
board to appeal to the landowners' sense of ownership of the 
corporation; that anything that would hurt the corporation would 
indirectly hurt the landowners themselves. The landowners wanted 
tt1eir 'dndon~' and the board agreed that they should have it. The 
blame for the problem was laid on the NLTB but the board promised to 
pay the transportation costs incurred by the landowners in reaching 
the payout point. ln view of the board's lack of responsibility this 
was apparently an act of pure grace on its part. 
The problem that the corporation and the board faced over the 
rent issue was the more general problem of the alien nature of the 
concepts of corporat~ identity and shareholding. A local majority on 
the board had not ensured that landowners could grasp the corporation 
concept. For this problem the review sociologist. as mentioned 
earlier, indicted the board. 'Decision-making is very much the affair 
of the management board which seldom communicates effectively with the 
members of the corporation' (N.Z. Foreign Affairs 1978 AppD:2). The 
solution he recommen~ed to this problem. a redefinition of the role of 
.------......_,, 
all non-local board members to that of advisers. is entirely 
unrealistic. 'nle elected representatives already have a majority 
which they have used to overule management advice on certain issues. 
such as wage setting. where they believe they are in possession of 
suitable criteria for action. On most technical matters they follow 
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their technical advisors, both public servants and expatriate 
management. They are extremely reluctant t o say anything which night 
be contradicted by one of the experts. No redefinition of the the 
role of technically qualified non-elected board members could reduce 
their power. As it is, it has been the General manager, who has no 
vote on the board, who has exercised most i'nfluence · over corporation 
act iv it ies. None of his decisions or actions has ever attracted 
Publl·c cr1't1'c1'sm from board me1nbers. Cr1't' · f h · ic1sm o t e corporation 
seems to have been confined to the Fijian Aasistant Ranch Manager, 
upon whom the General Manager and the Ranch Manager have often had to 
rely for communication. Similar criticism of his Fijian counterpart 
at Yalavou suggests that this type of position will inevitably attract 
criticism. People can conveniently avoid criticizing the expatriate 
who, they know very well, has all the power. 
It is similarly difficult to imagine how the elected 
representatives might better perform their function. What general 
aspect of the corporation's structure, or particular issue of 
corporation business, have they failed to report to their 
constituents? They do not understand the financial life of the 
corporation, nor can they easily pass on the boaru's discussion about 
such matters as the need to purchase new scales or feed supplements· 
They are told that the corporation is short of money and yet money is 
being spent on things, which to them, are of no obvious or immediate 
usefulness. ( l) If cash is really needed why not sell some cattle? 
[lj A good example of such a problem is dog biscuits. Board members 
could nnt understand why such large sums of money should be. spent on 
them. Tirny insisted that it be stopped• but they were surprised and 
disappointed to learn later ti1at the dogs had been shot. They had 
"niy expected that they would be fed on the same diet a11 village dogs, 
which wnuld be out of the question for working dogs. 
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The local members' tentative queries on s h uc matters are usually 
disposed of without them fully understanding why they are wrong. The 
number <'f issues on which they are "-ble to · 
- receive a solid mandate 
from their constituents, and which will not be dismissed for technical 
(including financial) reasons, is small. All of them concern the 
obligations of the corporation to the public in such matters as the 
payment of compensation to people whose gardens are damaged by 
corporation cattle. Corporation responsibility is taken for granted 
unless t~e expatriate manager can prove otherwise. In some cases, the 
manager believes, people fail to remove straying cattle so that they 
can claim compensation, which brings an early return on their planting 
labours, without the trouble and expense of taking their produce to 
market. 
Board members never press the corporation's interests in such 
mane rs. This is left entirely to expatriate management. Village 
livestock grazing on corporation pasture are removed by the board 
staff but the board is unwilling to consider compensation. The 
question of debts to the corporation finds board members similarly 
silent. This is perhaps partly because some of them are numbered 
among the debtors, but it is also part of the general reluctance to 
press the interests of the corporation against the public. In the 
case ('If one large debt (for the supply of truck tyres) management 
pres sec' the board to authorize legal action but the sector 
reprt~entative for the village of the truck owner made a plea for 
compassion. He asked the board to consider 'the problems' (]! _!_e_s.l!,) 
that the truck had encounteredi 'could the board please endure the 
debt a little longer?' (Board meeting 19 May 1980). The fact that the 
b -
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truckowner was a member of the larger pub lie (that i h s, ~ was not a 
co~tributing landowner) and was in fact a determined opponent of the 
cot porat ion, was not raised in the discussion. The motion authorizing 
leE,al act ion was passed, but without en thus is am. 
The most that the board could do in relation to a request from 
the acting General Manager for policy direction on debts, was to say 
th~t the board should stop allowing credit. Past debts were for the 
supp~ 1 of cattle, roofing iron or other goods from corporation stocks. 
Some of the debts were old and appeared to be irrecoverable. The 
policy of supplying goods on credit had originated with the first 
General Manager as part of his 'people's needs' approach. The acting 
General Manager in 1980 believed that the process was out of control. 
People seeking cattle seemed to know just how much cash to bring, 
together with a long face and a tale of distress, to secure a beast 
with the balance on credit. Although the acting General Manager 
expressed the problem in more diplomatic terms before the board, local 
members readily accepted the import of the request for direction. 
With the experience of countless failed cooperatives, it was not hard 
to see where 'dodonu' lay. Credit was a problem not simply because it 
could bankrupt the corporation, as the expatriate m4nager argued; 
more seriously, perhaps, it could create division. If credit were not 
given to everybody there would inevitably be disputes when it was 
deni.e<l. 
ln general, the attitude of the local board members and the 
corporation's supporters among the local population could be summed up 
in these terms: they pin their hopes on the corporation as a large 
~----------------------
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body with economic power but they are unsure of the amount of power it 
actually possesses and how it works. They are keen to see signs of 
this economic power, as for example, in payment of good wages and 
other forms of expenditure that enhancP. the corporation's reputation. 
Thl·s ca11 co11iirm th"t the corporat1'or. · f l d f · .. . ls power u an o publ1c 
usefulness. Such a view is concerned more with distribution than 
product ion. The production aspects of the corporation are either 
taken for granted or not comprehended at all. 
ln view of the gap between local aspirations and technical 
expertise, the board chairman has had to play an important 
intermediary role, especially during the renegotiaton of tha terms of 
New Zealand assistance. During the term of the first General Manager, 
the chairman was content to leave most of the intiat ive in the running 
nf the c<Hporation to the General Manager. T.iere was a solid rapport 
between the two on questions of the basic purpose of the corporation, 
which gave the General Manager the feeling that his 'people's needs' 
approach had full local support. The review sociologist's charge that 
lncal people had no say in the running of the corporation is true only 
to the extent that all of the initiative in corporation affairs was 
left to the General Manager and the chairman. However, there is 
little indication in the sociologist's report of the directions in 
~1ich the landowners, were they willing as well as able to exercise 
the full control that he recommended, would take the corporation. Ile 
su~gested that the corporation should change its structure so that 
'the ~<~~i- and the land to which it belongs is 1;onsidered as a sub 
di.vis i0n of the incorporation unit', ~t_4.,9.~l-~ members could then be 
closely identified with their own land and involve themselves in its 
~-------------------... -
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development . This, he believed, would lower the cost of development 
and PL't to good use the feelings of rivalry between mataqa_lis. 
m<>ney could be reinvested rather than distributed among members, 
Lease 
The technical feasibility of accomplishing such a subdivision is 
pursued. Would the cattle be divided up between the mataq~~is? 
If s0, how? Precise shares of ownership have not yet been 
established. Would the debt attached to development costs also be 
apportioned'? If so, what would harpen in the case of the discrepancy 
between development costs and value that has developed in overgrazed 
areas? Would all ~~~~~ units be viable independently? If not, 
acc0rding to what rules would cost-sharing in terms of both cash and 
lab<>ur, and the revenue from cattle sales, be divided? 
rtie feelings the sociologist describes are real enough but what 
LS their significance? 'A matacriJJ. headman', he says by way of 
exam?le, 'is already starting to question (not openly yet) the profit 
nf st!lling cattle grazed on their ~~q,ili land' (N.Z. Foreign 
Affairs 1978 App D: 22). It is important to note that such complaints 
are not made openly. This would be contrary to the Fijian style of 
pnlitics (Nation 1978:88-94). Sector representatives have not brought 
this feeling to the board and they are unlikely ~o face electoral 
~nmµetitinn fr<'m rivals anxious to break away. The hazards of making 
such a stand (being accused of divisiveness, trouble-making etc.) are 
,,;re;Jt, ...tiile the responsibility of actually arranging the transfer, if 
it could be made at all, is onerous and risky. 
Reorientation 2f ~ !_rojec~ 
~---------------------
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Given that the nature of continuing New Zealand aid was to depend 
local par tic ipat ion, it should not be surprising, in view of the 
problems mentioned above, that progress towards a new 
intergovernment a 1 agreeement proved to be slow. In the end, the 
contribution to negotiati.,ns made by the corporation board was 
necessarily the pr.oduct of the board chairman. There was no 
grnundswcll of popular opinion, only vague and sometimes cont rad ic tory 
desires. lt is imp.,rtant to note, however, that there has never been 
a challenge to the present chairman, despite the fact that he is not 
their democratically chosen leader. His opinion is the opinion of the 
board if the board is to have an npinion at all. 'It is to be 
el<pected', the chairman said in prefacing his summary of the board's 
atti.t11de tn the corporation's future, 'that the role, structure and 
tt1e a<lministrative and financing features of the corporation are as 
1t110 
yet, nnt clearly understood by most of the people' (BS,.:2). The board 
and management h.'.ld attempted to educate the people, and in particular 
to emphasize 'that any return would not be immediate', hut this was a 
continuing task. 
The chairman believed that it was important to draw a distinction 
between twn types of problem cnnfronting the corporation. On the nnc 
hand there were 'task problems', those associated with cattle and the 
commercial life of the corporation. On the other hand there were 
'pl'nple problems'. The chairman recalled the broad terms in which the 
aims of the corporation had been stated in the first memorandum of 
understanding and argued that the task problems had reached a plateau 
~ich would not allQw, for the time being at least. further progress. 
'People pr0blems' • "" the other hand, had not yet received adequate 
~----------------------
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tl. on owing to the lack of atten • revenue generated by the ranch 
"perat ions. No further attempt should be made to acquire more land 
until technical problems associated with cattle had been solved. In 
the meantime, there was scope for aid fonds to contribute to the 
general social improvement that the chairman believed the •people 
problems' required. 
TtlCse recomnunendations represented a proposed continuation and 
extension of the policies developed under the leadership of the first 
General Manager. The specific recommend at ions made by the chairman 
were all propod~ls that Mr Stone had been keen to implement: a 
portable saw milling unit which would allow villagers to use locat 
timber for improved housing (rather than granting timber concessions); 
~quipment and funds for small cottage industries such as honeymaking; 
,10 expan<le<l corporation workshop to al low classes in machinery repair 
and house construction; funds to allow corporation equipment to be 
used to develop communal amenities such as playing fields and village 
drains; VSA (Volunteer Service Abroad) personnel to assist- with adult 
educ at inn, 
A vital part of any new programme would be the management 
structure tn implement it, In accordance with a recommendati"n of the 
review team the first General Manager had not beea replaced when his 
(slightly extended) contract ran out at the end of 1979. The revie"' 
report nrgued that: the need for a General Man11ger had passed· Most of 
his functions could be delegated to the Ranch Manager with a 
substantial cnnseq•Jent saving in expenditure (on local salary, housing 
and vch ic le cqsts). 
~---------------------
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The chairman of the board opposed this change; he argued that 
the functions of two busy men could not suddenly be rolled into one 
position. 
Off ice r 
New Zealand responded by proposing an Administration 
assist the Ranch Manager but this was also opposed by the 
chairman and the board on the grounds that there could be uncertainty 
as to who was providing the leadership and intiative. Concomitant 
with this, he proposed, and the board resolved, that there should be a 
10cal General Manager des i.g.iate who would be supported by John ::>tone 
acting as a consultant. 
At this point, the issues of the future of the corporation and 
the role nf New Zealand aid within it, together with the question of 
tne management structure, became complicated with personality 
problems. The board was keen co have John Stone continue leading the 
pr"ject, while the Nl!w Zealand government had already resolved not to 
renppnint him but attempted to pass off their decision as an abolition 
"f the General Manager's post. The problem of personalities is one 
that burea,;crac ies, which by their nature ~ be impersonal, have 
difficulties in coping with. Mr Stone said that 'somebody suggested 
thnt l trod on Foreign Affairs toes by forgetting that l worked for 
them rather than the Board' ( pers comm). It would appear, however, 
that the New Zealand Gnvernment apportioned to Mr Stone some 
responsibility for the problems facing the corporation. 
[n the meantime the Ranch Manager became the acting General 
•1.:inager, in which capacity he prepared a detailed plau of options open 
to the corporatinn. The basis of the plan was diversification into 
cncna, pine and honey with goats and coffee also being investigated. 
~------------------·--
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Added to th is would be a number of measures to l'mprove the efficiency 
of the cattle operation. the sugar growl'ng and th · e operation of the 
wnrkshop. The acting General Manager argued that unless steps were 
taken to alter the course of the corporation it would not be viable. 
He real isl!d, however, that unless he had the full support of the board 
the plan could not be implemented. The reql•ired support did not 
l!ventuate. Despite the acting General Manager's support for social 
'eve lopmcnt as proposed by the chairman, the chairman was 
unenthusiastic about plans to try to make the corporation profitable. 
"' The 'task problems' as he called them should be put aside for the time 
bl!ing. While diversification, the spreading of risks, is a normal 
cnmmercial response to problems such as those facing the corporation, 
rn risk-averse villagers it might seem more like risk expansion. To 
.tl1•>!!e without technical knowledge. like the chairman and his lncal 
board members, the degree of risk associa~ed with each of the proposed 
areas of diversification was unknown. Tr.e failure of cattle 
performance to reach levels nrcdicted by other expei't9 reduced even 
fu:-ther any remaining confidm1cc in t<?chnical expertise. John Stone t 
desp.tc early optimism. had grave reeervations about the eventual 
profitability of cattle. ln fac~. he had come to believe that cattle 
in the tropics could never be profitable (pers colll11l) • 
Risk avcui0n. whether personal or vicarious (on bch,alf of 
lan<lnwnars), was not the only cauee of the chairman's reservations 
• l The chairman was also about the acting GcneralMonagcr e proposo s. 
w<>rricd by the possible social c"sts of attempts to make the 
cnrpnr.-ni.,n more efficient. TI\e workshop. for eicample. provided a 
useful if costly public service. Machinery hire. likewise. if 
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hampered by the need to make a profit, could reduce the social benefit 
that the chairman saw as d~sirable. 
The chairman's primary, obJ'ective is t o secure popular support for 
n:e corporation; this, he believes, is the key to the long term 
viablity of the corporation (pers comm). By demonstrating that the 
corporation is of use to the people he fiopes to increase its base of 
support and in particular to promote unity in the area. He hopes that 
rhc competing Ra Development Company might work together with the 
c<'rporat ion. It is significant that up to now there has never been a 
m<'ve by the board to restrict corporation assets, or general 
development assistance that might be associated with it. to 
c<1ntribut ~ng mataqa_~is iinly. [ l) At the moment within most villages 
s<'mc mataq_'!.l_i.:!_ have contributed land, while others have not. It is 
hoped by the chairman and the board that the corporation will be able 
tn persuade the n,,n-contributers to support the corporation, morally 
if not by the actual Cl.'"•nsent of land. 
In Rhort, the chairman's aim is for the corporation to be a 
genuinely public b"dy, an aim which is in accord with its 
establishment under the Land Development Ordinance but not quite in 
accord with the original project aim of a financially independent 
corpurat iiin. ( 2) This ambiguity of purpose is inherent in the 
l l] Labour contracts are restricted to the .!!!,ataql!Ji whose l~nd is 
being worked upon but general social benefits are no~ so restrLct~d. 
Cattle are available to corporation members at a sl1ght~y lower pr1ce 
but non-members can easily obtain cattle through relat1ves who are 
mumbers. 
l 2 l An example of the public nature of bodies created is provided 
the fact they arc exempt from the payment: of tax and stamp duty. 
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corporation constitut itJn. Clause 4(a). defines a clearly public 
function: 'to encourage a devel t f 1 opmen o and and resources within 
its area of operation, promote self-help and · the cooperation among 
landholders and people of that area and, therefore to contribute to 
the development of their general social and economic situation'. The 
next paragraph proclaims the aim of establishing and operating •an 
agricultural and pastoral business'. 
TI1e acting General Manager's contract expired in early 1981. In 
view of the difference of emphasis of the two corporation goals 
between him and the chairman, he did not renew his contract. In late 
1980 a team of New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
"fficers visited the corporation to propose a development and 
management strategy ftJr the next four years. Theu brief was narrowly 
technical and ignored the goal ambiguity problem. Figures were 
produced which showed a 'break-even cash situation' at the end of 
1984. The basis of these figures was diversification into a range of 
crops, along the lines of the acting General Manager's proposals. 
The aims of this exercise were: (i) to allow the New Zealand MAF 
to renew contact with the project so as to maintain high technical 
standards and at the same time give New Zealand aid administrators the 
necessary justification for continued aid; (ii) to provide a 
legitimation for the kinds of diversification proposed by the acting 
General Manager. It was envisaged that two expatriate staff members 
would be needed to implement the plan. One would be a General 
Manager, as sought by the board. In his role dcsc ript ion, however, no 
l 8"cl·a1 and economic mention is made of involvement in the genera 
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development of the area, though there is responsl"b1"ll"ty for training 
corporation staff. The other expatriate t ff s a member would be an 
Agricultural Operatiryns Manager, in reality the R h M anc anager with an 
expanded responsibility for cropping. 
In 1981 a new General Manager was selected for Utuisaivou. After 
a brief familiarization tour in Fiji, however, he withdrew from the 
piisition, on the grounds that there were too many ways in which the 
project could go wrong. The new memorandum of understanding, which it 
was hoped would be signed in October 1981, was postponed and a 
com~ittee of Fiji technical specialists headed by a Senior Veterinary 
Officer from HAF was commissioned to look carefully again at the 
question of the corporation's viability. 
Conlusion 
The troubled history of Uluisaivou makes it an easy target for 
criticism, both technical and sociological. Unfortunately for the 
project, however, the sociological criticisms are not always 
compatible with the technical criticisms. The technical expert 
criticizes the lack of good land while the sociologist argues that the 
people were pressured to contribute such land as they gave. The 
fundamental problem is the lack of clarity of goals· Ultimately 
every'me has been interested in the welfare of the people, just as 
everyone favours local participation. The problem with local 
participation is not whether to h11ve it, but how to achieve it, while 
What at the same time serving the interests of the people's welfare. 
happens, however, when planners believe they know the people's 
interests, and how they are best served, better than the people 
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themselves? 
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CHAPTER SIX 
GILDING THE LILY? 
The Contribution of Sociology to Individualism at Yalavou 
' ... project managers tend to use social scientists for 
confirmation, to "gild the lily". A small number of social 
scientists capable of dealing with cultural factors now do 
project work, but they are often used in self-defeating 
ways; for example the social scientists are consulted after 
the main features of the project design have been designed'. 
Glynn Cochrane (1979:8) 
'Although seldom stated in such a way, it is a fact 
that all development projects are founded on the premise 
that one can predict and produce social change. The theory 
of social change contained in most development projects is 
quite simple - a combination of need and supply: if most 
people who want money are shown how to get it, they wi 11 
adjust their behaviour accordingly'. Glynn Cochrane 
(1979:9) 
Beef farming in the Yalavou area commenced in the early 1960s 
shortly after the establishment of the 'pilot' project at Vcrata. Two 
young graduates of Navuso Agricultural College obtained leases in the 
area and were granted finance from the AILB. At that time the Yalavou 
area was almosr. uninhabited, The land in the cci>' "e of what is now 
the project area belonged to two landowning units, the members of 
which resided at Bemana village. There they were able to use small 
pieces of land belonging to other mataqalis, TI1e difficulty of access 
at Ya lavou made insecure tenure at Bemana prefer ab le to occupying 
thei.r 'true soil' (~ ~~) at Yalavou. In t.hc 1950s, however, 
Kaminieli, the head of one of the two ~aqalis (Vunabaka) moved back 
and founded what he hoped would eventua 11 y be a new village, He was 
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followed by two other members of the mat-:.qal_i who · h 
_ _ , in t e late 1960s, 
retired from work in urban areas. Sailosi, a member of the other 
~ta~i- (Naduguivalu), settled in 1968 after a disp•ite with other 
village members at Bemana. 
In }Q73, through normal extension contact, the Yalavou farmers 
asked for a road. The grazing potential of the extensive unoccupied 
area offered a promising avenue of approach to the government, 
although it soon became apparent that it would be a very large task. 
It was estimated that at least twenty miles of all-weather road would 
be needed, together with thirty miles of farms roads. It was also 
estimated that at least 2,400 heifers and 60 bulls would need to be 
imported to establish the farms. 
In view of the scale of the project it was proposed, in January 
1974, that Australian assistance be sought. In August 197b, after the 
preparation of a brief report on roading requirements (by a Snowy 
~!ountains Engineering Corporation engineer), the ADAA decided that a 
thorough investigation of feasibility was required. G.P. McGowan and 
Ass0c iates was awarded a twenty man•month contract. The feasib;l ity 
investigation at Yalavou, unlike that at Uluisaivou, included in its 
terms of reference a charge to examine social factors. In particular, 
the consultants were asked to consider: 'The extent to which existing 
socio-cultural norms might be incompatible with the form of land 
tenure and social and economic organization implicit in the proposal 
to establish cattle farms on the basis of individual land ownerships· 
(sic) lf considered appropriate the contractor should recommend 
al tc rnat ive forms of organization more suited 
to existing 
~-------------------·--
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socio-cultural norms i the possible sociological impact of any marked 
differential in rural incomes caused b th · Y e proJect and consideration 
of optimum farm size and form of land ownership or control best suited 
to ameliorate any such differential development ff t e ec _9 i flexibility 
Should be built into the development pro 1 ll posa s to a ow land use 
patterns to develop as appropriate to meet future situations and 
c1Jnditions'(ADAB 1976 Exec Rep:ll). 
As at Uluisaivou, the invitation to a foreign aid donor 
i.nevitably created delay. Eighteen months passed between the first 
informal contact about the project and the arrival of the feasibility 
team. Politica~ leaders in Fiji were unhappy about the delay. 
Nadroga, 1 ike Ra, was 1tn area in which there had been complaints of 
g"vernment neglect. Such were the complaints, in fact, that at the 
1977 elections, despite the promise of Yalavou, the local member of 
parliament became the first, and as yet only, sitting Alliance Fijian 
member to be defeated by an independent candidate. Iu actual fact the 
delay tn establishing a Yalavou project probably lost little support 
for the government. The roads at Yalavou, unlike the roads at 
Uluisaivou, were not designed primarily to open up access to villages. 
P1Jliticans hoped perhaps that the mere promise of a project for the 
province would dispel feelings of neglect, In view of the parochial 
nature of village feeling this would have been a vain hope from the 
beginning. The ADAA, for their part, were anxious that the hopes of 
the people in the Yalavou area should not be raised before there was a 
complete and practicable proposal to be considered. This had been the 
l f l · · · f f 1' nnumerab le proJ' cc ts a 11 over the esson o U u1sa1vou, 1 not o 
world. 
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~ Yalavou Concept: 
The basis of the Yalavou project was the development of sixty 
farms and the rehabilitation of thirty four · t · f 
- ex1s ing arms. 
Each farm would consist of about 500 - 600 acres (about the same size 
as Ti l ivalevu) carrying 100 - 150 cattle with goats and cropping as 
sideline activities. 
The project was co1\sidered to be economically marginal because 
the economic rate of return was calculated to be only 4. 3%. 
Outweighing this• however, was a number of objectives which, if 
achieved, would mean that 'the Yalavou project changes from a beef 
cattle project to a rural development project involving social 
development, technical training and land development' (ADAS 1976 
Annl: 3). In short 1 Yalavou was offered as a solution to the 'Fijian 
problem'. A large tract of unused land would be brought into 
production while Fijian participation in commercial agriculture would 
be lifted. It was also hoped that Yalavou would point the way to a 
'formula' for the utlization of other unused lands to the benefit of 
their owners; in particular, it would demonstrate 'that individual 
farm development is an effective and efficient way of development of 
ttie grassland resources of Fiji' (ADAS 1976 Exec Rep:l9). A conscious 
attempt was made to provide a contrast with the communal approach 
adnpted at Uluisaivou, 80 as to allow a comparison of the two models. 
Prc-poncnts of both projects have viewed them as social 
experiments, with the out.come being the discovery of a replicable 
"rganization for use elsewhere in Fiji, although it was also argued by 
the Yalavou feasibility study that the differing circumstancea of 
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ULuisaivou and Yalavou lent themselves to communal ism an.:1 
l'nd 1'v1'dualism respectively. [ l) At Ulu1' sa1· h 
· vou, t e study pointed out, 
potential grazing areas were located around villages that were already 
using much of the land on their margins in their cycles of shifting 
cultivation, whereas Yalavou was an extensive, almost entirely vacant 
b Loe k. Secondly, the people of Ra were said to be more communalistic 
in that 'the chieftan hierarchy is more strongly developed with 
the effect that individual ownership is less compatible' (ADAS 1976 
Ann1:2). On the the other hand, the feasibiltiy study asserts, the 
'Nadrogi.il-Navosa people are recognized for their individuality', a 
characterization which appears to embrace three distinct phenomena. 
First, chiefly leadership is said to be less important in the area; 
secrrndly, land ownership is often registered in the name of 'family 
groups' (.!..:?E.!:_~) rather than 'extended family groups' (!!!,ataqali> 
which is the norm in Fiji9 and thirdly, there was already in the urea 
a number of Fijians who had settled away f.rom their villages. Each of 
~hese three phenomena is interpreted as a dimension of individualism. 
The main problem with individualism was felt to be the extra 
expense it would incur in 'social development and training' and the 
risk that, despite this expenditure, the individualization require1 
f0r rhe project 1 s success might not occur. The feasiblity study 
to rec,..,gni Zlld these dangers and stated flatly that the recommend at ion 
prnceed with the project would be based upon 'a value judgement 
placed 0 n the effectiveness of the proposed social development 
prngram'(ADAR 1976 Annl:)), 
[ l J The feas ib i lit y team 
feasible, economically 
descripti,..,n was not used 
pnrt nf the case for the 
leader described Yalavou as
1 
a 'technical~y 
· l social experiment . Although this marg1na • . 
in project documentation. it was an important 
I d ' project s a option. 
~~------------------... -
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Two other problems associated with individual h' 
owners ip were also 
raised. First, selection of suitably motivated indi'v'd l · 1 · l ua s, essent1a 
rn the success of the project, would be hindered by social and 
p11lit L.:al pressure to give preference to .!!!!!!.~qaf~ members who, when 
wNking the land, 'are less motivated and more likely to be 
Jistracted'(ADAB 1976 Annl:5}. As a compromise, t:he feasibility study 
pr0p0scd a 'Selection Panel' tha't could veto the nominati,., 11 of 
unsuitable candidates from the ~t:.!.9.ali and, if necessary, allow 
blocks to remain vacant until suitable nominees could be found. The 
sec0nd problem identified in relatit'!n to individualism was that the 
rt?stricti,,ns <Jn the transferabi.lity of leases would reduce their 
s~curity value and therefore the amount of money that could be lent on 
r11em. This necessitated slowing down the rate nf devel<Jpment, 
mJXimizing use of the farmer's own labour and deferring expenditure on 
J m0dern h0use. 
The proposed solution to the first problem, together with a 
number of other important points in the project design, wnuld require 
landnwner approval before a decision could be made to go ahead with 
the project. In fact a 'preimplementation phase of seven months' to 
gain approval was recommended by the feasibility study. Most of the 
manpnwer for this exercise W3S to be supplied by Fiji; Australia 
"'"uld contribute only three man months by a member of the feasibility 
tl!am. 
Apart from the problems associated with individualism. a number 
"l nther socio-cultural problems that could affect the nutcome of the 
pr"jeci- were considered. Most were problems familiar to MAF extension 
~~---------------------
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staff. Among them, 'the real danger', was thought to be 'the demand 
for cat tie for a farmer's ceremony, especially one involving his 
siblings, parents and mother's relatives' (ADAB 1976Ann10:10). This 
had long been the greatest fear concerning Fijian cattle farmers. The 
feJsibility study concluded, however, that community attitudes respect 
'that a beef farmer relies primarily on cattle for his livelihood' and 
rhat 'Fijian farmers are not foolish enough to offer all that they 
have for ceremonies'(ADAB 1976 AnnlO:lO). No reference is made to the 
experience nf the Verata or Tilivalevu projects, although as mentioned 
earlier, it does support this argument. 
Ott1er problems raised were: developing a responsible attitude to 
lnan re payment; adjusting to a money economy ori.entat ion rather than 
a subsistence orientation; solving land disputes; maintaining 
initial enthusiaitm when the project is no longer novel; overcoming 
supernatural interpretations of misfortune; adjusting to the demands 
·' f n strict work routine. None of these problems was regarded as 
serinus. The bank repayment problem could be overcome by careful 
selectinn of farmers and an appropriate provision for replacement of 
rnrise found to be unsuitable. It was felt that the money economy 
w~utd nnt present serious difficulties for Yalavou farmers, as most of 
rhem had grown cash crops of various kinds for some time· L:rnd 
disputes could be solved by the active involvement of the NLTB in the 
prelir.iinary 10 cation of boundary lines. The momentum problem could be 
"vercnmc by avoiding 8 'big bang' beginning, recognising that in the 
early sta~es 'people need some enjoyment as well' (ADAB 1976 Annl0:8). 
An emphasis on practical training rather than merely 'classroom work' 
cnutd also assist in the m~intenance of momentum. To counter 
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•upernatural worries it was rec'lmmended th t h 
a a a c urch be provided in 
the focal farm ar:!a. To guard against family problems tl1 t l' ht 
. a. mg 
arise if a farmer died it was recommended that each farmer sign a 
iJdl. Adjustment to the requirements of a strict routine was seen as 
attainable through an element of compulsion, Each farmer's duties 
wriuld be clearly set out: to live on his farm, to comply strictly and 
prc)lnptly with the work programme Laid down by the supervisor, to meet 
l<'an rep.:iyments regularly as arranged by management, Farmers who did 
nrit fulfil these obligations could be replaced. C"mpliance wriuld be 
achieved through an agreement between the farmer and the Yalav0u Rural 
Development Board. This agreement, known as a 'Licence to Occupy' 
wnuld give the farmer secure tenure provided h~ met the specified 
c"nditi"ns, but it would allow the board to remove an unsatisfactory 
farmer. For the five yt1ars of the currency of tne Licence the lease 
f"r ~he farm would be held by the board rather than the farmer. The 
use "f the licence was taken directly from the Lomaivuna banana 
s-:hemn. 
ln th\! longer term, when the licence had expired and the far·mer 
n~d been granted a lease over his land, maintenance of the practices 
established would be accomplished by the benefits that the farmer 
derived from them. Although it is not emphasized in the feiui.bility 
,tudy, the farmers at Yalavou are clearly intended to be prosperous. 
·\l tt1ough the ecoilomic rate of return on the in·v'estmcnt as a who le 
.ni;;ht be only 4. 3%, the inte\"nal rate "f return enjoyed by thu 
farmers, would contribute almost nothing apart from their lab,,ur 
· · · the bencfl'ts ,,,· finance at 4%pa, would be 21.4%. i>n1.1,~r, wh l le enJQyl.ng 
At full development (in year 11) they would have an estimated income 
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of $5382pa which would be equal t:o the urban median 
wage (ADAB 1976 
Exec Rep:3S). It was the deliberate intent1'on of h t e feasibility team 
leader that the Yalavou farmers would be fully commercial farmers 
rather than peasants, thereby demonstrating that opportunities for 
income and status can be found in farming as well as in urban 
employment. 
However, in view of the creation of inequality implied by this, 
i.t was underplayed in the feasibility study. In contact with 
landowners the high 1ncome goal was also played down to avoid 
attracting people wanting to 'get rich quick' or to retire to easy 
m"ney. Tt1e feasibility team found that 'almost everyone interviewed, 
expecrs to .;arn more from cattle than any other commodity in the 
area'(ADAB 1976 Annl0:5). One of the tasks of the preimplementation 
phase would be to guard against 'groundless high expectations' and to 
ernphneize that the project: required young men capable of sustained 
hnrd labour (ADAB 1976 Annl2:2). Within the Yalavou concept there is 
an unwritten moral principle: t:he farme~ who labours harJ, defers 
enjoyment of the income generated by that labour and faces a situation 
nf risk with faith in 'Expertise', daserves to do better than his 
peers. His success points t:he way for others to succeed. The effects 
nf this principle will be examined later; what is significant at this 
pnint is that, although it is fundamental to the Yalavou concept, it 
is unwritten and has not been discussed with the landowners who• it 
seems' wr:rnld not- be capable of understanding it, or perhaps if they 
unders~oo<l it, they w11uld reject it. 
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This is the theory of motivation implicit in the Yalavou 
design. 
The feasibility team leader's assessment of t.he I.DA failure at 
Lcmaivuna was th .. t the farmers had not been provided with the 
opportunities to earn incomes high enough to provide sufficient 
incentive for careful management and consistent performance. The 
nomination of a target income equal to the urban median is an 
important step in development planning in Fiji. Iqbal SrJbhan points 
"Ut that 111 the developing world it 'has probably only been the 
Israelis wh0 operate from the explicit acceptance of the criterion of 
pr0viding each farmer with an income and stand~rd of living equivalent 
rn his counterpart in urban areas'(Sobhan 1976:48), 
ln November 1976 tho Yalavou steering committee was c0nvened in 
Its membership comprised representatives of appropria•:e Fiji 
G"vcrnment departments, tho ADAA and the consultants er\gaged t" 
C"nduc~ tho preimplemontat ion phase. At this meeting, and at A 
fnllnw-up meeting in Decem1 cr, a number of important decisions wero 
lt was dee ided that a development lease W"uld be taken out by the 
YRDB no the r.!t area for development only, and not over the total 
acreage nf land belonging to involved mataq~l_!.~· The deliberate 
intent was thnt 'more effort has to be put into the preimpleurnntat:i"n 
h l l · · f I , ocal people the pr1!c i se art.la to be p ase tn c ear y 1dent l y to t 1 
taken nut: under a development lease'• One of t·h" lees<Hll "f 
Ul 11isaivou had clearly been learned • 
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The YRDB would pay a flat rent of 10 cents an 
acre for grazing 
land, while it would charge farmers 20 cents an acre once d 1 eve opment 
C0mmenced on their farms. This would mean a rent deficit in the short 
rerm, a rent surplus for the middle of their lease term and a deficit 
again at the end as developed sectors are relinquished. This compa~es 
with a rent of 10 cents an acre on consent, and 50 cents an acre when 
fenced, at Uluisaivou. 
lt was proposed that the YRDB policy should be that gifts 
(~~~::!-~) of cattle or goats would not be allowed and that this 
should be made clear to farmers prior to their selection. A ceremony 
kn0wn as vakalutuniqele was proposed. 'By this ceremony the 
traditional obligation of the selected farmers to the landowners is 
satisfied, and to a large extent would help to placate the jealousies 
0f those getting ahead'. 
Ttle guidelines for farmer selection put forward by the 
feasibility study were endorsed by the steering conunittee. !!!~-~~Li 
nominees would be required to meet certain objective criteria (age, 
heal th, exp<?rience) and would be assessed by a conunittee composed 
mainly of 'technical experts' (MAF and FDB). The pr i.nc iple ..,f 
!.~~li nomination was endorsed in prn fcrence to inviting 
applications from ~.<1,alj_ members. Ma.t.aqalis would be given three 
years in ._hich to put forward an acceptable nominee for each farm. If 
( f h d t b n found tl1c selection a rer three years a suitable armer a no ee · 
wn ld b In tlte event of a farmer failing td meet u e open to thu .x.avusa. 
his 0b l igat ir .. s under the licence to occupy• his replacement would be 
S ~ler'"ed · The mata<ta.li could make a further 
" • from within the 1.av.usa • .;i. _ 
~-----------------· 
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nomination but equal consideration would be gi'ven to 
nominees from the 
whole yavusa. 
It was decided that the land consent sought f 
rom the mataqali_!!_ 
'-'l"uld include consent for road-building. Such d ld 
w roa s wou eventually 
be given into the control of the government. As a condition of the 
project no acquisition fee would be payable on land for road 
construction. Compensation would be given only for damage to crops or 
other improvements. 
Other decisions made by the steering committee included the 
following. (1) As a condition of the project all land w,.,uld be 
dereserved. (2) ~t__l!_<lal~ representation on the YRDB would be 
increased from six to seven with one representative for each of the 
l"ld Tikinas. (3) Royalties for gravel (which were ignored by the 
feasibility study) would be paid, although royalties would be at a 
lower than nrirmal rate (20 cents I cubic yard) because the mataq~i 
supplJing the gravel would be the main beneficiary of the road. (4) 
Existing farmers in the Yalavou area were to be automatically elig·~ble 
ro participate in the project provided they had an FDB loan and/ er an 
NLTB lease with rent fully pa\d up. 
The SC? decisions gave the steering c"mmittee a packase to put 
be fl' re the 
.!!!.atag,al is. A familiarization team was se lee ted to tour · .1e 
Yalavou area and put the project to the people. All of the team 
members wore fo'ij ian 9 two were from MAF, one from the FDB, the Roko 
M· a retired HAF officer, and a Fiji Sugar Corporation extension 
officer who had acted as a consultant sociologist in the preparation 
1Jf the feasibility study. 
~---------------· 
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ln its initial tour the familiarization team was charged with 
explaining the general concept and the key determinations that had 
been made by the steering committee. It was made clear that no 
commitment. had been made to go ahead with the project. ~~aqali 
members were allowed some time to discuss the project proposals among 
themselves before the familiarization team returned to listen to their 
rt!sponse (Familiarization Team Report 1977:3). At the follow up 
meeting, forms to consent to participate in the scheme were to be 
signed. 
Before the first reports of the familiarization team were 
considered in February 1977 an unexpected element of local 
participation interposed itself. The Secretary for Agriculture had a 
visit from Rav. Paula Niukula, a prominent Methodist clergyman who 
came from Bemnna. Rev. Niukula had heard of the project proposals as 
conveyed by the familiarization team and sought clarification of a 
number of points. His reservations regarding the project were later 
put in writing and considered by the steering committee at a meeting 
convened in Februrary 1977 to consider the findings the 
familiarization team. 
Rev. Niukula's letter articulated the general misgivings that 
landowners felt in relation to the project and proposed a number of 
specific amendments. The letter began by emphasizing that the people 
appreciated that the project proposals were the result of the most 
careful attempt to aim •for the greatest economic productivity', 
•hereby 'making a big contribution to the national economic growth of 
this c~untry' • ~'hile at the same time benefits for formers and for 
-
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landowners, and the change in their social life that the project would 
bring, had been taken into account. Des · t h · Pl et ls, there were several 
Points in the project proposal that. created • anxl'ety'. The project 
wnuld be stronger, the letter argued, if amendments to take into 
account t~:Pse problems could be considered. 
The first problem was the inability of certain mataa 11' ( t 
.:i...a s_ a. 
least three at Bemana) to provide candidates who met selection 
criteria. 'To exploit their lands without t · · t · · par.1c1pa.1on is an act 
belonging properly to the past.' The second problem concerned the 
farmer selection machineryi it would be a 'foreign bcdy'. 'Would the 
landnwners be expected to sit and watch others ccme and settle on 
their land and eKploit it?' The third problem concerned dcubts in the 
landowners' minds about the ability of farmers to carry on after the 
(RDB was wound up (in ten to fifteen years time). The fourth problem 
cnncerncd the existing lessees. Would the skills and experience of 
such farmers be recognized? 'Will they be given sufficient 
recogniticn in terms of privilege and responsibility in the planning 
and running of the Project?' Finally, brief reference was made to the 
problem cf sf,curing land for the focal farm. At this stage planners 
were already aware of the problemi more will be said of this later. 
Tn overcome these misgivings Rev. Niukula proposed that farmers 
wh" wished to do 80 should be allowed to take out leases in their own 
names; use of the land would be governed by a separate agreement 
between the YRDB and the farmer. A second measure would be to hold an 
annual or a biannual general meeting of all farmers to have some kind 
"f nversight "f the activities "f the YRDB. Thirdly, it was proposed 
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tha t fa1 ner se lee t ion should be a 'matt b er etween mataqali landowners 
of the block and a subcommittee of the YRDR', Finally, it was urged 
rhat landowners be recruited into management and admi'ni' t t' s ra.tl')n, 
The letter apologised for any delay it might cause to the project 
but argued that 'to sign the documents now being placed before us 
before these matters are resolved in our minds' would mean 'that we 
shall continue to be anxious and unhappy partners in the YRDR', This 
letter, together with the information gathered by the familiarization 
team, provided the st:eeritig committee with a clear appreciation of 
landowners' feelings. 
The familiarization team quickly discovered for itself that 
landnwners had strong feelings about some of the project proposals. 
ln particular, tlrny opposed derescrvation. The reserves policy, they 
sai.d, had been established hy ~~ Sulmna for their bene Ht. 
Dereservation could only affect their interests adversly. It should 
be mentioned by way of clarification that landowners' fears regarding 
dereservation are not simply that Indians or other non-Fijians might 
move in, but that other Fijians, from outside the province, could be 
granted land. From the landowners' point of view, the major 
difference bet1.:een land in reserve and out of reserve is that the 
latter may be leased without their approval, although it is normal 
NLTB practice to seek landowner approval. There is also a widespruad 
belinf that land in reserve may only be leased by members of the 
mataqali, although the law does provide that other Fijians may lease 
· d h tlte perm1' ,,, sion of the 0wncrs. 
reserved land prov~de they ave 
Despite prl')testations to the contrary by the familiarization team, the 
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landowners of Yalavou intepreted the d · - es1re to dereserve as an 
intention to bring in Fijians from other provinces such as Lau, Kadavu 
and Rewa. 
There was also a feeling among land0wners that they would be 
surrendering control of their land. The turag~ ni mataqali would °" 
longer have the power to distribute land (Familiarization Team Report 
1977:4). The development lease, which would precede the thirty years 
individual farm leases, would give, in effect, forty years alienation. 
In view of the fact that, in many cases, a large proportion of 
mataq_~ land would be thus alienated, these fears were 
under st and ab le. The project proposal argued that no-one had anything 
t<' (ear provided they were prepared to work hard; but landowners had 
to be prepared to leave to outsiders the judgement of whether their 
members were working hard. 
Another fear that arose among landowners was that the project 
W<'uld create jealousy among them. Who would benefit from the project? 
lt was clear from the project proposal that the majority would not 
benefit directly from the project. There was a widespread feeling 
'hat mataqali members should be allowed to agist their cattle on 
Yalavou project farms. Several villages asked that project farmers 
should be allowed to use their cattle to meet ceremonial obligations 
in the event of the death of their mother or father. 
All of these general apprehensions did not, however• amount 
to 
"Pr..., sit i"n to the project. Some were apparently attempts to redefine 
the projects in preferred ways while the land,,wners still had some 
bargaining pc we rs. Others were no more than general fears in the face 
bn 
Page 229 
of complexity and uncertainty. The overall reaction was one of 
gratitude that the area had been chosen for development 
(Familiarization Team Report 1977:1). The building of roads was a 
blessing t:hat would greatly increase the value of their land. The 
fear that the project might somehow reduce their control over the Land 
did not, on the whole, outweigh the benefits of the project. Most 
landowners were willing to consent to the development lease, despite 
their vague misgivings. As will be seen later, h"wever, commencing a 
pr0ject with consent thus "btained can create problems. The signing 
of consent forms might be legally binding but it does not ensure that 
landowner consent is achieved once and for all, particularly if 
consent has been obtained by a process of persuasion. 
ln additi"n to the widespread general misgivings, the 
familiarization team also encountered many specific problems. One ,,f 
these was existing lessees. There were already thirty existing FOB 
financed cattle farmers in the areas. Each of these held an NLT8 
lease which would need to be surrendered before the farmer could join 
the scheme on an equal footing with other project farmers. Some asked 
for compensat i"n for improvements made but were told that, since the 
wh0le purpose of the scheme was to enable them to make such 
improvements, compensation could not be justified. The existing 
leaseholders w;:ire afraid, however, that in surrendering their leases 
they wnu Ld lose their independence. In add it ion some existing lessees 
failed t" meet Yalav"u entrance requirements regarding age and health 
Sil that the quest ion of compensation could Mt be put aside 
nltngether. 
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Another minor problem that affected certain areas was reluctance 
to give land for watershed protection areas. 
these areas said that they would prefer to 
The ~taqalis owning 
develop the areas 
themselves as pine plant at ions. In view of the readiness of these 
~~ci.~l_~s- to consent their grazing land the watershed protection issue 
had to be put to one side to al low the scheme to proceed. 
The land required for the focal farm presented another problem 
that involved only t-hree mataq<!_li~, although it was obviously not a 
min<'r problem or a matter of detail. Without: an adequate focal farm 
the scheme could not proceed. This meant that some mataqa_l is had to 
be willing to contribute land for what would be of common benefit to 
all nf the other particip11ting mataqa1:_~~· Ninety year leases would be 
neeJed tor the area in the centre of the project where major buildings 
wnuld be established, although once the scheme was fully established 
anJ rhe training role concluded, the focal farm could be transfered to 
he nwnersllip of the ~~q,alis owning the land upon which it had been 
established. Despite assurance on this point one of the owning units 
was reluctant. It is misleading, however, to refer to this unit as a 
group; in fact it had only two adult males. Both had settled on the 
area designated ns the focal farm centre and were reluctant to move. 
One 0f them in particular, Sailosi, evaded attempts to discuss the 
matter and then, when finally c~nt.acted, said that he did not want to 
atisi.st a scheme which would benefit the people who had evicted him 
frnm his village ten years earlier. Another meeting was arranged, 
with the heads of all the mataqali!. in the central Yalavou area 
(Bcmana district.) present to attempt to 
fullnw NaduguivRlu member, Vaone, to consent 
persuade Sailosi 
their land. 
·d his 
It was 
-----
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finally agreed that they should retain about twenty acres each in the 
ml'ddle of the focal farm area. A req t d ues was ma e for compensation in 
the form 11f a concrete house with piped water and electricity. The 
farni.liarization team report recorded that they were advised that 'any 
compensat i.on would fol low established guide 1 i.nes and which would not 
surpass benefi.ciarys' existing standard of living'. Sailosi later 
di.sputed the rejection of his claims for compensation and claimed that 
he had in fact asked for much more. He and Vaone also asked that they 
be able to graze their cattle on their land outside the focal farm 
b<'undaries. The answer to this request was apparently fudged; a 
decision on the matter would have to be taken later. With matters 
'clarified' in this manner a~'!. was presented to Sailosi and V:ione 
who accepted it, thereby solemnizing their agreement. They also 
signed the normal consent form with the actual acreage to be filled in 
after a physical inspection had been made. The familiarization team 
repnrt records a recommendation that Sailosi and Vaone be alloted 10 
acres each and that the benefits they requested be grant~d to them 
nnly if they move outside the focal farm boundary. At the time the 
repnrt was written Sailosi had already decided to withdraw his 
~ .. 
cnnsP.nt. The report 1·ecommended that"NLTP: should go ahead and lease 
the land without their consent. The NLTB has the power to do this 
with unreserved land, though it would be against the normal 
practice. 
Project Finalizatin~ 
ln February 1977 the steering committee was reconvened 
to 
consider the familiarization team's report' together with the let.ter 
from Bemana. Of the two, the latter proved to be 
the more dee hive 
b 
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fonn of local input. Most of the requests ~ . 
•.ransm1tted by the 
familiarization team could not be granted. The preimplementation 
report summariies these requests, and the planners' · react1one to them, 
as 'bargaining for maximum benefits to the landowner which often would 
have resulted in unacceptable sacr.ifice by the lessee, or by 
neighbnuring landowners or by the national economy'. The landowners 
sought, for example, approval for the use of project cattle for 
ceremnnial purposes. Similarly, they asked that the cattle of other 
!!!.ataq~ members be agisted free on project farms. Both requests were 
denied; to accede would have required a reversal of normal MAF/FDB 
p0licy. Neither issue was of critical importance; consent could be 
nbtained without giving approval to these demands (and cattle would 
cnnt inue to be supplied unofficially for ceremonial purposes in 
insignificant numbers). 
Direc~ negotiations between Rev. Niukula and a sub-commit:tce of 
tile '3teering committee allowed the critical issues to be separated 
from the non-critical. Rev. Niukula made five significant proposal 11: 
( i) where a ~aqal i did not have suitable nominees the land would be 
held in trust and developed by a manager who would be nominated by the 
mataq!!,li but approved by the farmer aclection committcc;(ii) the 
farmer selection committee would include a representative of each of 
the mataqalis under con&ideration; (iii) a corpo~ation would be 
frirmt:>d to run the focal farm after the YRDS cea11od9 (iv) compensation 
f11r improvements would bo givon to the present: occupants of the fecal 
farm; (v) present les 9 cea in the area would be automatically granted 
licence11. 
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The first of these proposals was by far the most difficult. The 
preimplementation team leader believed it could create 'management 
problems' and preferred to discuss the matter with 'a wide range of 
~ople' before giving an answer. Granting this request would create a 
precedent that could change the who le compleKion of the project, If 
the prnblem to be overcome by this step concerned only three tokatoka~ 
at s,~mana perhaps another way could be found. The other requests put 
forward by Rev. Niukula presented fewer problems, All could be easily 
accepted, at least in general terms. Points of detail, such as the 
amount nf compensation for eKisting lessees, would need to be 
Jeterm ined. Ute corporation to replace the 'ilWB at the end <Jf its ten 
to fifteen year term was also acceptable in principle, although it was 
tno far into the future for a definite dee is ion. 
represent at ion on the farmer selection c«lmmittce w11s accepted without 
reservation. 
The first proposal, for managemant-in-trust, created the only 
problem that required continued negotiatil'ln, Rev. Niukula responded 
tn its rejectil'ln by asking that lcanes for Mn-mataqal~ Mminees be 
shnrtened to ten years. This also wa1 unacceptable to the 
prcimplemcntatinn team leader, Mr Ian Sillar. A farmer w~th ten yoara 
tenure and the certainty of non-renewal would lack the mot iv at ion 
nf'cess:1ry to carry out the demanding wnrk of farm development• At 
this p0int, however, Mr Sillar could eee more clearly the landowners' 
pr"blem: 'if there was to be blanket alienation of thair land for the 
long period of forty years they wanted to be certain that the 
select inn 
· f 'thin their own mataqali procedure favoured nomLnees rom Wl ----
h,, ldings. Convculy, if the term of alienation was relaxed 
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from forty years to say ten yt~ars 1 the mataq~l i W(')uld be happy with 
more harsh selection criteria wh1' h h c may ave necessitated no.ainees 
coming in from outside the landowning group' (ADAB 1977:31). 
Meanwhile, the brief manpower resources survey carried out by one of 
•he team's sociologists had suggested that there would be sufficient 
people within landowning groups to provide suitable nominees for all 
farms. The compromise eventually settled on was to spell out morn 
clearly a determination to allow .!!!_lltaqal~ members to have first choi•;e 
of blocks. They would have twelve months to nominate a farmer 
accep"able to the farmer selection committee. fo'armers who faih~d to 
fulfil their obligations under the licence to occupy would be 
replaced bj a further nominee of the landowners. In thR event of the 
death "fa farmer, "he YRDB would have the right to transfer the 
li.cen~" to a aui.tably qualified member of the immediatA family. It' 
there wnre no such suitable family member the landowners would again 
nominate a membnc for the selection committea to approve. Each farmer 
~10 met development goals would automatically receive a thirty year 
least! wh<'n his farm was fully developed. 
At thti conclusion of '"hese negoti.ations Rev. Niukula was invit:ed 
ro tnur wit:h the familiarization team which would seek ai.gnatures on 
consent forms. He declined, however, and wrote'.?. letter to the people 
0f BPmann <'xplaining the new provisi..,ns and leaving them to make up 
•hPir nwn minds. Priva,.ely he was not enthusi.ast:ic about the project. 
Tn1• rf'CinPm~~nt:s made thr. project accept:able, but only just· lie 
bl'liPv1•d t-hn" th11 whole concl'lption of "lie project ran against the 
~rain o{ Fijian culture. On the othflr hand the opportunity to develop 
•hf' arM cr>Uld net br. r.1ui ly pas1rnd up. 
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In May and June the steering committee reported that the project 
• G G y ma e c ear its attitude to Proposals WP. .. e final1'z~d. Th 0 NLTB f1'nall d 1 · 
den~servation; it was unnecessary. The LDA legislati..,n empowP.red any 
bodi~s created under it (including the YRDB) to lease Fijian reserved 
land. This bP.ing the case there was no point in overriding 
landowners' feelings on the subj't1ct. The 0 x1'st' l y l . ~· .1ng essP.es at a avou 
nnw made their bid for compensation in the form of housing, togetht1r 
1~i.rh frnced-off allotments of fifteen acres. This was a little more 
rhan previ.ously anticipated but was not a large enough problem to hold 
up the project. Tht1 Naduguivalu land rt1quirt1d for the focal farm was 
a morr srrious problt1m. Fortuitously, or so it seemed at tht1 timt1, 
rht~ locnl member of parliamt1nt, ~ Ost1a Gavidi, arrangt1d a mt1t1ting 
betwe(~n all Naduguivalu mf'!mbers, their close affinal relatives who had 
an int(~rest in tlrn land, and the Rol;.o Tui. ThP. list of demands 
prnsf'nted on their behalf by~ Osea was long but not outside tht1 
bounds of possibi! ity, although it includt1d a number of provisions 
that- wrrP. not t1asy to cost (for example, frt1e t1ducat ional and medical 
services for focal farm landowners)". Ratu Osea wrote to MAF 
Pxplaining tht1 arrangement that had been made. He qualified it, 
however, by adding that he believed the ~<.!ia.!..~ members may still 
havr had qualms. He tht1refore offered his services 
as an 
i.ntP.rmed iar y. 'KnowlP.dge of the attitudes and aspirations of 
landowners rn the Yalavou project makes u1e feel duty bound to remind 
tt1P YRDB of the passible tingt1ring resistance, passive and active, 
~ha~ it may encounter later on'. Later, when the project was under 
way, 
· d I · nsent and !.~~ Os1Hl' s role Sail.osi of Naduguivalu wLth rew ns co · - __ _ 
· was hP solving problems, or were 
camp ~o appear a little ambiguous: 
· • L'nterests creating problems that 
hls rndeavours to promote landowners 
wnuld not have o"herwise arisen? 
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Once thP. project waR underway, probl~ms wl'th '"' the landowners were 
handled by thP. YRDB, rif which more will be said later. At the close 
,,! ttw prt>implt1mentat ion phase, when both governments preparing 
for comm il:mt1nt, foel ing was that the 
prrimplemnntatirin study had 'engendered more confidance in the project 
on the sociol(')gical side' while a reassessmP.nt of costs had low d ere 
ti11~ rconomic justification of thP. project (ADAB 1977:4). The survey 
of the potential nomimrns from twenty-two of the forty-nine mataqal i:_!_ 
had found 'an unexpectedly high manpownr resource', confuting claims 
by Bt>mana people that three of their landowning units lacked suitably 
qualifind nominees (ADAB 1977:34). The problem that dMs not appear 
to havn bef'n canvasst~d at this stage was that of determining how many 
(1 f thrsn men would give up arable farming on the valley floor to move 
to thn hills and coi.c~:ience ranching. The only quali ficat il'ln that "IH' 
prrimplemnntntion rnpo·•t made about the opt imiem of the manpower 
survPy was that individuals idtrnt ified, d trn pi i: e t lrn i. r 
capabilities, would facn substantial 'traditional obligations and 
strt1s11es' as lesscrno on thP.ir own :nataqa~i land. It was th11ref(lrt~ 
thought that. 'an essential ingredient of project design and manngP.mPnt 
will bP. to mod1~rat:e thtisn obligations as far as possib\P. if commPrcinl 
succru is to bo achieved'. Despite this, for thP. purposes of 
budgrting, a success rate of 100% was assumP.d on the grounds that, 
althnugh n•placPmPnt of farmers would undoubtedly '>ccur, 
rPplncPmPnt mf>chnnism will bo quite nfflcient and ovP.rall projPct 
prrductivity will not bP. jP.Opardised' (ADAB 1977: lS). The grounds 
f h · i · f h subj'ective astuHtsmonts arP. not spelt 
.0r " " opt lm st LC note o t esn 
'lut. Tile labour resources survey is cited but il'llllediately qualified. 
the project was described os a 
t:o 
'sncial PX(>f'rimPnt' • thereby implying that: there was an 
of 
... 
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risk. 
The kP.y to the acceptance of the project, although not spelt out 
in the preimplementat:ion n~port, was the contribution it was hoped the 
projecr would make to 'the Fijian problem'; namely the bringing into 
production of idle Fijian land and t:he facilitation of Fijian 
participation in commercial agriculture, As mentioned earlier, the 
foasibi.lity team lfladt~r summed up the project in just six words: 'a 
technically foasible, economically marginal social experiment 1 • In 
view 0f the difficultifls flncountered in the past in achieving Fijian 
participation in commercial agriculture, it was argued that. t:he 
experimental status should not be counted against the project, nor 
should its economic marginality. The decision to proceed with a 
project of such f!conomic marginality, espflcialty when this is combined 
with a degrfle of risk, is a significant one. Ultimately the decision 
must be political, at least in the sense that it is made at cabinet: 
LPVP l. ln theory, burflaucrats P.rnploying technical criteria can 
identify goals and risks but they cannot justify the select.ion of 
goals with attendant risks. When first put to cabinet in Fiji the 
Yalavou project was not accP.pted. The Ministry of Finance argued that 
~he economics of the project wP.re not sufficiently at.tractive and that 
h f
. · i t o all A re"ubmission t P. numbP.r of potential bP.ne lC tar es was .o sm • n 
by the Ministf"r of Agricultre was needed to convince the economists of 
Fi.nancf" t.o acc•~pt t.he f A rl
'culture that 'a way' was 
argumP.nts o g . 
urgPntly needed to develop Fijian land. 
ThP. Ya lavou Rural DAVP.lopmP.nt ~ 
- --
Rur ~l o~vP.lopment Board rP.snmbles thn Superficially, thn Yalavou • ~ 
Uluisalvou Board. Both are 
establ ishnd under thP. Land IMvelopmf'\nt. 
Authority Ordinance and both are composed of a 
combination of civil 
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sP.rvants and locally elected representatives. The YRDB constitution 
spP.lls out project goals in greater detail th h . an t e Ululsaivou 
constitution but it also contains a general clause to allow the board 
ro consider its duties in the b d · roa est possible context: 'to 
· . wt ln t e area o P.ncourage the development of land resources ·th· h f 
- e peop e o operation, to promote self help and cooperation among th l f 
area and therefore contribute to the developmn.nt of th · l .. - elr genera 
social and economic situations'. 
The resemblance between the boards is, however, entirely 
supnficial. In accordance with its basically technical function the 
YJlavou board has a majority of civil servants. When the Bemana 
people asked for an extra representative for their area (to match the 
proportion of .. heir contribution of land) their request was turned 
down nn the grounds that the board's role was confined largely to 
'infras .. ructure dtwelopm1mt 1 which affected all areas equally. The 
P.lected representatives have voting rights but their minority position 
means that thry cannot combine to defeat the technical experts ln any 
Should the experts be divided, 
however, the popular representatives are able to exercise their power 
to resolve the matter. 
The functioning of the YRD8, particularly the role played by the 
popular rf'presPntat.ivrs within the board, in influenced by the 
•P.chnical complrxity of many of the issues under its jurisdiction. 
ThP two main functions which the board directs, farm d1welopment and 
road dPvPlopment, appnar rnlat.ively simpln on thn 
surface but th~ 
Pxr.cut: ion f k thr
ough thn combin•~d efforts of two 
o these t.as s 
crnates 
govPrnm~nts and privatn management consultants 
complPx ity, f f
. nee nte diagram below 
particularly ln thn arna o tna ·· 
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shows some of the financial complexity, although l't conceals the fact 
that funds flow unevflnly and often for · f · d · specl le purposfls only. 
I 
T 
G 
THE FLOW OF FUNDS 
F111 
Government 
SOURCES OF FUNDS Australian 
Government 
~ CHANNELS OF FUNDS 
~i-1---
MAF FOB 
DESTINATION OF HIN[•"J 
Consultants 
The YRDB, it should be noted from the diagram, is not at ti'e 
CPntre of the f:ow of funds, although it does decide how the funds 
will be spent and YRDB staff exercise day-to-day ccntrol ov"r the 
spenJing of many of the funds. It purchases all farm inputs, for 
which it is reimbursed by the FDB (loan funds to cover the farmers' 
sharPs of cos'" s), by MAF (subsidies paid for certain farm inputs} and 
by /\DAB (subsidies paid on items requiring foreign exchange). 
The managem1mt structure of Yalavou is represented by the diagram 
The centrality of the YRDB is the most notable ffiature of the 
si:ructure. The board is in total control of both 
farm and 
infras~ructural development. 
The board's dependence on a number of 
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institutions for the funding of t · · · ac lVltles under its control 
complicates the administrative t ma ters it directs but does not reduce 
the totality of its control. The supply of funds from these sources 
ts not subj P.C t to discretion, alth h . oug there have been delays which 
havP. caused cash flow problems. 
YALAVOU MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
Consultants 
Fq1 Government 
MAF PWD FOB 
Min of Finance 
Cornrn1ss1oner Western 
Adrn1n1strat1on i----
Staff 
Focal Fnrrn 
Labour 
Fnrrn 
Development 
Supervisors 
Task force 
Fore"1en 
Workshop 
Suporv1sor 
Workshop 
Staff 
Local Population 
7 Districts 
9 r----., 
I I 
I PWO Staff I 
I I 
L.----J 
With the creation of ~he YRDB the planning stage had, in theory, 
cnmf' to an end and implemt>ntat ion was under way. The planner& had 
plann1>d and the aw.ople had consented. In actual practice, consnnt had 
to be maintained and planners had to adapt their plan to the many 
sr,ci.al problems it fl!ncountered. In May, work on the focal was stopped 
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by Sailosi of Tokatoka Naduguivalu who denied that he had ever 
consented to lease his land to the proJ' ect, Th b e oard decided that a 
mrr.ting should be arranged b-tw--n Sat'lo · or. or.or. s \. t:he ~ Tui and the 
PlPcted board members. The board had a consent to lease form signed 
by Sailosi but did not want to use this to force him to surrender his 
land. At this point the chairman brought to the board's attention the 
nPr.<l to resolve the other issue left over from the preimplementation 
pha·rn, t-he quest ion of compensation to existing lessees who 
surrender~d their land without joining the scheme. 
At all subsequent meetings Sailosi claimed that the level of 
. " P. .n ag P.P. C(lmp<'nsa'" i.on he wanted for surrendP.ring ht' s land l1ad nev"'r b e r d 
l"o, He prPpared a long list, much longP.r than that contained in the 
Lf>tl"P.C written by Ratu Osen Gavidi. The MW list of demands was so 
long and expensive that it could only be intP.rpreted as a rP.fusal t:o 
grant- hi.s land. His point of view, as exp~essed to me, was that he 
was bei.ng asked to surrender several hundred acres of good arable land 
for a licence to occupy inferior grazing land. The assessment of the 
problt>m madt> by several participants in negotiations was that Sailosi 
had never wanted to consent his land but had found that social 
prPssure plesent in all of the meetings to which he was invited made 
an outright refusal impossible. Tue same observers believe that he 
was mri'"ival:Pd by a deeit'f~ not to hP.lp t:he ~oplP. of Bemana villagP. who 
In privatP., how.vP.r, Sai.losi said that 
an $0. 20/acre did not rnpresent the true valuf! of his arable land, 
Pllplici,. statt>mPnt of his moti.vP.s that should not be simply dismiut>d. 
Frllriw BPmanans accept his P.xplanation to thP. extP.nt that they 
a'"'"ributP. his rP.fusal to •grP.P.d' (!ocoko~), When access P.VP.ntually 
• bl l nd t'ncrP.aSP.d enormously. 
camp to t:hP. arP.a thP. valuP. of his ard P. a 
Siner thP.n, he has ber.n working with great industry to takP full 
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advantage of his new opportunities, It is a paradox, if not an 
the project design, that, although it contradiction within 
pspouses individual ism, it did not appeal "o such a determined 
It is also somewhat contradictory of the individualist as Sailosi, 
rational self-interest theme that Sailosi is expected to lease a large 
rract of arable land at $0.20/acre. t:hertiby making a Large 
contribu•ion to the collective good with l'ttl l l . 2 persona reward in 
ri>rurn. 
The problem created by existing lessees presents a similar 
paradoK. Stwc>ral not ab Le Lessees• one an elected member of tht~ YRDB, 
cl Pel ine<l to join thf! proj1~ct. One emphasized thf! clash between the 
projRct design and the Fijian way of life, Although he wa~ one of the 
pioni>ers of Yalavou. and a strong individualist by any definition, he 
was also heavily involved in communal affairs (as head of the local 
church organization, secretary of the school board and elected member 
rJf rhp YRDB). An0':her lea1rnholder rPfused to eurrend1~r his lease• 
claiming that it would awan a loss of independence. As a survivor ".>n 
his 'block' from the LDA days he felt confidtrnt in his own ability to 
Pstabli~h a farm but had doubts about the YRDB. He prPdicted that it 
Wf1uld collaps1~ following the withdrawal of expat:riate staff, as had 
h.1pp1>nPd to ttu~ LOA projects in the arP.4. l l I 
Both lessees refueed to join the project and sought compensat:ion 
for nny project road that might paes through their land· ThP. project 
thP. 
pl11n had assumPd that compensation would not be nP.cP.s83ry i 
projPc" was in the common good and therefore should receive thA 
support of all. ln view of thP.ir leas1,e, the hrn&AP.&' position in law 
(l) Fijian farm eupervisore said, 
s0lPly by "hP dP.sirP. to retGin control 
hi.s lPasP thP. mataqali would reduce 
him. 
ho~ver. that he was motivatf!d 
over land. lf he surrendf!rf!d 
the amount of land avail ab le to 
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was sound. The compensation thP.y svught was f · P.nc tng to keP. p thP. i r 
cattlP. from wandering onto thP. road. AftP.r some hP.sitation, in May 
1980 the board eventually agreed to pay for fP.ncing material which the 
farmrrs could use to erP.ct thP.ir own fP.nc~s. The timP. taken to reach 
such a dP.cision illustrates t~P. difficulties encountered by a 
~echnically oriented board, composed mainly of bureaucrats, in dealing 
with social problems· If thP. board had bPen df'ptHtdent Ol formal board 
proc1•dures for the resolution of all social problems ;., would have run 
into snrious difficulties. 
11\e first formal rP.view of Yalavou, commissioned by ADAB in 
accordance with the intergovernmantal memorandum of understanding, was 
hrld in 1979 after the project had been in existence for two years. 
ThP sociological compomrnt of this report was able to bring to tho 
YRDB an analysis of the social problems that the board found so 
Jifficult handlfl. The dir~ct management utility of this 
sociological reporting led the YRD8 to employ the sociologist for 
social monitering Pvery six months. 
Thr board's ability to respond to social problems is hampered by 
difficulties of jurisdiction and communication style. A good 
illustration of thesfl problP.ms can be found in a dispute between an 
lndian saw-miller and Bemana villagflrs which was brought to the board 
by 'hr Bemana representative. Before the establishmr.nt of the YRDB 
roads .. he miller had made an agre•~ment with a BP.mana landowning group 
'o log it:s land, The agreement included an undertaking by the mll ler 
'o makP a road which would improve access to Bemano villo&e while also 
hPlping .. o gain access to the timber. TI\e rood wae duly cut but. 
bPfor1> it wae gravelled. the nPwly established Yalovou rood obviated 
~hP nrrd for the miller to finish it in order to gain acceu to the 
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The miller then made an a~reement to supply b ·1 · ut di.ng material 
for a new community hall. This satisfied b some mem ers of the 
landowning group, as they had left the village to create a new village 
Other members of the group supported the 
rPst of Bemana in asking the miller to honour his earlier agreement, 
which involved consideration of much greater value than the roofing 
iron. The Bemana representative asked that the YRD8 ban the miller 
from using its roads. The civil servants on thP. board were reluctant 
ro take up th,, Bemana causn. The chairman spoke to the millAr who 
claimPd that he had promised only to bulldoze the road, not to gravel 
it. Afrer this, the board ruled that the dispute was a private mattP.r 
ourside its jurisdiction and that it should therefore not be raised 
From t:he Bemana point of view this was unsatisfactory. Thn 
Yalavou roads had deniAd them the village acCABB road they would 
ortwrwisP h.1ve had. However, ~hey could not agree on the n.~xt step. 
SomP fovourt>d a 'letter of request' (i, ~ .!!,i, ~~) to the YRDB, 
orhn s fr. l t a ' letter of complaint' <i .!'.'.2.!! .!!,i, ~.r..'!.> was j us t:i fied. 
WhPn a ream of visiting government ministers visit~d the area, on a 
missi..>n to gather the feelings of people at the grau-roots 11wel, 
nothing was said• it was felt that it would have been inappropriate 
~o put such a comploint bP.forP. a high level visitation. ThP. Bnmanans 
subsf'qupntly put a request to their Provincial Council which relayP.d 
thf' rPqurst to the District OP.vPlopmPnt Committee. At t:hP. same time, 
Phpy approaclwd thA YRDB with a reqUti&t that thP. board hAlp to finish 
~hf'i.r road. u f thn nP.xt board mP.eting was held, hownvP.r, thP. uP ore .. 
Gi>nnal Manug.-r dec idt~d to put a road through to the arabh~ land of 
SPVPral Bemana farmers who did not have sufficiP.nt arable land on 
Phf'i.r Yalavou blo,~ks. This road reachnd almost to the village. 
0 
tabua to o Y~D supervisor with a rP.quP&t 
-
• 
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that the road bP. slightly extended to reach th c · 
· e atholtc mission 
school, which was slightly closer to th 'll P. V\ age. [l) Project 
managemf'nt was opposed to this proposal, fearing that too much contact 
with th~ villagP. could jeopardise the independence of farmers. [21 
ThP board accepted management's more general view that such a 
fur roads could : 1t be P.ntP.rtainP.d as it would crP.atP. a precP.dent that 
could lf'ad to requests from all villages. The board also ruled that 
all future plans for roads would need to be approved by thP. board. 
ThP. First RP.view of Yalavou 
----------
Th~ first review of the Yalavou project was carried out in 
Qc".Jbrr 1979 by an elP.ven mf>t'Dber tP.am composed of represP.ntat ives of 
both governments. 11\P. rP.view' s terms of re(1ue11CP. included a 
requirement to evaluatP. the continuing rP.levance of the project's 
'to creatP. a replicable system of unlocking and 
dPvr>l.1ping Fijian nat ivP. land that will contribute to increased 
participation by ~ijians in the commercial sector of economy, whilst 
am1•liorating tlrn growing divergencP. betweAn rural and urban sectors' 
(ADAB 1976:99). Two sociologists were included in the team: an 
Australian sociologist with expertise in training for d"welopm1int and 
a Ftjian sociologist who had participated in both the feasibility and 
preimplemen".ation rAports. 
By 1979. after only two yP.ars. it was apparent that one of ".hA 
major problPm!I of thP. project would bP substantially incrP.asing coats. 
ThP al ready marginal pconomic pictur1! appt!arnd l ikr.ly to deteriorate, 
al".hough tht> rP.view did not bf!liP.vr it would ~A appropriatP, at thP. 
l · r-.v .,· ... w t' ts ovnra 11 P.conom ic v iob il it y. Par y stage of ".hp prOJP.Ct, to ~ ~ 
[ l I N1>ws of ".hi!I traditional rP.qu••!lt rrachPd manogP.mP.nt only whP.n 1 
<''4kPd thP.m what thP.ir ra11poni1e would bP. · , i 
[2! Thls. at leaat, w11s thP. ~rsonal viP.w of thP. ProJP.Ct SupP.rv sor. 
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Future beef prices were uncertain and other benefits, not included in 
rn•' 0riginal economic analysis had arisen. ( 1.) The main problP.m posed 
by thr expanding costs was that of of reconsidering priorities within 
•hr proji>ct proposal, 
On technical matters tlu~ review's proposals wc!re rel at i'f"lY 
minor, small matters of fine tuning. The most significant findings of 
•hr reviPw concPrned sociological and training matters. In gPn11ral, 
•hr review accepted the sociological hypothesis inherent in the 
Y;ilavou concept. 'If the socio-cultural constraints can be overcome 
•hp proj1•ct will achieve new standards of farmPr behaviour which rnny 
~nnble it to attain a level of success in beef cattlP husbandry ~1ich 
had nu• prPviously been realisrd in Pacific Island countries' (ADAB 
l97b:5l). On rh1• othi>r hand, the rmriew nicognized that it 'is 
difficult •o predict the behavioural response of the local community 
•0 •tw proj1•ct' (ADAB 1976:58). There would need to be a continuing 
m0ni•or of social problems and opportunities together with the 
crrn•ion of insti•utional flexibility so as to allow appropriate 
rrspons,..s. For examplP. 1 preasurea to accommodate othnr ~taiili 
mrmbrrs might mPan that farms need to be smaller. 
The revii>w noted the high level of subsidies to the farmPrs. The 
paymi>n• o( 'taek force foremPn' who actually helped formPrs in fPOCP 
c0ns~ruc~lon rPprPBPnted a dirPct subsidy of $1,100 for each forruPt. 
Thro hire rate for thP focal farm 03 bulldozer for fPncP. clParing, 
'- · d d pr .. ,n .. ratL'on was considerably 1011mr 
aCCPSS '"rac~ cutt\Og an gar PO rr• 
•I · L'r-.. d ... ll'vpry of fpncing matPriah and other farm 
\llll pr lvatr ratp9. r ..,.- "' 
b id thP. fP.VlPW arguPd that thP rPquisi•Ps rPprP&PntPd a furthPr au e Y• 
r
1
1 The . d t spPclfy what bPnPfita its author• havP in 
1 rPv Lrw o.-s no . oa'"a and cash 
mind. TilP)' arP. probably the grP.atP.r Pmph49 U <>n g · 1 h fa tP.r cash flow than catt P. cr..ipplng, both of which producP a 111uc s · 
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provf3ion of such subsidiP.s to participants only, raised an important 
qups•ion of Pquity as well as inhibiting 'the opportuni.•y for local 
~ntrPprnPurs ur institutions to d•vnlo 
' r. r. p sE>rvi.ces such as contract 
fi>ncing, t:racr-or hire, transport and possibly rE>pair faci.litil"s' (ADAS 
197b:55). ThP qu11sti.on of subsidiPs was conllidPrPd f as part o thP 
m0rP gPnPral qupstion of local participation. ThP review citPd thP. 
i>mph.1!1 i.s on local part ic ipat ion in rf'cPnt dPVPlopmPnt stud iPS. 
\la'"t1qnl is had madP rPpeatPd rPqtwsts for tho opportuni•y to providP 
c0nrrnct fl"nci.ng to farmP.rs; thP riwit>w arguP.d that they should bP 
srri0usly consi.dPr~d. 
A furth~r opportunity for local parti.ciation identified by the 
rPvirw was thf' format\on of a Yalavou branch of tho Nadroga/Nav011a 
Grn:.:i.Hs Association (NNGA). This b.:>dy, or anoth11r likP it, could 
'pcovi.dr basic 9Prviceo to the arna, such as transport of fonclng 
matnials and caHln, marknti.t1g of form rP.quisites, opnration of 
storPs, and provision of contract servicPs (n.g. co~tract fnncing 
•pams), (ADA8 1976:)6). Although t:hn revi.Pw dors not mPntion it, t:hP 
P•)ssibili•y of •hP utabllshmPnt of a Yalavou branch of thfl NNGA had 
bPrn rai~Pd in the fPaslbllity study. 
Closr>ly rr.lat:Pd to thP. quP.Stion of local putlcipation, and U.kP 
it a fashian3blP \dPa ln devPlopmPnt studlP.s, ~as thn lsaur of tho 
-•is• 'b ~· f b f't Und-r •hi .. t1e .. dlng the maraqali r1>qu1>st for u. r\ u•ton o enn le. ~ L i· • _ 
thp provision of cattlP for important CP.rPmonLP8 
was repP.atPd. The 
rrv iPw rP.commf'ndnd that, in V iP.W of t~~ !!'tlH pr oh ib it ion 
on thP. u1u• of 
c .:it t l p from its cl \P.nte' hP.rde, 4 91'tlltll 
hPrd of cull cat:tlP b.-
· · d f l f f purclla•A. by m,!!_ana_li mPmbPU. A 
matntalnt• on thP oca arm or "" ;;..A 
mA•a~ali rPquP.st for thP. construction of mroting burP.a in thr projPct 
arra waA also Pndorerd. d th ~· this would assist to tt was argue '"'" 
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countf>r thP rPstrictions imposP.d on t • arm•~rs obligations to thPir 
ma"aqa 1 is. ln this way, community support, which recPnt studies have 
sh0"'11 to br of vital importancP to thP succPss of pr · t OJPC s. could bP 
mai.n•ainf'd. 
lt lS in thP training arna that "hP maJ· or · .. · · " I - · crlLlClsms o~ ~lP 
Yalavou projt>ct WPrP madP. No ovPrall training programme had bPPn 
,,gtabli.sht>d, although thPrP was a largP supPrvisory/training staff. 
Projt>ct mauagt>mi>nt bPliP.vPd strongly in on-thP-job practical training 
and, by implication, rPjPcted formal training, but this had turnPd out 
•o n•quirP much morP supPrvisorial manpowPr than anticipa"Pd. ThP 
rPvi.f'W rrcomm0ndPd thP inclusion of morP formal mPt:hods, using group 
•pchni.qut>s, gradually increasing thP ratio of farmPrs to supPrvisors 
as lPVPl s of comprtPnCP rosP. To PnsurP that this could work, it 
"'''u lei br n<'crssary for supPrvisors to havP knowlPdgP of group training 
•pchni.quP~ togPthPr with gnnPral PXtf'nsion skills. {l) It was also 
rPcomm<'nd1•d that fannPrs' wivPs bP includPd in the training programmP. 
TI'P rPvirw not.Pd thP changP in farmPr sPlPction procPdurP from 
rt>commf'ndt>d in f"he fPasibility study. 'TI1P ~a~alis had 
ll<>mi.na"t>d only thP numbPr of farmPrs to fill th.-ir blocks so that 
·hPSt• Wi'fl' simply Pndorst>d by thP SPlPction committPP. A CPVlP.W of 
•hi~ procPdurP was proposPd, togPthPr with f"hP PStablishmPnt of a 
'm .. chanism for thP n·~lacfltl'IPnt of f!l!:'mPrs who do not achiPVf' a 
satisfactory standard of form dPVP.lopmf'nt' (ADAB 1976:89). 
aomP contradiction bPtWPPn this rP.commPndation and thP. 
t>mphasis in thP rPvirv on local partlcipa'!lon. 
&Pl Pct ion 
l l l ThP ProjPct SupPrvisor bPl iPVPS that 'Pxt.Pn11\on p~fort dlrPctP~ at 
4 CPrtain sPctor of thP rural community is unproduct1ve' • For /hP 
ftrst fPw yi>ara moat Yalavou farmPrs arP unablP :o ta~P so~and ~rm 
mimagPmPnt dPc is ions.. • TilP only pragmat. ic appri>ach ln th l9 s; tuat l<>n 
ill to do thf' farm planning on bPhalf of t:hP far:nu>r' (pPrs comm • 
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procPdurP that had PvolvPd was a clPar rPsponsP to the feelings of 
i 3 ndow11Prs. (SPP. abovP p.233). 
FiPldwork by thP. Fi~an sociologist disclosPd 
grit>11anci>s, most of} ~hich wer.e symptoms of 
a number smal 1. 
the communic·at ion 
difficulties. No tab le among these was criticism of board 
Mataqa~i members complainPd that their board 
ri>prPi:1t•ntat ivPs did not kPep them informPci of board affairs. 
'Communication within thP vil lagP is also a problem and therP is a lot 
of mi.sundi>rstan<ling about the purposPs and lik"lY beni>fits of the 
prvj1'ct' (ADAB 1976: 226). 
ThP list of complaints included the timbPr road problPm, rights 
•o Pmployn11'nt in thf• projf'ct, thf' amounts of rPnt paid, rPstric"tions 
,Jn thp usP of cattlP for cf'remonial purposf's, and thf' fPP for the 
agi.st:mPnt of rPlativPs' cattle ($10 p.a.). Despite thnse complaints, 
t:hf' ov<>ral l rf'sponsP to thP projt>ct was favourablt!. ExpatriatP staff 
WP[P Wt" 11 rPcPivPd, as the sociologist had predicted in the 
f1'as i.b i 1 it y study. There was considPrable rPspect for 
their 
profPssional skill, tht>ir dPdication and their sensitivity to Fijian 
cult:urP, although none had learnt to speak Fijian (dPspite the 
rPcommPndation in thP fPasibility study). 
The Fijian sociologist also madP a number of 
rPc,)mmm<>ndat: ions of morP d irPct managPmP.nt ut i.l ity • Ile urgPd that the 
pr,)b t .. m of inhf'rit iPnCP, dPC id ing which of thP farmf'rs' sons would 
SllCCPt'd t·hf'm, OP l So tha
t. thr family labour units prompt: y 
might funct:ion rfficiPntly and harmoniously. 
to Sp
d if wivPs could bP found tor bachrlor 
m~'l~li_s_ bf' approachPd . .-
farmPrs 1irho, on thPir own, wf'rP not ablf' l:o maintain 
stablP working 
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pattPrns. 
ln JunP 1980 thP YRDB bP.gan to dPal with thP. difficult problPm of 
rPsponding t:o the nwiew. The first recommPndation to be approvPd was 
•hat ~alling for a social monitor. Th d' P trPct managemPnt utility of 
•his function, in view of the difficultiPs of communication, was 
apprPciatAd by management and readily acceptPd by thP. board. lt was 
not cl Par, however, how far such a social monitor should go. Would it 
simply rPport g· evanc,1s, or would it consider t:.he larger quPst ions 
raisPd by thP review report, including for example, such questions as 
~tu• sizP of farms? 
h ordPr to be ab le to rPspond t:o the many and 
rPcmnmc·ndat iono of the review, the board askPd managP .Pnt to prPparP a 
dPtai li>d 1 is" of th£' rPcommPndat ions showing what act ion had bPPn 
t:akPn or was rrcommPnded. The board thi>n ratified managemi>nt's 
proposal or offered an altPrnat:.ive for each point. For most of t:he 
•pchnical issues the board accepted managPmPnt's rPsponsP. LikP the 
fannPrs, thP board did not have the Pxpertise to dissPnt from 
managemPnt's advicP. On the morn sociological matters, whPrP tnP 
rPviPw had bPen more critical, thP board may have fPlt more confidrnce 
lo its ability to question management, although most of managemPnt's 
proposals wPrP in fact accPpted by thP boord. 
· · l t 1d .. rway al f'hough f'hflrP St:,•ps to improvP tralnlng wPrP a rPa< Y u1 •· • 
wa3 a i-endPncy to try ~o divert any critlcal contPnt in thP rPpor". 
l 
• •,·lassroOt11' should not takP ~ as arguPd for Pxamplt>, that l:.1tP .. 
prPCPdPnCe 'on-thP-job 1 training: 'thP. Yalavou 
proj •'Ct has 
OVP.r 
llUCCPBSful ly favoured practical know how ovPr 
"raining Pxpert isP if 
OPCP!Uary'. NflvPrthr lese a McGowan• training 
Pxpert was despatched to 
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thP µrojP.ct to make training rP.commP.ndations and Project 
SupPrvisor preparP.d a dPtailed report rPgarding thP training of Fijian 
supPrvisors. of di~hotomy is a a' g tn apparent. ThP. 
i.mplical'.ion that on- .. hP.-J0 0b trai · l ntng wou d have to bP. sacrificPd in 
ordl'r to introducP. more formal t f · · YPPS o tratntng rP.liPs on a 
dichotomous distinction of doubtful utility. 
R<>garding thP more specific quP.stt'on f .. h · /f · o ~ e supervtsor armer 
ratio, managPmPnt argued that the existing ratio had been designPd to 
accord wi. th thP MAF avP.rage for Fiji. The board acceptP.d this 
respons<", although the national aV4!rage was hardly a relPvant 
standard. A more appropriatP. yardstick would have bPen the ratio of 
livPsock officers to livPstock farmPrs in Nadroga/Navosa province, 
althvugh this too would have been slightly misleading as it would 
lPave out of consideration the greater accessiblity of Yalavou 
farmns, and the availability of more transport facilities to the 
Yalavou supervisors. Howover, the important quest ion is: how many 
arP nePded? And that cannot be be considered apart from thP more 
gPnPral question of the nature of their function. TilivalPvu in 1977, 
during a campaign to rehabilitate farms, had a ratio of ~7, compared 
wi~h t 1w r:itio of 1:8 during the first year of devfllopment on rach 
Yalavou farm. 
ThP rPviPw suggflstion that farms, and therefore i.ncomPs, might be 
smallPr was rPjected by managementt the goal of median urban income 
was rPa f fi rmrd. Thn board ogrP.ed and added that lt considPred 
'thP. 
smallPr farm concPpt •. unrealistic ond dPstructivP.' • 
ManagPmPnt acceptP.d thP. nP.ed for an urgP.nt rPV iP.w of 
sp•~c if ic 
subsidif's, d 
to wi.dPn thP distribution of 
togPthP.r with the nPr 
bi>ni>fits. WhPn thn board mrt to consiJPr thP rPviP.w, stPps wi-rP 
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already underway to expand the use of contract labour. 
Social ~oring 
ThP first social monitoring report was prepared in February 19Sl 
by rl1P Fijian sociologist ·"'10 had b l w• ePn emp oyed in the original 
f11asi.bil ity study, the pr1:iimplem1•ntation stagP and the f' · irst review. 
Tllfl tPrms of reftHPnce for thP. study callP.d for an investigation of: 
- - - s i ion rom t e former (a) the motivational aspP.cts of t-l1e tran 't' f h 
agricultural pattern to 'the new situation of Australian beef 
t-pchnology'; (b) the impact of the market h · · economy on t e Pxistlng 
social structure::: (c) the local capacity to provide the r~quisite 
labour and managPmPnt sldlls for the project; (d) t-he effectiveness 
of communications within the projP.ct organization; (P.) thP effP.cts of 
•hp project on the land tenure system; (f) the nature of the family 
systPm and the household division of labour. 
ThP methodology Pmployed by thP. sociologist was basically that of 
tPcording 'aspirations', trPating SPparately those of the farmers and 
t-hosP of the landowners. The result was the by now familiar grumblP.s 
CPOSUS, There was also some limited objectivP data, covering such 
ma~tPrs as cPremonial f!xpenditure and crops planted, but this was for 
farmPrs only. TI\e sociologist foreshadowed that future surveys would 
gi.ve gr~ater attention to the question of farmer motivation and 
dPcision-m~king, lookiog at 'daily living patterns, the food consumed, 
.. hP .. asks donP, cPremonies attended, resourc~ distribution, and so on 
and so forth, ovPr silt months at l«>ast' (Rakoto 1981:\i). 
ln gPnPral tPrms, he found that in Parly 1981 thP project was 
bPing Pnthusiastically supported. 
'The most f'ncourag ing finding is 
"ha~ thP many cynicg who wrrP against Yalavou are changing att itud,.s 
.. h h · f d l. nfras':ruct.ure and by witnessing "he 
roug thPlr usage 6 ran 
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physical dPvelopment on project lands' (Rakoto 198l:i). It appeared 
that the social system was absorbing the nPw t h • PC nology remarkably 
wPll', Farmers had 'adjusted WPll to thPir nPw lifP style', showing 
t>nthusiasm and high motivation whPn thPir goats and cattlP arrivPd, 
ThP continuPd contribution to villagP cPrPmont'Ps by f armPrs, 
rlPspitP bPing 'loadPd with debts', was citPd as PVidPncP that the nPw 
~Pchnology could be absorb1>d without harmful social pffects. One 
farmPr contributPd eight cattle and anothPr thrPP, ll) Despite fpars 
PXprPss .. d in the fpasibility and prPimplemPntation studies, the 
sociologist believed that continued contributions were Q good sign, 
allaying 'the fear generated in some quarters that project farmPrs 
would becomP modernized at the cost of thP. social systP.m 1 (Rakoto 
1981:14). the sociologist argued that 'a shrPwd entrepenPur could use 
cnPn10niPs to attract labour or win the support of influ1rntial members 
0f ~he society to pPrmit access to t.hr system's rPsources' (Rakoto 
1981:14). 
On land tPnure matters the sociologist rPcordPd a numbPr of 
C<lmplaints made by landowi.ers, RPnt payments, it was said, had not 
bPPn dividPd up by thP NLTB according to ~~~~ shares, gravPl 
royal t iPs wPre not dist inguishPd and arab lP land was chargPd the samP 
rent as grazing land. Disputes within and between mataqalis over land 
The sociologist rrcommPndPd thn 
,••got: i.a~ ion and recording of 1iolut ions to theuP. disputes• 
quPst:ion of agistmPnt lingered on. 
rr•st>rvt>d for the cattle of non-participating mataqa!i, mrmbPre but t:hP 
arPas had not bePn idP.ntifiP.d. At thP timr of the study thPrP was 
· y l hArdd Finally. onP 
s.Jm(• mingling of landowners' catth wtth a 11vou .. "' 
Ill ThPsP WP.re cattle ovnPd bPforP Pntry to Yalavou. 
landowning group had madP arrangPmPnts for farms which t: a - prP. sPnt are 
in thP namP. of onP farmPr, to bP sharPd by a numhPr of 1 · r~ at ives when 
thP df'b t is pa id off and t:hPre is clear lPasehold t't:l l - P. • This 
arrangPmPnt is examinP.d bPlow {sP.e p.2isi). 
OnP particularly interesting observation made by the sociologist 
.was that: most farmPrs statP.d t:hat thP.y PntPrP.d the project in order to 
rnsurP that: t:hey would have sufficiP.nt land to pass on to t.hPir 
chi tdrPn. Th is, rathPr than any hoped-for incomP, had bPPn their main 
moPivation. HowPVPr, no rPal indication is givPn by t:hP sociologist 
Jf any changPs in val uP s rPgard ing land tP·nurP which might rP.su l t from 
Php Ydlavou sub-division. 
Communication with the landowners n:imainr.d a problPm, Board 
cont inm~d to bP criticized. The sociologist 
rrcognizPd, howPvP.r, that tlw tPchnical nat:ure of many board mattPrs 
madP t:hrm difficult to communicate and that transport difficultiP.s 
ofti>n madP it difficult for reprt!sP.ntat ives to rP.ach their 
He there fore rPcommP.ndP.d that somP. board meetings be 
hPl1 in villages and that the GPnPral Manager hold personal mrrtings 
Board rPpresPntat ives had a ff'W complaints of t:hf'ir own· Two 
claimPd not: to havP been consultPd on mattPrs concPrning t:heir arras, 
while a numbPr of othPl'S 1,mrP said to havP felt that they had 
s >mpP i.mf's bern • bulldozt>d into 8 tight corner' (Rakoto 1981: 8). 
Most of the specific recommendations made by the eoclologiat Wf>rP. 
· r l · v "nCP.8 The mo.it important 
tn rPsponeP to part icu Ar prob ems or gr\P. u - • 
l l d n'P. morp g
""nPral quP.at lone concP.rning 
laVP bPPO mPntioned a rea Y· . r 
•hp dirPction of social 
and rconom ic chang"' paaPd by the tll>rm& of 
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r·•fPrPnce were not pursuPd. The soc1'olog 1' st d r arguP. that the terms of 
rt>ft>rPnCP. act only as 'guidelines to any survey. Empirical findings 
dpt..rminP. whP.ther they are adPquatP or not' (Rak-:~ ... 1981:1}. Lacunae 
on land matters are particularly significant and, as will be 
suggPstPd below (see p.2B9) they are not accidental. 
~ Role ~ Sociology ~ Yalavou 
TIH• sociological input to the Yalavou proji>ct has obviously bf'<'n 
Planners have bePn aware from the start that social 
factors arP thP critical variablPs in the projPct. AltogPther thrPP 
sociologists have been employed to asePss social factors. The 
important quPstion is: has their role bPPn more than simply gilding 
'hP lily ? HavP thPY shaped the fundamP.ntal dPsign of the projPct and 
guidPd it.s implPmPntation? 8eforP. thesP. quPstione can bP answered, 
~hP main sociological dimensions of the project nPed to bP furthPr 
i.dPnt i.fiPd and clarifiPd. 
ThP Yalavou projPct contains thrP.e important. rPlationships: t:he 
YRDB/ farrnPr rPlat.ionship; the YRDB/landowner relationship; 
farmn/ landowner rPlat ionship. ThP. first two arP those over which the 
plannPrs havP most control but it is thP third, thP farmPr/ landowner 
l . h' . h ld h k ~ thP PVPntual SUCCPSS of thP rt> at.lone tp "1h1ch o s t e PY 'o 
projt>ct. 
Tile YRDB/FarmPr Relationship 
-
Up to now the YRDB/farmPr relntionehip has probably bePn the most 
"'"ll rstablishPd and harm··,nious of thP. thrPP.. 
My own fiP.ldwork 
· ftoc\·~1 monitor that YRDB supP.rvieors arP 
c0nf\rms t.hP. findings of t.hP. • • 
WPll l'PCP.iVP.d by farmP.rB. 
thP. disciplinP.d rP.lationship inhPrPnt in 
~hP licPncP to occ:upy is, on l P
tP.d by farm .. rs as thP. who P., acc:P -
lPgit-imatP, PVPR by th08P. who haVP to bP pusht•d. 
TI\P Pmphasis on timP 
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managemPnt • although new and foreign. is accepted as progrpssive and 
rfficiPnt. Rules limiting the number of housPhold b mem ers • another 
arra of potPntial conflict with traditional l va ues. have been Pnforced 
flrxibly by supervisors. who have in any b · case een surpr\sed to find 
•hat 'sponging' relatives have not been a bl pro em. One farmer did 
say, howevPr. that he thought hi~ status as a licensee on his farm was 
n0t right; it was as though he were just a 'hired hand' (vakatawa ni 
lomanibai). He was• RfWPrthPless • basically contented and regarded by 
--
his supPrvisors as a good farmer. 
Many farmers appear to have doubts about the eventual 
• ey are re uc ant to express :i, r,)fi.tabH ity of thPir farn1s though tit l t 
•his publicly. [ l I Many have given up fertile cropping land on the 
vall1•y floor to move to Yalavou and wonder whPtl11~r it will be worth 
it. None appeared troubled by the size of his debt. The only worry 
app.-.arPd to be that the labour expended might not be adt>quately 
rrwardPd. Many have apparently been directed by elders to go to 
'falavou, 
OnP problem that affects both farmers and supervisors is the 
prrssurP of t imP. The schedule of farm openings ie gAared to the road 
bui.lding programme and tlu~ OP.Pd to complete thP. project's basic 
physical d1>velopment within the planned six years. PressurA of time 
ri•ducPs ttw ability of supervisors to explain df'ciaions rPgarding farm 
planning t-o farmPrs. It also rPduc.,a the abll ity of expatriatP. 
supPrvisors to apPnd time training Fijian supPrvisors. 
bPltPVP• hoWP.VPr, '"hat ~hPy could havP dPv.,lopPd thP.\r farms much 
[ll Most discussions that I had with farmPr8 Wt•re hP.ld in groups. OnP. individu~l lolho had 4 Ghance to talk privatP.ly sP.i&Pd thP opportunity ~o ask wtrnthPr 1 thought thP projPct would be of 'valuP' (~) to thP 
farmPrS. People in thP v il lagea quotPd thP farmPU as say\ng thPY had 
doubt-a ~bout thP profitabillty of cattlP. 
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fast:Pr had thP.y been allowed to work accordl'ng t . 0 thelr own labour 
rPg imP and to use mat aqa l i labour • 
Ov~r thP twelve months from July 1980 to July 1981 there was a 
notici>ablP lift in farmPr confidence and greater interP.st in joining 
thi' proji>ct. The fear of many farmPrs and would-be farmP.rs was that 
official support for the projPct might be withdrawn aftP.r the first 
YPars, as happPnPd under the LDA. The huge exp d't f •• . . en l ure o resources 
Si'i'ms t:o havP convinct>d them otht>rwise. 
For many farmPrs the training grant has proved attractive. Since 
it is as much as many people expect to earn in a y0ar, most fPlt that 
thi'y had lit t LP to lose in joining the project. Some of thP poorer 
pi'rfor~ing farmers appear to havP bePn attracted by the opportunity to 
··am such incomP. wi .. hout labour. For Axrunple, they havP shown l itt LP 
intPrPst in plant i.ng food crops while they are in rect>ipt of their 
grants, HanagemPnt evPntually started cutting the grants of 
absPntPes, a sanction which proved eff@ctivP, especially when farint~rs 
lParnPd that money deducted would be lost and not simply dPlayed, 
• 
PPrCPpt: ions of the training grant. The original concept ion was of an 
vu .. right grant, a ncholarship to spend two yPars lParning nPw skills. 
Farmns .. PndP.d to rPgard the grant as a living allowance and 
cotnplainrd that for some it was insuff ic iPnt to cover Pxtw.naPa, 
particularly for thosP wlth school fPPll to pay. F1Jr bachPlore, many 
» f · whom had formrrl y bPPn de>.pPndPnt in thP i r fathP!'S • house>. a, $30 a 
rnon'"h was unaccustomPd W!'alth, morP. than they nPPdPd to livP, 
"SpPcl.tlly pre>. fP.rrPd to &Pt out, 
wl\PnPVPI' p>ulblP 1 for 
All many 
llP ighbour s • hOU9P8 Qt mPal t imP9, The introduct lon of 
dc-d uc t lons for 
.lbSPl\Cf'll furthPr WPAkPnPd thP. original 
idea of a grant • Wl\Pn 
has 
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quPstioned during the survey ahout income from · paid emplo~ent fanners 
did not know whether to count the grant or not. Was it cakacaka saumi 
-·-----
(paid employment) or ka .!!!_ loloma (a gift)? Supervisors said that it 
was a gift but the fanners re pl iP.d that, i.f i.t could be cut, it must 
be p:tid employmP.nt. In short, the grant has misunderstood but 
wPlcomed nevertheless. 
Tt1P main area ,,f difficulty i.n the YRDB/farnu~r relationship is 
•nat 1Jf poor performance. SomP. farmers have respondP.d poorly to YRDB 
tu•PlagP. In the worst cases, farmP.r replacemP.nt is the only solution 
but t~is is not a step that can be taken without a time-consuming 
pr0cess. lt requires a grP.at deal of consultation betwP.en all levP.ls 
YRDB management, consultation with thP. appropri.atP. board 
r•'prP:H•ntativt> and th1• mataqali., pP.rhaps using thP. Roko Tui as an 
inrPrtnt>diary, and finally, a submission .. o the Farmer Si>lection 
farmt>r will be any better, especially as he starts with the training 
gran" partly expended and the <11welopmP.nt of his farm behind schedule. 
By September 1981 only one farmer had been replaced for poor 
pi>rformancP. Poor Pf!rforming farmers who fall just short of thP 
•hrPahhold for rPmoval are in some ways an Pven more SPrious problem. 
Keeping •hrm ~p to the mark is demanding of supervisor~ timP without 
C1)mmensurate productivity returns. the eventual economic viability of 
•heir Cann units is by no mPans assured• 
As •his problem PmPrged in 1980, when the ratP of farm openings 
h • of farmPr sP.lP.ctlon was given grP.ater 
egan "o r\sP 1 thP. quP&tlon 
At th ~t ~\·mA eiaht out of thirty eight a~~Pntion by thP board. • - n O 
farmrra wPre conslderP.d to be ln one way or another 'delinquPnt'. 
rPvirw's criticism of aelection procP.dures was notPd by the board 
and 
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thf' chairman of the ~armer Selection Committee was invited to comment. 
HP Pxplained that the farm nominees were supposed t b o e the 'best' 
that i:ht> mataqal i could offer. Thi> board chairman th k d · en as e mataqalt 
rPprPsi>ntatives whether it was usual to have more applicants than 
blocks or vice versa? 
-
representative who answered said that The 
somPtimPs thPre was an excess of applicants, and sometirni>s there was 
not. The General Manager volunteered the information that one farmer. 
wl10 was a former PWD P.tnployee, had told him that he w,"'s 11 .• never rP.a y 
vPry kt>1•n to join thP scheme. ThP Assistant to the General Manager 
•lwn suggested that mot iv at ion was the key and argued that the task 
forcP foremen were not adequately trained, a suggeotioh which drPW a 
thf' Farm DPvelopment Manager. The FOB 
rPprPsentative on the board ·euggested that the problPm was that 
n0m i.nPc>s did not realise what joining Yalavou would involve. The 
laziPr 0f them did not t>xpect that eight to nine hours work 11 day 
wJutd bP rPquireJ, instead of the four to five hours thPy wPre 
accust:0mPd to, 
HPrP again are instances of the practicP. of infm:mal sodology. 
None of the board members had formal training in thP. social sciP.ncea 
yp• all havP idPas about farmPr motivation. Such ideas grow out of 
t 
· l · b t w~thout ocadP.mic training in ony of the prl\c tea P>tpertence u , • 
h ld '•t' ~lly "'-erP is also a s0cial sciPnCPS 1 thP.y tend to bP. P uncrt~ Cu • •
11 
•pnd1•ncy to asst,mP that various Pxplonations of social pht>nomf'na arP 
to blam- •P.lAction rather than motivation, f~r :nu•11nlly PJCclusiVPi ,... .. '" 
l'Xa1nplP, whP.n improvrmf'nts might be poulble in both orPa& • 
A more informrd sociological analysis nePda to bPgin 
by 
· d · • • fl of "roupe on thP differPnt lal pPformancP. of 
l P(I~ lfy\ng f'hP Ln UPRCf' e 
farmPrs. ld b 
thP poor norfonnancP of ThP most obvious case wou P r 
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fannt>rs from an P.ntirP. group. FarmPrs from t'hP So · 
- · V\ a~~d appPar to bP. 
such a group. UnlikP. almost all of thP othPr farm~rs t y l 
- ... a a avou, t:hP. 
Svvi farmP.rs havP. had little past: participation in thP cash rconomy. 
Tiii>y art> accustomPd to tht> morP intt>nnhtt>nt labour · f lnput 0 zaqona 
planring and manderinP. harvt>sting. lt is interesting to notr that thP. 
Svvi farmPrs P.stablishrd a rrcord for fPncing in their first months 
bu .. did not rP.turn from thP. villagP aftP.r tlwir Christmas bnink. 
Sinci> thrn tlwir pPrformanc1• has bt>Pn discouraging, leading nuinagPmi•nt 
e0 c.Jl\Std1•r changing them to 8 lPSS labour dem.'lnding fattPl\tng 
pr0gramnH•, ratlwr than brPPd ing. ThP Farmt>r St>lPction CommittP.P 
0bviously cannot bt> blamPd for .. hPir poor pt>rformancP, just as 
rPplaci>mPnt would providP no remt>dy. Fortunat:Ply, Sovi farmPrs arP 
not eyplcal of thP arPa, 0n.~ important sociological finding of thP 
; 
fP<isibi.li .. y st:udy,was that- most farmPrs who ownP.d lend at Yulavou had 
significant past contact with th•i cash Pconomy. 
G<JOd fa rmPr 8 can al so br found in groups. 
K.1r0ua v il lagr>, for P1rnmple, haVP manifested a high le>vPl of 
c<Jmm i .. mPnt, which can bP tracPd to thP fact that tlu•y havP long w:.intPd 
.. ,) sPttlP t:hP Yalavou arPa as most of thtd.r land is thPrP. They brokP 
away from Sautabu villagP in thP 1950s and now clai1n for tlwmsPlVP8 an 
ind"P"ndt>nt tr ad it ional political statu!J. ThPY haVP some> nlnPty acrP.s 
.if arablP land on thP vallPY floor, and :irP unaurP wht>tlwr can:lP will 
pr0vidP a bPttPr incomP than cropping, but thPY arP commlttPd to 
Yillav.>u for rPasontt of tradltlonal pridP. ThP Yalavou projPct allowa 
•hPm '"o opPn up thrir • truP 11oll' (..9!l!, !~) which, although not 
l f I 1 'vPl lhood tif thPir fPally OPPdPd now, wlll bP t:hP bas s 0 tlP • 
havP to worry about othPfl in thrir villagP wanting to 
lolhich is vacated hy thPir move to Yalavou. 
us .. thP land 
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Sovi and Koroua providP obvious P.X&nplPs of the influPnCP of 
group factors; arP. morP subtlP group factors at work in the 
majority of casi>s. T\rnsP will be PXaminPd in thP next chaptPr in the 
can"PXt ,if thP farmer/ landowner rPlationshl'p. s ff' · u lCP it to say ht>re 
rhat sonw of thti individuals who half .. bPPn nominared seem to lack 
nPcPssary motivation. 
'l'lwrP arP no objPct ivP critt>ria by which rPluctant candidatt>s can 
whPth•'r tht>y l>'ant to comP to Yalavou, thPrP is only onf' answPr thPy 
can gi.vP. In somP cases thP mataqali rPprP~PntativP answPrs on thPir 
bPhalf. Host nomlnPPS arP subdund du~ing thPir mPPting with the 
committPP .md tn~at it likP a court hearlngi thPlr hi>ads are hung low 
and thPlr voicP8 ari> almost inaudiblP, 
All ~hat tht> sPlPction commlttt>t> can do is to rl'j1•ct individuals 
wh1i art> roo young or obvioutJly not fit Pnough to pl'rform the labour 
ThP chairman of '-"" sPlPction 
c1JmmittPf' is a rPtirPd MAF officPr with PXpt~rii>nce of the LOA. Me 
bi"linPs "hat many LOA failures wPrP duP to the allocation of blocks 
ro young RinglP mPn who wPrP not ready for lndPpi>ndPnt living. Young 
nominPPll at Yalavou arP thPrPforP aakPd to statP whPther thPY havP 
hav~ marriagP plane and, \f not, who will bP 'looking aftPr' 
them, 
Th Py arP also askPd to nominatP a potPnt ial 
rPplacPmPnt. ThP 
C<lmm if' t'pp ha• tPndPd to g\VP young, marriagPablP 
mPn thP bPl\Pf\". of 
•h,. doubt, for not to do 80 , would bP to risk a disputP with thP 
ihP .Jr\g inal concPpt <lf indlvidua ls compPt ing for nomina" ion and 
W>rking hard through fPar of loalng thPir placP to anothPr willing to 
thP situation that has PmPrgPd at v•nk hardPr, hae llttlP rPlPvancP to 
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Yalavou. PotP.ntial rPwards, as mPntionPd Parl\'ft.r, ~ were played down in 
si>lling the projPct. lf it was hoped that astute individuals would 
soon si>nse the Pstimated internal rate of rPturn of 22%, expPctations 
havP bPPn disappointed. Similarly, the idP.a that farmPrs would be 
motivatPd by the fear of being ejPctPd 1 and thereby losing their 
- poor armPra are tota ,y goldPn opportunity, has been mistakPn. The f 11 
impPrvious to such appPals. ln practice, when the threat of ejPction 
is raisPd, thP farmer is accu1rnd 1 by thP Plders who SP.Pk to encourage 
him, of fail i.ng in his duty ".o his group, not foolish lack of 
st>lf-intPrPst. If he responds, as many haw•, it is probably more out 
of a sP.nsP of shamP than sP.lf-inter~st. 
l ask1'd one farmP.r (a good farmPr) under what circumstances he 
•hought a farm<'r would bP ejPcted. HP repliAd: 'if ne is lazy'(~ 
sa). l t-hpn askl'd what would bP. tlu~ test of laziness. His r1>ply was: 
'if a man dot>s not heed the board he will bP counted a:t lazy'. The 
1"h•JlP rPlationship is therP.fore concP.iVPd as onP of obPdienc.e and 
du"y, not labour and self-interest. 
The YRD8/LandownAr8 Relat~~nsh1:,e. 
---
From "h" bPginning it has bP.f'n obvlous that therP haVP been 
c0mmunica".ion problems in the rPlationship bPtwPen landownrrs and the 
YIWB. Tur limitat-ions of "he role of Plected boa.rd rPpresentatives 
havf' alr••ady be••n nott>d. ThP t'ijlnn gociologiet raised eomP of thP 
Jifficul"iPs facing thP rPprPef'ntatlvPo (trchnical subjt>ct mattPr, 
• r nnsp•Jr" at ion difficult lee) but an additional problPm io thP 
unfamiliari."y of "hf' dPmocratic proc1•durP. Of>mocracy, at all 
• · • · Although it is likt>ly that 
>[ Fijian socif'ty, is a new 1not\tU1 \OR· 
fact 
would bP chosPn undt>r any PlPctoral 
~PrP not t>lPctPd by any ~.,rt of properly 
t-hat ~hPY .. 
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constituted mechanism detracts from the l · Pgttim~cy of their role, The 
ProjPct SupPrvisor was unsure whether th · Py represented all people in 
thPir old Tikina constituencies or only pPople who consented land. 
ThP Assistant to the General Manager who organized the elections was 
surP that thPY were to reprPsent all of the people but h t ey were 
chosen by a show of hands at public mPetings which he called. A 
number of pt>ople complained to me that they had not been present at 
thosP mi>Ptings. ProcPdurP.s for the election should have bPen spelt 
0ut clParly in advance so that the elPctorate and the representatives' 
functions t1.re. perfectly clear. Unless there is clarification and 
f0rmalization of the Plectoral basis of the Yalavou board, there is a 
dangPr that landowners might repudiate any dPcision they .dislikP, 
arguing that they wPre not properly represPntPd. 
The remPdies recommPnded by the sociologist for the board's 
communication difficulties will do something to help reduce them but 
•hf'y cannot be removed al togethPr. The board mPets only about four 
It is unable to respond quickly and its response is 
impersonal .:md liable to be garbled, even when the minutes of meetings 
are translatPd into Fijian and circulated. It is for this reason that 
•he Fijian sociologist recommP~Pd direct discussions between the 
GPneral Manager and thP. landowners. He had participated in such a 
round of discu 1411 ions in 1979. In 1980, during fieldwork, I received 
from iand•Jwners many favourable comments about thoBP. discussions. 
PP0plP said that thPy wen• pleasPd to hear the guidt>l ines for mataqal i 
participation in faruu~r se>lt>ction rP.affirmt>d, as i.f they fParP.d somt> 
rPvPrsal of policy. In addition t::i such doub~s there were, 
in 1980, 
h 'pct For examplP, 1 was 8•ill widesprt>ad misconct>ptions about t P proJ · 
~old that pPoplP who ownPd cattlP could not join thP project, 
•h ". .. P•r c:attle woul.d have to pass a VPtPrinary 
" truth was that -" ' 
Pxamination before they could be included in the Yalavou herd. 
For day-to-day communication. managemPnt kas b d ··n u een P.pP.ndf>nt .., 
rlw Fijian Assistant to the Gr.neral Manager. a MAF secondPP, In a 
significant parallPl with his countPrpart at Uluisaivou. hP comPs from 
~hP province in which the project is established but from outsidP the 
proj•'Ct area. LikP his col league in Ra 1 he seems to havi> bPPn plac~d 
at a disadvantagP as a result of this. HP inhPrits all traditio11al 
animtrnit iPs bPtween his arP.a and certain of thP inland arPas. [ 1) All 
of his informal contacts in thP arP.a are more of a handicap than a 
b1•1w fit, as thPy are points of Pntry to intra-village fP.uds and 
rivalries. It is therPforP oftP.n difficult for him to pPrcPiVP issues 
i.n impPrsonal tPrms. Ally attPmpt to f'XPrcise authority (or worse• to 
appt>ar to enjoy stutus) is liable to be rPs,rnted and subjPct to 
m i.s intP rprPtat ion. 
ThP chairman of thP FarmPr Selection ~ommitteP.• who serves as 
translator during board mPetings. is subjPct to Aimilar criticism. 
Pt>ople claim !hat he doP8 not translate accurately. that he 
'supplPnu•nts • ( vakuri~) board mPmbf!rs' statemPnte with hill own 
i.dPas. My obsPrvation of his translations complf!tdy contradic:ts this 
al lf'g3t ion. (2) In fact. he has a rare gilt for translation that 
rPtains thr dPtail. thP nuancP alld the v'.gour of the odginal. 
· i ap--cll lr,11gi:>r than the original from SomP~LmPs this neceas tatP.a a n~ 
• h ~.ooP.thP.r with J0 PalousiPs. It is thu. pc>r AP'•• o 
•ha~ givP risP to thP chargPe of inaccuratP translation. 
( I . rrPctlon by somP of thP. inland groupo in I ln 1876 therP. was an lnsu to ethPr wlth eomP inland alllPs. wPre ~h i1 Prov inct>. Coastal ~11oplP • · g • tP.d in thP aupp"eulon of 
ar:nPd by thP colonial gov•"r11mPnt and auu · d to be connectP.d to 
• d nimoslt\Pa appe3r" . ht> rPvolt. Many preeent ~ya 1- 11 as 'the war of conversion PVPnts of ~hat 'war' (which1 u know ·'>CR Y 
~o chrlstianity'). board mPetinga that l 
l 21 These obePrvat iona Wf"rP made during two 
a~~PndPd. 
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In day-to-day matters the General Manager is almost totally 
his assistant for contact with village opinion. The 
GPnPral ManagPr has little direct contact with Fijian farm 
supPrvisors. whose main contact is. in any casP.. with farmPrs who are 
all morP or less isolated from their villages.[l) One danger inherent 
in thP GPnera l Manager's dependence on his assistant• is that the 
assistant will pass on only the information that he believes his 
supPrior wants to hear. One instancP of this occurrPd in 1980 when 
thP Yalavou Community Hall was opened. 'l'he assistant advisPd that no 
formal opening was required bPfore the hall could be usPd for a board 
mPPting. 'nlis apparently was management's fP.eling; the ProjP.ct 
SupPrvisor told mP that hP thought there had been 1 Pnough oponings'. 
During .. he lunch break foe the board meeting ':he wife of the Farm 
D l t S • d h h l d' " . l h h d Pvi> opn11•n upervtsor reportt1 t at t e a tes p,rparlng unc a 
bP•'ll surprised and dismayed that the hall had not bePn formally 
At the conclusion of tlu• mPeting there was therefor~ a small 
CPfPmony t:o mark the opPning. During one of thP speechPs. forgiveness 
was sought (from the ancPstors?) for the ommissi~n of the cPremony at 
thP b(" ,nning, nu~n, the bowl Of yaqona presented to the board 
chairman was an enamel bowl full to the top, which was not a polite 
gPs .. urP in keeping with thP occasion . Some participants .. ried to 
.. rPat ~t as a joke. but several informants suggested that this should 
bP rPad as a forr of protest at the lack of concern for tradition. 
Oespi~e difficultieB of communication, so far there have bPPn no 
GriPvancP& about rPnt, SPrious problems in rP-lations with land~wners. 
~ich havP aleady bePn mPntionPde arieP. out of the fact that, whilP 
dPVPlopmPnt lease over the area 
is in operation, therP. is no 
ArablP. land is 
Ill The GPnPral HanagP.r's officP is in Sigatoka. 
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lPased at the same low rent ( $0. 20 an acrP) as st~ep grazing land. 
ThPrP were also uncertainties about whPther gravel royalties had bePn 
propPrly separated out in lease payments. Mataqali Noisigarua, for 
i>xample, complainPd that 4000 acres of land had earnPd a rPnt of only 
$13 (Rakoto 1979: 1) • Together with the issue of the use of cattlP for 
ci>ri>monial purposP.s and the pavment of agistment fees th t J'q - • , e ren 
grii>vance can only be properly considered within the larger context of 
~hP farmPr/landowner relationship. PrPsent arrangemP.nts, that is low 
ri>nt, a ban on the supply of cattle and the charging of an agi.stment 
f PP, arP accepted for the moment j t:he quest ion is, will they lead to 
pr~ssurP being put on the farmer to make a return for all bene fl.ts 
ri>cPi.ved at Yalavou. 
Minor di..ssat i.sfact ior. among some landowning groups has arisen out: 
of ~ht> drawing of farm boundariPs. On1! group, for Pxample, wanted two 
fams whPrt .. manngPmPnt proposed three. LPgally the dPcisi.on belongs 
o managemPnt, which is motivated solely by the desire to design 
i>fficient farm uni.ts while wanting to take into account as far as 
possible thP fPt>l ings of the landowners. It is hPre that 
communication nPPds to be carefully monitored to ensure that there is 
a •wo way flow of information, so that managment is nwarP of 
landow1wrs' srnt i.mPnts. l l l 
· f t f rmPr leasPholdPrs who There was some diseatisfact\on rom wo o 
surrendered their lPBBPS to establish the focal farm. nu~y said that 
•hp compnnsaPion that thPY rPcP.ived was less than what they had bPP.n 
d Ag nl'n the Assistant to the ~neral !Pd to bPliPVP had been approvP • q 
f blamed the Assistant to [lj ThP mat.gqall that wantPd only two arms 1 was askPd to tell 
•h.- GPnPral lfan.;gPr for the threP fa, rms proposal· . -. th h assistant aga\n. mP ra Pr 
•h.- GPnPral Mil.lager llPVPr to sc>nd . \S double-dPaling, duplicity) was 
harsh word vPiva~alsini (hypocr\sy, 
usPd Po describP his actions. 
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M~nager, with whom they had nP.gotiatP.d the surrender of their leases, 
was bl am Pd. ManagemP.nt bell0 P.v 0 d h h 
· r. ' owever, t at the dissatisfaction 
arosP only when housing with water and eltctricity suppliP.d was built 
for managPmPnt personnel. lt is unfortunate that the full details of 
•ht> compPnsat ion agreed upon werP. not recorded. M .. h anagemen. as 
grPat care to record farmers' obligations in the tight lP.gal wording 
of thP licence to occupy, and to secure landowners' signatures to 
spPcifiPd leasing conditions, while not committing its own promises to 
contracts, which idP.ally would be written in Fijian. 
All things considerP.d, rP.lations with landowners at Yalavou have 
gPnPra l ly bPPn good. The severe difficulties experienced in rel at ions 
wi•h landownPrs by the Fiji Pine Commission and the Fiji Electricity 
Authori .. y i.n the M0nasavu hydro-electricity projPct (not to mention 
~he less sPvere problems at Uluisaivou) suggest that harmonious 
rPlations at Yalavou are a significant achievement and should not be 
takPn for granted. 'nle fact there has been no conflict, dPspite less 
•han per£ect communications, suggests that the project design must be 
fundamPntally acceptable to landowners. CP.rtai.nly there has bePn 
significant particivation by landowners in key decisions regarding the 
[• remains to be SP.PO I howPver, whether this participation will 
produce that are conduc i.ve to both productivity and thP ar rang•~mPnt s 
wishPs in the long Pr term. nte variable critical 
to 
of •hp landowm~u 
farmer/landownl!r r~lationship, which is 
rxaminPd in the nPxt chaptPr. 
Conclusion 
---
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fhi> planning impiPmentation of thP Yalavuu and project was 
charactt>rizPd from thP bPginning by a clPar concPption of thP projt>ct 
goal and a continuing dPtPrmination on the part of managPmi>nt to 
r.-.tai.n this goal. In this rPspPct thP projPct history is in distinct 
~ontrast to that of Uluisaivou. The ust> of sociologiEJt:s providr>s 
'
·1n.1•'1·'r obvL'ous c·~nt.rast. It rPmal'ns to b h t I • l r v P Sf'Pl\ 1 OWPVPr 1 W 1t•!' \Pr t\11• 
rolt> Jf sociologists at Yalavou will bP dPcisivt>. S0cial factors arl' 
fundum•'nt al 1-0 thl' PVPntual SUCCf'SS vf .. hr- proj1•ct. but hllVI' 
s.Jci.0l 0Jgists bN•n ablP to control 1-htt· social fact.ors? 'l'l1is rai.sPs thP 
di.Hi.cult quPstion of wltPthPr sociology is ablP to crPatP knowli>dgP 
•ha• givPs cun .. rol ovPr t>VPnts. No doubt \f th1• projt>ct runs into 
prob~i>ms •hat bring it into disrPputP, sociologists will havP no 
sh,ir .. ugP ,Jf t>xplana .. \.ons for 'failurP 1 • ThP problt>m would tlwn b<', as 
i• !IO uf!"i>n is in sociology, that ot' rPsisting thP t.~mp•ation ,.o 
JVPr-Pxplain, 1-0 find so many possihlt> rPasons for an PVPnt thnt its 
'ccurrPnCP is onP of iron clad nPcPssit:y. This is th•• tl"ap t-hat: 
Rt>inhard B••nd ix t-prms th•• 'fill lacy of rPt:rospPct ivP dPtPrminism'. lt. 
is impor1-ant, s~ndix says, .. o 'concPiVP of .. hP futurP as unc .. rtain, in 
•tw pas• as w<> 11 as .. hr prt>s••nt'. w .. rnust bP on guard aga\.ns.. b••ing 
1m0rP knuwing .. han wP havP a right to bP' (BPndix 1969:15-16). 
I .. should not bf' simply assum1>d that .. hP rPlativP Rmoothn1>ss 
"OP Ps•abl ishruPnt of •hp Yalavou proj1>ct. by compariRon wi. .. h thP 
·· U' · · · dl'catPS th•• supPri.odty of utfficultif>s 1•xpPri1•ncPd at ~ulsaliOU >.n 
•hp individual modPl. lt is notablP that .. h .. Y.'llavou projt•ct has 
· •hn basl'c conct>ption of thP proj~ct, bu .. 
t!Cf.tf'VPd land<)lorllf'r consPnt to \. .-
i• i.s no .. 
farming in •ht> longPr tPnn. 
this will lrad •o succPssful i.odividual 
ntts longPt tPrm goal vill rrquirP 
f l'n soct'al rPl"tl'onship1.1 within landowning group!.1\ undam"n•al changP 0 
ln par•icular, thP crPation of~ fundamrntally diffPtPnt 
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land tPnurP. Thf' important question is whP.thP.r this is possiblP.. Do 
thP Yalavou plannPrs havP tht> control thPy would likP to havP over the 
svcial procPsSPS at work within the project? In the next chaptPr the 
diff~rPnt styles of control PXPrcisPd by thr planners in the Yalavou 
and Uluisaivou projPcts will be c-ompared and rPlated to the problem of 
part ic ipat ion. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
PROJECTS AND PROBLEMS 
Ululsaivou and Yalavou Compared 
'It quickly became apparent to me that all 
problem-ridden; the only valid distinction 
between those that are raore or less successful 
their troubles and those that are not' (Albert 
1967:1). 
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projects are 
appears to be 
in overcoming 
O. Hirschman 
A comparison of the Yalavou and Uluisaivou projects ls not as 
simple as it might at first sight appear to be. Although Yalavou has 
cxperlt.!nccd fewer problem!.! than Uluisalvou, most people in the 
Ululsaivou area have had much less exposure to the cash economy than 
the majority of Yalavou landol>!ners, Most Ull\isalvou landowners arc 
accustomed to a mode of production similar to that of the Sovi farmers 
Ht Yalavou, who, lt will be recalled, have been a serious problem for 
Yal<lvou supervisors (see above p.260), Secondly, a project in manr 
ways similar to Yalavou has already been rejected at Uluisalvou. The 
vacant land at Uluisaivou ls not a single block largely divorced from 
the v lllages of its owners; it was never likely that it would be 
granted to an organization that would sub-divide Lt in the Yalavou 
With what criteria of evaluation, then, can the projecta be 
co~pared? The :1atural buruaucrat Le approach "'°'' 
1
.d be to compare the 
efflclcncy with which they puuuc the common goal of promotion of the 
part lclpat Lon in commcrcI.al agriculture by .-ljlan owners of preoent ly 
unusl.!d land. Yalavou ls clearly the more effective of tht:! two 
projects l b t it 
is also the more cootly. 
in achieving this goa , u 
Economl~ ~rltcria such as cost/benefit analysis arc not particularly 
helpful, If economic criteria 
Md been important, neither project 
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would have been undertaken. Yet a way to develop Fijian land and 
Fijian participation in commercial agriculture must thereby increase 
be sought for political reasons. 
The ma.in reason for the acceptance of b ti j o t pro ects was a 
hoped-for contribution to the establishment of a replicable means of 
developing commercial agriculture among Fijians. At Yalavou. where 
the USAID logical framework has been employed. 'replicabllity' has 
alwdys been seen as the goal. though little attempt is made in project 
documentation to spell out what replicability means {The logical 
framework is explained above on p.31.) It is. perhaps. a reflection of 
the importance of the concept that planners shy away from a 
definition. which might need co be defended. Like 'participation' it 
ls more ui:Jeful if left vague. At Ululsaivou the general iJea of 
replicability was recognized. though without using the terminology of 
the logical framework (and also without any attempt to consider what 
l'tlplicabillty might involve). 
The general idea of repllcabillty is recognizably bureaucratic. 
Rcpllcablllty would be 'C!fflclent' because it would reduce duplicntion 
of administrative procedures. It would be impersonal because lt would 
standardize the machinery for responding to parochial Jrmands for 
development. In short• lt would further incorporate Lnto Fiji'· 
plannlng apparatus the 'project apvroach' • through which oversca!l 
funds are most easily channelled. 
By 1981 lt was appar..int that neither project was replicable 
in 
the sense thnt it could be simply duplicated elswhcre; 
Uluisaivoll for 
l Yal ftvou because of lts enormous reasons that need no claborat on, " 
expense. I 
want to compare the dlfferent waya the t'.o projecta have 
pursued their apparently aimllar goal, 
and to conaldcr the 
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significance of their non-attainment of it. 
The Contribution of Sociolo~ 
Of the four projects, Yalavou alone has f 1 ormal y eraploycd the 
expertise of sociology in its design and implementatlon, although a 
sociologist (Howard Gill) had an opportunity to read th! Uluisaivou 
feasibiity study and make informal commen~.s. Ile promptly identifie~ 
problems associated with local participation, but the simple sulution 
that he recommended (a local majority on the board) is perhaps one 
that he might have modified, had he had the opportunity for fieldwork 
dnd for furt~er investigation of the problem. The review sociologist 
also identified local participation as the critical variable, but 
offered no p~actical steps for ils improvement. Verata and Tilivalevu 
were planned entir,Jly by MAF vderinary offlcers (who had no training 
in sociology). 
Although two sociologists were employed for the Yalavou 
feasibility study, the sociological chapter in the feasibility report 
was written by the team leader from material supplied by the 
sociologists. One sociologist actually oppposcd the project. This 
was based on his general belief that it would fail just as all such 
projects had failed in the past, rather than the evidence of 
flel<lwork. The grounds for his gloomy prognosis 
were apparently 
numbered among the many 'constraints' mentioned 
in the fcasiblllty 
study, all of whlch tho study argued could be overcome. His more 
i;anguinc sociological colleague, with the 
benefit of fieldwork 
(together with previous experience of the area and fluency in 
the 
local dlalect), f th
e argument£,t lon that the 
provided the basis o 
constralnts could be overcome. 
lt was his argument, for ~~ample, that 
the people of Nadroga 
were more indivldualhtic than the people of 
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Ra. [ l I 
It is ~otabl€ that the use of two Gociologists led to two 
Jpparently conflicting points uf view. One of the reproaches of 
sociology as a discipline of practical use to planners is the 
Jlfficulty its pr act iooers hav" i i v n com ng to agreement. Such 
disagreements make it difficult to present sociological knowledge as 
the rationally objective principles that bureaucrats require. In fact 
the dlf ferences between the sociologists at Yalavou are probably 
unlmportant. 1 e prete 1 s role as that of Neither sociologist i t r d Ii 
Jttcmpting to assign a degree of ?robability to the required 
tndivldualist outcome. They sought only to identify problems and 
their possible solutions. The main difference between them was 
probably the degree of confidence they had that the constraints could 
be overcome. 
L-:ven if both sociologists had agreed that the problems could be 
overcome, would this have made the d~sired project outcome any more 
ctJrtaln or prcdlctable'l Had the consultants known a little more about 
sociologists (if not of sociology) they would not have chosen an 
outspoken critic of conventional development as a member of their 
team. [i.) The problem Ls, what kind of objective data could different 
[ l I When [ a11ked the team lettder why he had written thh in the 
Cu.iuiblllty study, he was at first unable to recall the rcason(s). A 
little later he snld lt was becauge many people .in Ya' 1vou area had 
already moved out of their villages. The soclologl~t. on the other 
"and, sald that this was his contrlbutlon and meant thrP.e things: (1) 
thl' people of Nadroga were generdly regarded as paylng less attention 
to chichi (il) they often held land in smdler groups (l tokato~<~) 
thnn elsewhere in Fijl; (lll) they generally worked ln cooperatlve 
group11 le88 frequently than the Fljlan norm. 
[:j See Crocombe (1969) for an early expression of hls views. ln 
Crocombe (l977:J9-40) tu! makes more 11peclfic criticism of project type 
"ld. 
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sociologists have used to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other 
regarding the social feasibility of h 'l t e alavou proposal? 
The chapter on 'socio-cultural factors' i n the feasibility study 
is based almost cnt l rely on 'judgementR •. For exa~plc. it is argued 
thal the people of Nadroga and Navosa arc ~ndlvidualistic by 
comparison with other FiJ'ians. Alth h oug this as11ertion is not without 
" individualism in its foundation. it ls impressionistic and trqats 
widest and most vaouc sensl!. ( l} Th ,., e argument that the landowners of 
Y,ilavou have had prf.lvi i • ou9 exper ence ln commercial agriculture is one 
for which objective evidence is available t though little systematic 
... e ·eas ity <ldta was g11tt1erqd for th f ibil study. Survey data which I 
gathered confirmed that the uociologist's impressions wore an accurate 
reflection of the hard facts (sell above p.11.A- ). The only exception 
w,1s the Sovi group. which. as mentioned llarller. h the exception that 
proves the rule. 
The argument that landowners using their own land arc less 
motivated than 'immigrants' (that 18 Fijians moving in from other 
areus) ls commonly accepted in Fiji. Hard evidence ls available to 
support this. though none iB cited in the Yalavou feasibility study. 
[ Z.I There arc many other variables to be considered, however. before 
it can be concluded that immlg.ant farmtirs will always be better 
motivated than people already living in the area. Past experience in 
[11 The attitude of Nadroga people to their chiefs. for example. ls 
only an imprllsidoo but it hall been con!llatently recorded over a long 
pt!riod. An early obncrver noted that the people 'living on thu 
S lgatok.1 rl ver and the gra11J11 country of Navosa are more of a democracy 
and pay less attention to such chiefs as they have.• .nor have the 
chiefs anything like the same influence' as chiefs elsewhere in Fiji 
(quoted in Spencer L941:6). [2.) The Fijian sociologist was aware. for exan,ple. of the poor 
pt!rformunce of landowners who took over cane farns at Koronubu/Veharu 
ln his home province of Ba. ll le lntcreatlng to find that ln the 
Seaqaqa project• both Indian and Fijian migrant!I applied themselves r.1o~e assldtmudy than people of both races already resident ln the 
area. There h some doubt• however• as to whether their superior 
lndustry rewarded the• econouilcally (see Evans lCJ80:lS7). 
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commercial agriculture, for example, needs to be taken into account. 
If the immigrants who have outperformed the locals have had prior 
experience in commercial agriculture, whil• the 1 ~ ocals have not, a 
simple compari,;on is no longer possible. 
ThP. most si••nlf leant lacunae in the i 1 i l o soc o og ca data gathered 
for Yalavou are those regarding farmer performance at Verata and 
Tllivalevu. The differential performance of the two mataqalis at 
Tilivalevu is an obvious lesson, directly applic~ble to Yalavou. 
Farmers who have land rights on the valley floor are likely to lack 
commitment to their rugged hlll country blocks. Or conversly, farmers 
who have no other claims on land are likely to have a high level of 
commi tmcnt. The hardships endured by the 'Ulivalevu farmers, without 
the han<lsome training grant, show that suitable motivation may be 
fuund ln non-economic factors or, if the desire for control over land 
:iust be considered uconomic, motivation may be found in economic 
factors other than current income. It should also have been noted 
that the close supervision cxerciaed by the DVO at Vorata only lifted 
farmer pt!rformance temporarily. Farmers allowed the DVO to make all 
decis Lons regarding inputs of labour and capital, but most falled to 
mdlntaln the oattern established. 
No explanation ls offered in Yalavou project documentation as to 
how the ~lzc of the training grant was arrived at. Tho clear 
lntuntlon of the grant ls to secure farmer independence, so that in 
th<• crucial flrst two yoarll farmers would not need to seek help from 
L l b 1 ttl
.. dlffus·• oblloatlonll that European 
re at vcs and there y ncur • - 0 
observern have long b 
l to v1jlan economic regarded as !!!!, o stac e r 
progress, ( l I The fe1ars concerning obllgatlons and 
the consequent 
need to build lndepcnd~ncc were not contributed by the sociologists. 
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The Fijian sociologist has at all project stages argued that 
traditional obligations are not a problem, b 1 a e ief which he had 
previously tested with survey data (Rakoto 1973:32). 
The kinship obligations question is not the only one in whi.ch 
sociological advice has been ignored. It ~as recommended that 
expatriate supervisors learn to speak Fijian, but no attempt was made 
to provide the necessary time and instructional assistance. The 
J<1ngers of a 'big-bang' beginning were raised, but the project has had 
to move with tremendous rapidity to keep up with the road building and 
farm opening schedule. 
It ls clear, then, that the the feasibility team leader (who was 
~ubsequently the Project Supervisor) haR made a significant, if 
lnfonnal, contribution of soci..>logy to the project. It will be 
reca 1 led that it was he who described the Yalavou project as a social 
experiment. The hypothesis that he had in mind was presumably the 
very general one of the suitability of 'individualism' (undefined) for 
the development of Fijian land. The nature of this general hypothesis 
needs to be explored. In particular, the notion of individualism 
needs to be clarlfl(~d. It appe2rs that he has defined individualism 
as part of the p,a~red indivldualism/communalism distinction. Unlike 
many of his planning predecessors in Fiji, he seems to have avoided 
<:<rntlng this dhtlnctlon in overly dichotomous term1h lie said to mu 
ln l980 that tw saw the project as 'walking a tlght 1·01>e trying not to 
loan too for towards the side of communallsm, nor towards the side of 
lndlviduallsm'. The questlon is, what doea he regard as leaning too 
Ill The feasibility team ieader was opposed to any notion of 'need' 
belng applied to tlw grant; lt was •1n outright grant to enable 
farmers to apply thc~.sclves to the learning activities of their early 
years. 'Need' carrlen connotationl4 of welfare which he seems to 
consl<lcr und\!alt·abl11. 
-r -·-
\ 
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much towards one side? As nn example of 1 eaning too much towards 
communal lsm, he 
school at Bemana. 
mentioned the request to build a road to the mission 
To accede to this would be communalist because it 
would tend to maintain the old ti es with the village. Physical 
isolation will, it s~ems, be conducive to farmer independence. The 
problem with the hypothesis regarding farmer independence is that it 
is only implicit, despite its central importance. 
At Uluisaivou, also, sociological assumptions have been made 
without being spelt out and critically examined. The .key assumption 
bt!hlnd the Uluisalvou project is obvious and simple: •Fijians, being 
communally minded, live in groups in which the intert!sts of individual 
m0mburs can be satisiEied by serving the interests of the group. At 
till! f0usibility stag~, the Yalavou design made the equally simple, 
converse assumption: the interests of the group can be satisfied by 
accommodating the interests of individuals; and these can be 
satlslfled if all individuals are giv~n the opportunity to compete for. 
places at Yalavou ou the basis of merit. At the preimplementation 
stage, huwever, this assumption was altered in a way that planners 
Lhought to be slight, but which turned out to b~ far-reaching. The 
merit principle was thought to have been modified by allowing priority 
to ~ataq~~~ members whereas it had been replaced endrely by the 
princl.ple of ~ataqa ll nominat Lon of fanners. The Project Supervisor 
hds clung n~vcrthelcss to the idea of farmer independence. 
The Tilivalevu and Vcrata projects have had their 
own 
soc lo loeical hypothe!4ee, despite the 
lack of involvement by 
The Old '.a··tlal_a' theory of colonial days professional sociologists. 
arguf!d 
•--· motivated to move out of th<?ir villages. 
that gala la h;HI to uc 
F.1rmcrs at Tillvalcv11 and Verata were 
therefore required to build 
bz 
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tl\e1' r own houses and to e t bl· - s a ish their own crops before loan funds 
could be advanced for farm development. No further attempt was made 
to limit their contact with their villages. In fact, at Tilivalcvu , 
communal labour was used to erect fences. 
Hore recently NAF and FOB officers. have sought to inspire lower 
performing farmers by providing housing loans to the better farmers. 
This was a reversal of the policies of colonial times. Plnnnei:s hoped 
to ttse the 'non-rational' Fijian preference for housil~ to motivate 
rational economic activity. As such it i d i s an .!!...., .!.!2.~ piece of informal 
sociology. 
!!!.£~pf Hypotheses 
To what extent can the hypotheses ittiplicit in the projects be 
tl:lsted? What evidence is available, and what is needed, to establish 
their truth or falsity'? What alternate hypotheses might be proposed? 
The architects of the projects have not spelt out the conditions they 
envisage for testing their social experiments. 
At the outset the Uluisaivou planners simply use~med that the 
communal proposal \.;ould succeed. Its characterization as an 
e~periment came luter, after it hud encountered difficulties. 'lal.nvou 
was regarded os on experiment from the stnrt, though the experimental 
vorinblos wore not specified. (1) In practice, the key experimental 
variable hus been farmC?r indepcndcnc.t.: ns embodied in tha licence to 
occupy nnd nssociatcd policies of munugement. this is the 
chnrnctcristic of the ::nluvou project which distingui11hes it from the 
Vi!rntu nnd 'rllivnlovu projects. :tt is the brainchild of the 
fonslbility team leader who, it witl be rac.nlled, chur11ctcriiad the. 
(\] rhe tarms of rafcre.ncc for the social monltodng exercise. in 1980 
\./ere the first fit tempt at defining <?xpcrimcnt.nl vndublas, tl1ough they 
largely ignore the .farme.tllnndowncrs rcl.utio.nship, which, M argued 
below, ls ctltienl to the project outcome. 
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. project as a social exp~riment without specifying the conditions for 
the testing of the experiment. ~row many 1 ~ failed farmers' would 
constitute a failure of the principle of fanner independence? [J.] Or 
would it be Fijian culture that would fail, while the principle of the 
independent ~roducer ~otivated by rational self-interest is left 
standing? This would appear to be a principle to which he is firmly 
attached. It is in fact a point of view that has a long history in 
Western society. It. is the view that J .A.C. Brown has said is 
embodied in : 'The beliefs that work is an unpleasant necessity, t~at 
'· the, individual is basically self - interested, basically lazy, and 
basically competitive, that society consists of a mass of unorganized 
individuals, each at war with the other; that the human body is a 
' machine to which a mind is son\ehow attached; that fear of starvation 
is the main negative incentive and money the main positive one'. 
These beliefs, Brown argues, are 'products of a certain type of 
society at a certain stage of development. They correspond to no 
fundamental human traits, and, even when they were most generally 
acceptad, were never true of more than a minority of members of 
industrial society' (Brown 1954: 276). In the application of these 
ideas to 'inlavou, the goal of farmer independence attempts to create 
the atomistic society that conservative managerial ideology regards as 
the norm. 
'the term e~peritnent is a mechanistic metaphor that is nt least 
decade out of date. A more fashionable t,erm, thnt does not carry the 
undasirable :tmplicaticm thut people in thf.I project urM are guinea 
' I' t c"uld ha Vu been snid that there pigs, would bil 1 behavioural risk • .., 
WM a chunce that project goals might not hnve bMn nchicvcd because 
t l) Th11 t is, how many fn rroe rs would b11 u...m ble 
Tl\ls would be the minimum definition of failure 
th11 high expenditure on each far1ner it is 
cixpect rotn:c. 
to service their debt? 
for 'lalnvou. Glven 
probably reasonable to 
p 
"' 
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there iu an element of behavioural risk. 
But what are the implications of t~1e term behavioural risk? As 
suggested in chapter one, there are hints of manipulation in the whole 
framework of goals, inputs and outputs, i t h n o w ich peoples and 
cultures are fitted as elements of behavioural risk. Manipulation is, 
of course, far from the minds of planners, h w o regularly call for 
local participation. But how do the two, the logical framework an~ 
local participation, work together in practice? 
Local Participation 
There have been three distinct fonns of local participation in 
the projects: · ( i) initial consent; (ii) representation on project 
boards; (iii) reporting of feelings and problems through social 
monitoring by sociologists. 
For the first type, it is clear that the experience of Yalavou 
has been more successful than that of Uluisaivou. Yalavou has been 
given almost all of the land that planners had envisaged as necessary 
for the project's succsss; Uluisaivou has not, and project viability 
has thereby been put at risk. At Yalavou, it will be recalled, the 
project, when first put to the people, aroused some misgivings. 
Planners had to make d: ltey concession (mataqali nomination of farmers) 
before consent could be obtained. gven then, some landowners were not 
entirely happy, £oaring the problems it would cause within their ranks 
'-Than the time ca.mil to select farmers. But, faced with the choice of a 
project or no project, they were prepared to consent• nnving learnt 
nt Uluisnivou that the project must not be promised before all land 
"1as c.onsonted, this nrm-bencllng tactic wa.s available. Howev1'lr, the 
risks inherent in it should not be overlooked. 'rha way in which 
consent was obtained will not be forgotten. 
Should the project 
p 
bz 
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encounter unexpected difficulties and lose populatity, popular memory 
is likely to endow the consent process with an even greater degree of 
duress. (Another lesson of Uluisaivou). 
Yalavou was fortunate to have the services of Rev. Paula Niukula 
during the consenting process, The Fijian sociologist and the 
preimplementation team had accurately relayed to planners the general 
misgivings regarding the project, but Rev. Niukula was able to 
articulate these forcefully across the table. In this way the full 
import of the landowners' feelings could be grasped by the expatriate 
feasibility team leader. 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the consenting 
process at Uluisaivou could have been handled as easily as at Yalavou, 
if only there had been a preimplementation phase, a sociologist, a 
familiarization team and an articulate spokesman. The land sought at 
Uluisaivou was all 'unused' or 'idle', but its location on the margins 
of villages and existing garden land meant that the arable portions of 
it were set aside for the use of children already growing to maturity. 
The second form of local participation, representation on the 
projects' controlling boards, has not worked noticeably well in either 
project. Board representatives are accused by their constituents of 
failing in their functions. The occurrence of this complaint in both 
projects suggests that the problem should be traced to the 
i 1 t tives 
Part of the 
nstitutions rather than the particu ar represcm ·a · • 
problem might be thnt democracy is new and relatively unxamiliar for 
rur ~1 1 i'n the sense of local politics, u Fijians, but politics, at east 
d 
"'he real problem is that the 
an the idea 0£ representation are not. i 
interests 
parochial. 
nnd aspirntions thnt 
arn to be rcprcsnntcd are tntnnsely 
One of d 
Anduring concerns the first an "' 
of board 
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representatives has been to ensure that all parochial units are 
equally represented in employment opportunities. Turning this point 
around, the many board decisions and activities that do not have 
direct and immediate implications for parochial interests are 
by the representatives. 
ignored 
The representatives are all 'nt 11' l. e igent men and most are 
extremely articulate (at least in Fijian). They are the natural 
spokesmen of their communities. The rol ti t h d e 1a t ey o not perform so 
well, however, is that of spokesman for the board, explaining, for 
example, why the huge resources that arc so obviously available for 
the project cannot be employed for the many purposes which they and 
their constituents regard as important. Why, for example, is it not 
possible to extend slightly one of the project roads so as to provide 
access to a school. Board representatives accept the argument that to 
entertain any such request from one community would mean that all 
similar requests would have to be acceded to. This answer accords 
with the practices of pnrochialism in provincial and tikina councils. 
But why, representatives and their constituents wonder, must all the 
effort be concentrated on cattle development? Why is there, on the 
one hand a tremendous rush for completion, and on the other, an 
inability to start up 'our' farms before the 'others'? Hany requests 
made to the board by landowners' representatives (for example those 
regarding compensation for lessees in the project area) receive the 
ans••or that funds are not available· At Yalavou, where outright 
'gifts' $100 000 re to be paid to project totalling more thnn , a 
farmers, this is hard for the average man to believe. [l] 
[ ed the expression of ·11 Richard Curtnin and lt. J • May repoirbt 1 enditure within feelings arising out of highly vis c exp 981.). Sepik n.ural Development l>rt>jact (Curtain and HaY 1 · 
similar 
the Enst 
~ ~ ~ 
" 
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The boards and the projects are, t th o e representatives and their 
constituents alike, foreign bodies. One Yalavou board representative 
explained to me that board activities had reinforced his belief that 
'the law of the Fijian' (na 1 · · ~ ~ 2:. Taukei) and the 'law of the 
European' are differertt. When board discussions were carried on in 
English he did not pay attention ( dau vakawelewele). [ 1) 
The board at Uluisaivou is outwardly much less foreign. Hee tings 
open and close with Fijian ceremony and prayer; Fijian is the 
dominant language of board business and there is a clear majority of 
locals. The business of the board, however, is unavoidably foreign. 
TI~ weak financial situation of the corporation means that there is 
llttle room for the exercise of discretion by the board. All finance 
Js tied to specific economic purposes, in relation to which local 
cepresentatlves have little to say. 
~ ~ It is for this reason that the corporation's chairman has been 
' l ~ anxious to involve the corporation in general development work, 
;j 
bn 
meeting 'people' needs. This will not only help to make the 
coi:poration popular, it will involve the board members, and with them, 
hopefully, their constituents, in corporation activity. 
The third type of local participation, the expression of local 
opinion through sociological monitoring, has worked well at Yalavou 
and not so well at Uluisuivou. Yalnvou was fortunate to have a 
sociologist who, in addition to academic qualifications in sociology, 
hntl substantial c~pcricnce as a field officer with the Fiji Sugar 
Corporation. Perhaps just as important, however, were the terms of 
Tl,c· se directed him to the areas of reference written for him by ADAll· • 
·[l) tt is 1 1 that he commenced our discussion of board nte-rcst ng £ r this man at least 
nctivitics with prnyerl '.tt would ap~ear that, .. 0 t the outset of encl\ 
the absence o! prayer nnd cc~emony symbo;izeis a the board always 
ll\aetlng that th<l board is foreign. At Ulu.Lsn vou 
commences with a ~agon~ ceremony nnd a prayer• 
.. 
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interest to project management. At Uluisaivou, on the other hand 
' 
the 
sociologist produced a long discursive argument against conventional 
rural development, using his Uluisaivou information as illustrative 
case material. Project management, that . h b 
c is t e oard and the two 
governments, found it·impossible to use the report t · 'f o Justi y any 
course of action. The sociologist had certainly tackled what all 
would agree was the main problem, local i i part c pation, but he had qot 
indicated how local participation could be increased. The suggestion 
that local representation on the board be increased was hardly 
relevant; despite the recommendations of the original feasibility 
study, there had always been a local majority. 
The sociologist also failed to recognize the leadership role that 
had been played by the first General Hanager. He recorded the very 
favourable response of the community to Hr Stone, but his leadet·ship 
role, and the legitimacy accorded it by the local comt~uni ty, were not 
recognized (apparently because they did not fit ;1.n with the 
populist/traditionalist approach that he employed). The sociologist's 
account of local participation seems to assume that all of the 
problems e~perienced at Uluisaivou were due to outside influence. 
this assumption oversimplifies the problem considerably. It is a 
charge ~1ich New Zealand officials strenuously deny. All of their 
efforts have been directed to local participation. 
what control do they have over local participation? 
The Question of contr~~ 
The problem is, 
There hns been a marked dif fcrcncc ln tho nature of the project 
bl ffi i ls in Australia and New ovarsight exercised by the rcsponsi e o · c a 
j \ s been axcrciscd by Zealancl. Although ovorsight 0£ both pro acts m 
the rnspc.ctiv'e. departments of fOrelgn nffairs, the Australian ,\DAS has 
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been staffed more by development assistance specialists, than by 
generalist diplomats on rotation (the New Zealand practice). This 
difference, it appears, has contributed to l tle markedly different 
manner in which control has been exercised over the projects. 
Yalavou, under ADAB, has been ordered by the 1 logical framework, 
approach, with a clearly established goal and purpose, and with the 
necessary inputs and outputs specified. 
Uluisaivou, by contrast, began with an ambiguous purpose, geared 
to a vague goal (providing 'both economic and social benefits to the 
people of the Saivou area'). These were not further defined when the 
evaluation review was carried out. The evaluation report and the 
first General Manager had quite different conceptions about what the 
project purpose was; the former assumed that Lhe corporation purpose 
was to become a financially viable enterprise for the benefit of its 
owners, the latter regarded it as a vehicle for general development, 
even if this required a measure of subsidy. [l] 
For three years from 1978 to 1981 the corporation drifted, unable 
to develop further without more land, or a fresh input of capital, and 
unable to look forward to profits for its owners for many years. 
Further devdopml!nt had to await New Zealand assistance. 
The nature of control and responsibility in this situation -s 
interesting. New Zealand officials, resting on the principle of local 
control, said that any rcasoMbla request .from the Fiji government on 
behalf of the corporat.i.on wo1,1ld be gi'll'cn npt1t·ova1. 
government tmdorsed thti chnirman' s preference not to push 
[1) A !Hmior New Zea.land o.€fical mcplaincd the p~o~l~~r~~ 
't.1e never conceived of the project as an integra e h 
project but John (S:one) seemed to envlsnge it ns sue 
but did not communicate this to us' (pars comm)• 
The Fiji 
ahead 'With 
these terms: 
development 
rather early 
p 
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further significant investment, but rather 
'' to concentrate on 'people 
needs' until the future viability of l tle ranch's operations was 
clearer. New Zealand in turn was preparecl t o accept this. The 
corporation would propose amall '11 ~ vi &SB improvement projects and the 
New Zealand High Commissioner ~ould be empowered to approve the 
release of funds. So long as the projects were small, approval could 
be delegated to the New Zealand High Commissioner f or prompt approval, 
just as Head of Mission discretionary fu11ds are d now ispersed. This 
approval would be granted promptly, without any fuss about project 
inputs, outputs etc. 
The question of the future viability of the corporation as a 
business enterprise would meanwhile be left to be determined by a New 
Zealand manager who would fulfil 'the technical and advisory role' 
thnt was an essential complement of the emphasis on local control. It 
would be unrealistic, however, to expect that the technical matters 
could be neatly separated from the corporation's other social 
activities. The many recommendations for improved efficiency made by 
the acting General Mannger in 1980 had implications for the 
corporation 1 s relations with 'the public', which apparently led the 
chairman of the board to decline to take them up. the position of the 
General Manager was not an enyiable one, as is illustrated by the 
Withdrawal of the Gener.al Manager designate in 1981. 
F)':om the very beginning the position of General Manager has been 
the key to the style of. control implicit: "1ithin 
the flexible 
Uluisaivou project. The first General Manager, it wlll be recalled, 
had n number of disagreements with officials front the Hinistry of 
Foreign Aff:\lrs. lle was under no obligntion to follow their advice, 
Just as they were u1\der no obligation to renew his contract• 
p 
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New Zealand officials have obviously been aware of their 
government's responsibility and have, accordingly, maintained their 
commitment to it. On the other hand, they seem to deny the reality of 
the degree of control they have, and witl1 th t ti i a , 1e r specific 
responsibility for thE project inputs they agree to give. Such an 
approach would, in ADAB, as in many donor agencies, be liable to 
attract censure. The report of the Australian Auditor General on an 
efficiency audit of ADAB took ADAB to task for sometimes allowing 
recipient country priorities to promote 'goals not directly related to 
Australia's development assistance policies' (Australian Auditor 
General 1981 : 17). 
In view of the problems experienced at Uluisaivou it might be 
thought that the flexible recipient country orientation that New 
Zealand has employed is thereby discredited. To leap to this 
conclusion, however, might be a mistake. Recalling the debate between 
1 flexible policy' and 1 mechanistic implementation' outlined in the 
first chapter, perhaps there is some merit in the New Zealand 
approach, which hns been obscured by the unfortunate turn of events· 
At Yalavou the lines of control have always been clear· The 
consulting firm responsible for projact management has a clearly 
defined contractual relatiortshlp with ADAS, to which body it reports 
quntterly. As a valued client of consulting firnts, ADAB can be sure 
tl t i d .t 1 k i usly T\\n g'"'at pains taken to \a ts a vice .:.s a ways ta cn ser o • - L"' 
rMpond to ench recommendation of the evnluation report cloarly 
illustrate this. (At Uluisnivou, on the other hand, tho evaluation 
rcvfow was largcly ignored.) It would be 11 mistake, however, to 
conclude thut the 'ialavou project is controlled by ADAS. The 
ovctsight they exercise. is simply thnt of ensudng that the execution 
p 
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of the projec~ adheres to the agreed goal d 
an purpose. This is the 
only way in which they can account for the use of Australian funds in 
the project. The important question to ask t y 1 a a avou is : does 
continued adherence to the project goal and purpose ensure that it 
will be attained? As ·explained in chapter six, Yalavou· management has 
exercised close control over its farmers, while maintaining cordial 
relations with the landowners from whose ranks they have been chosen; 
the relationship over which they do not have direct control is the 
landowner/farmer relationship. And this is the most important of the 
three relationships. Project management hopes that by controlling the 
farmer they will, in the longer term, control this relationship. But 
what is the ·nature of this relationship, and can it be controlled? 
The farmer/landowner relationship is the least developed of the three 
relationships at Yalavou. Farmers have been allocated their blocks, 
and the pattern of their day-to-day activity has altered with their 
move to Ynlavou, but the changes are still new and unfamiliar• Hany 
£armors visit their villages at the weekend and some still have their 
wives nnd/ or children residing there. Some 29 per cent of farmers 
surveyed still had houses in the village, most of which were better 
than their temporary dwellings at Yalnvou. Some still have gardens in 
tho village, although it is difficult to get honest answers to 
quas tlons nbou t gardens in the village, The Yalnvou licence is 
supposed to rcquit:a their f\lll labour commitment• 
Almost; nll Ynlavou farmet:s described their .!!l!lE!ql\l!. land as 
having bean divided up (wnsawasc) • Hnny spodfica11y identified 
Yalnvou as the mn!n cnusc of the divir;l.on. r'or most, howcvr.ar, the 
l 1 bil!ty of thu project ls Ynlnvou sub-division is on trial until t 10 v a 
nsccrrtnlncd. Those who hnvc w1cntod lat\d on the valley £loor still 
t'(~taln rights to that .htttd, even H othars prMtmtly use it; 
but lt 
p 
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is only a matter of time before those rights weaken. ·one farmer who 
replaced his younger brother wh l en 1e was e3'ected f rom Yalavou (for 
cattle theft) gave his valley land to his brother, When I asked the 
older brother whose land it was, he replied that it was still his. l 
then asked if it would remain his land in the event that his brother 
married. Then, he $aid, they would divide it in half. Questions like 
this are not easy to ask, and while they 1 are to crated from an 
unmannered fu!.!. Valagi (European) they would probably be resented if 
asked by a Fijian. More importantly, the answers gi.vcn cannot be 
assumed to be 'correct' or 'final'; decisions over land rights would 
need to be negotiated between all concerned parties in the mataqa~~· 
They are family mat;ters, not subject to any law, inherently private in 
nature, ideally capable of adaptation to the needs of indiv.idtmls, but 
subject: to the strongest sentiments of jealousy as well as fraternal 
communality. I felt confident enough to ask this farmer only because 
he I.las not in the presence of any fellow members of his mataqalJ. or 
his village. 
So f~r, only one landowning unit seems to have squarely faced the 
ques t!on of the influence of Yalavou on land tenure arrangements• 
This is Tokatoka uru of Bemana. Each Uru farmer has entered into an 
agreement with members of closely related families that have clai1ns by 
rights of equity on the Yalavou land. The contract was preparetl by n 
lawyur in Suva und contains specific obligations on both sides• 
The 
sharing rl'.lla.tives will contribute labour and resources us need ad 
for 
£arm development and in return will receive a specific share in the 
farm, "1hich will be 
lenachold title ls 
1 is repaid and the formalbed when the onn 
clear. 
'}'.he specific aim of the agreement is to 
ensure that the direct descendants of the Yalnvou farmers are not 
the 
sob beneficiaries of the innd. 
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Management's response to the Uru plan has been cautious. The 
project Supervisor, when I asked him for his response, was at first 
unaware of the agreements, despite the fact tl1at h t ey had been 
reported by the Fijian sociologist during the project review. The 
project Supervisor was disturbed by the gr b a cements, ecause they could 
Upset the independence of fnrn1ers b t h ;: ] ~ , u e 1e.t that no action to 
combat the agreeements would be advisable. \11 l l t lat could oe done 
would be to watch and wait. 
Rev. Paula Niukula (see above p. 22S) was a member of Uru as , was 
the Bemana board representative who had at first declined to join the 
scheme. Both believed t:hat the project was not in accord with the 
Fij inn way of life. ~lanagement has tended to regard the Uru group as 
difficult, as determined traditionalists. The Project Supervisor's 
opposition to the extension of a road through to the Bemana mission 
was a result of his fears regarding Bemana as a nest of comnmnnlism. 
In fact the Uru group differs from other groups only in its 
ability to nnnlyze its motives and to express them articulately. 
Other groups have the same general feelings about the project and the 
same values nbout the sharing of land. Not all groups have the same 
degree of shortage of land at the moment, but it is only a matter of 
time before they do. the fact that most groups prefer to leave values 
there will not be 
regarding fond tenura vogue is no guarantee that 
di l .,.t is nlso n" gu"rantca that farmers will be sputes n tho future. ~ v 0 
indapundent. Some members of 'rokntokn Uru said that there was no need 
~ 1 h contr"cts but Rav. Niukula could forsee to J.Otmalizc arrangmnentS W t "' 
difficulties if this atcp ware not taken. 
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Mataqalis not presently short of land h 
. ave a different perception 
of Yalavou. They say that people were 'chal ..lenged' ( . bolei) to go 
Yalavou, although for younger members this is perhaps more in the 
nature of a command. The main purpose of th i e r participation is, as 
the Fijian sociologist' was told, t o ensure the availability of land to 
future generations. For some, this means . occupying ths= land so that 
outsiders cannot use it; for others, there is competition to keep 
One mataqali withdrew two land within particular family lines. 
blocks, ostensibly to preserve land for mataqali cattle, but in 
reality to reserve it for people who had a just claim to it but could 
not enter Yalavou because they were either too young or otherwise 
occupied at the time. 
It is paradoxical that the use of a contract could be interpreted 
as anti-individualistic. Contract in the literature of sociology is a 
by-word for modernity and individualism. The use of a contract to 
define communalistic relations should be seen as a progressive step, 
although a departure from the dichotomized view of 
individualism/ communalism is requited to be able to accept it• The 
problem that the Project Supervisor forsaw was that which, from the 
beginning, had seemed to him to be critical, namely the problem of the 
independence of tl1e farmer. Unless he was secure in the knowledge 
that the fruits of his labour would be his alone, he would lack the 
motivation to remain committed to con1mercial beef farming. 
From the 
beginning this had been seen primarily in terms of the use of cattle 
f 11 
blem? As e:<plained in 
or ceremonial purposes, but is it rca Y a pro · 
arguments to suggest that ceremonial obligations would not 
cause the 
the fourth chapter, experience at Vera ta and TiliVnlevu suggests that 
it is not. The Fijian sociologist hus consistently argued that it is 
In Study tlle
. t. e"m lender used the sociologist's 
not. the feasibility ~ 
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project to fail, while arguing that 
p.21~). In his first social monitor the 
it was !!.!£ danger (see above 
sociologist reaffirmed his 
confidence that farmers 
liquidating their stock. 
would meet their social obligations without 
Ast\lte farmers, I \e argued, would use 
· ccr1~mony to buiJ.d valuable goodwill. B t il u st 1 management worries. 
"' 
Hataqalis are not the only groups with whom fai:mers have 
relationships. Their Villages and their churches continue to place 
obligations upon them. The survey data that I collected suggest that 
these obligations are as s.trong as obligations to their mataqalis, 
Obligations to in-laws muse also be included, but these are are 
. 
individual/bilateral relationships rather t:hn1\ group obligations, 
Whare there i.s consi.derable reliance on access to land through in-law 
connections, spending on c~remoninl obligations can rise to the high 
levels reported at Bemana. By opening up more land, Yalavou might 
help to reduce the pressures for such spending. Restrictions on the 
use of cattle for c.aromonial purposes are a weak mechanism for 
II 
ensurlt\g thnt ,fnrmcrs nre not hindered by social obligations. 1£ 
'nrmcrs arc genuinely obtig~ted they will divert their resources one 
way or another. One of the major problems at TiHvulevu urtd Vernt:a 
has bMn poor use of monoy by farmers. Tlm<llY \oll'.lcd control and fence 
repnlrl '-lhich nrc nllCC'tJGnry for controlled breeding und good ealving, 
depend ou tho fnrm!:'.!r reserving enough of his cuttle revenue to cover 
u:.tpcnd:lturl'l on wcciH.cldc, fcrtilbcr t\ntl fencing mrttcdnl • Fnrm12rs 
often do not hnvo tbc cash for thMu supplies when they ure most 
needod. Many nrc content to rely on ~LW Md FOB to help thctrt wl. th 
d ~1 G r" · Rende, loans ~hen nuch nu1int,muncc:? c!(pcnd:tture ls ov1.n: uti. ~· r co 00 
Agdeult:ur!ll Mllnngor o~ the FDB, c~pluinod that the FDS ban on the use 
of c:i.ttle for corcmony \\fas lll\p011cd mnlnly to mnki! it Mtd.ilr for 
h:rnmrs to nay tto to pilople to w\\Otn th~Y were not genulnoly obllgnted • 
p 
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Bank officers were aware that the ban was not 1 a ways observed. If a 
farmer was found to be giv:l:ng away more cattle tha•·l 
• he could afford 
the bank would take action, otherwise it did not bother, and did not 
worry. Hr Reade argued that the best means d to re uce the pressure on 
farms was to create more farms so that the burden could be spread. 
The licence to occupy limits the extent to which demands can be 
made upon the labour time of Y.alavou farmers. For the first two years 
in particular, when the sanction of deductions from training grant 
payments is possible, the licence serves its purpose. After that, 
minor absenteeism is a nagging problem. It is probable that some 
absenteeism is the t'esult of continued use of land in the village. 
The problem is that farmers are evasive and untruthful about this. 
The building of mataqali bures around the project urea will have 
important implications for the farmer/!lrnta,qali relationship. It will 
provide vanucs fot" 'mataqal~ relatives to hold traditio110.l ceremonies 
t.tithout formers having to trnvcl to the village. It will also allow 
fannc.rs to organize themselves into small local groups. It is this 
possibility that probably accounts £or manugements' enthusiasm for the 
projoct, given managmcnt' 6 fan rs about farmer' a resources being sought 
by relatives. Mimngemcmt nlso prefers that £11rmers be able to fulfil 
their socinl obligations on or nenr thoir farms rather than in their 
villages. 
At Yulnvou, the ln~nlowning groups nre satisfied at this point 
l i i t • ts 'thev have thuir 
that the project is in tlccord with t1\e r n arus · • • 
nominees on the blocks. Their personal ties with thu nominacs vill 
link th
·rougl\ which their intcrE?sts will be 
provide. n cotH::inuing 1 
sc.rvud. But 
i >the annual rent 
they do have unfulfilled. cxp~ctat orts' 
is low' cspecinlly ns most ftirtnS irtclude nt least some 
, 
F 
... 
Page 2% 
arable land. This must be regarded as a subsidy to the farmer, for. 
which he will make a return at some time in the future. Attempts by 
project management to limit the transfer of resources from Yalavou 
farmers to their matagali brothers will not be easy to implement. It 
would have been more ln accord with the goal of farmer independence to 
to ma e clear that the pay an economk rent from the beginning, so as k 
farmers' obligations to the landowners have been met. The practical 
difficulty that this would encounter is the need to make a detailed 
survey of the blocks to de terminc the precise proportions of the 
different classes of land on each block. 
It is not possible to predict the nature of the relationships 
th<tt will develop be tween Yalavou farmers and their landowning groups. 
Each farmer will have a thirty year lease, which might be thought to 
provide the basis for a new, independent attitude to livelihood, bi1t 
it shoulc! be recnlled that one of the most promising farmers at Verata 
lost all motivation when he .found that he would be denied renewal 
buyond thirty y<:Hlrs. Acquisition of land rights, rather than income 
frotn cattle. had apparently been the main motivation for his early 
enthusiasm, just as his anrly promise had been a factor tn nrousing 
the jealousy of his relatives whC> owned the land upon which ha had 
Mtablishcd his farm. Farmers at "fnlavou have co\\sistantly said (to 
r.1c nntl to Aporosa Rnl~oto) that the ncqui:!dtion of rights to lnnd, 
usually for the snkc of ehildral\, hns bacn the main ranson for joining 
Ynlavou. Unfortunately 
for planners nt "inlnvou, however, the 
o.llocntlon of a block at "inlavou cannot ba tnkcm ns the nss:l.gnnHmt of 
suc~cssful davclopment 
all futuro rights in the lnnd to that nominee. 
of n blnck alt<Jrs the. vnlu<l of the. land nnd thereby the nttltudc. of 
nll interested partic!J within th<l lnndownins group • 
p 
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Land tenure is therefore the critical social variable that 
Yalavou management must attempt to control, though it must be clear 
that reference to it as a vm:iable i's purely metaphorical, and that 
the desire for control is not necessaril 1 )' mate led by the ability to 
control. The range or problems gathared together under the heading of 
land tenure is wida, embracing social, cult r l u a , economic and 
'q s ave a shortage of land, others institutional matters. Some mata nli h 
have more than they can presently use. A l d i d s .an s use increasingly 
for cash cropping, people begin to value it in a new way. Informal 
access becomes increasin~ly difficult, even for kinsmen, who, once 
granted use rights, will tend to gain longer- term rights. Nothing, 
howaver, will' unite jealous kinsmen more easily than opposition to an 
outside body attempting to take control of their land. 
The three quotations that head chapter three perhaps say almost 
all thare is to be. said in general terms about land tenure problems. 
Tha path land tenure must follow in a capitalist society is claarly 
towards making land a fraely trnnsfarable commodity, but there are 
many twists and turns in the path, and no final destination. For 
Fijians, the pressing problem is to find some way of distributing 
rights to land within communities. At the moment there are no 
!!,~taqnli members \.lho are able to lease 1 their share' 
institutions, traditional or legal, 
able to achieve this 
satisfactorily. 
of matnqali land inject n degree of transferability into the system. 
"'h f h r agri"ultural lenses can be sold, 
l c unc~pired portions o t irty yea ~ 
and therby offered as loan security, although NLTB approval is 
there is no 
required, ln practice 1 tha NLTB grants approval if 
opposition from landowners. 
~ u £or its own purposes, prefers to 
·rha i: D11, 
landowner 
see fonscs trnnsfcrrcc.l to people who will l\Ot 
MCOUnter 
obj actions • Land in reserve, -which can bll lensad only by its owners, 
p 
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has no real security value, though the FDB prefers its loatl clients to 
take out a lease in order to gi 1 ve c ear title within the mataqali. 
Loan security is, in fact, the main moti'vation f or Fijians to 
undertake the expense of a lease. Then, when a lease has been 
approved, there is often a reluctance to pay rent. Why, people ask, 
should they pay to USC: their own land? The effects of the increasing 
efficiency of the NLTB, which is steadily reducing the arrears in 
rent, will be interesting. The difficulty of the land tenure •factor' 
is that it combines social, cultural, economic and institutional 
matters. It is also highly charged with politics, although in the 
past political concern has been oriented more towards relations with 
other races 'than to relations within the Fijian community. The 
political and institutional problems associated with land tenure, 
which will be exnmined in rnore detail later in this chapter, are so 
much harder to solve because of the complexity that results from the 
interac t:lon of social, cultural and economic forces. The 
establishment of a framework that suits the varying circumstances of 
Fijian matnqalis might be an impossibility. In other words: the 
conclusion that land tenure is the 'critical social variab4e' is no 
conclusion at all. 
the other social factors at 'ialavou are all relatively minor and 
under c.01\trol. Management• s fears regarding ceremonial obHgntions 
seem to have been allayed, The previous involvement of most 'lal~wou 
farmers in the cash economy and, with that, the absence of labour 
n'r" disposed to 1cnrn the lessons reciprocity, means thnt most farmers "' 
of time nnd f 
their 'inlavou supervisors• 
resource management rom 
Cornmunicnt:ions with lando\.t11ers have t\Ot baen easy, but 
strenuous and 
continuing cf forts 
scom to have! prevented the problems 
expctienccd by the F.lji Pi.nu Commission, nnd to n lesser 
extent~ the 
p 
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Uluisaivou project. 
At Yalavou all attempts possible have b een made to control the 
'variables' that might determine the 'causal linkages' between project 
'inputs' and 'outputs:. It is in that sense representative of the 
state of the art in the mid l970s when it was formulated. The 
criticisms that I would make of it are therefore more in the nature of 
identification of problems inherent in the project approach, than of 
an indulgence in hindsight-assisted criticism of the work of planners 
at Ynlavou. There is only one point where I would suggel!t that thing~ 
should have been done differently at Yalavou, even within the confines 
of project planning. During discussions with the pre.implementation 
leader, Rev. Paula Niukula ask.eel if it would be possible to develop 
some of the Yalavou blocks in trust, if suitable nominees could not be 
found by the mataqali. The team leader rejected this on the grounds 
that it would be too costly and difficult to manage. With hindsight, 
it is now apparent that poor perfot'!nlng farmers are a serious problem 
in terms '. of management and expense. They are not easily removed and 
the expenditure of their training grants is wasted and irrecoverable 
when they are removed. In the section below dealing with the Farm 
Hanagetnent Co-opcrutive thete :ls positive evidence thut the 
development- :.tn- trust proposal could have worked. '.rhe fact thut it 
would hnvc had .mnta_qal~ sttrit)ort ·would appear to ba an aclditiomtl merit 
of the proposnl, although the team leader might have interptreted such 
1 an Uncle
. 8. t·rubl"' l'"'ning towards commu11aUsm. !1!1l.~l!.~.l approval as ¥ ~u 
dan~ers of 
the 
\ d th ... re is !lvidence of the At Uluisai vou, on the othar 1an , ... 
di t
,.. rerluests without considering 
simply ace.a ng u "1 
lt should not ba forgotten thrtt ill. its early yertrs 
tha 
consequances. 
Uluisnivou project was widely citad ns an example of sensttve 
p 
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appreciation of local needs (see, for example, Fairb, .. i .. n 
" L 1977: 33) 0 
The Farm Management co-oper~ 
The desire for communal! ventures remains strong. The problems 
experienced at Uluisaivou reflect the fact that it is not based on an 
existing community, ra thcr than any waning f o communal feeling, The 
failure of many communal projects i th 1960 n e s, which influenced 
thinking in planning circles (sec Spate 1959 77 83) : - , did not etadicate 
the desire for communal economic activity, only the official sympathy 
they received. The Farm Management Co-operati.ve (FMC) is a government 
sponsored venture into communal economic activity, which has resulted 
from the continuing interest in communal enterprise, 1t was 
established in 1978 with the function of providing management for 
communully owned farms. It is a registered co-operative with a board 
\ 
of d:lr(!.ctors comprising the Commissioner Central, the Director of 
Agricultttr(!., the Regis trnr of Co-oparati ves and representatives of 
each of the member farms. In raturn for a management foe each member 
farm is given a manager at\d the sarvic~s of the FMC head of £ice for 
financial management and higher level management (on such matters as 
investment). When fnrms join the FHC they nre required to agree to 
abidn by nll decisions of FHC rcgnrdlng farm mnnugemcnt und to give 
three months 1 notice before withdtu\oling from FMC. So long <tS they 
hnve loon!l with the FOB they nrc, however, unnblc to cxcrdse this 
right. Membership of r1tc is n condltlon of their loans• 
1 "'he null'lbcr of £4rms uslrtg 
'rho FMC ttonccpt hrts proved popu nr • 1 
srcw from tho 
t\.IO in 1978 to scvtm in t981, with n 
furthar £ivtl fnrms u.tshlnn to join. Each of tha .fnrms is cntiruly thn 
i l tlvc ln contrnst to arane to FMO is fr~~ly given, nt their own .tn t n , 
r~sult of local initiative. 
the dcgrM of control tbnt lnndow11crs 
\\ 
II 
F 
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the difficult process of 'consent' that accompanied each of the aid 
assisted projects. 
The creation of the FNC itself is th e result of initiative from 
outside planning circles· In 1973 the Tailevu Provincial Council 
bought shares in a co-operative dairy farm (Tailevu Dairy Fa~mers' 
co-operative) and then in 197l1 purchased outright another dairy farm 
~ e rst purchase was (the Tailevu Provincial Co-or)erat·ive). 'h fi 
financed by an FOB loan, the second by Citibank. [l] At the Tailevu 
Dairy Farmers' Co-operative farm, poor management gradually led to a 
production decline, which led in turn to a shortage of funds and the 
beginning of a downward spiral. In 1976 the manager was sacked and a 
New Zealand voluntect worker was placed in charge. An Assistant Roko 
was placed in charge of t:he other farm (the Tailevu Provinical 
Co-oparative). The financial l\f£nirs of the former farm slowly 
improved; at the latter they further deterioriated. 'By 1977 the 
Tailevu Provincial farm was in a desperate situation. For a time 
product: ion ceased through liquidity problems, while interest charges 
mounted. Large sums of capital (raised by traditional methods) 
injected by the provincial council appeared likely to be lost. til 
The provincinl council received substantial informal management 
assistance from the· Agriculture. Dcparttncnt. A senior veterinary 
officer was plnced in charge of the farm, although this functiol\ was 
out side of Heinl Pu~Hc Serv l\!c Commission rules• 
. . i . formed in 1969 under 
[l} The Ted.le.vu Dniry Farmers 1 Co-opar?t v~ wasns then Chairmtm of tlle 
the leadership of Rntu WilHttm Tognniv~lu ~~~r:l yunrs of political 
'rnilevu .Provincial council. It too h sl n on the conll.ltion thnt n 
premmre before the :rnn ngroud to t ~b•"~~ ionn was obtained ti.ftor 
suitubln rnnnnger wn.1 recruitad • Tho. Cit a 
a Mcond PIJll loun was rcfuttad • . . . . cl . •t of it ( $33, 079) .froll\ tM 
l1.1l A total of $43, 928 was contdbute , mos 
~di Tallevu felltlvnl 1976 • 
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What the Tailevu Provincial farm really ne d d 
· · e e was re-financing. 
(The Citib1~nk loan was a short tenn one i h 
, w t a consequently steep 
repayment sehedule and a commercial rate of interest.) The FOB was 
unwilling to provide finance unless \' i could be assured that there 
would be sound managentent. Tailavu Provincial Council was fortunate 
to have substantial political influence upon which to draw. The 
former council chr.i rman, who was the m i a n proponent of the purchase of 
the dairy .farms, wn.~ an influential cabinet minister. The FMC was 
accordingly crea;ted as the solution to the problems of the Tailevu 
Provincial fa rm. Finance to found the FMC was obtained .from the 
budgets of th~ departments of Fijian Affairs, Agriculture and 
Co-opernt.lves •· FHC was not quite a bottom-up creation, but neither 
was it the creation of planners. 
Once established, it provided an avenue for two other ailing 
comm\il\al cattle ventttres, which had unsuccessfully sought FDB finance. 
With the notnble exception of Uluisaivou, communal cattle ventures had 
t'.\t. 
fallen from favour with the Agriculture Department in"t960s. The two 
surviving forms that joined .n1C had been struggling 01t since the 
1940s, i.n one form or another. One of the farms httd sought FDB 
finance. specifically to purchase a freehold dairy farm, on land 
nlienn tcd from thci r v:lllage. The other farm us eel land that otherwise 
would hnvc. been vacant. 
'the low 
'rho FHC hns lessons .for both Ynlnvou und U1uisnivou. 
wages paid to farm workers indicntc that, if there ls a trua sense of 
commul'\ity, there is no need to pay wages ns high as those. demanded at 
Uluisnivou. 
. ,ckly wage at Uluisal vou 
$20 .. $25 n week, lltt1<! more half the nvcrnsc wa 
) ,. . c of the ntc farms lml/c (and less than half of that at Yntavou • .,ot.l 
In 1980 
.. t:·n· l!f on the dairy .fdrn1s earned about 
parmttncnt o L 
p 
had work done without payment, 
efficient use of management's 
payment, however low, were made, 
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though experience showed that more 
supervision would be made if some 
Many of the tasks on FMC farms are 
carded out on a contract basis. FHC managers are able to negotiate 
rates of payment to suit the individual circumstances of each farm. 
Unlike management at Uluisaivou, the FMC has a free hand in all 
decisions. Community use of farm assets is limited. Many of the 
r:1uchines, such as tractors and vehicles, are owned by FMC and provided 
on contruct for specific jobs on the fal.'ms •. FMC managers are all 
1 outsiders' ( vulagi). When one co-operative joined FMC, the 
traditional head of the village was made manager, with a young 
diplomata f.rom the Fiji College of Agriculture to assist, When the 
traditional leader failed to act in accordance with FMC ptactices he 
~as replaced and it was made a gcnctal tule that all managers should 
be 'outsiders' .[l] With time, resistance to 'outsiders' might grow, 
but in the first few ycnrs at lonst, it has been accepted. tt would 
npp<H\t that the fact that it is the co-operatives that appr011ch the 
FMC assists acceptance of outside mnnngef'lent. When farms hnve repaid 
their FOB .touns they will be free to withdrnw from FMC· It is likely 
that some will; the thousht of the mnnngett\cnt £ell, which in most 
cases ls approximntaly equal to the resident manager's snlnry, will 
seem n loss to the community, f:ve?n Tailevu Provincial Council members 
speak of the longer tern1 desirability of having soMone from thuir 
provincn (n 'Kni To.ilevu) as mnnnger {)f the Tailevu Provincial Fnrr.t• 
--· ·-1• 
'the fact thnt one of tho FHC' s mnnngers is from Tailevu nppnrf!ntly is 
l i TM re is some tloubt 1 not enough to satisfy pttrochinl fee ng• 
d FMC offers the opportunity to 
[l) 't'he rnngc of sizes of farms un er 1.. des thereby offedng 
grade furm munfigcrs 1 rcsponsibllitios nnd saln an , alternative career 
opportunities for pron\otlon• . '!hts3· i o~f!~!sc of Agriculture, who structure for diplonmtes from the ~1 . 0 
cilsht othurwlsn pursue n career :tn cxtonslor\t 
p 
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however, thnt this manager would be willing to leave FMC to manage the 
Tailevu farm. His training in dairy management was originally gained 
in New Zealand in order t i hi o equ p m to manage a co-operative in his 
home village. This farm is now under FMC but h e preferred to work on 
one of the other farms. It therefore remains to be 
seen : (a) whether communal farms will be able .. o i .. f nd qualified and 
.. an whether farm willing managers within their communal enti y·, d (b) 
committees will appoint managers wl'o do t \ \ • no lave t1e necessary 
expl'.lricnce • It should be recalled in this connection that the 1local1 
assistant managers at both Uluisnivou and Yulavou seem to have 
encountered difficulties as a result of traditional animosities. 
In general, the motives of the participants in the communal 
ventures do not appear' to be economically oriented. In one village, 
the co-operative goo.s back to the 191.0s, although it \.las not 
registered until 1955. !n 1959 Watters found that the management: of 
the co-opera ti va was basicnlly sound. He argued that the strong th of 
tha co-opo.rativcJ was the unity of traditional organization; 
1 
tha 
terms "Co .. oparntivc" nnd "village" ware ttlmost synonymous' (Watters 
1969 : 97). !ncomc from the co-oparativa's activities was used for 
3cncral village dovclopmcnt (a school building nnd piped \.later) and 
houses. Individuals paid for half of thll cost: of their houses, and 
the co•optn:n tl vc met the other half. Among thll reasons people g11vc 
for their co ... operntivc nctiv.ity t-tns thfit 1f 1m attempt waa mt\de to 
t\ivido. lnrtd up nntong th11 members of the vurious i tok.1tok.1 there would 
ba qunrr11b (Watters t969 : 97). In 1959 cultivnblc lnnd \Uts ln short 
supply nnd land w.is 1 ncquidns n quasi-commcr<!ial vnluc' • J.>urchutHl of 
ill.lcnated and lensed dttl.ry ltmd was sought 1n order to provide thll 
means of livelihood !or t\lll future gom.rrntions. The mor<l scnt.lmcntal 
dca.lte for ~ccovcry of thlllr true soil <sc.t! £inn) uns nlso tt inotlvch 
p 
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Attempts to purchase this land had been first made in the 1960s. It 
was only when the FMC was established that the FDB was willing to 
supply the nElcessary loan. 
When the Ta:llevu Dairy Farmers' Co-operative was proposed, 
'income to members' was put forward as one of the aims, but so 
were : ' to be a source of good breeding stock to interested 
shareholders'; 'to enable Fijians to regain possession of the land" 
(the farm was a European -held 99 year leasehold), Since most 
shareholders have contributed only $2 .SO each it is obvious that the 
income goal is less important than the others (a 20 per cent dividend 
would return 50 cents). In 1976, when the New Zealand volunteer took 
control, 'breeding stock' (calves) were being sold for $6. For 
several years no new heifers joined the herd. 
At another co-operative farm, the purchaSG of a a\enerator for the 
milking machines was another side bMefit that loomed larger than 
monetary return. After the FHC took over 1 another generator was 
purchased and the village people were sold the old senerator. 
Attempts to pay for a ohure of generator operating costs thtough 
supply of 'free 1 labour did Mt work smoothly. 
Up to 1981 only ortc of the co-operatives has had to fMe the 
question of what to do wlth profits• tly 1981 thll Ta:l.leVU Dllity 
Fatmers 1 Co .. opcruti ve had recovered sufflc.iontly to mnkc n profit of 
When bnlanccd by nccumttlntnd lousos this gnvc n s1nnt.l $21, 712. 
positive bnlat\cc in the npptopdntion nccount, tht1s propnrins thn WllY 
£or the future dlStdbution of proflt:s • The Gcnatrtl Hnnusnr of thn 
FMC favours the mnklns of a bonus ls1111c when this takes plncc, so thnt 
levels of shnrcl\oldlng ml~ht be lHtcd • 'this would h!llp to bdn8 
tlX~ctntlons rcgttrding tha vuluc of incmbarshlp into n renlbtlc 
p 
t:n 
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framework of equity and profit. This decision, l 10wever, is not a 
manngemen t decision and must be made b h Y t e members of the 
Co-operative, not the FMC. 
In 1979 there were 1870 individual 
. members of the Tailevu Dairy 
Farmers' Co-operative with a total shareholding of $10,123 and a 
further lat. group members with a total of $11,984 1n 
- shares. However, 
share certificates 
than $24 in shores. 
members and 101 
have been issued only for shareholdings with more 
The annual general meeting of 1979 attracted 137 
interested members of tile bli (' k pu c va arogo EOS!:_'). 
Minutes of the meeting reveal little about the feelings of either 
directors or shareholders about the purpose of the co-operative 
and futul·e directio1ls. .Problems of previous years are glossed over 
quickly. The promise of future profits still appears to be treated 
with scepticism. This should not be surprising, however, as the 
co-operative del1ared profits in the years preceding its crisis. [l] 
'rhe present FMC structure and rules of oparation are almost 
entirely the work of the MAF veterinurian who created it. The role of 
tho FHC is higly regarded by plnnncrs, although there i'l a tendency to 
regard it: as personnllstic nnd unduly dcpondo.nt on the one individual 
(~n expatriate on contract). Financially, it lends a precarious 
existence, ralylng on funds fron1 the budgets of HAF, Co-operat;ives nnd 
Fijian Affairs, The ntC Gcnaral Hanngor would like t.o sec tho 
orgnn:l~ntiou. duplicnted clso.\.lhnrc in Fiji (nt prosont it is limited by 
lts Suvn bnse), However, its c:dstenco on the murgins of scvcrrtl 
d l ,, k lt dlffl"u'lt fo .. it' to co,milctc for the opurt:ml.\nttt buugo.ts tltl:l cs .. .. 
required Eundn ulthln the framework of Flji1 s buclsctnry systcm. Tho. 
future roln of the F~IO is t\l(ftcforc uncertnin· 'l'hc forces thnt wtll 
[l) Tho. 'proHts 1 hnd been mndc through snla of stock. 
\' 
p 
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shape it lie in the overall institutional framework for development in 
Fiji, to which I now turn in order to consider the goal of 
replicabili ty. 
Replicability and Institutions 
Since the mid 1960s the Fi'i b ' J ureaucracy has steadily i~idened the 
scope of its activities. As ex 1 · d i I P aine n c1npter two, however, the 
relationship between parochially orie,1ted villagers and bureaucrats is 
not an easy one. Before the reform of the Fijian Administration in 
the m:ld 1960s Fijia'.:1 village communities had a relationship with the 
government that was, in most respects, agreeable to them (while 
efficiently maintaining law and order, the important colonial 
priority). Perhaps the main problem with the old system was that it 
attempted to enforce reciprocity of labl)Ur in areas where cash was 
increasing in importance. When the position of ~ (and with that 
the Tikina Council) was abolished, Fijians lost the sense of direct 
contact with govern:nent. The political channels provided by 
provincial councils have not yet adapted to this new role. The 
substance of the triumph of 1 inidividualism' in the 1960s was, as 
suggested in chapter four, the fact that Fijians were expected to 
relnte as individuals to an increasingly diverse and specialized range 
of civil servants. In agricultural matters this meant that H they 
could obtain a lease over their 1and, extension officers could arrange 
finnnca nnd provide marketing assistance. If they could hot nrrange a 
lQnse tht?re wns little that the extension of.fleer could do. 
Of itself this probably did not trouble many Fijian villagers· 
thc.ir m11in ac;pirations ware for 
infrastructural development, 
especially roads, rather than intensifictttion 
of agricultural 
production. problem f <!.Cing their 
desire fOr roads was that 
The 
p 
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infra.structure was inevitably linked in planners' minds to economic 
activity. For a new r.oad to be established, there had to· be an 
accompanying economic justification irtcreas d d > · e pro uction that would 
follow from its construction. This implied either the introduction of 
new settlers or the intensification f o production by the exist\ng 
· po1111lntlon. Projects seem to be the/natural vehicle to achievc~ther 
or or both of these gonls • Hence tho goal of repl:tcability at Yalavou 
nnd Uluisaivou. 
The failure of the Ynlavo~ project to achieve replicnbility 
prascnLs i}n interesting problem. The logical framework· has boon 
/ 
udhcred 'r;o and project manngement has consistently sought to achieve 
the ngr£lcd goal. Svmcwhere in the course of events, however, costs 
have e>.pnnded to such nn extent that the project soal hns become 
tlotached from the project purpose. 1 have neither the data nor tho 
t:echnical e>tpert:isc to determine in what areas costs might have bean 
contrtinad at Yulavou, but there are arena of o}(pcnsc. which seell\ to be, 
on sociological grounds, unwarruntod, T.hc enormous e)tpanditurc on 
training grrtn'•lJ (over $1000/fnrmer) is popular \oiith nominees, but it 
docs not sMm to hnvo llfte.d farmar performance suf flciantly to 
justify the expanse. TM close supervision inherent in the Ynlrtvou 
mod!!l nho r<lquitcs consldornblc cxpdMll; prtrtic\llarly ln the form of 
vohicln costs. 
Much of the Ynlnvou project builds on existing MAt?/FDn practicch 
It ls thu parts t:lmt do not, thnt scctn to bll cxponsi'le: tho high 
level of supctvblon nnd subsidy. The n!rnumptfon r.rn.dc by Yala.vou 
ilt !ta nlmplest, "1M that tbc profit Incentive artd 
suHlclcnt npplicntiot\ of tcchnicul ttdv!Ct): \tould uchlcvd thll lOO \H~r 
p 
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feasibility and preimplementation stages. Where Yalavou went wrong 
was in assuming that the extra margin of finance and superior 
technical skill available to an aid donor could achJ.eve a level of 
success far nbove that of existing inr:titutiot's, I 
- , . n other words 
replicability implies·that there must be an attempt to build on 
existing .tnstitutions · As mentioned already, the Yitlavou feasibility 
study docs not attempt to analyse the problems of Verata and 
Tili valevu. Similarly, it does not attempt to sec how existing MAF 
livestock extension practices could be improved. It attempts, rather, 
to replace them with a nnw institution, '~llich creates farmers by 
direction, not by extension. An examination of the experience at 
Tilivulevu and Veratn would have shown that extension there was, in 
practice, more like direct:lon 1 though without the power to coerce 
through n licence to occupy. Of ficinls in Fiji have long been nware 
of the limitations of extension work. [ 1] HAF officinls have to do 
much more than simply advise. Yalavou would therefore have done 
better to see how problems of extension could be overcon\e within thn 
existing inst\tutions. 
The FDB's rola is clearly defined and littla needs to be said 
nbout it. 't'hera is little room for 1nodification. It must rnmnin an 
essentially pansiva institution, respo~d:lns to requests for finance by 
taforcncc to crlt<n:ia which it establishes for development priorit:lM 
and security. In cons.ldaring lonna to Fijfan far1ncrs, security is 
normally th<l main considcratJ.on, and with thnt, problems of 
oKtcnsion/manugcmcnt• 
. ... 1 omparatlve data fro1n l'apun [l} nob HclUllop gives sonta int~rost ~~o~s he found, is consumed by n m~w Gui.Mn. tho time of cictcns. on w1~. ro.iatod to their essential varl<!.ty of tMks only pQdphcrn Y 
funetlons (McK.Ulop 1975) • 
•I 
p 
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HAF's role has always. been more active than that of the FDB , and 
it has tended to become more active. In colonial times its role was 
largely limited to extension work, though extension has always been 
interpreted fairly widely. As ti DVO b le o served at Verata, there had 
always been a tendency to manage farms rather than advise farmers. 
' The Farm Management· D ivisi h k · on as ta en this informal role a little 
further in recent years. Budgets and feasibility studies have been 
prepared for a variety of bodies and individuals, MAF Land Use 
Section provides n public !:!ervice parallel with that of Farm 
Management. Land Use staff prepare sub-divisions, such as that 
required for the Senqnqa project. Like the Farm Hanagement budgets 
and fensibili'ty studies, this service is pi:ovided without payment by 
the user. 
Still more active involvement has taken place through the Crop 
Development Fund, which allows HAF to plant crops and then to recover 
the cost from individuals or bodies prepared to take it over. In this 
\.lay citrus was planted in Mtid and sold to Fiji Citrus Products (a 
company with both public and private equity). Cocoil was planted on 
500 ncres of a freehold block purchased with an FOB loan by the Indian 
tenant rice farmers living on it. The costs of planting will bo 
\ calculated by }~\F economists and rccovored from the sale of the cocoa; 
once costs have been recovcrt?d, cocoa earninss will be used to retluco 
tha FDU loan. 
HAF offlcinls would like to further e'l{tcnd this rola 
'Vllth the astablishmc:mt:. of n projects division to plnn and implenu.mt 
The limitnt:lon!l oc the eittension role have long bocn 
projects. 
nppnrent. The difficulties of 4 project approach arc, at present, 
lcM well known • 
p 
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Another body that is presently trying to create for itself a role 
in the development of Fijian land is the Native Lands Development 
corporation (NLDC), a com1Jany owned by th N · e ative Lands Trust Board. 
[ l] Initially, it was oriented more towards urban property development 
but the acquisition of cane land, which the owners of Seaqaqa wished 
to be developed in trust for Fijian cane farmers, created a need for 
agricultural expert:lse. The style of development that the NLDC 
management envisages for itself is more entrepreneurial than anything 
previously attempted in Fiji. With the financial and administrative 
resources available to the NLDC it is hoped to be able to pay higher 
rents than those pnid by smallholders while giving a good return on 
NLDC investment. Later, when landowners are ready and able, land 
could be returned to them as a profitable enterprise. 
The main problem that the NLDC has encountered is availability of 
land suited to their purposes, For most crops, the capital intensive 
methods fnvout:ed by the NLDC would require large tracts of land. An 
attempt to acquire land in Ba Province proved unsuccessful. NLDC 
management was surprised to find that debt ridden cane farmers, with 
cano. yields well below the national average, were unwilling to 
surrender their leases for an 'acceptable' price. A block of land in 
the Bcmana area, where arable land has long been scarce, also found 
the owners unwilling to lease their land (sea rtbove p.12~) • The only 
lnnd obtninecl so fnr is at Legalcga where pulse trials have been 
carried out. This lease was made under the powers of the Nt/rB 
to 
l 1 d rs
' permission. Landowners 
ease unreserved land without an owne 
opposed the lcnse because fewer people would be employed. The of for 
On "ti·rroundintt cnnu lnnd did not ulter their of higher rants thnn paid 0 to 
t\\
" NLTB ln s n passive role in development (l] Like th<l 
nctivitfos. 
As explained 
tnade it a 
formerly • 
FDB, ~ P Y li t to take the initiative. 
l:t must wait for ~Mse a~~ r~~~g:nizntion of the NL'rB has 
in chapter one, tde brecee"ucrntic orgunbation thn11 it was 
more neutral an ur u 
p 
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feelings. 
A large tract of land (8480 ha) · in the Korotolutolu basin 
' 
ndjacent to the Seaqaqa cane project, was identified in 1980 as an 
area of potential operation for the NLDC. A f easibility study carried 
out in September 1981 found, however, that the acreage of land suited 
to the activities envisaged by the NLDC was smaller than previously 
thought, and that landowners had a strong preference for smallholder 
development· An earlier pre-feasibility study for the growing o.f 
cassava for ethanol had aroused fears of a large fo~eign company 
takeover. For most of the project area, cocoa cultivation, which is 
suited smallholder production, would be the only suitable 
commercial activity. The NT.DC' s role, :lf any, would be limited. Even 
to 
if the land had been more suited to the NLDC's intentions the 
reluctance of the landowners remained. Forced leasing of land is a 
step that the NT.TB is very rcluctn.nt to take. The Lcgalega case can 
in no way be taken as a precedent. The expatriate management staff of 
the NLDC do not seem fully to appreciate the political sensitivity of 
this issue. 
t>lal\l\e.rs in Fiji nre often reluctant to recognize the power that 
Fijian landowners have over their land. In the existing institutional 
and politicnl environment it is not possible to compel landowners to 
participate on terms other than those to which they ure willing to 
agrM. Re-cognition ot this p0wcr would not bo a devolution of power, 
but rather a fOrnrnlizntlon of the power rolntlons ns they uru 
As Irtme 
i Su"\\ a formalbution could cl\larg11 presently constituted in pruc.t· ce • · '" 
to both plnnnors and landowers. the power nvn.tlnble 
RothMburg has pointed out, it is wrong to regard Cili\ttal.izntiol\ artd 
tlcccntrull~ntion us 'opposites in n v.cro·sum relation' 1 'nn incronsa 
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l·n local roles does not necessari'l ·1 Y enta1 a decrease in central 
power, and Y.!.s_e ~' (Rothenberg 1980: 146), 
The strength of the FMC structure lies in the fact that the power 
needed by the FMC to exercise efficient management is freely granted. 
By waiting for landowners to find the requisite cooperation among 
themselves, the FMC respects the landowners' right to full control 
over their land. At the same time, the FDB 1 s requirement that 
technically qualified management be in control is met. The problem 
this arrangement presents to planners is that the initiative lies with 
the landowners. This is unsatisfactory if economics dictates that an 
entire area be developed at once in order to justify infrastructural 
investment. 
The goal of a replicable systew of developing Fijian land should 
be carefully scrutinized. The problems of existing institutions show 
how the goal came to be sought but is it feasible or desirable as a 
goal? The problems that Yalavou and Uluisuivou have experienced 
suggest that it is not. The bureaucratic urge to universalistic 
solutions should be resisted. 
p 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION 
1 
••• the issue is not to secure " h " . . 
"our" projects, but is rather to . t ~~r 11 pa~ticipation in 
in "their" devel"pment' Glynn Coc\~~!~e ~ 19~~~ l2~)~ticipation 
At this point the concept f 1 o part cipation is in tatters. It is 
clear that participation is ~ problem, not the solution to other 
problems, though even to talk of 'the' participation problem is to 
overlook the fact that it is in li rea ty an amalgam of several 
cu a , t e pro em of participation in different problems. In part:i 1 r h bl 
project:s should be seen as one aspect of the wider problem of 
participation in development planning. 
In Fiji the problem of participation in projects must be set 
within the context of the changing relationship between Fijians and 
theil: government, which was analysed in chapter two. Until its 
emasculation in 1966 the Fijian Administration provided the majority 
of rurul Fijians with a strong personal link with government. 
Participation, in a variety of forms, was not simply encouraged it was 
obligatory. Successive generations of expatriate civil servants and 
visitinB 'experts' opposed this compulsorily communal system, urging 
individualism which, they claimed, would allow the 'free expression' 
of Fi.jinn talents• the advocates of this individualism made the 
simpfo nssumpt;lon thnt less commu1utlism would mean more individunlisnl, 
whfoh was nssumud to 
be an cssuntinl ingredient of modern economic 
nctlvity. they would no doubt be dlsn~pointad to sec that tho 
abolition of the communal system has uot baQt\ followed by a flowaring 
Of lndividualbm. In !net, thcrfl a.re blttor cldims of ncgia<!t from 
rural nrentl and ~ wldtmlng sanse of dlstnncc between villugcrn and the 
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government> which belies the achievement in 1966 of democratic control 
of the civil service. 
Some rural Fijians ~ self-reliant individuals 
' 
able to go to 
government officials ~rmed with the skills needed 
. to negotiate a lease 
and a loan based on leasehold security. , or to arrange a business 
registration or a contract for marketing produce. ~1 h ~any, owever, are 
not, and even among those with the necessary skills, l t1ere arc many 
unL\tJle to gain" the social support needed to secure a lease over their 
own mataqali land• Without a lease (which means without loan as well) 
there is little that extension workers can tlo to help Fijian farmers 
compete in commercial agriculture. Hence one source of many of the 
widespread complaints of neglect. 
Another source of complaints is the gap betwaen, on the one hand, 
the strong parochialism that developed under the old Fijian 
Admini;~tration and, on the other hand, the decision-making of the 
centralized budgeting system under which infrastructural spending is 
", · !c;~atcd at present. 'rhcre is not yet a system of local government 
: • 1\.ogh which a significant degree of popular participation in 
allocations for infrastructural spcttding can bo made. The intention 
to <1,cvclop such a system, which wus c:<prcsscd in Development Plan 
Eight,, seems optimistic, to say the lcnst. 
An~thcr fundamental problem is the unfon\iliurity of the 
domocrutlc processes of 
At 'i"lavou, £or pnrlinmcntuty gov<irnmont • ... 
1:ixn1npla, landow1\ers with grievances about tlu1 projoct did not take the 
opportut\ity of n ministerial visit (made expressly for the purpose of 
their griavancas. They folt it would have been impolite. 
Civil 
h • .. rooks• level) to express improving communicntions with t e srns 0 "" "' 
servants sometimes hnvo complcmcntnry illusions 
about their role, 
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forgetting that they are the servants of 
\ 
the public and accountable to 
their superiors for he performance of their public duties. Such 
civil servants of ten fail to dispel (and sometimes even encourage) the 
widespread attitude that civil servants I 1ave powers that they can 
dispense in favour of whomever they please. . In Fiji the strict rule 
of law, together with the political taboo against racial favouritism, 
mean that people who arc aware of their riohts (and the o corresponding 
duties of civil servants) are able t b i h o r ng t em into line. The 
problem in Fiji is more one of increasing uwa·rnness f ~ o existing rights 
than of removing entrenched practices that deny the public influence 
over civil ::iervants without recourse to informal networks or 
corruption. The regularization of the administration of the Native 
Lands Trust Board (described above in chapter two) removed the only 
significant exception to the general rule of fairly strict 
bureaucratic execution of adminiscrntivc functions in Fiji. 
It is unfortunately true, however, that many rural people in 
riji, both Indians and Fijians, might sometimes prefer civil servants 
to be more susceptible to bribes, or at least to claims made through 
networks based on primordial loyalties of one kind or another. Such 
practices would make the bureaucrats seem more human, more fcaling1 
more reliable in timos of need ri:ttht'lr than gcnorally prudtctable. Tho 
popularity of the flu>eible, curing lcadorship of the Gunornl Hanngor 
of Uluisaivou ro:.flacts these sentiments. 01\ thu ocher hnt1d, any 
doparturc from the rules could well bring ~ritlcism .from other membcu 
of the rural community, from parochially oriented commuMl groups that 
ballcvc they urc mlirning out or frol'd indcpondtmt smu11holdors '-!ho 
b!llfova In the equity of the pdneiplc ot adherence to pr<H!cdt'lnt• 
Such indcpandcnt farmers with 11ocurtl 111nscs nnd accuss to FOil 
Hnanc:lnl support would have cvcl'Y reason to boli(tv'c that the prc!'HH\t 
p 
Page 315 
rules .are equitable. 
It should be recogn' d h ize t at bureaucracy is usually a highly 
appropriate form of administration in a society of independent 
producers. The problem in Fiji, i as n many other developing 
countries, is that while some people are i econom cally independent and 
well-versed in the skills re<tuired t d 1 o ea with bureaucracy, many 
people are not· They lack both the skills and the social und economic 
independence to use those skills for their own betterment. They are 
dependent upon communal entities for access to land, labour and 
capital. Fiji differs from most developing countries, howaver, in 
that institutions cuter more for the smnll independent producer thnn 
for the vested interests of traditional elites or communal gcoups. 
Hence the preaching of indiv.ldual.ism. 
The desira to reach out to rurul Fijians who bad not been able to 
attract the support they needed from officials within the norll\al 
agrlcultural extension frantcwork was one of the major motivations 
behind tho cattle projects, though the:lr eventual shaping as projacts 
rosulted from the need to go to outside aid dol\ors for funds. The 
introduction of aid donors meant that the developmel\t: of large arans, 
rathc.r that\ small increments on the margins of existing development 
activities, could ba undertaken. This implied both the delivery of 
govcrmnont sarvicds on nn unpro.ccdc.ntc.d scale in the. project arc.as and 
an inc.reuse in planning, that is nn !ncrease in t:ha buraaucrutic 
delivery 0£ thu desired goods• 
Plnl\Mrs 
............ 
Tha concept of participation is closely reintcd to tM concept of 
plnl\Mr• Within this gMeral category l: have subsumad a rnnga of 
tli 
"O"'''r""'"'" ... offi"'l"l"', b(lth le>cnl tu\tl cxpntdnta; 
· sparatc. elcmtH\ts: o ""' ..... .., .. .. u .. 
p 
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consultants; feasibility study teams; evaluation study teams; 
agricultural scientists; engineers,· econo i t m s s; sociologists. 'rhe 
common factor in this diverse range of roles is a share in 
decision-making• Planners are decision-makers, unlike 
who are decision-takers, and there is a distinct 
the 
gap 
'people' 
between 
~ It is true that project decision-makers and decision-taker", 
part:ici.pants do make decisions that will influence the outcome of a 
project but they do not make the strategic decisions that can set the 
course of a project; they are more often left merely to react. The 
gap between planners and people is not unbridgeable, but it is the 
search for ways of bridging it that is the important task; merely to 
identify participation as the problem is to bog the irl\portant 
questions. 
The conventional picture of project planners at work depicts an 
orderly progression through the project cycle: 
identification, 
feasibility study, appraisal, implcmentati<m, evaluation. In this 
idealized picture local and overseas aid o!f icials treat one another 
na peers and consult one another fully, £inully arriving at decisions 
which sntisfy both parties. Of course this is a caricature, as the 
anulysis of th<l t~o cnttlc projects has nlrendy ill.ustrlited. In fact 
decisions nt dif f erc:nt stages find unequnl contributions by the two 
s~ts of officinls. 
At the idcnt:l.Hcntion stage:. the Inldtttlve Hes wlth locnl 
they havo nvnilnblc to them moro information thtm the 
ofHcinls; 
ov«!ram.l.s of flclnb "1hO consider the rc<iuost for nssistnnce. The 
decision to Cdll for o.nd fund n fcnsibllltY study (or n prcfensiblllty 
study lf the rcqucGt is not sufficlcntlY supported by dntn) ls one 
thnt tcndrJ to be mnde nutoauitlcnlly, provided the request is not 
p 
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patently impractical or outside the bounds of the donor country's aid 
objectives, and provided funds are available. 
Once a feasibility study commences, the initiative moves from 
local officials to officials of the donor count.rv. At y 1 i a avou t 
passed to consultants commissioned to undertake the feasibility study. 
At Uluisaivou, on the other hand, it passed to New Zealand government 
. 
officials. In both projects there was significant political pressure 
to find justification for speedy implementation of some sort of 
project that would meet the request for assistance. Where the 
decisions were made by a team of public servants selected by diplomats 
this pressure found distinctly less resistance (the put-up job 
suggestion mach1 above). At Yalnvou, with a consulting firm conscious 
of its professional reputation, feasibility had to be proven more 
thoroughly (though not necessarily more slowly). It might be argued 
that the prospect of a mano.gemcmt contract (which the Yalavou 
consultnnts did subsequently obtain) tends to tip the scales in favour 
of establishing feasibility but a firm conscious of its longer term 
interests is not likely to be swayed easily by this. 
When the feasibility study :ls ready for appraisal, the initiative 
moves back to donor of Hcials, though their scope for saying nnythi.ns 
d d i. i. by t\\"t stage, very much more than yes or no is Hmite an t · s, " 
harder to say no than yes. tf the interests iin<l wishes of local 
officials have been nccomo<lated in the .fcnsibility proposal it is 
almost 11.npossiblc to say no• 
"t. u·\v norm"llY provldos a wide charter £or the 
The fans:lbilitY .. u,, .. 
oHictnls or consult::mts antrutJtcd with the reponsibilitY £or 
"~ 1 n matter rcquidng pollticnl lmplomcntaHon, though just how wiue s 
. l is approved, control p:urncs into the 
judgm'l'h'.mt. When ltnplctntmtnt on 
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hands of such 'managers' • Only at this stage do th , 1 , e peep e , the 
participants, or the potential participants, move actively into the 
picture, though most projects nowadays would have had a sociologist 
working in the feasibility st•tdy t k • o ma e some attempt at including 
their interests and wfshes in project proposals. The costi of not 
taking such pains are well illustrated by the Uluisaivou project. 
Finally there is evaluation , which experience at both Yalavou 
und Uluisaivou e mos a · cu t stage in the project suggests is th t 'iffi 1 
cycle. It is easier to secure agreement to vague promises at the 
outset than to concrete proposals that will directly affect existing 
managers and pat'ticipants. Of course the conduct of the evaluation is 
very much influenced by the way in which the eat'lier stages of the 
cycle have been conducted. At Yalavou where the principles of the 
USA'ID Logical Framework had been employed the evaluation was carried 
out with markedly greater success than the Uluisaivou review, despite 
the opposition of Yalavou management to some of the review proposals. 
The real problem at all stages of the project cycle is to move the 
initiative to project participants. The careful bureaucratic 
procedures which must accompany MY aid project make it difficult for 
planners to incorporate the interests and aspirations of projei:t 
participants. 
1 r t~eat 'the people' It would be unfair to say that most P nnne s .. 
as if they ure the lnst variable to M brought untlor control, but it: 
is cartuinly true that interaction betWMtt plnnnars responsible for 
feasibility studies and potential project participants is inherently 
\ tl tlcnl nature of difficult in the catly stngcs because of the 1YP0 
1
e 
the issues thilt haVll to bll dcinlt \.'ith• It pl;inMrs are vague nbout 
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the nature of the project planned th ey run the risk of failing to gain 
from potential participants an accurate perception of their likely 
reaction to proposed project activities. If, on the other hand, 
planners are more definite they run tll" i ~ r sk of creating disputes in 
the future about failare to deliver promised goods,· the danger of the 
charge of 'overselling' which was made at Uluisaivou. 
It is to the sociologist that the difficult job of bringing the 
people into the project initially falls. In performing this role the 
sociologist receives little guidance from his discipline, which might, 
in any case, be anthropology, geography, politics or history rather 
than sociology as such. The divergent interpretations of social 
change which circulate among the various disciplines of the 1 softer' 
social sciences do not lend tnemselves to the direct application that 
is often possible with the theories and models of economics. 
Project work, unlike academic social science, is oriented more 
towards description than generalization (or, to use the language of 
sociology, it is ideographic rather than nomothetic). In <'.!hapter 
three I examined some of the gnneral ideas that have been used to 
interpret social change in Fiji. From these I composed a general 
picture of the constraints which surround Fijian choices in 
socio-economic matters. More importnnt thnn this general picture, 
however, are the doscdptions of each project areu. These contribute 
the 
to an understanding of the pnrticulnr motives which He behind 
act.tons of the participants in each or the projects. The divergent, 
i \ t\\e
. r the" be historiat\s 
generaliicd !dens of social scient sts, w1c 1 
like Frunc.e writing on land tenure or anthropologists such as Rutz nnd 
nclshaw debating the the 
role of ceremonial c~penditure, make an 
essential heud.stic contribution to 
the descdpti\•e tnsk of the 
p 
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project sociologist, but the difference i i n or entation is clear. 
The fact that only on~· of th-2 two major projects has made use of 
sociologists limits the generalizations that can be extracted from 
this study, npnrt from the obvious lesson thnt Uluisaivou,' without a 
sociologist in the feasibility study, was at a clear disadvantage by 
comparison with Yulavou. The fact that Yalnvou's two sociologists 
offered di.ffcrent opinions about tl f ib l le ens i ity of the project 
clearly did not diminish the useful role they played. 
The important contribution the sociologists made at Yalavou was 
to create, from the start, an uwurenes9 of the types of problems that 
might arise• The technical specialists who had control of the project 
were sonuitizad to social issues and prepared to make significant 
changes in project design in order to accomodute social problems. !t 
was apparent at Ynlavou, howavor, that the inputs of sociological 
judgemont were not confined to those from socJ,ologists. 'rho 
ngriculturnl scientist supervising tho implcmcntlltion und mnnngcMnt 
of tho. project mndo his own contributions bused on his 0\.11\ conceptions 
of tho ()ld issue of indivitlut~~.uai. tMso inputs were made for the 
purpose of mnlntninlng control over the projoct in tho sense of of 
ensuring its continued udhcrcnc.c to tho agreed gonl of fnrm 
dovclopmcnt b.nscd on un individunl model. 
At Ululsnivou tho Gonornl* Munngcr nlso made nn informnl. 
contribution of sociologicnl ideas, based on n very different 
COt\MptiOlt of humnn MtUti'.h 
Unltku the ideas of the Ynlnvou 
supcrvitmt- ~ howovor • these idcnu wtn:c nt vnduncc. with the odBlnnllY 
ngread project goal. 
lntarpretation oE 
staltHl'idte • 
'rho ~nd ra11ult of thb dHfcrcMc in 
project gon1 vna ycnru of cot\fuiilOn i:md 
the project 
> 
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• which has been subject 
• 
to the most disciplined and bureaucratic 
decision-making, has achieved more i sat sfactory local participation 
thnn Uluisaivou. This i s not to say that it has achieved 'more' local 
participation (whatever that minht mean), Ti · ~ 1e ~mportant point is that 
it achieverl a degr~e of participation at a ~ritical point; at the 
ma aqa nomination ~ beginning, with the acceptance of tl1e principle of t li 
of formers~. oun o oca participation could Without that, no 'am t' f 1 1 
have saved the project. 
The question which arises out of Yalav~!I' s achievment of both 
disciplined adherence to a single major goal and significant local 
part:ic.lpution is: how has this been possible and, more particularly, 
what part have planners played in its achievment7 To some extent it 
was the fortuitous availability of an articulate spokesman (Rev. Paula 
Niukula) that nllo<Ned tho feelings and interests of landowners to be 
clearly perceived by the feasibility team leader. On the other hand, 
tho work of the sociologist had prepared the ground for this 
persuMion and, behind his contribution, in a more fundan1entul role, 
were the terms 6£ l:efcr<mce. These stressed the importance of the 
need to deter.mine the social feasibility of the proposed development• 
The Yalnvou project was nlso helped by the fact thnt it was 
developing for tha first tlma n largely unused block of land. Yalavou 
has not baan n complox or dif £icult social environment ln which to 
Motcovcr, before it is concluded tbnt thn elements of local 
participation thnt halpad the project to establish itself \.fill 
nuarnntcc thu momentum to ciu~ry it through to n 11uccessful concludon, 
t 
,,.11 £---e· r pctfornumce should be. recalled. 
t\C (l~erging problem V~ UL"' 
Pnllurn of fttrml!r motivntlo1\ mu!Jt 111110 be rcgt\rded ns n failure of 
p>rtl.cl.pntlo•· Th•r• I.• • d•nto< th•t th• rigid concoptl.on of 
> 
If~ . ' I . ' 
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individualism held by management will stifle the motivation of some 
farmers. Unless farmers have a sound belief i h n t e long-term 
legitimacy of their right to use the land they are working, there is 
.. per ormance (as happened on the danger of sudden drop-off in fa~nier f 
one of the faru\s at Verata) when th i e v gorous supervision of 
highly-paid expatriate staff is removed. The evaluation team's 
recommendation that consideration be given to sub-division of farms 
was rejected out of hand (as were attempts by other groups to have 
larger farms), 
It is interesting to recall that project management's policy 
regarding farm size was endorsed by the board. Could it be said, 
therefore, that the policy was the result of local participation? Or 
are the wishes of the landowners the only consi<li::i.'ations of local 
participation? It is probably more accurate to regard the board's 
endorsement of the policy as an indication of the ineffectuality of 
the board as an instrument of local participation. (l] There can be 
no doubt that the problem of local participation in all its forms will 
continue to face the plal\t\ers of '{alavou. 
At Uluisaivou, despite its problems, there has not been n failure 
to <!onsidc.r the question of local participation. lndecd, all thtoush 
'· its troubled history the various parties tesponsible £or Uluisai vou 
~ have C!rtdorsed the principle of local partlciaption. Why) it m:.,,.ht 
\ 
(l)t suspect also that management hnd the opportunity to stand on 
technical expertise it\ prascnt:lng its cnae to the b. onrd. Had 
:l t a•e before 
evaluation team had the opportunity to rtrgue s . c s 
board, the. bonrd might not huvc d:lsminsed its recomll\endat:lott• 
its 
the 
the 
> 
Page 323 
then be asked, has satisfactory local parti i . c pat1on not been achieved? 
The review sociologist simply denied that local participation had ever 
been provided for, while offering no indication of how genuine 
Participation might be achieved. lt \ d b ia een assumed by Uluisaivou 
planners that a democtatically elected board would of itself provide 
for local Participation but t\1is a ti d ssump on prove to have no 
foundation, though this has never been openly acknowledged; not by 
officials of either government 1 nor by management, nor by the board, 
The uncomfortable fact is that democr.acy is not a familiar mode of 
organization for rural Fijians. They are accustomed to the leadership 
of chiefs who, while they might take into account the interests of 
their subjects, are expected to show courage and initiative, and to 
have regard for the overall interests of the groups under them. It is 
the lot of the common man simply to worry about his own short-term 
problems nnd to grumble (see Nation 1978). In the early years of the 
corporation the traditional style of leadership was practised by the 
former ~ of Saivou 'rikina (which takes in most of the project 
areu). The review sociologist criticized this style of leadership 
without spelling out any alternative. 
But what is the nature of 
the pr,..,blemi 'rhc sector 
a
. nd, :lf they acted together, the votes 
representatives had the vo~ces 
to over-rule Ratu Jonnvutn. 
-
It is surely the fact thnt they did not 
Since the d~rtth of 
n J 0. ttt"r c\lie· f lt"S been able t:o perforn1 this role, ~. onnvnta no 1~ u 
for 
tnaku use of these powers that is cha rcnl problem. 
sprang only partly from tl'.t\d:ltiotml rank; 
~ Jonnvntn 1 s 
th" l"'ndcrship role davalopcd dudng his it was also a carry-over of ... "' 
authority 
period ns nu1:l of Sn:tvou. 
-
> 
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The fundamental obstacle to local participation at Uluisaivou was 
the size of the corporation. It was, as one bo d b ar mem er put it, 'too 
wide' • It needs to be broken up into smaller units if local 
participation is to be achieved, But whose responsibility is it to 
e w10 e project? One of the initiate such a recou~~itutio11 of th l 1 
problems that has plagued Uluisaivou is the difficulty of determining 
up an n epen ent corporation where responsibility lies. In setting i d d 
founded on the principle of local control the New Zealand aid 
officials created an enc •;mous problem for themselves, When the 
evaluation review was carried out it was apparent that the review 
team's ideas about the project's aims differed from those of the 
General Manager whom New Zealand officials had appointed and the 
Chairmun of the board in which they had invested significant powers. 
The t.'esul' was confusion and stalemate that continued for over two 
years. In short, the lack of firm bureaucratic control does not 
guaranteee that strong local intitiative will emerge. 
To sum up: commitment to a specified project goal has in some 
respects stifled initiative at Yalavou, but it has not prevented it 
altogether. Conversely, the lack of commitment to a specific goal has 
not guaranteed the cmergcncn of local initiative at Uluisaivou. 
Control and participation, it should be clear, must grow together 
ru thcr than being traded one ugains t the other• 
F,lannina !!.ni t>roblen\"'S,olving 
T\msl! obsetVtl tions concnrnins control und participatio\\ suggest 
!t is also possible, for l!xumple, to 
an important ge?nurnl lesson. the 
b h 
"Otn""'i\alism and individualism. 
encourage simu1tancoualy ot ~ "'" 
h t 
....... "'\\ieh characterlied colO\\ial 
dichotomous contraGt betwuon t n wv • 
Und 
.. rlies tho rcspoctive ratio1\ulea of 
policy for so long, nnd which ... 
> 
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the projects, is ralse and misleading. 'Wh enever one encounters such 
opposites', E.F. Schumacher argues, 'it i s worth looking into the 
depth of the problem for something more than compromise, more than a 
half-and-half solution. Maybe what we really need is not either-or 
but one-and-the-other-at-the-same-time' (Schumacher 1974:202), 
Schumacher derives this method of problem-solving from a distinction 
between, on the one hand, the sorts of problems typically encountered 
in the physical sciences and, on the other hand, those problems which 
typically arise in the human activities that are the subject of the 
social sciences. The former lend themselves to convergent thinking, 
the latter to divergent thinking. As an example of the way in which 
convergent thinking can solve a physical problem he cites the 
designing of n 'two-wheeled, man powered means of transportation. 
Various solutions are of fcred, which gradually and increasingly 
converge until, finally, a design emerges which is simply "the answer" 
- an answer that turns out to be amazingly stable in time. Why is 
this answer so stable? Simply because it complies with the laws of 
the Universe - laws at the level of inanimate nature' (Schumacher 
1978:140). 
l.n the human world, however, 11nswers to problems will, if pursued 
d 
· diverge 'until some them appear to be exact 
assi uously enough, 
opposites of the others' (Schumacher 1978:141). ~ypical opposites of 
this kind nre: freedom nnd equalitY; stability rtnd c\mnge; justice 
and marcy. Unlike problems in the physical sciences, 
which may be 
1so1ved 1 once nnd 
for illl, problems in the humttn world can only be 
transcended by being 'grnpplcu with' continually• 
> 
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On a less philosophical plane Aaron Wildavsky puts forward 
similar ideas in connection with the need for interactive 
problem-solving in policy analysis. 'E very policy is fashioned', he 
says, I Of tension between resources and objectives, planning and 
0 v ng problems involves temporarily politics, skepticism and dogma. s l i 
resolving these tensions' (Wildavsky 1979;17). The interactionist 
approach rejects both 'prediction of behaviour' and 
'authoritativeness' as goals for policy analysis. Rather, 
interactionists stress the unpredictability of human activity. 'The 
trouble with social interaction is that you don't know how it will 
turn out in advance. People can't be trusted to be predictable' 
(Wilduvsky 1979:139). Goals must be, accordingly, flexible. The 
general idea is to specify 'a desired relationship between manipulable 
means and obtainnble objectives' in order that 'analysts escape the 
essential distinction - between a puzzle that can be solved 
definitively, once all the pieces are in place, and a problem for 
which there may not be a programmable solution' (Wildavsky 1879: 16). 
But would this mode of analysis satisfy an aid dol\or designing a 
project ? Are not donors likely to require more specific gonls? the 
USAID Logical Framework demands more rigid linkages between inputs and 
outputs than 'n desired relattonship between manipulable means and 
obtainable objcctlvas', lt could ba argued against this, however, 
that the intcrnct:lot\iSt model captures tho reality of successful 
projoct formulntlon and implomontation bottor than the Logical 
Frnmowork, th• ronl function of which is to justify project•• th• 
.. ful ""d do the 
problem is, however, how m1.my projects nrc succcs... , .... 
inovltnbly burooucrotl.c procodur.. thnt aid donor< """' follow m•k• 
succbsu all the more dif£1cu1tl 
[, 
> 
I : 
~. ' 
r: i 
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the fundamental problem that facns '° project designers who would 
hope to follow the interactionist model is the inherent difficulty of 
achieving interaction between parochially minded villagers and modern 
bureaucracies. It is true that the successful operation of the 
interaction model would involve, Wild as av sky argues, that 'citizens 
••• act as analysts by becoming part of public 1 po icies through which 
they can determine what they are getting for what they give, by 
learning to perfect an Y exercising their their preferences, d b 
autonomy so as to enhance i:ecprocity by taking others into account' 
(Wildavsky 1979: 19). But how is this possible if the people involved 
are not autonomous individuals, if existing patterns of reciprocity 
are confined to culturally limited social circles, to kin groups, to a 
single village or, at most, to a small group of villages with a 
population of perhaps 800 or 900 people? 
In short, there is no formula that can abolish the social 
distance between villagers and plnnners (whether they be 
policy-makers, implementors or mnnagers). Projects attempt to 
circumvent this problem but too of ten they fail· The participation 
solution to project failure is superf,icially attractive bt1t offers no 
It begs the question it pretends to answar: is it possible 
relief. 
to 'achieve 1 participation? What control do projact planners have 
over the various olcments of participation? It is nll too clMr from 
the cixpericnco of Uluisaivou that projacts ti.re sariously hindered by 
mere Hp-scrviM to pnrtlclpntion. No progtess can b~ mnde in coming 
to tortns with this problem until it ls rcnUicd that it is n genuine 
PlnnMrs must exercise control over projccte., and it is 
dilemma. 
lntWit::£1ble thtit this control be cl(atelscd burc:tucrnticdly, but 
bureaucratic nuthorlty inhibits pntdclpatlon by pcoplt? accustomed to 
trnditloMl authorltY• Oi\lY with the most 11Mlduous effort will lt be 
> 
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possible to combine bureaucratic contr 1 d , 0 an participation. 
The participation solution to project problems represents little 
mo ern zation dressed up in th~ language of more than the politics of d i 
the 1970s; participation, to be successful, implies the establishment 
of a 'civic culture', if not a move across the entire spectrum of the 
Parsonian pattern variables - diffuseness to specificity, affectivity 
to affective neutrality, collectivity-orientation to self-orientation, 
ascriptiOtl to achievement, and so on. When one recalls that 
modernization theory itself owed much to Weber's distinction between 
traditional authority and bureaucracy it seems almost as though there 
has been retrogression rather than development in theories of 
political and social change. Where the modernists and their populist 
successors go wrong is in believing that the problems that they have 
identif:i.ed can be solved once and for all. 
It iP. importnnt to realize, however, thnt bureaucracy and 
participation reprcse11t only the widest antinomy present ~.n 
development projects; tltcre are numerous others thnt must be 
reconciled in order to to allow the requirements of both burcnuctacy 
and participation to be mot in any particular project. The 
uni va.rsuHsm of burenucrucy, for oxnmplc, must be combinud with 
particularistic sentiments (and not simply particular 
1
nccds' 
At Uluisui vou the combinnt.lon that was 
identified by planners)• 
naadcd, but could not be uchiavud, was thrtt of control by technical 
uxportise nnd pnrticipntiort by lando\11\crs in d6lcision•mnking 
\ \ d tl\
.. clMr majorit" of 
l>t:oc.esscs. At Yulnvou, on tho ot \cr um , "' " 
public servants on th(! project board mudc clear that d<lchlot\s were to 
be mnde on the bash of tc.ch\\icnl c}Cpertlse, while not denying 
to Voi
,... thc.lr oph\iona nnd to have 
landowners tho opportunitY ..... 
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minority voting rights. The antinomy th t h a as not been achieved at 
Yalavou is that of indiv;i.dualism and communalism (that is, the goal of 
individual farms and the reality of communalist constraints), The 
development-in-trust compromise 
the accomodation needed between 
(see above p.234) might have offered 
individualism and commul\nlism but 
project planners stuck to the old dichotomy. Blame for the fruitless 
c aracterized colonial communalism/individualism dic\1otomy whic\1 h 
planning, and which wus carried over into the Yalavou and Uluisaivo~1 
projects, obviously cannot be attributed to the shortcomings of any of 
the long succession of individuals who have advocated the respective 
policies. The real problem can be found in the bureaucratic 
structures within which they operated. Dichotomies, as Bet\dix 
observed, abound in normative conteicts. 'rhey make for clearer 
definition of rules and are therefore likely to meet the needs of 
bureaucracy for clear-cut, predictable rules. :tt is not impossible 
for bureaucrats to avoid the trap of dichotomies but is much more 
difficult if they nro not subjoct to pressure from citizens aware of 
their ability to influence the bureaucratic decision-making process. 
!he exper;tencc at Uluisnivou nnd Yalavou suggests that sociologists 
cnn fncilitatc the interaction between planners and people which is 
essential for flexible project i1nplementation thnt incorporntes 
suitnble forms of local participation, thoush sociologists cannot 
&\mranteG tho control over social processes which plann<n~s ll\ight ba 
tempted to scak. 
p 
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Appendi~ OE_ 
The Socio-Economic Survei 
The purpose of the survey wna to collect bnsi~ socio-economic 
dnta about both the '11 vi ages of the land owners involved in the 
projects, nnd the project farmers. This \o/Ould enable n comparison of: 
( i) 
(ii) 
the 
the 
socio-economic environments of the four project nrens; and 
socio-econom1'.c pos · t • f h l ions o . t a project formers ( I,n 
tJluisnivou, of ·course, there were no individual formers). The survey 
questionnaire sought only the most salient facts nnd relied on the 
nbility of informants to estimate the values of many of the fncts. 
This proved sntis£nctory for most fncta; the major differences 
between t:hc different vil tnges could be clearly seen. 
The survey, which wns carried out in seven villages, wns not a 
silmplc survey. In the larger villages all households that could be 
contncte<l ware included. ln the smaller villages (Tilivalevu, 
Nnknlnvo and Nabalnbnln) several visits were mndc to ensure that all 
households wore included. Households living nant villngcs, the 
mcmbara of \.ihi.ch i:cg#lrdc.d thcm!lclvag as members of th!l vUbg.a, wore 
included. The villngas cnn to some e~tcnt be rognrdcd ns 
rcprescntnt:ivo of the 1 nrcas 1 ln \.ihieh they arc located 1 bue nt> 
ttt.t~mpt hns bMrt mudc to trMt them ns snmplcl!. of Any given 
populntlona, 
!hrca villHgcs vcra 
tli.Eferancos throughout tho project uelt. 'rhMo. vcre! 
included nt Ulubnivou bccnmie 'Of the obvious 
Nnbnlabdtt, 
e 
NvuniyMmunu/RnviravL and Nnil\\'Jlt. The locntion of d l villHl.t,..
13 
> 
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constitutes the biggest 
seven contribution of land by the 
pai-ticipating old Tikinns (30 per cent of the total). Land 
contributed as a propartion of total land is also greatest at Bemana. 
Three Bemnnn lnn<lowrting groups have all of their land involved in the 
respect not typical of other Yalavou project. Bemnna is in this 
villages participating in Yalavou. n ata on Sovi vill~ge were obtained 
from Yalnvou nominees, though these were not . 1 d d . inc u e in the village 
data. I had hoped to take the questionnaire to a village on the lower 
ens t bank of tho Sigatoka, where sugar cane · is grown, but several 
attempts to make arrangements failed. 
Nnvunimono village was chosen as representative of the Veratn 
area on the advice of Ra.t.u Waqn Vest ·.tln of Ucunivanua, Vcrata. His 
choice of Navl\nimono appeared to be influenced by the foct it is an 
extremely nant and picturesque village. If cash income were the 
criterion of wealth it would be the poorest village of the seven, 
whereas it was 1 in terms of qunlity of life 1 the best. 
A trans lntion of. the survey questionnaire 1 which was written in 
Ftjinn (Le. 'Standard Fijian 1 i or 1Bnunn 1 ) 1 is reproduced bDlow. 
The questions marked (lo'C) hnd fixed choice answers which hnve baan 
omitt~d from the tr1rnslntion (for the snke of brevity)• 
Thn questlonnnira 1-las not pretested. As n result t found thnt) 
under most circumst11nces 1 1 neecfod to adminhter it person:ilty in 
order to ensure that! quMtiorta "Were interpreted the sM\e In all cnsM • 
'thrM mt?n at Nni.luva and ond nt Nnvunimono iMisted on filling it out 
tlu.~msclWH~) though t eheckcd their nMwerEh My wife administered 
eight ttuMtionMlres at N11vunimono, hnving lenrnt e~~~tly hov the 
qutnJt:G.trn~ wt? re to be nsked. All queAtionnnltM verc iu\swercd in group 
s ltudt::ioiu~, wltli onlookt?rA rC?ndy to eorrect rcspi:mdent' 8 lm!lwcn • 
p 
. . 
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Judging from the corrections made, thi' s appeared to assist the 
reliability of answers. 
'Income' figures cited in the text refer to the answers to 
111,c,l. The answers to these questions were often revised after 
adding up the answers to III,c,2-9. A few farmers referred to 
records, cane farmers were able to refer to FSC accounts, but most 
simply 'guessed'. Data from Mr. Charles Eaton of the Southern 
Development Company allowed me to check the earnings of Bemann tobacco 
growers. Some growers estimates were a little higher, some a little 
lower than the nctunl figures. Mr. Eaton could not be sure, from his 
records, whether the nmounts paid incluced or excluded deductions for 
goods supplied to farmers on credit. In any case1 it seems that the 
farmers' estimates were reasonably accurate. Tables showing the most 
important survey results are shown on page 33b. 
p 
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The Survey Questionnaire 
I HOUSEHOLD DETAILS 
(a) Name, i tokatoka at l' (b) Age (FC) , tn.__i!_q.~, yavusa memberships. 
(c~ Standard of education reached (FC) 
2 SPOUSE 
(a) Name, i tokatoka, mataqilli, y,avusa memberships 
(b) Age (FC) 
(c) Standard of education attained (FC) 
3 CHILDREN 
(a) Ages and sex 
(b) Education standards attained (FC) 
(c) Marital status of ~ach (FC) 
(d) Place of residence of each (FC) 
II GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT (cakacaka vakailavo) 
1 What is your work or source of money? 
2 Have you previously worked at something else? 
3 ( i) Have you ever lived in 'town'? FC 
(ii) If yes, for what length of time? (FC) 
(iii) Did you have a job? (FC) 
(iv) I( so, what was it? (FC) 
4 How often do you visit 'town' FC 
III FINANCIAL MA'tTERS 
A. Assets 
1 House . 2 Is it in the villages or outside? (FC) 
3 (a) Size of house (FC) 
(b) House style (FC) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
(c) Condition of House (FC) 
When wns it built (FC) 
How much did it cost to buil~? 
t£ built now how much would it cost? 
Is this your permanent house (nomu v.de 
no you live in it? 
,gther Asset;.! 
9 (n) Cattle 
- working bullocks 
... Steers 
- Cows 
- Heifers 
.. nulls 
(n) Gonts 
tudei). 
-
(Fe)• 
> 
~·· 
(b) Hor~{'s 
( c) H:•J::se :.saddle 
(d) Brnk d~posits 
(u) Create Union lhnres 
( f) Others - Cf~c-
- truck 
- plough 
- barrow 
- trnctor 
B Debt 
-(a) cro<lit Union 
(b) FDB 
(c) NL'rn 
(d) Other 
C Mona>:., Gnincd From Your Work 
l How much lust your? (1980) 
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2 ltow much would. you expect in n good yenr? · 
3 Whnt produce do you sell? Show the money gnincd from each lnst year 
4 Did you onrn nny money from t:ha snle of livestock last year (1979) 
- Cottle - Horses • Pigs - Goats 
5 Money from fishing lnst yonr (1979) 
6 MoM:,t from paid employment 
(n) Whnt wns your pny for n week or n month? 
(b) Permanent work or cns~nl? 
Poultry 
7 Honey from rent 8 How many weeks or months did you work lnat year? 
9 Di.d you receive tmy help from your tclativos? Wbnt kind of help? 
D JJse of Monet 
l School fues 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
fo) Uo\J nntny chUdrcm 
(b) Fees par term (c) Uow tnnny children go to school (d) How nu:U\t children of s'tho.ol t13il (6 .. 14) do not go to achOol? 
'i.'tl)t ln&t ycnr 
P?oV"isi.onttl tfi){ 1 . . . £ .· d l I\ wt!l!k or 4 
Uow much mone.y do you u!l~ on 1 a tore . bought) 00 " 
month? (Nominate. nmount~ or 1don 1 t kno""' . · nths 
Expenditute. on mnrdnge or funernls over lMt 12 mo • 
Rt!nt pnymcntaJ 
Church conta~i.butd.onB 
C n) "1tiekly (b) nnnunlly (v_Aknmidnnd) 
Ct1tlrnd.ng~ (S,o,rul) 
• Provi.nch. l 
'"' tlklnn 
.. School 
,. 
> 
- Church 
- Traditional 
9 Hedicul costs for year 
10 Transport costs for month 
11 Loan repayments. 
tV USE OF LAND 
u 
How muny members in youi; 11lll.l:..ruUl.li , 
(a) now muny adult males/ fomnles (a rough estimate if it is a large 
11U1.tn.q.a.li ) 
(b) How many live (i) in or nenrot1'e v~lluge (ii) in town or away? 
3 How n1an/ .lcres of matnqali land is your household able to use. 
4 How much is being used now? (FC) 
s Is your 1nn.~.1lH.a.li lnnr.t divided up (s, S.!l \~'ll!Q t,Y). If so, please clarify. 
6 Do you use the land of another mntaqnli.? If so, is it (i) land of your 
mother's llUl.t.n.CUl..li (ii) land of your spouse's matnqnti. (iii) land of a 
relativo's m:ttngnli (iv) land of the matnrull.i of an acquaintance (~ cl.lli! gn 
llll. nomt1 v,eiki lni). 
' 
\ 
~ 
I 
Key to Village/Projects 
Villages 
A - Navunimono 
B - •rilivalevu 
C - Nakalavo 
D - Bemana 
TABLES 
E - Ravivavi/Navuniyaumunu 
F - Nabalabala 
G - Nidluva 
Projects 
H - Verata 
I - Tilivnlevu 
J - Ynlavou 
Number of Respondents 
20 
2 
10 
20 
16 
15 
20 
13 
11 
32 
Note the differences between column totals and number of 
respondents nre missing cases. 
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These are a result: of (i) inability of some respondents to 
answer 
questions and (ii) inapplicability of some questions to some 
respondents (e.g. some respondents have no children who have 
completed 
school and therefore cannot answer the question shown in the 
third table). 
AGE OF RESPONDENT 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B C D E F 
<25 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26-35 6 0 0 1 1 1 
36-45 5 1 1 6 2 4 
46-55 3 0 6 4 7 8 
> 55 6 1 3 9 6 2 
EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT 
G H 
2 0 
8 0 
5 2 
1 3 
4 8 
I J 
0 3 
0 17 
7 7 
0 5 
4 0 
VILLAGE/l?RO,ll~Ct A B C D I:: F G lt I J 
<Clnss 6 
Chss 6 .. 8 
~orm 3 .. 4 
Higher 
7 2 4 
10 0 5 
3 0 0 
0 0 1 
5 10 7 
13 6 8 
1 0 0 
l 0 0 
4 4 7 8 
16 5 4 17 
0 2 -0 6 
0 2 0 1 
HIGllESt EDUCA'l'lONAL LC:VEL ttEAClll':D DY 
RC:SPONDENT 1S SON 
V!LLAGl::/PROJECT A B C D E F G ll I J 
-
l. 
' !
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<Class 6 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 Class 6-8 3 1 3 1 6 6 4 2 3 1 Form 3-4 3 0 0 2 3 1 1 2 0 1 Fiji Junior 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Higher 3 0 1 3 1 0 1 3 0 0 
FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO URBAN AREAS 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E F G H I J 
/1 a week l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 n week 3 0 3 0 2 5 ., 3 5 1 I 
1 n fortnight 8 2 2 3 7 8 6 3 2 2 
l n month 6 0 3 
'• 
1 2 4 3 2 9 
1 every 2-6 2 0 2 10 5 0 3 2 2 15 
months 
Seldom 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 5 
PLACE OF RESIDENCE 
. 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c 0 E F G H I J 
Ir Village 19 2 6 7 13 8 9 1 l 12 
Vngnlnln 1 0 4 13 3 7 11 11 10 17 
(outside village) 
•• 
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SIZE OF HOUSE 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E 
) 
F G H I J 
Small 5 0 3 3 3 0 4 1 0 
Medium 14 13 l 4 8 9 6 13 6 9 12 
large 2 1 2 9 4 9 3 5 2 3 
CONDITION OF HOUSE 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E F G H I J 
Good 9 1 2 6 G 9 3 4 2 14 
Fair 5 1 4 11 6 6 8 4 9 13 
Poor 2 0 2 3 4 0 9 4 0 2 
TYPE OF HOUSE 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E F G 11 I J 
All Thntch 2 2 1 5 8 0 5 0 0 16 
Iron Roof/ 12 0 7 6 8 10 15 8 9 11 
thatch walls 
All wood 6 0 0 7 0 3 0 3 1 1 
Cement Block 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 
WAS A FEAST PREPARED FOR HOUSE BUILDERS? 
VILLAGE /PROJECT A B c D E F G ll I J 
Yes 0 1 0 3 14 8 9 0 0 7 
No 12 1 8 16 2 4 11 5 11 22 
CASH EXPENDED ON HOUSE CONSTRUC'r!ON 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c t> E F G H I J 
<$500 12 2 7 12 14 5 19 7 9 19 
$501-1000 6 0 2 4 2 3 1 0 l 3 
$1001-2000 l 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 1 0 
$2001-4000 1 0 0 0 0 l 0 3 0 0 
>$'•000 0 0 l 2 0 3 0 3 
0 0 
NUHl3ER OF COWS 
VILLAGE/PROJECTS A n c t> ·E· F G u I 
J 
() 11 l l 4 2 2 s 0 0 2 
1-5 13 l l 4 2 3 9 
0 0 6 
6-10 7 l 7 14 11 11 10 
0 0 0 
,. 
\ 
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1·1-15 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 )16 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 13 11 20 
NUMBER OF WORKING BULLOCKS 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E F G H I J 
0 20 0 "· 7 6 2 r 11 13 0 2 
1 0 0 'u 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2 0 1 2 9 6 13 2 0 9 27 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
4 0 1 0 1 l 0 1 0 1 0 
NUMBER OF CATTLE CONTRIBUTED TO 
FUNERALS/MARRIAGES OVER LAST 12 MONTHS 
VULAGES/PROJECTS A n c D E F G u I J 
0 20 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 28 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CASH INCOME ES'r!HATE FOR PREVIOUS YEAR 
VILLAGES/PROJECTS A B c D E F G H I J 
<_$400 12 2 4 '• 5 1 18 4 
8 15 
$401-700 3 0 l 3 4 l 1 3 0 9 
$701-1000 3 0 0 4 2 0 0 4 1 2 
$1001-1300 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 
$1301-1600 2 0 0 l 3 0 1 0 1 1 
)$ 1600 0 0 s 7 0 13 0 1 1 0 
EXPENDITURE ON WEDO!NGS/FUNERALS ETC. FOR 
PREVIOUS YEAR 
VtLLAGES/PROJECTS A n c D E F G 1l t J 
<.$50 19 1 4 9 11 9 17 8 6 
24 
$51-100 1 0 s 3 1 1 0 1 1 6 
$101-150 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 l 1 l 
>$150 0 1 1 5 3 5 2 3 3 2 
ESTntA'l$D HONTltLY STORE t:;XPEND!TURE 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A n c 0 E r G u t 
J 
<.$20 13 0 1 7 7 4 12 
s 0 11 
$21 .. 40 7 l 3 10 4 3 8 3 5 
18 
•• 
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41-60 0 1 2 1 2 5 0 
'• 
2 2 )$60 0 0 4 2 3 3 0 1 4 1 ~ 
AMOUNT OF LAND USED 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E F G H I J 
None 4 1 10 0 5 6 l 3 2 0 
<1 acre 5 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1-2 acres 7 0 0 3 2 0 10 0 0 0 
3-5 acres 0 1 0 7 6 1 5 1 0 0 
6-8 acres 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 
9-12 acres 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
) 12 acres 4 0 0 6 2 7 0 8 9 25 
IS USE MADE OF OTHER MATAQALIS LAND? 
VILLAGE/PROJf:CT A B c D E F G u 1 J 
'lcs 3 0 10 10 11 11 11 8 4 4 
No 15 1 0 10 5 
'• 
9 4 7 26 
ts HATAQALI LAND DIVtDED UP? 
VILLAGE/PROJECT A B c D E F G ll 1 J 
'lcs 1 10 20 3 6 0 1 ll 25 
No 16 () 0 0 13 9 19 11 0 3 
Unsure 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
* 12 Yalavou respondents said thnt their most substnntil\l house was still in thnir village. 
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